Showing posts with label beyond reasonable doubt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label beyond reasonable doubt. Show all posts

Thursday, 30 June 2022

Whether accused must prove right to private defence beyond reasonable doubt?

  To sum up, the right of private defence is necessarily a defensive right which is available only when the circumstances so justify it. The circumstances are those that have been elaborated in the IPC. Such a right would be available to the accused when he or his property is faced with a danger and there is little scope of the State machinery coming to his aid. At the same time, the courts must keep in mind that the extent of the violence used by the accused for defending himself or his property should be in proportion to the injury apprehended. This is not to say that a step to step analysis of the injury that was apprehended and the violence used is required to be undertaken by the Court; nor is it feasible to prescribe specific parameters for determining whether the steps taken by the accused to invoke private self-defence and the extent of force used by him was proper or not. The Court's assessment would be guided by several circumstances including the position on the spot at the relevant point in time, the nature of apprehension in the mind of the accused, the kind of situation that the accused was seeking to ward off, the confusion created by the situation that had suddenly cropped up resulting the in knee jerk reaction of the accused, the nature of the overt acts of the party who had threatened the accused resulting in his resorting to immediate defensive action, etc. The underlying factor should be that such an act of private defence should have been done in good faith and without malice. {Para 21}

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before B.R. Gavai and Hima Kohli, JJ.)

Ex. Ct. Mahadev Vs Director General, Boarder Security Force and Others.

Civil Appeal No. 2606 of 2012

Decided on June 14, 2022

Citation: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 739

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Thursday, 29 March 2018

Whether charge of adultery in Divorce proceeding is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt?

To prove the charge of adultery the standard of proof required in a criminal case cannot be applied for the proceedings under the Act. Person alleging adultery is only required to prove the allegations by preponderance of probabilities and the degree of probability depends on the gravity of the offence. It is well established that application for divorce is a civil proceeding and analogies of criminal law cannot be applied to it. It is equally true that the petition for divorce on the charges of adultery cannot be allowed merely on suspicion and doubts expressed by the party approaching the Court. The view of proving the matrimonial offence beyond reasonable doubt has undergone a sea change and in the modified form the petitioner is only required to prove his case by preponderance of probabilities and the degree of probability depends upon the gravity of the offence. A Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Lalit Lazarus v. Smt. Lavina Lazarus, MANU/MP/0016/1979 : AIR1979MP70 considered this aspect of the matter in detail and held that (Paras 6 and 7)

'The next question to be considered is whether the petitioner has proved that the respondent No. 1 is guilty of adultery. Previously the view was that the matrimonial offences have to be proved by petitioner beyond reasonable doubt but recently the view has been modified and it has been held that petitioner is only required to prove his case by preponderance of probabilities and the degree of probability depends on the gravity of the offence Rayden on Divorce in Vol. 1 at page 193 has observed "But a suit for divorce is a civil and not a criminal proceeding and the analogies and precedents of criminal law have no authority in the Courts administering divorces; they are civil Tribunals. It is wrong, therefore, to apply an analogy of criminal law and to say that adultery must be proved with the same strictness as is required in a criminal case. As far as the standard of proof is concerned, adultery, like any other fact on which irretrievable breakdown of marriage is concerned, may be proved by a preponderance of probability, and although it has been said that in proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear, and that even in these days there is a stigma in adultery, nevertheless views on adultery have changed and it no longer generally entails the serious social consequences that in some former limes resulted from its discovery."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

O.S.A. No. 11 of 1996

Decided On: 26.06.1997

 M.R.G.L.J. Vailsher Vs. Smt. Ramola Vailshery and others

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.P. Sethi, C.J. and Hari Nath Tilhari, JJ.
 Citation : AIR 1997 Kant 341
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Sunday, 6 November 2016

Whether execution of will can be doubted on ground that it was executed in different language?


It has always been the Plaintiff’s case that the Testator could
communicate in English, and did so reasonably well. It is nobody’s
case that the Will is fabricated because the Testator could not speak
English. The only case, as I understand it, is that it was exceedingly
odd for him to have done so considering he had written his previous
wills in Gujarati and took great pride in his mother tongue. A very
similar argument was taken before a Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court in Sanat Kumar Das v Arati Das.
 (2009) 4 CHN 593 (DB).Here, the testator,
who was educated in English, had signed the Will in Bengali.
Though the caveators in this matter were aware that the testator
knew Bengali, they had not known him to sign in that language
before. The High Court dismissed the submission. It is settled law,
the Division Bench said, that the Probate Court cannot require
proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’
, nor must the Court proceed on a
presumption that the Will is suspicious. I am in most respectful
agreement with this decision. I do not find that the language of the
Will is troublesome enough to doubt its veracity. Every person is at
liberty to draw up their Will in whatever language they please; and
once there is, as we have here, proof that the testator was fluent in
more than one language, this aspect, on its own, assumes no
significance at all. I am therefore unable to accept Mr. Narula’s
submission in this regard.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
TESTAMENTARY & INTESTATE JURISDICTION
TESTAMENTARY SUIT NO. 20 OF 2005
IN
TESTAMENTARY PETITION NO. 753 OF 2004
SHIRISH POPATLAL SHAH,
v
ARUN POPATLAL SHAH,
CORAM : G.S.Patel, J.
Dated : 8th July 2016
Citation: 2016(6) MHLJ 257
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Saturday, 11 June 2016

Whether S 106 of Evidence Act can be invoked against accused if his presence near spot of offence is not proved?

 It would now be necessary to consider provisions of Section 106
of the Evidence Act, 1872. As per Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872,
when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, then the
burden of proving that fact is upon the said person. It is well settled that
Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 does not relieve the prosecution of the
burden of proving its case beyond all reasonable doubt.  It is only when the
prosecution case has been proved that the burden with regard to such facts
which are within the special knowledge of the accused could be shifted on
the accused for explaining the same.  Reference in this regard can be made to
the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vikramjit Singh Vs. State of
Punjab 2006 (12) SCC 306. 
In  Sharad Kondiba Walke (supra),  the  Division   Bench  while
considering   aforesaid   provisions   held   that   if   the   initial   presence   of   the
accused has not been established by the prosecution, the question of invoking
the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 would not arise.  It is
only after initial burden of establishing the presence of the accused at the site
of the crime is discharged that the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence
Act, 1872 could be applied.   Similar view has been taken by the Division
Bench in Subhash Gorakh Khankal (supra). 
Thus, from the aforesaid, once it is found that the prosecution has
failed to show the presence of the appellant at some time proximate to the
occurrence of the crime, the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act,
1872   cannot   be   applied.     Moreover,   the   present   case   being   based   on
circumstantial   evidence,   each   circumstance   leading   to   the   guilt   of   the
appellant is required to be proved independently and beyond reasonable
doubt. The presence of the appellant near the scene of the incident having
not been satisfactorily proved and the same being one of the major links in
the chain of circumstances, it will have to be held that the prosecution has
failed in proving the guilt of the appellant.  
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.592 OF 2013

Sunil s/o Latari Khuje  vs State of Maharashtra, 

CORAM  : B. R. GAVAI & 
 A.S.CHANDURKAR JJ.
  DATE   :  MARCH 28, 2016 
Citation:2016 ALLMR(CRI)2212
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Thursday, 12 November 2015

When accused can seek acquittal on ground of incorrect framing of charge on the ground of prejudice?

 When we speak of prejudice to an accused, it has to be shown that the accused has suffered some disability or detriment in the protections available to him under the Indian criminal jurisprudence. It is also a settled canon of criminal law that this has occasioned the accused with failure of justice. One of the other cardinal principles of criminal justice administration is that the courts should make a close examination to ascertain whether there was really a failure of justice or whether it is only a camouflage, as this expression is perhaps too pliable. With the development of law, Indian courts have accepted the following protections to and rights of the accused during investigation and trial :
(a) The accused has the freedom to maintain silence during investigation as well as before the Court. The accused may choose to maintain silence or make  complete denial even when his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is being recorded, of course, the Court would be entitled to draw inference, including adverse inference, as may be permissible to it in accordance with law;
(b)     Right to fair trial

(c)     Presumption of innocence (not guilty)

(d)     Prosecution   must   prove  its   case 
  beyond   reasonable  doubt.
21. Prejudice to an accused or failure of justice, thus, has to be examined with reference to these aspects. That alone, probably, is the method to determine with some element of certainty and discernment whether there has been actual failure of justice. `Prejudice' is incapable of being interpreted in its generic sense and applied to criminal jurisprudence.
The plea of prejudice has to be in relation to investigation or trial and not matters falling beyond their scope. Once the accused is able to show that there is serious prejudice to either of these aspects and that the same has defeated the  rights available to him under the criminal jurisprudence, then the accused can seek benefit under the orders of the Court.

Supreme Court of India
Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi vs State Of U.P on 4 August, 2011

Bench: B.S. Chauhan, Swatanter Kumar
 REPORTABLE

Citation;(2011)8 SCC300,2011 CRLJ4399
Read full judgment here; click here
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Thursday, 26 February 2015

Whether charge of Fraud made in civil proceedings must be established beyond reasonable doubt?

Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act defines 'fraud'. It is a comprehensive term and embraces large number of delinquencies. A person who alleges fraud must give particulars thereof in his pleadings. It must be established beyond any reasonable doubt. Lord Atkin in A. L. N. Narayanan Chettiyar v. Official Assignee (AIR 1941 P.C. 93) observed :
"Fraud like any other charge of a criminal offence whether made in civil or criminal proceedings must be established beyond reasonable doubt. A finding as to fraud cannot be based on suspicion and conjecture."
Kerala High Court
Unique Alliance Industries, Goa vs Anupama Agencies, Trichur And ... on 11 March, 1994
Equivalent citations: AIR 1995 Ker 52, 1998 91 CompCas 254 Ker

Bench: V Kalliath, P Mohammed
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