Kerala HC Summarises law on liability of parents and Guardian of minor in case of rash driving by minor

 Since the issues raised in these petitions are seminal in nature, the following propositions are culled out from the above discussion for appropriate guidance and action by all authorities.

(i). The offence under section 199A of the MV Act is sui generis and

is an independent offence.

(ii). The commission of an offence under the MV Act by the juvenile

is an essential ingredient of section 199A of the MV Act, however, a finding regarding the commission of an offence under the MV Act by the juvenile as per section 17 or 18 of the JJ Act, is not a sine qua non for initiating proceedings against the guardian or owner of the motor vehicle under the said section.

(iii). Proceedings against the guardian of a juvenile or owner of a

motor vehicle under section 199A of the MV Act can be initiated if

information regarding the commission of an offence by the juvenile has been recorded in the General Diary. The recording of information in the General Diary has to be followed by the submission of a Social

Background Report of the child in Form No.1 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016, without undue delay and at any rate, atleast along with the final report.

(iv). The final report in relation to the offence allegedly committed by the juvenile ought to be submitted before the Juvenile Justice Board at the earliest, preferably within two months of recording the information in the General Diary. The period of two months mentioned in Rule 10(6) of the Model Rules is only a directory provision and is not mandatory.

(v). As the JJ Act does not contemplate any charge to be framed

against a juvenile for a petty offence, the decisions in Polachan V. State of Kerala [Crl.M.C No. 7479/2022] Sameera v. State of Kerala [2023 KHC Online 9217] as well as in Khairunnisa v. State of Kerala [2023 SCC Online Ker. 4265] are per incuriam.

(vi). The inquiry against the juvenile before the Juvenile Justice

Board shall be conducted according to the procedure prescribed for the trial of petty offences under the Cr.P.C.

(vii). The inquiry against the juvenile for driving a motor vehicle

without a license if any alleged, must be completed by the Juvenile Justice Board within four months of the date fixed for hearing after filing the final report or if any extension is granted for two months further, within the said extended period. As section 14(4) of the JJ Act is a mandatory provision, if the inquiry proceeding against the juvenile is not completed before the JJB within the period mentioned therein, the proceeding against the minor will become statutorily terminated under section 14(4) of the JJ Act.

(viii). If the inquiry proceeding against the minor is terminated under section 14(4) of the JJ Act, or if the JJB comes to the conclusion under section 17 of the JJ Act that the juvenile has not committed the offence, the proceedings against the guardian or owner under section 199A of the MV Act cannot continue thereafter and the accused will have to be acquitted or discharged, as the case may be. {Para 27}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

 CRL.MC NO. 34 OF 2024

SHARAFUDHEEN  Vs    STATE OF KERALA

MR. JUSTICE BECHU KURIAN THOMAS

Dated: 24TH DAY OF JUNE 2024 

Citation: 2024:KER:44617

Print Page

Kerala HC: Manner Of Attack & Injury Relevant To Ascertain If Accused Intentionally Attempted To Commit Murder U/S 307 of IPC

It is the well settled law that, in order to attract the offence under Section 307 of IPC, there must be an intentional attempt to commit murder. In the instant case, going through the manner in which the incident occurred and the attack at the instance of the 1st accused, either intention or knowledge to cause death of PW1 could not be found and the 1st accused only caused one injury that also on the shoulder of PW1, as borne from the wound certificate. Therefore, on no stretch of imagination, it is safe to conclude that the 1st accused committed the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC. {Para 13}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Crl. A. No. 972 of 2014

Decided On: 05.03.2026

Moosantepurakkal Manaf Vs. State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A. Badharudeen, J.

Citation: MANU/KE/0922/2026,2026:KER:20486

Print Page

Kerala HC: Whether Motor accident claim tribunal can dismiss claim petition for default/non prosecution?

 Where the Tribunal is genuinely satisfied that there are contumacious laches on the part of the claimants in prosecuting their claims and where the claimants are not interested in prosecuting their cases, the Tribunal can dismiss the application for default using Order IX Rule 8 in appropriate cases. To the above extent the decisions in Lukose v. Govindan Nair (MANU/KE/0070/1990 : 1990 (1) KLT 378) and Saramma Scaria and others v. Mathai and another (MANU/KE/0165/2002 : 2002 (2) ILR 191), are overruled.

5. When the claim is dismissed for default, parties will be free to approach the Tribunal to set aside such orders by filing application under Order IX Rule 9. But, if the Tribunal decides the matter on merit suo motu collecting evidence, the only remedy open to the claimant will be to file an appeal before the High Court as provided under Section 173 of the Act. After the judgment in Saramma's case (supra) we have seen that many Claims Tribunals are dismissing the cases on merits holding that no evidence is adduced on the side of the claimant and claimant is absent. In such circumstances, the claimant will be compelled to approach the High Court which may incur heavy expenses and inconveniences. If the Tribunal dismisses the case for default, he can approach the Tribunal itself of the place which he has selected in view of section 166(2) of the Act, to file the claim petition for setting aside the order of dismissal of the case for default and the Tribunal should be liberal in its approach when such applications are filed.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

M.A.C.A. No. 327 of 2004

Decided On: 01.09.2005

Jacob Thomas Vs. C. Pandian and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Koshy, K.M. Joseph & K.R. Udayabhanu

Author: J.B. Koshy, J.

Citation: I(2006)ACC204, 2006ACJ464, AIR2006Ker77, AIR2006Ker77, ILR2005(4)Kerala419, [2006(2) JCR250(Kerala)], 2005(3)KLJ331, 2005(4)KLT545, 2006(1)RCR(Civil)193,MANU/KE/0396/2005.

Print Page

Kerala HC: Accused Exempted From Personal Appearance including accused residing abroad Can Answer Questions Virtually Or In Writing as per S.351 BNSS

 In Basavaraj R.Patil and others v. State of

Karnataka and others [(2000) 8 SCC 740], while

considering the question whether the accused can be

permitted to file his written submissions under Section

313 of the Cr. P.C, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as

follows:

“23. Section 243(1) of the Code enables the accused,

who is involved in the trial of warrant case instituted on

police report, to put in any written statement. When any

such statement is filed the Court is obliged to make it part

of the record of the case. Even if such case is not instituted

on police report the accused has the same right (vide

Section 247). Even the accused involved in offences

exclusively triable by the Court of sessions can also exercise

such a right to put in written statements [Section 233(2) of

the Code]. It is common knowledge that most of such

written statements, if not all, are prepared by the

counsel of the accused. If such written statements can

be treated as statements directly emanating from the

accused, hook, line and sinker, why not the answers

given by him in the manner set out hereinafter, in

special contingencies, be afforded the same worth.

24. We think that a pragmatic and humanistic

approach is warranted in regard to such special exigencies.

The word shall in clause (b) to Section 313(1) of the Code is

to be interpreted as obligatory on the Court and it should be

complied with when it is for the benefit of the accused. But

if it works to his great prejudice and disadvantage the

Court should, in appropriate cases, e.g., if the accused

satisfies the court that he is unable to reach the venue

of the court, except by bearing huge expenditure or

that he is unable to travel the long journey due to

physical incapacity or some such other hardship

relieve him of such hardship and at the same time

adopt a measure to comply with the requirements in

Section 313 of the Code in a substantial manner. How

this could be achieved?

25. If the accused (who is already exempted from

personally appearing in the Court) makes an application to

the court praying that he may be allowed to answer the

questions without making his physical presence in court on

account of justifying exigency the court can pass

appropriate orders thereon, provided such application is

accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by the accused himself

containing the following matters: (a) A narration of facts to

satisfy the court of his real difficulties to be physically

present in court for giving such answers. (b) An assurance

that no prejudice would be caused to him, in any manner, by

dispensing with his personal presence during such

questioning. (c) An undertaking that he would not raise any

grievance on that score at any stage of the case.

26. If the court is satisfied of the genuineness of

the statements made by the accused in the said

application and affidavit it is open to the court to

supply the questionnaire to his advocate (containing

the questions which the court might put to him under

Section 313 of the Code) and fix the time within which

the same has to be returned duly answered by the

accused together with a properly authenticated

affidavit that those answers were given by the accused

himself. He should affix his signature on all the sheets

of the answered questionnaire. However, if he does not

wish to give any answer to any of the questions he is free to

indicate that fact at the appropriate place in the

questionnaire [as a matter of precaution the Court may keep

photocopy or carbon copy of the questionnaire before it is

supplied to the accused for answers]. If the accused fails to

return the questionnaire duly answered as aforesaid within

the time or extended time granted by the court, he shall

forfeit his right to seek personal exemption from court

during such questioning.

27. In our opinion, if the above course is adopted in

exceptional exigency it would not violate the legislative

intent envisaged in Section 313 of the Code.” {Para 6}

15. In light of the above discussions, I don't find any

legal impediment in permitting the petitioner to answer

the questions under Section 351 BNSS either by adopting

the procedure laid down in Section 351 (5) BNSS and

Basavaraj R.Patil’s case or by getting his answers

recorded via the electronic video linkage under the

Linkage Rules and getting the statement signed as per

the procedure under Rule 8 (16) of the Rules. It would be

up to the petitioner to choose the method.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL.MC NO. 9203 OF 2025

RAMESHAN Vs  STATE OF KERALA,

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS

Dated this the 22nd day of October, 2025.

Citation: 2025:KER:77918.

Print Page

Kerala HC: Information Given By One Accused Leading To Discovery Can't Be Used To Connect All Accused U/ S.27 Evidence Act

 The records show that the prosecution is heavily relying

upon the recovery effected, based upon the confession given by the

accused to rope him in this case. The evidence of PW4 would go to

show that on 15.03.2011 he had arrested all the three accused and

has questioned them. His evidence in to the effect that on the basis of

Ext.P7(a) confession he has recovered 83 bottles of Indian Made

Foreign Liquor. But it is very pertinent to note that PW4 not deposed

the exact information, he had allegedly received from the accused and which led to the recovery. The information deposed by PW4 do not tally with Ext.P7(a) information which he has allegedly recorded. It is a settled law as held by the Apex Court in the decision in Bodh Raj vs. State of Jammu Kashmir (AIR 2002 SC 3164) that in order to rely upon a recovery effected under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, the prosecution is duty bound to prove the alleged information received from the accused while in custody, which led to the recovery. The investigating officer must record the information and prove it or if not recorded, prove the exact information he had received from the accused by deposing in the Court. In the instant case, in the absence of the prosecution proving the alleged information received from the accused, I have no doubt in my mind that no value can be attached to the recovery evidence. {Para 8}

9. Another important aspect which comes to fore in this case is the impossibility of the fact that all the three accused together have

given information in the form of Ext.P7(a). It is quite impossible to

believe that all these accused have spoken simultaneously and in one

voice. As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in Mohd.

Abdul Hafeez v. State of A.P. (1983 KHC 413), if evidence otherwise confessional in character is admissible under S.27 of the Indian Evidence Act, it is obligatory upon the investigating officer to state and record who gave the information; when he is dealing with more than one accused, what words were used by him so that a recovery pursuant to the information received may be connected to the person giving the information so as to provide incriminating evidence against the person. In the instant case, the version of PW4 is that when he questioned all the three accused, he received the very same information ie; Ext.P7(a) and the exact information given by each of the accused has neither been recorded nor proved. If so, the information allegedly received from all the accused cannot be used to connect the 2nd accused.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL.REV.PET NO. 1438 OF 2017

SELVAN Vs  STATE OF KERALA

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. V. BALAKRISHNAN

Citation:  2025:KER:74410.

Dated: 08.10.2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Kerala HC: Accused can not be convicted only on the basis of disclosure and recovery evidence U/S 27 of Evidence Act

 Be that as it may, it is further to be seen that the conviction of the accused is solely based upon the recovery evidence alone and nothing more. It is a settled law as held by the Honourable Apex Court in Manoj Kumar Soni v State of MP [2023 SCC OnLine SC 984] that a disclosure statement is not so strong a piece of evidence which is sufficient on its own and without anything more, to bring home the charges against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Similarly, in the decision in Varkey C.V. v State of Kerala[2024 KHC 7096], this Court has categorically held that mere recovery of the weapon of offence on the basis of the information received from the accused, is of no use if there is no other evidence which could betaken as a connecting link about the use of the said weapon for the commission of the crime. That apart, recently in the decision in Abdul Jabbar v State of Kerala [2025 KHC OnLine 901], this Court has again held that while recovery under Section 27 can be a crucial piece of evidence, it cannot be the sole basis for conviction since, it is not a substantive evidence and needs to be corroborated by other evidence. If so, in the light of the afore discussions, I am of the view that the conviction and sentence rendered against the revision petitioner/2nd accused cannot be sustained. {Para 10}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL.REV.PET NO. 1438 OF 2017

SELVAN Vs  STATE OF KERALA

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE P. V. BALAKRISHNAN

Citation:  2025:KER:74410.

Dated: 08.10.2025.

Print Page

Kerala HC: Period Of Release On Interim Bail Not To Be Computed As 'Detention Period' For Granting Statutory Bail U/ S.187 BNSS

  In the present case, the petitioner remained in detention at

the first instance from 18.02.2025 till 24.05.2025 (96 days), and at

the second instance from 09.09.2025 to 22.10.2025 (44 days). In

view of the declaration of law by the Supreme Court, the broken

periods could be taken together to appreciate the claim of statutory

bail. The question now arises is: “Could the period during which the petitioner remained in interim bail be counted for calculating the requisite period for statutory bail?”. {Para 9}

12. The learned Amicus Curiae has taken me to the various

decisions and the relevant statutory provisions. The learned

Amicus Curiae relaying on Amir Hassan Mir v. UT of J & K and

others, (Manu/JK/0206/2022), submitted that the petitioner could not be treated to be in detention or custody for the period he was released on temporary bail. The learned Amicus Curiae submitted that only the actual  custody undergone by the accused will be counted for computing the period for default bail. The learned Amicus Curiae, on going through the facts of the case, submitted that the petitioner has remained in detention only for 140 days. Therefore, he is not entitled to statutory bail.

13. What matters for statutory bail is detention, as provided in

the statutory provisions, whether it is in one spell or in two spells.

An accused person is entitled to be released on statutory bail by

adding the truncated periods of detention suffered by him. I have

no doubt in concluding that the period during which the accused

person was released on temporary/interim bail should not be

computed for the purpose of reckoning the period for statutory bail, as only the actual period of detention undergone by the accused need be counted for. Therefore, the necessary conclusion is that the petitioner is not entitled to statutory bail.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

BAIL APPL. NO. 11634 OF 2025

FISAL PJ,  Vs  STATE OF KERALA

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. BABU

Citation: 2025:KER:79121

Dated this the 23rd day of October, 2025

Print Page

Kerala HC: Wife Cannot File Writ Petition On Behalf Of Husband Without Valid Power Of Attorney

Thus, it is evident from the provisions of

Order III of the CPC that an appearance, application or

act in or to any Court which is required to be made or

done by a party in the Court, can be effectively made or

done by the party in person or by a recognised agent. A

recognised agent, for that purpose, includes a person

who holds the power of attorney. The provisions

contained in the Powers of Attorney Act 1882 indicate

that there is no prohibition for a litigant seeking a writ

under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution

through a power of attorney holder. The donee of a

power of attorney is no more than an agent of the donor

and does not pursue the proceeding in his own

independent capacity. Instead, he acts for and on behalf

of the donor and is subject to the limitations which are

contained in the instrument. {Para 11}

12. The present writ petition is filed as though the

petitioner is the owner of the estate. Apart from a bald

assertion that the petitioner is managing the property on

account of her husband’s absence, there is no material

conferring authority on her.

13. The reliance placed on the decisions in

Narayanan Nair’s and Ashadevi N.P.’s cases are

misplaced. In Narayanan Nair’s case, this Court

recognised the right of a duly authorised agent to

institute a suit on behalf of the plaintiff in light of the

written authorisation produced along with the plaint.

Whereas, in Ashadevi N.P.’s case, this Court held that

the broader principles of the C.P.C. apply to writ

petitions. Neither the provisions in the Evidence Act,

CPC, the Rules, nor the precedents referred to above aid

the petitioner in filing the writ petition on behalf of her

husband without a power of attorney.

14.  The right that can be enforced under

Article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or

individual right of the petitioner himself, though in

the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or

quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or

modified”.

(emphasis supplied)

Tested against the aforesaid principles, I hold that

the petitioner has no locus-standi to institute and

prosecute the writ petition on behalf of her husband.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C) NO. 2862 OF 2025

SHAREEFA, W/O. ISMAIL K.P. Vs  THE SUB COLLECTOR, TIRUR,

PRESENT:  MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS

Dated:  25.08.2025

Citation: 2025:KER:65018

Print Page

Kerala HC: [S.50 MV Act] Registered Owner Of Offending Vehicle Liable To Compensate For Accident, Can Recover Amount From Transferee

Section 50 of the Act deals with the procedure for transfer of ownership. It is an admitted fact that the ownership was not transferred and in the registration certificate, the appellant's name is shown as the owner of the vehicle. The transfer of ownership did not come into effect, though, it is alleged that the vehicle was transferred to the additional fifth respondent and thereafter to a third person. {Para 11}

12. The Parliament has consciously introduced the definition

of the expression ‘owner’ under Section 2(30), making a departure

from the provisions of Section 2(19) in the earlier Act of 1939. The

principle underlying the provisions of Section 2(30) is that the

victim of a motor accident or, in the case of a death, the legal heirs

of the deceased victim should not be left in a state of uncertainty.

In Naveen Kumar (supra), it was held that for the purpose of the

Motor Vehicles Act, the person whose name is reflected in the

records of the registering authority is the owner and he is liable to compensate. However, the tribunal has found that since there was

no valid driving licence for the rider of the motor cycle, the tribunal

has fastened the liability on the registered owner and the rider of

the motorcycle. I do not find any reason to interfere with the same.

14. The tribunal has rightly found that the insurer should

pay the amount and then recover the said amount from the

registered owner and driver. I do not find any reason to interfere

with the same. But, I make it clear that in case the amount

awarded by the tribunal is realised from the appellant/owner, the

appellant can recover the said amount with interest awarded by

the tribunal from the date of payment till realisation from the

additional fifth respondent, through due process of law. The

appeal is accordingly partly allowed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

MACA NO. 2872 OF 2014

ABDUL KHADER Vs   ARUMUGAN

PRESENT

MRS. JUSTICE SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN

Decided on 10.07.2025 

Citation: 2025:KER:50546

Print Page

Kerala HC: Wife can claim maintenance after divorce despite prior compromise agreement if she is unable to maintain herself

Apparently, Ext.B2 was executed in the year 2004, and the claim for maintenance was raised only in the year 2012. Thus, without much discussion, it can be held that the consolidated payment of Rs. 30,000/- towards permanent alimony under Ext. B2 compromise will not disentitle the first appellant from raising a claim for maintenance at a later stage if she is actually unable to maintain herself. Therefore, it can be concluded that the first appellant is entitled to claim maintenance from the respondent, notwithstanding the terms of Ext.B2 agreement, either under Section 37 of the Act or under Section 125 of Cr. P.C., if she was unable to maintain herself during the relevant time. {Para 20}

 In the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam

(Before Sathish Ninan and P. Krishna Kumar, JJ.)

Sheela George and Another V V.M. Alexander 

Mat. Appeal No. 586 of 2017

Decided on June 2, 2025

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 3501

Print Page

Ker HC : Claim filed under MV Act withdrawn after interim award – subsequent proceedings under Workmen’s Compensation Act not barred

We are of the opinion that merely for the reason that earlier the claimants have proceeded under the MV Act and later, withdrew the said proceedings and filed WCC for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, it cannot be held that the subsequent claim is barred by Section 167 of the MV Act. Moreover, the interim award which was received under Section 140 of the MV Act is also seen adjusted towards the compensation granted by the impugned order. {Para 8}

9. In the above view, we find that the application filed before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation under Section 22 of the Workmen's Compensation Act is not hit by the bar of Section 167. In the above view, there is no illegality or impropriety in the impugned award granting compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act after deducting the interim award of Rs. 50,000/- received under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 

 In the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam

(Before K. Harilal and Annie John, JJ.)

United India Insurance Company Limited Vs Mary alias Baby and Others

Decided on December 14, 2018

Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 8199

Print Page

Kerala HC: Appellate courts U/S 29 of Domestic Violence Act have the power to pass interim protective orders

 It is true that, as per Section 28 of the DV Act, all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, ‘the Cr. P.C.’ hereinafter). Even though Section 29 of the DV Act not specifically mentioned in Section 28, appeal provided under Section 29 of the DV Act is against orders passed under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the DV Act. If so, the provisions of the Cr. P.C. is not excluded in an appeal filed under Section 29 of the DV Act, even though the provisions of the DV Act not given specific powers to the appellate court to grant interim orders. When a statute gives power to an appellate court to decide a matter in issue after reappreciating the evidence to set aside, vary or confirm the order, the appellate court should have the power to regulate the proceedings of the appeal till its disposal. If so, the appellate court if held to be lacking power to pass interim orders, the plight of the party who succeeds in the appeal will be in trouble. If so, it is difficult to lay down a ratio that the appellate court dealing with the appeal under Section 29 of the Act, has no power to pass an interim order, since the said power is not conferred by the DV Act. On the contrary, the appellate court can pass interim orders to regulate and to proceed with the appeal to do complete justice in between the parties, during the pendency of appeal, by resroting to the provisions of the Cr. P.C. or by resorting to its incidental or ancillary power embodied in the appellate jurisdiction following the principle embodied in the maxim ‘ubi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest’ (Where anything is conceded, there is conceded also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist.). Therefore, negativing the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is held that, an appellate court dealing with an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, is empowered to grant interim order/interim orders during pendency of an appeal to regulate the proceedings till disposal of the appeal on merits and to do justice between the parties. {Para 10}

 In the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam

(Before A. Badharudeen, J.)

Farsana P.S. and Another  Vs Razveen Raffique 

CRL.MC No. 6782 of 2024

Decided on October 14, 2024

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6055

Print Page

Kerala HC: What conditions the court should impose for releasing accused found in possession of intermediate quantity of contraband?

Admittedly, the quantity involved is

'intermediate' as per the relevant notifications. {Para8}

9. Accused Nos. 1 and 3 were ordered to be

released on bail as per order dated 18.07.2022 in B.A.

No.5043/2022 by this Court.

10. The learned Public Prosecutor submitted

that the petitioner has criminal antecedents. It is

submitted that he is accused in Crime Nos.21/2022,

347/2015 and 177/2019.

11. Having regard to the facts and

circumstances of the case mentioned above, the

petitioner can be ordered to be released on bail on

stringent conditions.

In the result, this Bail Application is allowed as

follows:

(a) The petitioner shall be released on bail on

his executing bond for Rs.1,00,000/-

(Rupees One lakh only) with two solvent

sureties each for the like sum to the

satisfaction of the jurisdictional court.

(b) He shall appear before the Investigating

Officer on Mondays and Saturdays between

10 A.M. and 11 A.M. till the final report is

filed.

(c) He shall not attempt to interfere with the

investigation or influence any witnesses.

(d) He shall surrender his Indian Passport

before the Jurisdictional Court. If he does

|not have a passport, he shall file an affidavit

to that effect, within a period of one

week from the date of his release.

(e) He shall not involve in any other cases of

like nature while on bail.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

BAIL APPL. NO. 5531 OF 2022

 AKHIL JOHN  Vs  STATE OF KERALA

PRESENT

MR.JUSTICE K. BABU

Dated this the 21st day of July, 2022

Print Page

Kerala HC: Police Cannot Attach Bank Account Under S.107 BNSS Without Magistrate's Approval

 IRAC Analysis of Kerala High Court Judgment (Crl.M.C.No.3740/2025, Order dated 02.06.2025)

With Emphasis on the Concept of "Proceeds of Crime"

Issue

·       Whether the police, during the investigation of a criminal case, can freeze the bank account of a third-party company (Headstar Global Pvt. Ltd.) under Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), or whether such freezing requires a specific procedure under Section 107 of BNSS, especially when the funds involved may constitute "proceeds of crime".

Print Page

Kerala HC: What conditions the court should impose while releasing accused on Anticipatory bail?

 Considering the dictum laid down in the above decision and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, this Bail Application is allowed with the following directions:

1. The petitioner shall appear before the Investigating Officer within two weeks from today and shall undergo interrogation.

2. After interrogation, if the Investigating Officer propose to arrest the petitioner, he shall be released on bail on executing a bond for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) with two solvent sureties each for the like sum to the satisfaction of the arresting officer concerned.

3. The petitioner shall appear before the Investigating Officer for interrogation as and when required. The petitioner shall co-operate with the investigation and shall not, directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade her from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer.

4. Petitioner shall not leave India without permission of the jurisdictional Court.

5. Petitioner shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected.

6. Needless to mention, it would be well within the powers of the investigating officer to investigate the matter and, if necessary, to effect recoveries on the information, if any, given by the petitioner even while the petitioner is on bail as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another [MANU/SC/0100/2020 : 2020:INSC:106 : 2020 (1) KHC 663].

7. The petitioner shall surrender his passport before the investigating officer, at the time of surrender. If there is no passport, the petitioner will file an affidavit to that effect. {Para 12}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Bail Appl. No. 3740 of 2025

Decided On: 03.04.2025

K.O. Paul Vs. State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Kunhikrishnan, J.

Citation: 2025/KER/29313, MANU/KE/1319/2025

Print Page

Kerala HC: Under which circumstances prime facie case for offence under NDPS Act is made out against accused even if no contraband is seized from his possession

 The offences alleged against the petitioner include the offence under Section 29 of the NDPS Act. Section 29 of the NDPS Act reads as follows:

29. Punishment for abetment and criminal conspiracy.

(1) Whoever abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence punishable under this Chapter, shall, whether such offence be or be not committed in consequence of such abetment or in pursuance of such criminal conspiracy, and notwithstanding anything contained in section 116 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), be punishable with the punishment provided for the offence.

(2) A person abets, or is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit, an offence, within the meaning of this section, who, in India, abets or is a party to the criminal conspiracy to the commission of any act in a place without and beyond India which-

(a) would constitute an offence if committed within India; or

(b) under the laws of such place, is an offence relating to narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances having all the legal conditions required to constitute it such an offence the same as or analogous to the legal conditions required to constitute it an offence punishable under this Chapter, if committed within India."

9. A perusal of the same would show that an accused can be prosecuted even if no contraband is seized from him, provided there is evidence to show that there is abetment and criminal conspiracy. In other words, the Section would show that the actual possession of the contraband is not necessary to convict a person for the offences under the NDPS Act. If abetment and criminal conspiracy are proved, the accused can be convicted.

10. In this case, there is a telephonic conversation between the 1st accused and the petitioner. The prosecution alleges that there is a conspiracy between accused Nos. 1 and 2. When such a case is put up by the prosecution, this Court cannot observe that there is no prima facie case against the petitioner, while considering a bail application. It is a matter of evidence. A bail court need not consider the admissibility of the call details produced by the prosecution to prove conspiracy and abetment in all cases.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Bail Appl. No. 2181 of 2025

Decided On: 20.02.2025

Anzar Azeez Vs. State of Kerala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Kunhikrishnan, J.

 Citation: 2025/KER/15357, MANU/KE/0765/2025

Print Page

Kerala HC: Benefit Of First Proviso To Section 479 BNSS Cannot Be Applied Retrospectively To Convicted Prisoners

Therefore, the benefit of the first proviso to sub section (1) has only been given to the under-trial prisoners with retrospective effect and not to the convicted prisoners. The learned counsel for the applicant/accused referred to the dictum in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, MANU/SC/0851/2022 : 2022:INSC:690 : 2022 (4) KHC 570 : AIR 2022 10 SCC 51 in which it has been held that appeal or revision shall also be construed as a facet of trial. It was also held that delay in taking up the appeal coupled with the benefit conferred under Section 436A Cr.P.C. among other factors shall be considered for a favorable release on bail. Section 479 BNSS which has substituted Section 436A Cr.P.C. is more beneficial and hence the benefit is to be granted to the applicant/accused, goes the argument.

Here the crucial question is not whether Section 479 BNSS is applicable to appeal and revisions, but the question is whether retrospective effect of the provision can be given to convicted prisoners also. The Apex Court as per the aforesaid order has extended the benefit of the first proviso to Section 479 BNSS with retrospective effect only to under-trial prisoners. When the Apex Court is presently seized of the matter and is monitoring implementation of Section 479 BNSS, propriety demands that this Court refrain from interpreting and passing orders regarding its applicability to convicted prisoners retrospectively. Hence, the relief claimed by the applicant/first accused cannot be granted.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Crl. M. Appl. No. 1/2023 in Crl. A No. 1042 of 2023 and Crl. Appeal No. 1042 of 2023

Decided On: 14.01.2025

Arunkumar Vs. State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.S. Sudha, J.

Citation: MANU/KE/0696/2025.

Print Page

Kerala HC: As per S.349 of BNSS, Magistrate Can Direct Any Person To Provide Voice Sample For Purpose Of Investigation

Similarly, no legal requirement can be read into the declaration of law made in Ritesh Sinha (supra), or for that matter Section 349 of the B.N.S.S, that the accused person should have been in custody at the time when an order for voice sample has to be made. While Ritesh Sinha (supra) uses the language 'any person', Section 349 B.N.S.S. would separately deal with 'any person', by suffixing with the expression 'including an accused person'. Similarly, the language in the first proviso to Section 349 is that the person should have been arrested at some time in connection with the investigation, which requirement is amply satisfied in the given facts. If this Court has to go by Ritesh Sinha (supra), there is no such requirement that the person should have been in the custody at the time when the order for voice sample is made. The requirement in Ritesh Sinha (supra) is that such an order has to be passed 'for the purpose of investigation of a crime'. Under Section 349, the criteria is the satisfaction of the Magistrate that it is expedient to direct any person to provide his voice sample, again, for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under B.N.S.S. Therefore, the thrust is upon the question whether the voice sample is required for the purpose of investigation in a crime.

8. In the instant facts, this Court notice that the crime in question was registered pursuant to a trap. If, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the phenolphthalein test has turned negative, that is all the more a reason for the Investigating Agency to produce whatever evidence possible in support of the prosecution case. If, as claimed by the Investigating Officer, there exists a voice clip containing the voice of the petitioner, wherein, he had allegedly demanded bribe, the same would constitute an important evidence in the armoury of the prosecution. Such an attempt cannot be shut down, since it has to be conceded that it is fully within the realm and prerogative of the Investigating Officer to search, explore and furnish all and whatever legal evidence possible in support of the prosecution case.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Crl. MC No. 9284 of 2024

Decided On: 14.11.2024

Sunil Rajan K Vs. Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C. Jayachandran, J.

Citation: MANU/KE/5069/2024.

Print Page

Can police refuse to lodge FIR on email complaint from abroad? Kerala High Court answers

 The Kerala High Court, in the case YYYY v State of Kerala & Ors, delivered a significant judgment clarifying the obligations of the police under Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) regarding the registration of FIRs, especially in the context of complaints sent via email from abroad and unsigned complaints.

Case Details:

• Case Number: Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 4778 of 2020

• Date of Judgment: 1 July 2025

• Bench: Justice Kauser Edappagath

Print Page

Kerala HC: U/S 173 of BNSS, Zero FIR's can be registered even if a complaint is sent via email from abroad and police cannot reject it for lack of signature or territorial jurisdiction

The implementation of Section 173 of Bharatiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'the BNSS'), marks

a significant shift in how the police handles information relating

to the commission of a cognizable offence. Now, Zero FIR has

been given statutory recognition by incorporating it in Section

173 of BNSS, which deals with the registration of FIR in

cognizable cases. Zero FIR has been introduced with the

primary purpose of ensuring that victims can file complaints

regardless of jurisdiction. Therefore, the police cannot refuse to

register an FIR if a cognizable offence is made out in the

complaint, even if the complaint is forwarded from a foreign

country. In these circumstances, the rejection of Annexure A7

complaint made by the petitioner on the ground that it was

unsigned and sent through e-mail from Australia cannot be

justified. {Para 3}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL.MC NO. 4778 OF 2020

SOYA  Vs   STATE OF KERALA

PRESENT

 DR. JUSTICE KAUSER EDAPPAGATH

Citation: 2025:KER:44462

Dated: 20TH DAY OF JUNE 2025 

Print Page