Showing posts with label bail application. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bail application. Show all posts

Friday, 11 September 2026

Bombay HC: If successive bail applications are filed with no change of circumstances, it is liable to be rejected

Upon careful perusal of the grounds raised in the present application, this Court finds that the contentions raised are repetitive and those were already advanced and considered by this Court and eventually, rejected the same while rejecting the bail BA No.2316.2025 order in earlier application. No fresh reasons have been brought to the notice of the Court justifying reconsideration of the matter to change the view previously taken by this Court. It is rather established principle that the successive bail application must be founded on material with change in circumstance. In absence of such change, the application deserves to be rejected. {Para 21}

22. To secure bail, the applicant must establish that the evidence collected and intended to be presented by the prosecution fails to establish a prima facie case of the applicant's involvement in or commission of the alleged offence. Since this necessary aspect has not been satisfied by the applicant, the applicant is presently disentitled to claim the bail. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

BAIL APPLICATION NO. 2316 OF 2025

SHUBHAM NARAYAN WAGH Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

CORAM : SACHIN S. DESHMUKH, J.

Date : 5th December, 2025

Citation: 2025:BHC-AUG:36563

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Wednesday, 22 April 2026

Questions and answers on law (Part 92)

 Q 1:- Grounds of arrest are not explained to the accused in a language he understands. What is its effect when deciding a bail application? The letter explaining the grounds of arrest is in English, but the accused only knows Hindi. In such a case, is it sufficient to explain the grounds of arrest in Hindi, or is it mandatory to provide a written letter in Hindi only?

Ans:- “If the grounds of arrest are not communicated to the accused in a language he understands, it is a violation of Article 22(1) and the statutory mandate, and while deciding bail the court can treat the arrest and remand as legally defective. If the accused knows only Hindi, a letter in English alone is not enough. The safer and now stronger view is that the grounds must be furnished in writing in the language understood by the accused; at minimum, they must be effectively explained in Hindi, but mere English writing with oral explanation is vulnerable to challenge.”

Judicial phrasing

You may say: “The test is not formal communication but effective communication. If the accused cannot understand English, the grounds must reach him in Hindi or the language understood by him, preferably in writing, failing which the defect materially strengthens the bail plea.”

Q 2:- What properties cannot be transferred as per provisions of transfer of property Act?

Ans:-  Under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, the following properties cannot be transferred: spes successionis, mere right of re-entry, easement apart from dominant heritage, personally restricted interest, right to future maintenance, mere right to sue, public office and salary, pensions/stipends, transfers opposed to the nature of the interest or for unlawful object/consideration or to a legally disqualified transferee.

Illustrations

A son cannot transfer his chance of inheriting his father’s property during the father’s lifetime, because that is only a mere possibility.
Similarly, a person cannot transfer a mere right to file a suit to another person.


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Saturday, 25 October 2025

Kerala HC: Period Of Release On Interim Bail Not To Be Computed As 'Detention Period' For Granting Statutory Bail U/ S.187 BNSS

  In the present case, the petitioner remained in detention at

the first instance from 18.02.2025 till 24.05.2025 (96 days), and at

the second instance from 09.09.2025 to 22.10.2025 (44 days). In

view of the declaration of law by the Supreme Court, the broken

periods could be taken together to appreciate the claim of statutory

bail. The question now arises is: “Could the period during which the petitioner remained in interim bail be counted for calculating the requisite period for statutory bail?”. {Para 9}

12. The learned Amicus Curiae has taken me to the various

decisions and the relevant statutory provisions. The learned

Amicus Curiae relaying on Amir Hassan Mir v. UT of J & K and

others, (Manu/JK/0206/2022), submitted that the petitioner could not be treated to be in detention or custody for the period he was released on temporary bail. The learned Amicus Curiae submitted that only the actual  custody undergone by the accused will be counted for computing the period for default bail. The learned Amicus Curiae, on going through the facts of the case, submitted that the petitioner has remained in detention only for 140 days. Therefore, he is not entitled to statutory bail.

13. What matters for statutory bail is detention, as provided in

the statutory provisions, whether it is in one spell or in two spells.

An accused person is entitled to be released on statutory bail by

adding the truncated periods of detention suffered by him. I have

no doubt in concluding that the period during which the accused

person was released on temporary/interim bail should not be

computed for the purpose of reckoning the period for statutory bail, as only the actual period of detention undergone by the accused need be counted for. Therefore, the necessary conclusion is that the petitioner is not entitled to statutory bail.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

BAIL APPL. NO. 11634 OF 2025

FISAL PJ,  Vs  STATE OF KERALA

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. BABU

Citation: 2025:KER:79121

Dated this the 23rd day of October, 2025

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Tuesday, 14 October 2025

Bombay HC: Session Judge should not reject bail application of accused relying on documents produced across the bar by the complainant, which do not form part of the record of the investigation

 The Court also considered photographs produced by the complainant in Court, which were considered to arrive at a conclusion that she sustained injuries on her upper limbs. It is difficult to countenance such a procedure being followed by Sessions Court, whilst considering a bail application, to look into documents produced across the bar by the complainant, which do not form part of the record of the investigation. It is not expected of a Sessions Court to consider such material which does not form part of the investigation papers, but is taken as a ground for rejection of a bail. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

CRIMINAL APPLICATION (BAIL) NO.32 OF 2025

Mr. Vinod Shetkar Vs  State of Goa

CORAM : VALMIKI MENEZES,J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 25th June 2025

Citation: 2025:BHC-GOA:1019,2025 ALLMR (CRI) 2928.

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Sunday, 5 October 2025

Bombay HC: Whether offence under S 120B of IPC (Criminal Conspiracy) is attracted against Corporate body if its directors Conspire to Defraud Investors?

  The next contention raised on behalf of the applicant is that the offence under Section 120-B of the IPC (criminal conspiracy) cannot apply, since the company Finnmart is not a living or biological person. This argument, however, does not hold good in its absolute sense. The material placed before the Court does not suggest that the alleged conspiracy was only between the complainant and the company Finnmart. On the contrary, the case of the prosecution is that the applicant, along with other co-accused persons, in connivance, hatched a conspiracy to cheat innocent investors by inducing them to part with their hard-earned money on the false promise of extraordinary returns. The law under Section 120-B IPC clearly recognises that conspiracy is essentially an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act. When natural persons are involved in designing and executing such a fraudulent scheme, the non-biological character of a company does not in any way take away the offence of conspiracy. The individuals who control, plan and execute the scheme can always be held liable for entering into a conspiracy. {Para 35}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Bail Application No. 1175 of 2025

Decided On: 04.09.2025

Milind Satish Sawant Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Amit B. Borkar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/5408/2025,2025:BHC-AS:37033.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Bombay HC: Sessions Court, even after being designated as an MPID Court, continues to exercise its full powers under the Cr.P.C. as a Sessions Court

 At first glance, the argument put forward by the applicant may appear attractive. However, when examined more carefully, it does not withstand legal scrutiny. Section 6 of the MPID Act expressly empowers the State Government to designate one or more Courts of Session as Designated Courts for trying offences under the MPID Act. The legal position is well settled that such designation does not change the essential nature or character of the Court of Session. {Para 23}


24. In other words, the Court of Session, once designated under the MPID Act, does not lose its original identity as a Court of Session under the Cr.P.C. It continues to remain a Sessions Court, possessing all powers vested in it by the Code, and, in addition, it also acquires the special jurisdiction conferred upon it by the MPID Act.


25. If the argument of the applicant were accepted, it would mean that by virtue of designation, the Sessions Court suddenly becomes a forum with narrower powers than what it otherwise had under the Cr.P.C. Such a conclusion would be illogical and contrary to the settled principle that conferment of special jurisdiction enlarges the competence of a Court, but never curtails its original powers unless there is a clear legislative intent to that effect.


26. It is also a well-recognised canon of statutory interpretation that jurisdiction once vested in a Court is not taken away except by express provision or necessary implication. The MPID Act contains no such provision which curtails the ordinary powers of a Sessions Court. On the contrary, the legislative intent is to confer an additional jurisdiction on the Sessions Court to ensure effective and speedy trial of offences relating to fraudulent financial establishments.


27. Therefore, the correct interpretation is that the Sessions Court, even after being designated as an MPID Court, continues to exercise its full powers under the Cr.P.C. as a Sessions Court, while also exercising the additional jurisdiction conferred by the MPID Act. The designation, thus, is an enlargement of jurisdiction, not a restriction.


28. If we accept the interpretation suggested by the applicant, it would result in an impractical situation. In cases where the same fraudulent transaction gives rise to both MPID Act offences and IPC offences, two different trials would have to be conducted, one before the Magistrate for IPC offences and another before the Designated Court for MPID offences. This would cause unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings and may even result in conflicting findings by different Courts on the same set of facts. Clearly, the Legislature, when it enacted the MPID Act, never intended to create such confusion or duplication.


29. The purpose of the MPID Act is very clear. It is to provide for speedy trial of offences by fraudulent financial establishments and to ensure effective recovery of money so as to protect the small investors. If offences under the IPC that are part of the same fraudulent activity are sent to a different Court, this very purpose will be frustrated. The evidence would have to be duplicated, witnesses examined twice, and two judgments delivered on the same matter. Such an approach would waste judicial time and resources and defeat the legislative intent of creating a special forum to deal with these cases efficiently.


30. Therefore, it is evident that the Designated Court, being in essence a Court of Session, retains full competence to try IPC offences which are closely linked to the offences under the MPID Act. In the present case, the allegations of cheating and breach of trust not only fall under the provisions of the MPID Act but also clearly attract Sections 406, 409 and 420 of the IPC. These offences are so interwoven that separating them would prejudice the prosecution and also undermine the cause of justice. For this reason, the contention that the Designated Court lacks jurisdiction to try IPC offences cannot be accepted and is rejected.


31. The reliance placed by the learned counsel on the distinction between the PC Act and the MPID Act is also misplaced. It is true that the PC Act expressly contains provisions empowering the Special Courts to try not only offences under that Act but also connected IPC offences. However, the absence of such an express provision in the MPID Act does not mean that the jurisdiction of the Designated Court must be narrowly construed. The purpose of the MPID Act is equally clear, to create a special machinery to protect depositors and to provide for quick adjudication of fraudulent financial transactions. A restrictive interpretation would frustrate this object.


32. When Section 6 is read along with Section 13 of the MPID Act, it becomes clear that the Designated Court continues to be a Sessions Court under the Cr.P.C. while also exercising the additional powers under the MPID Act. A Sessions Court under the Cr.P.C. is already competent to try serious IPC offences. Therefore, once a Sessions Court is designated as an MPID Court, its competence to try IPC offences connected with the same fraudulent transaction cannot be curtailed merely because the MPID Act does not use the same wording as the PC Act. The absence of a verbatim provision is not exclusion, and the general powers of the Sessions Court remain intact.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Bail Application No. 1175 of 2025

Decided On: 04.09.2025

Milind Satish Sawant Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Amit B. Borkar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/5408/2025,2025:BHC-AS:37033.

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Sunday, 24 August 2025

Supreme Court: Whether the court considering bail application for heinous offence should give findings on merits of the case?

 Whether Courts are permitted to undertake detailed examination of evidence at the bail stage -- Held, at the bail stage, Courts are precluded from undertaking a detailed examination of evidence or rendering findings that touch upon the merits of the case -- Court cannot conduct a mini trial or record conclusions that could influence the outcome of the trial -- While detailed evaluation is not required, some reasoning must support the grant of bail, especially when the offence is grave -- However, even in such cases, the reasoning must be confined to prima facie satisfaction, not merit based findings

Whether Courts while considering bail applications can record elaborate details that give impression of pre determining trial outcome -- Held, there cannot be elaborate details recorded to give an impression that the case is one that would result in a conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while passing an order on an application for grant of bail

Per R. Mahadevan, J.

In Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, the Court cautioned that there cannot be elaborate details recorded to give an impression that the case is one that would result in a conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while passing an order on an application for grant of bail.


At the bail stage, courts are precluded from undertaking a detailed examination of evidence or rendering findings that touch upon the merits of the case. Only a prima facie assessment of the material is warranted. The court cannot conduct a mini-trial or record conclusions that could influence the outcome of the trial. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav, the Court reiterated that while detailed evaluation is not required, some reasoning must support the grant of bail, especially when the offence is grave. However, even in such cases, the reasoning must be confined to prima facie satisfaction, not merit-based findings. By the impugned order, the High Court proceeded to grant bail to the accused by delving into the merits of the case and recording findings that fall within the exclusive domain of the trial Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 3528-3534 of 2025 

Decided On: 14.08.2025

State of Karnataka Vs. Darshan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: R. Mahadevan, J.

Citation: 2025 KHC 6693: 2025 INSC 979, MANU/SC/1098/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Sunday, 13 July 2025

Kerala HC: What conditions the court should impose while releasing accused on Anticipatory bail?

 Considering the dictum laid down in the above decision and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, this Bail Application is allowed with the following directions:


1. The petitioner shall appear before the Investigating Officer within two weeks from today and shall undergo interrogation.


2. After interrogation, if the Investigating Officer propose to arrest the petitioner, he shall be released on bail on executing a bond for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) with two solvent sureties each for the like sum to the satisfaction of the arresting officer concerned.


3. The petitioner shall appear before the Investigating Officer for interrogation as and when required. The petitioner shall co-operate with the investigation and shall not, directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade her from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer.


4. Petitioner shall not leave India without permission of the jurisdictional Court.


5. Petitioner shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected.


6. Needless to mention, it would be well within the powers of the investigating officer to investigate the matter and, if necessary, to effect recoveries on the information, if any, given by the petitioner even while the petitioner is on bail as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another [MANU/SC/0100/2020 : 2020:INSC:106 : 2020 (1) KHC 663].


7. The petitioner shall surrender his passport before the investigating officer, at the time of surrender. If there is no passport, the petitioner will file an affidavit to that effect. {Para 12}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Bail Appl. No. 3740 of 2025

Decided On: 03.04.2025

K.O. Paul Vs. State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Kunhikrishnan, J.

Citation: 2025/KER/29313, MANU/KE/1319/2025

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Kerala HC: Under which circumstances prime facie case for offence under NDPS Act is made out against accused even if no contraband is seized from his possession

 The offences alleged against the petitioner include the offence under Section 29 of the NDPS Act. Section 29 of the NDPS Act reads as follows:

29. Punishment for abetment and criminal conspiracy.

(1) Whoever abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence punishable under this Chapter, shall, whether such offence be or be not committed in consequence of such abetment or in pursuance of such criminal conspiracy, and notwithstanding anything contained in section 116 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), be punishable with the punishment provided for the offence.


(2) A person abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence, within the meaning of this section, who, in India, abets or is a party to the criminal conspiracy to the commission of any act in a place without and beyond India which-


(a) would constitute an offence if committed within India; or


(b) under the laws of such place, is an offence relating to narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances having all the legal conditions required to constitute it such an offence the same as or analogous to the legal conditions required to constitute it an offence punishable under this Chapter, if committed within India."


9. A perusal of the same would show that an accused can be prosecuted even if no contraband is seized from him, provided there is evidence to show that there is abetment and criminal conspiracy. In other words, the Section would show that the actual possession of the contraband is not necessary to convict a person for the offences under the NDPS Act. If abetment and criminal conspiracy are proved, the accused can be convicted.


10. In this case, there is a telephonic conversation between the 1st accused and the petitioner. The prosecution alleges that there is a conspiracy between accused Nos. 1 and 2. When such a case is put up by the prosecution, this Court cannot observe that there is no prima facie case against the petitioner, while considering a bail application. It is a matter of evidence. A bail court need not consider the admissibility of the call details produced by the prosecution to prove conspiracy and abetment in all cases.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Bail Appl. No. 2181 of 2025

Decided On: 20.02.2025

Anzar Azeez Vs. State of Kerala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Kunhikrishnan, J.

 Citation: 2025/KER/15357, MANU/KE/0765/2025

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Saturday, 12 July 2025

Bombay HC: Under which circumstances, the court can release accused involved in vehicular accident prosecuted for an offence U/S 304 of IPC on bail?

 The First Information Report is plain about causing the

vehicular accident. The reasons are best known to the

investigating officer how he has applied Section 304 of the

Indian Penal Code. Even it is presumed that Ganja was lying in

the car, it was very small quantity. Such quantity does not bar

granting bail and there will be no impediment of Section 37 of

the N.D.P.S. Act. It is an act of rash and negligent driving. The

Court has sympathy towards the persons died but cannot close

the eyes towards the provisions of law in respect of granting bail.

It is not in dispute that villagers have mercilessly beat two

accused persons in the car. They were also hospitalized, not for

the injuries caused in the accident but for the injuries sustained

by assault. The question is whether the applicants would

interfere in the investigation and flee away from the trial. There

is no case as such. {Para 5}

6. After having gone through the documents placed on

record, the Court is satisfied that material investigation has been

completed. Further detention of the applicants is not required.

However, to protect the interest of all, certain conditions are to

be imposed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

938 BAIL APPLICATION NO.957 OF 2024

Akhilesh Sanjay Pawar, Vs The State of Maharashtra

CORAM: S.G. MEHARE, J.

DATE : 20th JUNE, 2024

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Friday, 4 July 2025

What factors the court should consider while deciding bail application of accused for an organized crime under BNS?

 When deciding bail applications for organized crime under Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), courts must consider several specific factors beyond general bail considerations.

Essential Requirements for Section 111 BNS

Courts must first examine whether the essential requisites for organized crime are satisfied:

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Thursday, 3 July 2025

Checklist Toolkit for Session Judges: Bail Applications under SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act

 Pre-Application Assessment Framework

Prima Facie Case Evaluation

  • Verify if allegations specifically fall under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act

  • Assess whether the incident occurred in public view as required for most offenses

  • Determine if there is evidence of caste-based intent to humiliate based on caste identity

  • Check if the act involves entrenched social norms like untouchability or caste superiority

  • Evaluate whether it's a mere insult without caste-based malice (not covered under the Act)

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Karnataka HC: No Bail U/S 479(1) BNSS On Completing Half Or 1/3rd Sentence If Accused Booked In Multiple Cases

It is important to note that Section 479 of BNSS makes it clear that the benefit of first proviso to Section 479 is subject to Section 479(2) of BNSS and the Court has to take note of the third proviso, thereof, wherein investigation, inquiry or trial in more than one offence are in multiple cases are pending against a person, he shall not be released on bail by the Court. It is important to note that the second proviso to Section 479(1) of BNSS empowers the Court to order the continued detention of a person for a period longer than one-half of the period. All the provisions have to be read conjointly, including Sections 479(1) and 479(2). The Trial Court also taken note of the said fact into consideration since there are more than one offence against the petitioner and IPC offences are invoked and separate case is also invoked by invoking PML offence.


11.When the offences are different as well as when more number of cases are registered against the petitioner, he cannot invoke the proviso under Section 479 of BNSS seeking the relief on the ground of one third punishment even if it is considered, maximum punishment he has already underwent and the said proviso is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand, since the Court has to take note of the gravity of the offence and multiple cases against the petitioner and more than Rs. 1,544 Crores fraud has been committed that too this petitioner being a founder Chairman of the said bank.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Criminal Petition No. 9930/2024

Decided On: 23.11.2024

K. Ramakrishna Vs. The Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

H.P. Sandesh, J.

Citation:  MANU/KA/3939/2024

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Delhi HC: Chargesheet Filed under S.187(3) BNSS Without Obtaining Sanction To Prosecute Under Arms Act Not Incomplete, No Default Bail

 Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Judgebir Singh v. NIA, MANU/SC/0501/2023 : 2023:INSC:472 : (2023) 17 SCC 48 referred to the judgment in Suresh Kumar (supra) and held that a chargesheet filed without sanction cannot be treated as an incomplete chargesheet and does not entitle an accused to a default bail as contemplated under Section 167(2) of the CrPC [now Section 187(3) of the BNSS]. 

"45. We find no merit in the principal argument canvassed on behalf of the appellants that a charge-sheet filed without sanction is an incomplete charge-sheet which could be termed as not in consonance with sub- section (5) of Section 173CrPC. It was conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that the charge-sheet was filed well within the statutory time period i.e. 180 days, however, the court concerned could not have taken cognizance of such charge-sheet in the absence of the orders of sanction not being a part of such charge-sheet. Whether the sanction is required or not under a statute, is a question that has to be considered at the time of taking cognizance of the offence and not during inquiry or investigation. There is a marked distinction in the stage of investigation and prosecution. The prosecution starts when the cognizance of offence is taken. It is also to be kept in mind that cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offender. It cannot be said that obtaining sanction from the competent authorities or the authorities concerned is part of investigation. Sanction is required only to enable the court to take cognizance of the offence. The court may take cognizance of the offence after the sanction order was produced before the court, but the moment, the final report is filed along with the documents that may be relied on by the prosecution, then the investigation will be deemed to have been completed. Taking cognizance is entirely different from completing the investigation. To complete the investigation and file a final report is a duty of the investigating agency, but taking cognizance of the offence is the power of the court. The court in a given case, may not take cognizance of the offence for a particular period of time even after filing of the final report. In such circumstance, the accused concerned cannot claim their indefeasible right under Section 167(2)CrPC for being released on default bail. What is contemplated under Section 167(2)CrPC is that the Magistrate or Designated Court (as the case may be) has no powers to order detention of the accused beyond the period of 180 days or 90 days or 60 days as the case may be. If the investigation is concluded within the prescribed period, no right accrues to the accused concerned to be released on bail under the proviso to Section 167(2)CrPC. {Para 36}


46. Once a final report has been filed with all the documents on which the prosecution proposes to rely, the investigation shall be deemed to have been completed. After completing investigation and submitting a final report to the court, the investigating officer can send a copy of the final report along with the evidence collected and other materials to the sanctioning authority to enable the sanctioning authority to apply his mind to accord sanction. According sanction is the duty of the sanctioning authority who is not connected with the investigation at all. In case the sanctioning authority takes some time to accord sanction, that does not vitiate the final report filed by the investigating agency before the court. Section 173CrPC does not speak about the sanction order at all. Section 167CrPC also speaks only about investigation and not about cognizance by the Magistrate. Therefore, once a final report has been filed, that is the proof of completion of investigation and if final report is filed within the period of 180 days or 90 days or 60 days from the initial date of remand of accused concerned, he cannot claim that a right has accrued to him to be released on bail for want of filing of sanction order.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Bail Appln. 1713/2025

Decided On: 25.06.2025

Suraj Kanojia Vs. State Govt of Nct of Delhi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Tejas Karia, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/4621/2025.

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Thursday, 26 June 2025

Supreme Court: 'Bail Is The Rule, Jail Is The Exception' Even In Special Statutes Like UAPA

Key Principles Established:

Bail Assessment Framework:

  • Courts must assess whether accusations are prima facie true based on FIR, charge sheet, and case diary

  • Assessment should consider totality of evidence on broad probabilities

  • If accusations are not prima facie substantiated, bail may be granted

Constitutional Balancing:

  • Inordinate delays in trial and long periods of incarceration without conviction violate Article 21

  • Courts must harmonize statutory provisions with constitutional guarantees

  • While legislative intent must initially be adhered to, prolonged detention without trial mandates prioritization of constitutional rights over statutory bars

Specific Findings:

  • Mere participation in meetings and protests organized by banned organizations doesn't establish prima facie involvement in terrorist activities

  • Protected witnesses' statements and recovered materials lacking direct incriminating evidence insufficient for UAPA charges

  • Over two years in custody without trial commencement with 40 accused and 354 witnesses constituted unreasonable delay

Relief Granted:

  • High Court's denial of bail was set aside

  • Emphasized that denying bail in deserving cases contravenes Article 21

  • Directed release on appropriate terms within seven days

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 5387 of 2024 

Decided On: 17.12.2024

Athar Parwez Vs. Union of India (UOI)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Augustine George Masih, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 995, MANU/SC/1345/2024.
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Supreme Court: What parameters the court should adopt while releasing accused for an offence under UAPA?

 It may merit to discuss at the outset, the scope and application of Section 43D(5) of UAPA whereunder the court, at the stage of bail is not required to meticulously examine the admissibility and reliability of evidence. The degree of satisfaction required under this provision has to be lower than the proof beyond reasonable doubt, but must still be rooted in material that is not inherently improbable or ex facie unreliable.

{Para 23}

24. The rigour of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA would, however, in an appropriate case yield to the overarching mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, especially where the trial is inordinately delayed or where the incarceration becomes punitive. However, such relaxation cannot possibly be automatic and must be evaluated in light of the specific facts and risks associated with each case, as has been previously clarified.1

Key Holdings:

  • Reaffirmed that under Section 43D(5) of UAPA, courts are not required to meticulously examine the admissibility and reliability of evidence at the bail stage

  • Special Courts can consider the magnitude of the offense, transnational nature of operations, and possibility of influencing investigation while denying bail

  • Noted the prima facie case of conspiracy under both NDPS Act and UAPA in transnational smuggling operations

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2570/2025 

Decided On: 13.05.2025

Harpreet Singh Talwar Vs. The State of Gujarat th. National Investigating Agency

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Surya Kant and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Author: Surya Kant, J.

 Citation: 2025 INSC 662, MANU/SC/0675/2025

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Sunday, 22 June 2025

Supreme Court: under which circumstances the magistrate can release accused on bail as per S.437(6) CrPC/S.480(6) BNSS

14. The foregoing discussion lead us to conclude and answer the questions under reference as under:


Q-1 An Accused involved in a non-bailable offence triable by Magisterial Court whose trial is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in that case, and who has been in custody during the whole of the said period, does not get an absolute or indefeasible right to be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate. The Magistrate has a discretion to direct otherwise (refuse bail) by recording in writing the reasons for such rejection.


Q-2 The provisions contained in Section 437(6) of the Code are not mandatory.


Q-3 The Magistrate has option/discretion to refuse bail by assigning reasons therefor. The parameters, factors, circumstances and grounds to be considered by Magistrate vis-a-vis such application preferred by the Accused Under Section 437(6) of the Code may be:


1. Whether the reasons for being unable to conclude trial within sixty days from the first date fixed of taking evidence, are attributable to the Accused?


2. Whether there are any chances of the Accused tampering with evidence or causing prejudice to the case of the prosecution in any other manner?


3. Whether there are any chances of abscondence of the Accused on being bailed out?


4. Whether Accused was not in custody during the whole of the said period?


If the answer to any one of the above referred fact situations or similar fact situations is in affirmative than that would work as a fetter on the right that accrues to the Accused under first part of Sub-section (6) of Section 437 of the Code.


The right accrues to him only if he is in custody during the whole of the said period as can be seen from the language employed in Sub-section (6) of Section 437 of the Code by the legislature.


It would also be relevant to take into consideration the punishment prescribed for the offence for which the Accused is being tried in comparison to the time that the trial is likely to take, regard being had to the factors like volume of evidence, number of witnesses, workload on the Court, availability of prosecutor, number of Accused being tried with Accused and their availability for trial, etc.


The factors which are quoted above by this Court are only illustrative and not exhaustive.


Q-4 The factors, parameters, circumstances and grounds for seeking bail by the Accused as well as grounds to be considered by the learned Magistrate for his satisfaction would not be identical or similar to Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of the Section 437 of the code, but may be relevant and overlapping each other depending upon facts and there cannot be any straight jacket formula. But, we may add that the reasons for rejection of applications Under Section 437(6) need to be more weighty than the routine grounds of rejection.


Q-5 The parameters relevant for deciding application Under Section 167(2)(a)(I)(II) of the Code (default bail), cannot be imported for exercise of power Under Section 437(6) of the Code.


Q-6 A decision in principle rendered by a coordinate Bench of equal strength would bind another co-ordinate Bench as it lays down a principle of law and not a statement of law in context of subject matter.


Q-7 The legislature, while enacting Section 437(6) of the Code, has not given an absolute, indefeasible or unfettered right of bail. But right of bail is given with a rider investing the Magistrate with discretion to refuse bail by recording reasons therefor. Therefore, the right of Accused for a speedy trial, though, Constitutional and aimed at liberty of Accused, is not put on that high a pedestal that it becomes absolute. It is a right given with reasonable restrictions. This is the only way the provisions of Section 473(6) of the Code and Article 21 of the Constitution of India can be harmonised and have to read and interpreted accordingly.


20. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the Appellant deserves to be released on bail, subject to certain terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 818/2025 (Arising out of Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 1314/2025)

Decided On: 18.02.2025

Subhelal Vs. The State of Chhattisgarh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

 Citation: 2025 INSC 242, MANU/SC/0235/2025
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Checklist Toolkit for Session Judges for deciding remand and Bail Applications Under NDPS Act

 Pre-Application Assessment

Legal Framework Verification

  • Confirm charges under NDPS Act sections (particularly Sections 19, 24, 27A)

  • Determine if case involves commercial, intermediate, or small quantity

  • Verify applicability of Section 37 restrictions

  • Check if public prosecutor has been given opportunity to oppose

Jurisdictional Considerations

  • Ensure first remand was conducted before magistrate (not special judge).

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Checklist Toolkit for Session Judges for deciding remand and Bail Applications of accused Under Prevention of Corruption Act

 General Principles for Bail Under PC Act

Fundamental Considerations:

  • Bail is the rule and judicial custody is the exception in criminal cases

  • Both Sessions Court and High Court have concurrent jurisdiction to grant bail under Section 439 CrPC

  • Allegations of corruption must be dealt with zero tolerance

Pre-Hearing Checklist

Documentary Requirements:

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Checklist Toolkit for Special Judge(Pocso): Bail Applications in POCSO Act Cases

 Jurisdictional Considerations

 Critical Note: Special POCSO courts have exclusive jurisdiction for POCSO cases. Session courts cannot entertain anticipatory bail applications for POCSO offenses - only Special POCSO courts are empowered to do so. Regular session judges should refer such matters to designated Special POCSO courts.

Pre-Application Verification Checklist

Court Jurisdiction Verification

  • Confirm if the court is a designated Special POCSO court

  • Verify if case involves POCSO Act offenses exclusively or in combination with IPC sections

  • Check if accused is a juvenile (below 18 years) requiring different procedural considerations
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