Bombay HC: Senior citizen can not use senior citizens Act to evict daughter in law from residence granted to her as per domestic violence Act

Senior Citizens - Eviction of daughter-in-law - Legality of - Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (Act of 2007) - Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (D.V. Act) - Present petition filed to challenge orders of Sub Divisional Officer and Appellate Authority, which rejected petitioner's application for eviction of his daughter-in-law from "Writ House" - Whether proceedings under Act of 2007 can be used to circumvent a subsisting residence protection order granted under D.V. Act - Held, petitioner's attempt to evict daughter-in-law and minor granddaughters via summary procedure under Act of 2007 was a mala fide effort to bypass judicial protection orders already upheld by High Court - Court observed that petitioner, who owns multiple properties, fabricated a narrative of homelessness to justify eviction - Court held that provisions of Act of 2007 cannot be weaponized to defeat a woman's right to residence in a shared household under D.V. Act - Harmonious construction of both statutes is required, and Act of 2007 cannot be used as a "proxy" to facilitate marital disputes or harass protected parties - Impugned orders of lower authorities were found to be legally sound and justified - Petition dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 50,000/-.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 11433 of 2023

Decided On: 13.08.2026

Devba Pauladsing Girase Vs. Kavita Himmatsing Girase and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ajit B. Kadethankar, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/5559/2026

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Supreme Court: Hindu Daughter-in-Law Who Becomes Widow After Father-in-Law's Death Entitled To Maintenance From His Estate :

Section 19 of the Act provides for the maintenance of "widowed daughter-in-law" of the deceased Hindu. It simply contemplates that a Hindu wife is entitled to be maintained after the death of her husband by her father-in-law. Thus, it casts an obligation upon the father-in-law to maintain his daughter-in-law. The said obligation subsists only during the lifetime of the father-in-law as the aforesaid provision nowhere contemplates that the daughter-in-law would be entitled to maintenance from the estate of the father-in-law. In other words, Section 19 contemplates for the maintenance of the daughter-in-law during the lifetime of father-in-law, whereas, Section 22 contemplates "maintenance of dependants" including "widowed daughter-in-law" from the estate of her father-in-law meaning thereby that a claim Under Section 22 can be raised only after the death of the father-in-law. {Para 28}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 245-246 of 2026 

Decided On: 13.01.2026

Kanchana Rai Vs. Geeta Sharma and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pankaj Mithal and S.V. Bhatti, JJ.

Author: Pankaj Mithal, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 54, MANU/SC/0059/2026,2026 SCC OnLine SC 59.

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J & K HC: Daughter in law making allegation against her father in law that he has outraged her modesty-relevance of this allegation in deciding anticipatory bail application

Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner is aged 74 years and at this age it is improbable that he would have launch sexual assault upon none else than his own daughter-in-law. It has been submitted that the fact of the matter is that the husband of the prosecutrix, who happens to be the son of the petitioner, has passed away, whereafter the prosecutrix has re-married and she at the behest of her husband wants to have a share in the property of the petitioner. The learned counsel has submitted that already there is a civil litigation going on between the parties and the petitioner has filed a Suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the prosecutrix and her husband before the Court of Sub-Judge, Nowshera in order to protect his possession over the land owned by him in village Hanjana ThakraTehsil Nowshera District Rajouri regarding which the prosecutrix and her husband are making persistent attempts make forcible entry. Copy of the interim order passed by the learned Sub Judge, Nowshera has also been placed on record.

{Para 4}

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also contended that it is improbable that the petitioner would sexually assault his daughter-in- law, that too, in presence of his wife. He has further submitted that the prosecutrix while making her statement under Section 164-A Cr.P.C., during investigation of the case, has introduced a new story by stating that after the death of her husband the petitioner had committed forcible sexual assault upon her on two occasions, which allegation does not find mention in the FIR lodged by her, which was registered on the directions of the learned Magistrate.

6. On the basis of aforesaid facts, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the impugned criminal prosecution launched by the prosecutrix against the petitioner is nothing but a device to wreak vengeance upon the petitioner and his wife so as to coerce them to set apart a share of their property in her favour.

7. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and having perused the documents place on record, it appears that there is prima facie merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as such, a case of grant of interim indulgence is made out in favour of the petitioner.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT JAMMU

Bail App No. 109/2025 and CRMM No. 349/2025

Decided On: 25.04.2025

Mohd. Ayub Vs. Union Territory of J&K

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Dhar, J.

Citation: MANU/JK/0372/2025.

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Whether Parents-in-law can claim for maintenance from their widowed daughter-in-law under Section 125 of CRPC?

This Court has considered the submission and the judgment in the case of Saroj W/o. Govind Mukkawar (supra). In the case of Saroj W/o. Govind Mukkawar (supra), the distinguishing factor was that the widow of the deceased son was appointed by the department, where the deceased was serving, on a compassionate ground, wherein she was required to give an undertaking that she will maintain the members of the family who were dependent on the deceased. In this case, there is nothing to indicate that the job secured by the petitioner is on a compassionate ground. Even by looking at the application, it is clear that deceased husband was working in MSRTC, whereas now the petitioner is appointed in health department of the State Government. Thus it is clear that the appointment is not on a compassionate ground. The submission that the petitioner would succeed the property of deceased need not be considered in the proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. The categories of persons entitle to claim maintenance are already mentioned in Clause (a) to (d) of Sub-Section 1 of Section 125. This Court has already held in Criminal Revision Application No. 139/2017 that maintenance under the said section can be claimed only by the persons falling in the category mentioned in the Section. {Para 8}

9. Thus considering this legal position and the facts of the case it is clear that the respondents are not entitled to receive maintenance from the petitioner on the counts firstly that they are not coming under the relation mentioned in Section 125. Secondly the appointment of the petitioner was not on a compassionate ground in place of her husband. Thirdly on the count that the respondent no. 2 has also received an amount of Rs. 1,88,000/- after the death of deceased son. The fact that the couple have a land and have their own house, is also not disputed. So even on facts this Court finds that no case is made out by the respondents to claim maintenance from the petitioner. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds that the continuance of the proceeding of Criminal M.A. No. 25/2019 pending in the Court of Learned Nyayadhikari Gram Nyayalaya, Jalkot, Dist. Latur would be an abuse of process law and therefore the same is quashed.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 1092 of 2022

Decided On: 12.04.2023

Shobha Vs. Kishanrao and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kishore C. Sant, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/1469/2023.

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Hindu Adoption and maintenance Act 1956 (maintenance provisions only)

 Chapter III

MAINTENANCE

18. Maintenance of wife.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime.

(2) A Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance,—

(a) if he is guilty of desertion, that is to say, of abandoning her without reasonable cause and without her consent or against her wish, or of wilfully neglecting her;

(b) if he has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live with her husband;

(c) 13[* * *]

(d) if he has any other wife living;

(e) if he keeps a concubine in the same house in which his wife is living or habitually resides with a concubine elsewhere;

(f) if he has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion;

(g) if there is any other cause justifying her living separately.

(3) A Hindu wife shall not be entitled to separate residence and maintenance from her husband if she is unchaste or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion.

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Whether the family court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law?

 Unquestionably, the dispute in this case revolves around Clause (d) of explanation to Section 7 (1) of the Family Courts Act. A mere glance at the provision indicates that it has been worded in careful and cautious terms. It states that a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship would lie exclusively before the Family Court. 

{Para 21}

22. What has to be seen is whether the circumstances in which the order or injunction is sought in the present case arise out of a marital relationship. The test is not whether the cause of action, forming the the basis of the prayer for injunction, arises out of a marital relationship or whether the marital relationship is the reason for the grievance ventilated by the plaintiff. All that has to been seen are the circumstances in which the injunction is sought. Once the Court identifies the circumstances, if those circumstances arise out of a marital relationship, Clause (d) of the Explanation to Section 7 (1) of the Family Courts Act would ipso facto be attracted.

23. Explanation (d) in Section 7 (1) of the Family Courts Act does not, either expressly or by necessary implication, require the parties to the lis to be husband and wife. Clearly, in so opining, the learned SCJ has effectively re-written the statutory provision. There is nothing in Clause (d) of the explanation to Section 7 (1) of the Family Courts Act in which indicates that the clause would apply only where the litigation is between husband and wife. For the clause to apply, all that is required is that (i) there is a marital relationship, (ii) the martial relationship has resulted in a certain set of circumstances and (iii) the order or injunction which is sought in the suit is sought in those circumstances.

24. Applying these tests to the case at hand, if one examines the plaint, and the case set up by the respondents in the plaint, it is clear that the circumstances in which injunction has been sought by them have arisen out of the marital relationship between the petitioner and Pardip. Had the petitioner not married Pardip, she would never had been the daughter-in-law of the respondents, she would never had come to stay in the residence of the respondents, the respondents would never had given her any permissive licence to reside therein, and the entire chiaroscuro of events, which have been emphasised in the plaint by the plaintiffs, to highlight the alleged ignominy and persecution to which petitioner allegedly subjected the respondents, would not be in existence. The fact that the petitioner married the respondents’ son was the foundation of the relationship that emerged between the petitioner and the respondents, and it was in the circumstances which arouse out of that relationship that the entire dispute between the respondents and the petitioner, as per the allegations contained in the plaint, filed by the respondents, arose.

28. That being so, in my view, the case squarely falls within Clause (d) of the explanation to Section 7 (1) of the Family Courts Act.

29. I am unable, therefore, to subscribe to the view expressed by the learned SCJ in the impugned order 30th October, 2019 in Suit 12114/2016 that the suit was not required to be transferred to the Family Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

CM(M) 69/2020 & CM APPL. 2707/2020

AVNEET KAUR  Vs SADHU SINGH & ANR .

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR

Dated: 01.06.2022

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Whether court can direct daughter in law to pay maintenance to mother in law in senior citizen Act?

We have reservations about such direction to Sheetal Shah to pay maintenance amount to Nalini Shah. As already observed, in Section 2(a), 'children' include son, daughter, grandson and grand-daughter and there is no reference to the daughter-in-law. Be that as it may, upon perusal of the original record, we do not find a single document showing the earnings of Sheetal Shah. In that view of the matter, the Impugned Order, to the extent that it directs Sheetal Shah to pay Rs. 25,000/- alongwith her husband Devang Shah to Nalini Shah and Mahendra Shah, cannot be legally sustained. However, so far direction given to Devang Shah to pay the said maintenance amount to Nalini Shah, the same is legally sustainable. {Para 32}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 3323 of 2019

Decided On: 06.05.2022

 Sheetal Devang Shah Vs.  Presiding Officer of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sambhaji Shiwaji Shinde and Revati Mohite Dere, JJ.

Citation: MANU/MH/1615/2022

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Whether the court can direct Daughter-In-Law To Pay Mother-In-Law Maintenance Under Senior Citizens Act?

We have reservations about such direction to Sheetal Shah to pay maintenance amount to Nalini Shah. As already observed, in Section 2(a), 'children' include son, daughter, grandson and grand-daughter and there is no reference to the daughter-in-law. Be that as it may, upon perusal of the original record, we do not find a single document showing the earnings of Sheetal Shah. In that view of the matter, the Impugned Order, to the extent that it directs Sheetal Shah to pay Rs. 25,000/- alongwith her husband Devang Shah to Nalini Shah and Mahendra Shah, cannot be legally sustained. However, so far direction given to Devang Shah to pay the said maintenance amount to Nalini Shah, the same is legally sustainable. {Para 32}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 3323 of 2019

 Sheetal Devang Shah Vs. Presiding Officer of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sambhaji Shiwaji Shinde and Revati Mohite Dere, JJ.

Citation: MANU/MH/1615/2022

Decided On: 06.05.2022

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Can daughter-in-law claim relief against parents-in-law under the Domestic violence Act if she has no dispute with her husband?

 While the DV Act is a social welfare legislation granting protection to women who are victims of domestic violence, every dispute amongst family members cannot be converted into a dispute under the DV Act. The same ought not to be allowed to happen, as it may cause unintended misuse of the provisions of the said Act creating turmoil within families, especially when there is no matrimonial dispute whatsoever between husband and the wife, i.e., son and daughter-in-law. The provisions of the DV Act cannot be used as a ploy by the son, to either claim a right in his father’s property or continue to retain possession of the father’s property, on the strength of his wife’s right of residence. A civil dispute relating to ownership of property cannot be converted, in this manner, into a case under the DV Act, as the same would amount to be an abuse of the beneficial provisions of the DV Act, by stretching it over and beyond its purpose and ambit.{Para 49}

50. The following peculiar facts arising in this case, deserve to be highlighted:

(i) The ownership of the Plaintiff in the suit property is not in dispute.

(ii) The sale of the property of the mother, which took place in 2011, was never challenged by the Defendants.

(iii) The purchase of this suit property in the name of the Plaintiff was never challenged by the Defendants.

(iv) There is no complaint of Domestic Violence raised by the daughter-in-law before any forum. In fact, to the contrary, the Plaintiff has filed complaints against his son and daughter-in-law with police repeatedly, alleging ill-treatment and abuse.

(v) The Defendants i.e., the son and daughter-in-law are living together peacefully. The written statement before the trial court was filed jointly. The first appeal was also filed jointly, and so is the present second appeal. There is no estrangement or marital discord between them.

(vi) The order passed in the application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC has also been executed and the Defendants have already moved out of the suit property and are living in alternate premises.

Therefore, the facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from the facts in Satish Chandra Ahuja (supra) and Smt. Vanitha (supra).

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

RSA 14/2021 & CM APPLs. 3964/2021, 3966/2021, 21708/2021

AARTI SHARMA & ANR Vs  GANGA SARAN 

CORAM:

JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH

Date of decision: 24th August, 2021

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Whether daughter-in-law can seek an order to restrain parents-in-law from selling their house property?

 While relying upon the principles annunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, the learned Appellate Court in the impugned judgment observed that the daughter-in-law (petitioner herein) was not residing at the house in question on the day of presentation of the complaint nor any time soon before. Further observed that she was occupying a staff quarter allotted to her husband and lived in the house in

question only for short duration and occasionally visited parents-in-law, to say only thrice. The Appellate Court accordingly held that these short durational visits or stay of daughter-in-law at the house of the parents-inlaw would not get the house a colour of being a shared house hold and having hold so, the restraint order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate was set aside, it being without any finding as regards the nature of premises being a shared house hold. Further held that the parents-in-law shall be well within their rights to sell off the house in question.{Para 14}

20. But the pertinent question which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the old aged parents-in-laws, who at the fag-end of their life, wish to sell off their property to relocate themselves in a better place of their choice, be restrained to sell of the house or permitted to do it? In this regard, the pertinent observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satish

Chandra Ahuja (Supra) are as under:-

“90. Before we close our discussion on Section 2(s),

we need to observe that the right to residence under Section

19 is not an indefeasible right of residence in shared

household especially when the daughter-in-law is pitted

against aged father-in-law and mother-in-law. The senior

citizens in the evening of their life are also entitled to live

peacefully not haunted by marital discord between their son

and daughter-in-law. While granting relief both in

application under Section 12 of the 2005 Act or in any civil

proceedings, the Court has to balance the rights of both the

parties. The directions issued by the High Court [Ambika

Jain v. Ram Prakash Sharma, 2019 SCC OnLine Del

11886] in para 56 adequately balance the rights of both the

parties.”

21. Applying the afore-noted observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to the case in hand, this Court finds that the impugned judgment dated 03.05.2021 suffers from no illegality or infirmity.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 CRL.M.C. 1327/2021 & CRL.M.A.7314/2021

VIBHUTI WADHWA SHARMA Vs KRISHNA SHARMA AND ANR. 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT

Pronounced on: 17.05.2021

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Whether the father can claim right to sperm of his deceased son without consent of the wife of the dead?

Learned counsel relies on the parental

relationship of the petitioner and the deceased to assert

the petitioner’s right to collect such sperm, irrespective

of the permission of the wife of the deceased. In the

alternative, counsel submits, the respondent no. 4

ought to be directed to give her ‘no-objection’ or, at

least, to respond to the request of the petitioner.

However, the petitioner’s prayers have to be

refused on both counts.

As far as the alleged right of the petitioner to

collect such preserved sperm of his son, contrary to the

arguments advanced by counsel, the petitioner does not

have any ‘fundamental right’ to such permission,

merely by dint of his father-son relationship with the

deceased. The sperm preserved at the St. Stephen

Hospital belonged to the deceased and, since the

deceased was in matrimonial relationship with the

respondent no. 4 at the juncture of his demise, the only

other person, apart from the deceased, having any right

to it is his wife, that is, the respondent no. 4. The

father-son relationship of the petitioner and the

deceased does not entail any such right of the petitioner

to the progeny of his son. As such, the right espoused

by the petitioner for himself is illusory and nonexistent.

As far as the prayer for a direction upon the

respondent no. 4 to respond to the petitioner’s

communication is concerned, the same is beyond the

scope of the writ court, since the matter does not

involve any violation of fundamental or statutory right,

nor does the respondent no. 4 come within the

definition of ‘State’ as envisaged under Article 12 of the

Constitution of India.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

W.P.A. No. 4553 of 2020

Asok Kumar Chatterjee Vs. The Union of India & Ors.

Dated: 19-1-2021

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Whether the husband is a necessary party to suit filed by father-in-law against daughter-in-law for her eviction from his house?

 Question No.7

118. Learned counsel for the appellant challenging the

direction issued by the High Court that the husband of

respondent be impleaded by the Trial Court by invoking

suo moto powers under Order I Rule 10 CPC, submits that

no relief having been claimed against the son of the

appellant, he (son) was neither necessary nor proper

party. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on

the judgments of this Court in Razia Begum Vs.

Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and others, AIR 1958 SC 886 and

Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. Municipal Corporation of

Greater Bombay and others, (1992) 2 SCC 524. Latter

judgment of this Court discussing judgment of Razia

Begum has laid down following in paragraphs 10 and 12:

“10. The power of the Court to add parties

under Order I Rule 10, CPC, came up for

consideration before this Court in Razia Begum

(supra). In that case it was pointed out that

the Courts in India have not treated the matter

of addition of parties as raising any question

of the initial jurisdiction of the Court and

that it is firmly established as a result of

judicial decisions that in order that a person

may be added as a party to a suit, he should

have a direct interest in the subject-matter of

the litigation whether it be the questions

relating to moveable or Immovable property.

12. Sinha, J. speaking for the majority

said that a declaratory judgment in respect of

a disputed status will be binding not only upon

parties actually before the Court but also upon

persons claiming through them respectively. The

Court laid down the law that in a suit relating

to property in order that a person may be added

as a party, he should have a direct interest as

distinguished from a commercial interest in the

subject-matter of the litigation. Where the

subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration

as regards status or a legal character, the

rule of presence of direct interest may be

relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is

of the opinion that by adding that party it

would be in a better position effectually and

completely to adjudicate upon the controversy.

…………”

119. There can be no dispute with the preposition of

law as laid down by this Court in the above two cases.

In the present case, although plaintiff has not claimed

any relief against his son, Raveen Ahuja, the husband

of the respondent, hence, he was not a necessary party

but in view of the fact that respondent has pleaded her

right of residence in shared household relying on

Sections 17 and 19 of the Act, 2005 and one of the

rights which can be granted under Section 19 is right

of alternate accommodation, the husband is a proper

party. The right of maintenance as per the provisions

of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is that of

the husband, hence he may be a proper party in cases

when the Court is to consider the claim of respondent

under Sections 17 and 19 read with Section 26 of the

Act, 2005.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

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Whether court can convict father-in-law for offence U/S 202 of IPC if he fails to inform the authorities about the suicide of daughter-in-law?

The learned Counsel for the respondent State of Rajasthan, however, submitted that the accused would atleast be liable of having committed other offences. It may be noted that the question whether they would be liable under Section 498-A or 304-B does not arise for consideration inasmuch as these provisions were not on the statute on the day of occurrence. However, A 1 was atleast under an obligation to give information about the death of the deceased since the same was unnatural. Assuming that the prosecution has not positively proved that the death was homicidal yet from the medical evidence it is clear that it was not a natural death and consequently the death should atleast be noted as one of suicide. Even in the case of suicide an offence of abetment punishable under Section 306 is inherent. There- fore, even in the case of a suicide there is an obligation on the person, who knows or has reason to believe that such a suicidal death has occurred , to give information. In Kalidas Achamma v. The State of A.P., S.H.O. Karimnagar. I Town P.S. [1987] 2 ALT 937 it was observed as under:

In the case of every suicide abetment is inherent. Whether ultimately it is proved or not, it is a different aspect. Abetment of suicide is an offence punishable under Section 306 IPC and therefore whenever a case of suicide is there, the body cannot be disposed of without informing the Police and further as provided under Section 174 Cr. PC the Police have to hold an inquest since it is an unnatural death.

In the instant case A 1, who reached his house on 18.3.82 knowing fully well that the deceased had already died, informed P.W. 8 that the deceased was in a serious condition. Likewise he informed P.W. 12 on telephone without disclosing that the deceased was already dead. However, when P.W. 6, the brother of the deceased, came to the house where the dead body was lying, A 1 told him that the body would be cremated. To the same effect is the evidence of P.W. 13. P.W. 6, the brother of the deceased, on his own went and gave a report to the police. It can thus be seen that A 1 intentionally omitted to give the information in respect of the death of the deceased which he was legally bound to give. Section 202 1. P. C. is in the following terms:

202. Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform-Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, intentionally omits to give any information respecting that offence which he is legally bound to give, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.

This Section punishes the illegal omission of those who under law are bound to give information in respect of an offence which he is legally bound to give particularly being the head of the family. Under this provision it is necessary for the prosecution to prove (1) that the accused had knowledge or reason to believe that some offence had been committed (2) that the accused had intentionally omitted to give information respecting that offence and (3) that the accused was legally bound to give that information. Shri R.K. Jain, however, relied on a judgment of this Court in Harishchandrasing Sajjansingh Rathod and Another v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0114/1979 : 1979CriLJ1025 and contended that the word "Whoever" occurring in the opening part of the Section refers to a person other then the offender and has no application to the person who is alleged to have committed the principal offence. In that case the accused were tried for offences punishable under Sections 331 and 304 read with Section 34 IPC in respect of the death of the deceased and were acquitted.-On appeal by the State the High Court, however, convicted them under Section 202 IPC A Bench of this Court while reversing the order of High Court observed thus:

We have gone through the entire evidence bearing on the aforesaid offence under Section 202 but have not been able to discern anything therein which may go to establish the aforesaid ingredients of the offence under Section 202 of the Penal Code. The offence in respect of which the appellants were indicted viz. having intentionally omitted to give information respecting an offence which he is legally bound to give not having been established, the appellants could not have been convicted under Section 202 of the Penal Code. It is well settled that in a prosecution under Section 202 of the Penal Code, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish the main offence before making a person liable under this section. The offence under Section 304 (Part II) and the one under Section 331 of the Penal Code not having been established on account of several infirmities it is difficult to sustain the conviction of the appellants under Section 202 of the Penal Code. The High Court has also missed to notice that the word 'whoever' occurring at the opening part of Section 202 of the Penal Code refers to a person other than the offender and has no application to the person who is alleged to have committed the principal offence. This is so because there is no law which casts a duty on a criminal to give information which would incriminate himself That apart the aforementioned ingredients of the offence under Section 202 of the Penal Code do not appear to have been made out against the prosecution. There is not an iota of evidence to show that the appellants knew or had reason to believe that the aforesaid main offences had been committed.

(emphasis supplied)

19. From these observations it is clear that there was no evidence to show that the accused therein knew or had reason to believe that the said offences have been committed and on the other hand they were made principal offenders. In such a situation the ingredients of Section 202 can not be said to have been made out. It is in this context that the meaning of the word "whoever" has been considered. But in the instant case A 1 returned to his house where the dead body was lying on 18.3.82 and the circumstances clearly go to show that he had knowledge that the deceased died of an unnatural death. Therefore he had knowledge or atleast had reason to believe that an offence had been committed even if, at that stage, he thought that it was only a suicide. Therefore it was his bounden duty particularly as head of the family to inform the authorities. He omitted to do so. On the other hand, he went about telling that the deceased was still alive and her condition was serious. But when P.W. 6, the brother of the deceased, came to the house and enquired, A 1 told him that the body would be cremated and he intended to do so without informing the authorities. Therefore all the ingredients of Section 202 are made out against him and he clearly committed the offence punishable under this Section at that stage. The fact that he himself was made an accused in other offences subsequently does not absolve him of his complicity in respect of the offence punishable under Section 202 IPC So far A 2 is concerned, he came to the house only after the investigation commenced. Therefore his case stands on a different footing. In the result the convictions and sentences awarded against A 1 and A 2 l are set aside. A 1, however, is convicted under Section 202 IPC and sentenced to undergo six months' R.I. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 303 of 1984

Decided On: 28.08.1991

Bhagwan Swarup  Vs. State of Rajasthan

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Whether injunction application to restrain daughter-in-law from entering the marital home is maintainable?

 In the present case, the first defendant has squarely questioned the title, of the plaintiff, to the suit property, and has contended that it is joint family property. She has claimed her right, therein, not merely on the ground that it is her matrimonial home, but as the mother of a coparcener to the joint family. These disputes required to be adjudicated, in the suit, and no order, interlocutory or otherwise, can be passed on the premise that the plaintiff is right, and the first defendant is wrong.

35. In my opinion, it is not necessary to enter, deeply, into the circumstances in which mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction, can be granted at an interim stage, as these principles are well settled. The decisions, on which Ms. Rajkotia relies, and which have been cited hereinabove, clearly indicate that, essentially, a plaintiff, in order to be justified to claim an interlocutory mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction, has to establish (i) a strong case in his favour, the standard being higher than that of a prima facie case, (ii) that denial of prohibitory injunction would result in irreparable loss to her, and (iii) that the balance of convenience is decidedly in favour of grant of mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction at the interlocutory stage. Additionally, grant of mandatory or prohibitory injunction, at an interim stage, has been approved where the failure, to do so, would result in the suit becoming infructuous, or the final relief, sought therein, being rendered illusory. None of these criteria are satisfied, in the present case. Most importantly, the first defendant had been residing with the plaintiff, since 2002 (or, at the latest, 2014, even if the plaintiff's stand were to be accepted), and it was only on 10th May, 2020 the first defendant left the house of the plaintiff, to visit her mother. It cannot, therefore, be said, by any stretch of imagination, that, by allowing the defendant to return to the house, where she had been staying till 10th May, 2020, irreparable harm would ensue, to the plaintiff. Mere bald assertions, to the effect that the first defendant was harassing the plaintiff, can hardly suffice. Given the option between allowing the first defendant to return to her matrimonial home, where she had been residing since 2002, or 2014, and banishing her, at least during the pendency of the suit, therefrom, the balance of convenience is also, decidedly, in favour of the former, rather than the latter, alternative.

36. Ms. Rajkotia had sought to submit that, were injunction, as prayed by her, in this application, not granted at this stage, the suit would be rendered effectively infructuous, as it would linger on for years. The submission fails to impress. The prayer, in the suit, is for a decree of possession, in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, in respect of the suit property, and for the decree of permanent injunction, restraining the first defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit property, by the plaintiff. In fact, the prayer, in the present application, effectively seeks grant of the prayers in the suit, before the suit is tried and at an interlocutory stage. If this Court were to restrain the first defendant, at this stage itself, from returning to the suit property, the plaintiff would secure possession thereof, and, effectively, a permanent injunction, in terms of prayer (b) in the suit, would also be granted. The plaintiff, therefore, effectively seeks decreeing of the suit without a trial.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

I.A. 4618/2020 in CS (OS) 506/2018

Decided On: 02.07.2020

Anita Chopra  Vs.  Rohini Chopra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C. Hari Shankar, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1332/2020

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Whether the father can seek eviction of the daughter in law from his house without seeking eviction of his son?

 Coming back to the facts of the present case, I find that in view of the specific assertion made in the plaint that the plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the suit property, the contents of paragraph 1 of the written statement clearly indicates that it is an admitted case of the defendant-appellant in his written statement that the suit property is the exclusive property of the plaintiff. It is also not in dispute that the plaintiff is an old person and his wife, the mother-in-law of the defendant, is a handicapped person with one amputated leg. It is also not in dispute that a divorce petition is pending between the son (husband) and the defendant and the assertion/pleadings of the plaintiff that his son has left the house and is living elsewhere could not be dislodged by the defendant-appellant and there is a concurrent finding of fact by both the courts below, which do not appear to be perverse in nature so as to require any interference by this court. No objection was ever raised before the trial court that husband is a necessary party. This was not even the ground before the lower appellate court. As such this cannot be raised at this stage. As already observed a substantial question of law arises out of pleadings and the judgments of the lower court. As such, on this ground no such substantial question of law can be raised at this stage in the present appeal. Even otherwise, the answer to the substantial question of law framed in the present case is that even considering the definition of shared household as provided under Section 2 (s) of the Act, 2005, the appellant daughter-in-law can be evicted without seeking decree of eviction against son with whom she had moved on the 1st floor of the suit property after marriage of the son of the plaintiff with the appellant.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Second Appeal No. 1079 of 2019

Decided On: 12.06.2020

Sujata Gandhi  Vs.   S.B. Gandhi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.K. Birla, J.

Citation: MANU/UP/1183/2020

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Whether family court has jurisdiction to try suit filed by mother in law against daughter in law?

I respectfully agree with the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court and the view aforesaid of the Bombay High Court. The claim of a third party to a marriage even if she be the mother of one of the spouses cannot be adjudicated before the Family Court and to the prejudice, on the aspects noted herein above, as to procedure, appeal, limitation, of such third party. It may be noted that the respondent/plaintiff in the present case is claiming absolute title to the property not as the representative or trustee of the husband of the petitioner/defendant and/or through the husband of the petitioner/defendant but in her own capacity as the widow and nominee of her deceased husband. It is also significant that though the petitioner/defendant is admitted to have been inducted into the suit premises owing to the marriage with the son of the respondent/plaintiff but that is not the cause of action for the suit. The cause of action for the suit is the refusal of the petitioner/defendant to vacate the house of which the respondent/plaintiff claims to be the exclusive owner. Merely because certain facts leading to the cause of action referred to the marital relationship of the petitioner/defendant would not make the suit as one in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship. The language of Clause (d) of Section 7 is peculiar. The words "circumstances arising out of marital relationship" do not qualify the words "suit or proceeding" but qualify words 'order or injunction'. Thus, the order of injunction sought from the court has to be in circumstances arising out of marital relationship. The order sought in the present case of eviction of the petitioner/defendant and of recovery of mesne profits from the petitioner/defendant does not arise out of a marital relationship but arises out of exclusive ownership claimed by the respondent/plaintiff of the property and the occupation thereof by the petitioner/defendant without authority and/or after the authority has ceased".

13. The facts of the present case are similar to the facts in Manita Khurana Vs. Indra Khurana (supra). In the present case, the plaintiff claims to be the exclusive owner of the suit property having purchased the same by way of a registered sale deed dated 29th August, 2014 and seeks the relief of injunction against the two defendants. Merely because the two defendants are married and the defendant No. 1 has taken the plea that some money in the purchase of the suit property and the construction thereof was spent from the earnings of defendant No. 2 which plea of defendant No. 1 would be hit by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016, the relief in the present suit cannot be said to be between the parties to the marriage with respect to the property of the parties or either of them. Consequently, the preliminary objection raised by the defendant No. 1 that the present suit is not maintainable and should be tried by Family Court is dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 104/2017

Decided On: 06.05.2020

 Meena Kapoor  Vs.  Ayushi Rawal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mukta Gupta, J.

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Whether Mother in law asking daughter in law to do household/domestic work amounts to cruelty?

 No family is totally devoid of clashes among members

constituting it. It is common for elders to scold and sometimes abuse

youngsters. Making a daughter in law to do the house hold/domestic

work is also not something unusual. From the evidence tendered by

the respondent, it is all the more clear that the aforestated factors

formed the basis for her ill-will to petitioner's mother.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE

&

 MRS. JUSTICE MARY JOSEPH

 20TH DAY OF MAY 2020 

Mat.Appeal.No.137 OF 2014

RANJITH.P.C. Vs   ASHA NAIR.P,

MARY JOSEPH, J:

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Whether Wife can demand flat in redeveloped building claiming that she had vacated premises as per S 95A notice of MHADA?

Smt. Pusalkar has argued before us in-person that she was removed from her matrimonial home through the statutory mechanism contained in Section 95A of the 1976 Act, which bore the threats of penal measure and summary eviction process. But this was during the time the decree of judicial separation remained operative. She traces the root of her ‘dishousing’ to a notice dated 10th July 2000 (bearing no. MBR & RB/FN/GN/2136 of 2000) issued by the Board under the 1976 Act. Her case is that it is composite statutory obligation of MHADA, the builder and her husband to rehouse her in her matrimonial home. It is a fact that the said respondents functioned under a statutory scheme while redeveloping the property, commencing from approval of the development scheme, vacating the old building and re-entry into the allocated portion of the redeveloped premises by her husband’s family. The appellant was also dishoused from the said building under that scheme. But in our opinion, when a builder has discharged his obligation by accommodating the original owners in the redeveloped

portion as per such a scheme, a lady married into that family would not be entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to enforce her right to matrimonial home citing the provisions of the said statute, if her husband does not permit her to reside in the allocated portion. She does not have any independent claim on title or interest to that property having its genesis in that statute. Her claim of right to reside in her matrimonial home is sought to be projected by her as collateral to the statutory right of her husband to be rehoused or rehabilitated in the new building. But her right to reside in her matrimonial home stands detached from and is independent of the statutory scheme under the said Act. Neither MHADA, nor the builder can have any further legal obligation to rehouse her. She is staking her claim as a constructive beneficiary of the redevelopment scheme. But our opinion is that the right she is seeking to enforce, though flows from a set of events on the basis of which her husband can claim rehabilitation, is actually anchored to an independent legal principle under the Family Law. We accept that she was an occupier under Section 2 (25) of the 1976 Act, but such occupier status was dependent upon her husband’s independent right as part owner of the property. Her right flowing from her matrimonial status cannot get diffused with her right of rehousing or rehabilitation under the statutory  scheme. Her right to reside in her matrimonial home does not flow from the 1976 Act.

Though she was dishoused as an occupier applying the provisions of the 1976 Act, claim of her rehousing is based on her status as wife of the respondent no. 8. In our opinion, such claim has to be adjudicated upon by the Civil Court or the Family Court or any other forum the law may prescribe. Such right of the appellant cannot be diffused with the right of her husband under the 1976 Act, whose family property, part of which he is the owner, has been reconstructed.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7231 OF 2012

AISHWARYA ATUL PUSALKAR Vs MAHARASHTRA HOUSING & AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

Dated: 27 April, 2020.

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When daughter in law is not entitled to get relief in domestic violence proceeding against her in laws?

From the 3 of 4 pleadings and record, it can be perused that the petitioners herein, who are in- laws of respondent No.1, are not joint in residence, while further taking into account that respondent No.1 had herself sworn in an affidavit as far back as in 2011 that no ill-treatment had been meted out to her by her husband or his family members in the divorce proceedings as well in the application filed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. A reading of the complaint does not show that any incident amounting to domestic abuse as defined under the DV Act is set out against the petitioners herein after the year 2011 till such time as the petition was filed in the year 2015, which becomes a substantial ground for this Court to interfere. The complainant has also not been able to establish that there was a 'shared household' with the petitioners as the husband of the complainant- respondent was in a Government job and residing separately from the petitioners, which fact has not been controverted. The respondent has not been able to establish a "domestic relationship" as defined under Section 2(f) of the DV Act of 2005 to be able to sustain a complaint against the petitioner.

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Hazura Singh And Ors vs Jaspreet Kaur And Ors on 24 January, 2020

CRM-M No.16389 of 2016 

CORAM: MS. JUSTICE JAISHREE THAKUR Present: 

 Citation: 2020 P & H 107.

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Whether widowed daughter in law is entitled to get maintenance from father in law if there is no coparcenary property?

19. Maintenance of widowed daughter-in-law.

(1) A Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained after the death of her husband by her father-in-law : Provided and to the extent that she is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property or, where she has no property of her own, is unable to obtain maintenance

(a) from the estate of her husband or her father or mother, or

(b) from her son or daughter, if any, or his or her estate.

(2) Any obligation under Sub-section (1) shall not be enforceable if the father-in-law has not the means to do so from any coparcenary property in his possession out of which the daughter-in-law has not obtained any share, and any such obligation shall cease on the remarriage of the daughter-in-law.

10. Shri Deopujari, learned Counsel for the appellants has further contended that provisions of Section 19(2) only bar execution of the obligation by such widowed daughter-in-law against father-in-law if father-in-law has no coparcenary property. In other words, he contends that the obligation of father-in-law which springs from Section 19(1) is independent of its enforceability under Section 19(2). He argues that the obligation cannot be executed or enforced through a Court of law because of bar under Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Act if such father-in-law has no coparcenary property, but the obligation exists even against self acquired property under Section 19(1). I am not in a position to accept such distinction. An obligation which cannot be legally enforced cannot be recognized as legal obligation at all. Section 19 is a complete scheme in itself which provides for an obligation and also its enforcement. It creates a right in daughter in law with corresponding liability on father in law. It specifies in what circumstances & to what extent the right accrues and when or how it is enforceable. It is therefore not possible to read Section 19(1) independent of Section 19(2) of Act. I, therefore, find no merit in the argument sought to be raised by the Appellant.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 117 of 1989

Decided On: 18.01.2008

Venubai Wasudeo Rambhad Vs. Laxman Lahanuji Rambhad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges: 

B.P. Dharmadhikari, J.

Citation: AIR 2008 Bom 13,

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