There are very many instances in which a decree can be said
to be in favour of the parties to the litigation, irrespective of the fact whether
they are the plaintiffs or defendants in the suit. In such cases, the decrees
can be said to be capable of execution at the instance of any of the parties
to the suit. Examples of such decrees are those passed in suits for
partition, specific performance of a contract, suits under Section 92 CPC,
etc. I may hasten to add that the list is not exhaustive.
A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Iswar Sridhab
Jew v. Jnanendra Nath (AIR 1960 Calcutta 718) has laid down the law
that where a scheme decree is executable and gives any rights to any
party, which can be enforced by execution, the fact that the person seeking
execution was formerly a defendant in the suit and a judgment debtor
under the decree cannot possibly prevent him from working out the decree
by execution. Learned Judges have drawn an analogy from a decree in a
suit for partition to arrive at the conclusion.
I may immediately refer to Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963 (in short, "Act") to vouchsafe the point that under certain
circumstances, even the defendant can seek indulgence of the court for
reliefs subsequent to the decree. Section 28 of the said Act deals with the
rescission of a contract after passing of a decree in a suit for specific
performance. It is well settled that a suit for specific performance does not
come to an end on passing of a decree. Section 28(1) of the Act
empowers a vendor or lessor to apply in the same suit in which the decree
is made to have the contract rescinded, if the purchaser or lessee, as the
case may be, does not, within the period allowed by the decree, or such
further period as the court may extend, pay the purchase money or other
sum. From this provision, it is clear that despite the vendor or lessor was a
defendant in the suit, such a person gets an opportunity to seek rescission
of the contract even after passing the decree. This principle has been
approved by the Bombay High Court as early as in 1923 in the decision in
Bai Karimabibi v. Abderehman Sayad Banu (AIR 1923 Bombay 26).
Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Patna in Kanu Charan Deep v.
Bimla Deep (II (1996) DMC 214) has held that a decree in a proceeding
under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal
rights is executable even at the instance of the respondent as the decree is
in favour of both the parties. Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
Ajudhia Prasad v. The U.P. Govt. through the Collector (AIR 1947 All.
390) has considered the scope of the expression "decree holder" occurring
in Section 2(3) CPC and held as follows:
"Now it is clear from this that a person in
whose favour an order capable of execution has
been made is also a decree holder. It is also evident
from this definition that a decree-holder need not be
a party to the suit. He may be 'any person'. ..........."
For the said reasons, there cannot be any dispute that the decree passed
in a suit for fixation of common boundary of the plaintiff and defendant,
being one intended to put an end to the dispute between the parties and to
achieve the object of common good, should be allowed to be executed by a
defendant in the suit too. According to me, the sum and substance of the
legal principles to be borne in mind regarding the terms "decree holder"
and "holder of a decree" can be stated like this. The term "decree holder"
denotes a person (i) in whose favour a decree has been passed (ii) in
whose favour an order capable of execution has been passed and (iii)
whose name appears in the decree, either as plaintiff or defendant, and the
following conditions are satisfied:
(a) the decree must be one capable of execution and
(b) the said person, by the terms of the decree itself or from its
nature, should be legally entitled to seek its execution.
Similarly, the term "holder of a decree" takes in not only the "decree
holder", but other rightful persons like transferee of a decree, legal
representative, etc.
Therefore, I am of the definite opinion that the view taken by
the executing court that a decree for fixing common boundary of the
properties of the plaintiffs and defendants cannot be demarcated in an
execution proceeding moved at the instance of the defendants is clearly
illegal and hence unsustainable.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALAAT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD
FRIDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF JUNE 2015.
CRP.No. 321 of 2013
SOMAVALLY Vs PRASANNA KUMAR
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