Showing posts with label pocso Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label pocso Act. Show all posts

Sunday, 27 September 2026

Instagram Chat With Student Cannot Be Sole Material To Deny Bail': Bombay High Court Grants Bail To Tuition Teacher In POCSO Case

Advocate for Respondent No.2, is that Instagram chat between Applicant and his friend are appended and this chat shows the nature of the crime allegedly committed by Applicant. However this singular chat when seen, prima facie does not explicitly describe the commission of the offence with which Applicant is charged neither does this chat state the time, place or nature of the offence. Hence in my opinion this cannot be the sole material for considering denying bail to Applicant.

IIN THE HIIGH COURT OF JUDIICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIIMIINAL APPELLATE JURIISDIICTIION

BAIL APPLICATION NO. 3066 OF 2026

Sunil Sundar Gandhi  Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr. 

CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.

DATE : SEPTEMBER 18, 2026.

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Thursday, 24 September 2026

Supreme Court permitted a mother to relocate her two minor children to the United Kingdom, while denying custody to the father who is facing prosecution under Pocso Act

 These principles, read together, make it clear

that the son’s disclosure and his safety cannot be

subordinated to the father’s claim for custody

particulars when the criminal case is still pending.

Under no circumstances, the respondent-father, as

long as he is facing prosecution, can be considered to

be a person entitled to custody of the children. Such

a course of action, apart from being contrary to the

solemn object of the Juvenile Justice Act, may also

lead to the prosecution being frustrated, inasmuch

as, were the custody of the son to be handed to the

respondent-father, the possibility of the son giving a

free and fair deposition in those proceedings would

virtually be negligible. {Para 56}

57. We are of the considered view that, even

assuming the respondent-father succeeds in the

quashing petition pending before the High Court of

Calcutta and the criminal proceedings arising out of

the POCSO FIR are quashed, the Courts would have

to remain circumspect in assessing the

circumstances and background in which the

allegations came to be levelled by the son against the

respondent-father. The subsequent outcome of the

criminal proceedings, by itself, cannot efface the

circumstances in which the disclosure was made or

render the child’s apprehensions wholly irrelevant for

the purposes of determining his welfare and custody.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 12774 OF 2026

DEBARATI BHUNIA CHAKRABORTY  Vs

SUMAN SANKAR BHUNIA 

Author: Mehta, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 1043.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 23, 2026.

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Wednesday, 9 September 2026

Supreme Court: How to appreciate evidence if FIR neither discloses the identity of the accused nor does it refer to any particular features of the accused?

 However, the significance of the contents of the

FIR, to be specific, the omissions therein, cannot be

overlooked while examining the subsequent theory

about identification of the accused-appellant. The

FIR neither discloses the identity of the accused nor

does it refer to any particular features of the accused

which could have assisted the victim to identify the

accused in the TIP. The identity of assailant was

admittedly not known at the time when the FIR was

lodged. Consequently, the manner in which the

identity of the accused-appellant came to be

ascertained subsequently assumes considerable

importance. {Para 25}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 135 OF 2026

DHANRAJ  Vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN 

Author: Mehta, J.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 07, 2026.

Citation: 2026 INSC 958.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: How to appreciate evidence if investigating officer fails to investigate complaint of accused that he was falsely implicated due to political rivalry?

 The Investigating Officer (PW-8) was cross examined

on behalf of the defence, and a specific

suggestion was put to him with reference to the

complaints made by the accused-appellant and his

family members regarding false implication of the

accused-appellant at the behest of the local MLA. The

Investigating Officer admitted that the complaints

made on behalf of the accused and his family

members, supported by affidavits, had been received

by him, but he did not make any inquiry into such

complaints. {Para 28}

29. This omission assumes significance because the

defence was not merely putting forth a bare

suggestion of false implication. It had specifically

brought to the notice of the Investigating Officer that

the accused-appellant and his family members had

approached the authorities alleging that the

appellant was being falsely implicated and targeted

on account of political rivalry. Once such complaints

were admittedly received during the course of

investigation, the Investigating Officer was expected

to undertake at least some verification before

completely discarding the same. His failure to

conduct any inquiry on these complaints deprives the

Court of an important circumstance which could

have either fortified or dispelled the defence plea.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 135 OF 2026

DHANRAJ  Vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN 

Author: Mehta, J.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 07, 2026.

Citation: 2026 INSC 958.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: How to appreciate evidence if sketch of accused prepared with the assistance of the victim was not produced on record?

The Investigating Officer further admitted that

the victim and her father were taken to Jaipur, and

that a sketch was prepared for the purpose of

identifying the accused. However, he admitted that

the said sketch was not available with him and had

not been produced before the trial Court. This

circumstance assumes considerable significance, as

the sketch, having been prepared with the assistance

of the victim at an early stage of the investigation,

constituted an important corroborative material for

ascertaining the identity and physical features of the

then unknown assailant. The non-production of the

said sketch deprives the Court of an opportunity to

examine whether the description furnished by the

victim at the earliest stage was consistent with the

physical features of the accused-appellant. {Para 31}

32. Hence, it is safe to conclude that the

Investigating Officer had no reliable evidence which

could point the finger of suspicion towards the

accused-appellant as being the perpetrator of the

crime. Thus, there remains a serious doubt regarding

the basis on which the accused-appellant came to be

arrested and his subsequent identification as the

assailant.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 135 OF 2026

DHANRAJ  Vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN 

Author: Mehta, J.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 07, 2026.

Citation: 2026 INSC 958.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: How to appreciate prosecution evidence if there is material discrepancy in medical evidence regarding time of incident and age of injuries?

Firstly, there is a material discrepancy in the

medical evidence and the deposition of the witnesses

regarding the time of the incident which goes to the

root of the matter affecting the veracity of the

prosecution case. {Para 51}

 52. At the cost of repetition, we may mention that

as per the deposition of the medical jurist (PW-7), the

injuries on the body of the victim were 5-7 days old.

The medical jurist examined the victim on 7th

December, 2016. Hence, the incident could not have

taken place on 5th December, 2016 as alleged in the

FIR and must have taken place at least 2-3 days

earlier. The presence of pus and maggots in the

wound noticed by the doctor on the perianal region of

the victim, is also indicative of the fact that the

injuries were at least 5-7 days old.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 135 OF 2026

DHANRAJ  Vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN 

Author: Mehta, J.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 07, 2026.

Citation: 2026 INSC 958.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: How to appreciate evidence if victim has not identified accused before court and name of accused was not mentioned in FIR?

Secondly, and more importantly, there is a fatal

flaw in the prosecution case on account of the failure

to get identification of the accused done by the victim

during her deposition before the trial Court. {Para 53}

54. We feel that the presiding officer of the trial

Court as well as the Public Prosecutor were equally

responsible for this fatal omission. The significance

of this omission is further amplified by the fact that

the accused was not named in the FIR; the victim

categorically stated that the police had disclosed his

name to her and; the prosecution merely relied upon

the TIP to establish the identity of the accused.

55. The prosecution case thus suffers from serious

infirmities regarding the identification of the accused;

grave contradiction between the medical evidence

pertaining to the age of the injuries and the alleged

time of the incident as set out in the FIR and the

depositions of the prosecution witnesses.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 135 OF 2026

DHANRAJ  Vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN 

Author: Mehta, J.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 07, 2026.

Citation: 2026 INSC 958.
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Saturday, 8 August 2026

Bombay High Court Drops POCSO Charge Against Youth Booked For Slapping, Abusing Minor In Filthy Language due to absence of Sexual intent

 I have heard all learned counsel. Perused the impugned order.The allegations against the Applicant are that he followed the victim and abused her in filthy language in hindi and slapped her. Admittedly, Section 354-D, 509, 323 of IPC is attracted by the act of the Applicant. The question remains whether Section 12 of POCSO Act is applicable or not. Section 11 of POCSO Act defines sexual harassment of a child and Section 12 describes the punishment for it. Section 11 specifically states that a person is said to commit sexual harassment upon a child, when such person exhibits sexual intent towards the child. In the present case, it appears that Applicant was angry with the behaviour of victim in the school and he wanted to confront the victim about the said act and on that count, the incident took place. So from the incident, it does not appear that the Applicant had sexual intent as described in Section 12 of the POCSO Act. I have gone through the case laws cited by learned counsel for the Respondent. The facts of the cited case and present case are different hence, not applicable. No case is made out against the Applicant under Section 12 of POCSO Act {Para 5}

IN THE JUDICATURE OF HIGH COURT AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. NO. 189 OF 2026

Prasad Kashinath Bade  V The State of Maharashtra

CORAM : SHIVKUMAR DIGE, J.

DATE : 27th JULY, 2026.

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Wednesday, 22 April 2026

What are presumptions under s 29 and 30 of Pocso Act?

 Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, 2012, create a mandatory "reverse burden of proof," requiring special courts to presume the accused is guilty of sexual offences (Section 29) and possessed a culpable mental state (Section 30). The accused must prove their innocence, rather than the prosecution proving guilt, departing from traditional criminal jurisprudence.

Key Aspects of Section 29 (Presumption of Guilt):
  • Application: Applies to offences under Sections 3, 5, 7, and 9 (sexual assault, aggravated assault).
  • Requirement: The Special Court shall presume the accused committed, abetted, or attempted the offence.
  • Rebuttal: The accused must prove the contrary to overcome this presumption.
  • Limitation: Courts have held that this presumption is not absolute; the prosecution must first establish foundational facts (i.e., that the act actually occurred).
Key Aspects of Section 30 (Presumption of Culpable Mental State):
  • Requirement: The court will presume a "culpable mental state" (intention, motive, knowledge) on the part of the accused.
  • Burden: The burden lies on the accused to prove they had no such mental state.
  • For the purposes of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the Special Court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability.
Judicial Interpretation & Scope
  • Not a Replacement for Prosecution Evidence: While these sections shift the onus, the prosecution must still prove "foundational facts" to trigger the presumption.
  • Purpose: These provisions aim to protect vulnerable children from the trauma of prolonged trials and rigorous cross-examination, reflecting the need for swift justice in child abuse cases.
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Sunday, 22 March 2026

Judging with Sensitivity, Deciding with Precision: Appreciation of Evidence in POCSO Trials


The success of a POCSO trial often depends not merely on what evidence is produced, but on how that evidence is appreciated. In cases of child sexual abuse, the courtroom must remain a place of legal discipline, yet the judicial process must also respond to the realities of childhood, trauma, delayed disclosure, and the absence of conventional forms of corroboration.​

For the legal fraternity, this branch of adjudication presents a delicate responsibility. The court must protect the child from the injustice of disbelief rooted in misunderstanding, while equally safeguarding the accused from conviction unsupported by legally acceptable proof.
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Bombay HC: Under which circumstances, disclosure made by the child victim though hearsay is admissible as per S 6 of the Indian Evidence Act?

14. The evidence of PW 2 and PW 7 as regards the disclosure made by the child victim though hearsay is admissible in view of the provisions of section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act which recognizes and embodies the rule of res gestae, which is explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Gentela Vijayvardhan Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in MANU/SC/0719/1996 : AIR 1996 SC 2791 thus:


"15. The principle of law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act is usually known as the rule of res gestae recognised in English law. The essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue "as to form part of the same transaction" speaking, in exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The rationale in making certain statement or fact admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue. But it is necessary that such fact or statement must be a part of the same transaction. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae ............... "


Section 6 is an exception to the rule of evidence that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The statement must relate to the fact in issue or relevant thereto and must be substantially contemporaneous with the fact. Such statement though not evidence of the truth of the matters stated are of corroborative value. In Sukhar ..vs.. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in MANU/SC/0626/1999 : (1999) 9 SCC 507 the Hon'ble Apex Court observes that section 6 is an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility of hearsay evidence provided such evidence is almost contemporaneous with the fact/s excluding the possibility of fabrication. The essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue, as to the form part of the same transaction, that it becomes relevant by itself.


The evidence of PW 2 - Pushpa and PW 7 - Priya that the child victim narrated the incident to them is therefore admissible in view of the provisions of section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Appeal 316 of 2018

Decided On: 01.07.2019

Manish Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.B. Deo, J.

Citation: 2019 SCC ONLINE BOM 1154, MANU/MH/1619/2019

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Supreme Court: Sole testimony of child , if credible, can sustain conviction under Pocso Act even without corroboration.

None of the grounds, on which the High Court cleared the Respondent, had any merit. By now it is well settled that the testimony of a victim in cases of sexual offences is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of a statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of a sexual assault alone to convict the accused. No doubt, her testimony has to inspire confidence. Seeking corroboration to a statement before relying upon the same as a rule, in such cases, would literally amount to adding insult to injury. The deposition of the prosecutrix had, thus, to be taken as a whole. The victim of rape is not an accomplice and her evidence can be acted upon without corroboration. The prosecutrix stood at a higher pedestal than an injured witness does. If the court finds it difficult to accept her version, it may seek corroboration from some evidence which lends assurance to her version. To insist on corroboration, except in the rarest of rare cases, is to equate one who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her claim of rape will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars, as in the case of an accomplice to a crime. The evidence brought on record contains positive proof, credible sequence of events and factual truth linking the Respondent with rape of the prosecutrix and had criminally intimidated her. Hence, Respondent was found to be guilty for offence Under Sections 376(2)(f) and 506 of Code, 1860 since he committed rape with a minor girl aged nine years. The judgment of the High Court was set aside and the conviction recorded by the Trial Court was restored. [31],[32] and[34]

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1231 of 2016 

Decided On: 15.12.2016

State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sanjay Kumar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Sikri and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.

Author: A.K. Sikri, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1599/2016

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Friday, 13 March 2026

Bombay HC: Under which circumstances, Session Judge should not rely on CA report or DNA report without examining scientific experts?


 

The Bombay High Court has delivered a significant ruling on the limits of judicial reliance on forensic reports in criminal trials. In State of Maharashtra v. Tejas @ Dada Mahipati Dalvi & Ors., the Court made it clear that where Chemical Analyser reports and DNA reports are relied upon as incriminating material, the trial court cannot treat them as self-proving documents and proceed to convict without examining the scientific experts concerned.

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Thursday, 12 March 2026

Bombay HC: Failure To Examine Forensic Experts Whose CA reports / DNA reports Are Relied Upon Vitiates Trial

 We find from the record that, amongst other circumstances, the

Sessions Court, in the present case, did rely upon the CA reports at

exhibit-166 (collectively) to hold against the appellants i.e. the accused persons. This is evident from paragraph 143 onwards of the impugned judgement and order of the Sessions Court. We find that the Sessions Court committed a grave error while observing in paragraph 142 of the impugned judgement and order that since the accused did not move any requisition for examining the chemical analysers for any specific cause, the reports of the chemical analysers at exhibit-166 (collectively) were being directly admitted in evidence without examining the chemical analysers. Such a course of action was clearly not open for the Sessions Court, for the reason that the Supreme Court has laid down that such witnesses ought to be court witnesses even if the prosecution fails in its duty to summon such crucial witnesses, if at all the CA reports / DNA reports are to be relied by the prosecution. We are of the opinion that the impugned judgement and order to that extent is vitiated and the trial itself stood vitiated to that extent. {Para 20}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CONFIRMATION CASE NO.3 OF 2024

State of Maharashtra  Vs. Tejas @ Dada Mahipati Dalvi,

CORAM : MANISH PITALE &

SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ.

DATE : MARCH 10, 2026

Citation: 2026:BHC-AS:11660-DB

ORDER : (Per Justice Manish Pitale)
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Monday, 16 February 2026

Important judgments on POCSO Act

 POCSO Act Imp. Judgments


1. Arjun Malge Vs. State of Maharashtra Bom HC 2021

Held : Notice of hearing of case and bail application is mandatory to victim. 


2.Aparna Bhat vs. State of M P. Supreme Court 2021


Held: Notice to victim must. Bail conditions should not be arbitrary. 


3.Nipun Saxena vs. Union of India Supreme Court 2019

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Tuesday, 10 February 2026

‘POCSO Act is gender neutral’; Karnataka High Court refuses to quash sexual assault case against Woman.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:

Ø The Act, being a progressive enactment, is intended to safeguard the sanctity of childhood. It is rooted in gendral neutrality with its beneficient object being the protection of all children, irrespective of sex. The Act is thus, gender neutral.

Ø Sections 3 and 5 which form the foundation for offences under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, delineate various forms of assault. Although certain provisions may employ gendered pronouns, the preamble and purpose of the Act, render such usage inclusive. Therefore, it is inclusive of both male and female.

Ø The ingredients of Section 4 of the Act dealing with penetrative sexual assault are equally applicable to both men and women. The language of the provision clearly indicates inclusivity.

Ø The ingredients of the offences, the ones punishable under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, are clearly met in the case at hand.

Ø Delay in registration of the crime, in the case at hand, cannot become the reason for quashment of the proceedings, owing to the alleged offence and the age of the victim.

Ø The submissions of psychological impossibility and absence of potency testing, fall flat in the light of modern jurisprudence, noted hereinabove.

Ø The submission that psychological trauma cannot result in an erection would tumble down, in the light of several studies, that psychological trauma does not always prelude physiological or biological reactions, especially ones of coercion and fear.

Ø The submission that, in an intercourse the woman is only a passive participant and a man is an active participant is noted only to be emphatically rejected, as the thought itself is archaic. The jurisprudence of the present times embraces the livid realities of victims and does not allow stereotypes to cloud legal scrutiny.

 In the High Court of Karnataka

(Before M. Nagaprasanna, J.)

Archana Patil  Vs State of Karnataka

Criminal Petition No. 12777 of 2024

Decided on August 18, 2025, 

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 17687

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How Pocso amendment Act 2019 made it more gender neutral?

The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, was already designed to be gender-neutral regarding victims, but the 2019 Amendment Act further solidified this by making it gender-neutral with respect to both perpetrators and victims through the expansion of definitions and stringent punishment provisions. The amendment ensures that a child is defined as any person under the age of 18, regardless of gender, and the law applies uniformly to all, irrespective of the perpetrator's gender.
Here is how the 2019 Amendment enhanced the gender-neutrality of the POCSO Act:
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Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 2019

 


[Act 25 of 2019]

[5th August, 2019]

An Act further to amend the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

BE it enacted by Parliament in the Seventieth Year of the Republic of India as follows:—

1. Short title and commencement.— (1) This Act may be called the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 2019.

(2) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.

2. Amendment of Section 2.— In the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012) (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), in Section 2,—

(a) in sub-section (1), after clause (d), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:—

‘(da) “child pornography” means any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a child which include photograph, video, digital or computer generated image indistinguishable from an actual child, and image created, adapted, or modified, but appear to depict a child;’;

(b) in sub-section (2), for the words, brackets and figures “the Juvenile Justice

(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000” (56 of 2000), the words, brackets and figures “the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015” (2 of 2016) shall be substituted.

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“Private Viewing” Isn’t Private Immunity: Supreme Court Recasts Child Pornography Law Under POCSO & IT Act (2024 INSC 716)

The Supreme Court’s reportable decision in Just Rights for Children Alliance & Anr. v. S. Harish & Ors. (Criminal Appeal Nos. 2161–2162 of 2024, decided on 23 September 2024) is a watershed moment in India’s cyber–child protection jurisprudence. It corrects a trend of quashing prosecutions on the premise that mere storage or private viewing of child sexual abuse material is not punishable unless there is proof of publication or transmission.

At its core, the judgment does two things for the legal system: first, it gives a structured, mens rea–centric interpretation of Section 15 of the POCSO Act (post-2019 amendment) as creating three distinct offences; second, it situates Section 67B of the IT Act as a broad anti-exploitation provision that criminalises not only dissemination, but also consumption-related conduct such as browsing and downloading.
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