Can the court hold that rented property was used for composite purposes if the professional uses part of it for his professional work?

  In the present case, the Respondent being Chartered Accountant, was using one room for consultation. His clients used to visit the premises for consultation. Therefore, mere usage of the premises of the Chartered Accountant for carrying out his profession though admittedly dominant purpose and use of the premises is for residence, that itself cannot be sufficient to hold that the premises was let out for composite purposes. It no way change or alter the purpose of letting out. The landlady may or may not take objection to such composite usage. In Sakharam Narayan Kherdekar Vs. City of Nagpur Corporation and Ors. AIR, 1964 Bombay, 200, this Court while considering the advocate's profession held that it is not a commercial activity in the premises, and therefore, registration is not necessary under the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act. In the present case also, there is nothing to show that the premises or portion of the premises was registered for any commercial activities.{Para 4}

5. In Narayan Dattatraya Umbarkar Vs. Late Shri Shankar Hirji Pandya (deceased by his legal heir), 1993 Bom.R.C. ig 324, while dealing with the said provision held that mere user of part of premises for profession would not account to change of user.

Therefore, the professional like Doctor advocate, Chartered Accountant if use their premises for professional purpose and dominantly for residential purpose, the so called agreement cannot be said to be for composite purpose of residential and non-residential. It is observed by this Court in Bhavarlal Sukhlal Soni by L.Rs. Vs. Lakshminarayan Deo Public Trust, 1994 Mh.L.J. 843, that Section 13(1)(l) provision applies only to premises taken on lease for residential use and not to premises taken for commercial use. However, in the present case, there is clear finding given by the Court below that tenant use to have office in the suit premises in connection with the income tax. There are witnesses to support the same also. But having once found that it is permissible for such tenant to use the premises for professional purposes, and such use in no way amounts to change of user of the suit premises, this finding according to me supports the case of the landlady that the premises was let out and used through out for the residential purpose and it was never objected as it no way amounts to creation of composite tenancy. Once, it is clear that the tenant has used this entire premises dominantly for residential purpose and the use of portion of the premises for professional purpose, is not amount to change of user and therefore, the tenancy through out as created is of residential purpose only.

Bombay High Court

Sumatibai Anandrao Rajurkar vs Shri Punamchand P. Lohade on 2 December, 2008

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Whether the court should dismiss eviction suit if the tenant takes plea that change of user of tenanted premises is not permissible?

(j) Prohibition on the Change of User:

74. About the State Government's directions issued on 03.12.2009 and consequential regulatory orders passed by the Municipal Corporations concerned, the Courts below have held that those directions came much later, and after the decree was passed, at that. They have also opined that the Corporation could not prove that those directions apply to Nashik.

75. At any rate, on the issue about the restrictions on the change of use, this Court has ruled in Cricket Club of India Ltd. In that case, the respondent leased the suit property in March 1943 to the applicant's predecessor, for running a filling station. In December 2000, after the original tenant's death, the respondent issued quit notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to the applicant. Later, he sued the applicant for eviction. He filed the suit under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act, 1882. On contest, the Small Cause Court decreed the suit. In appeal, it was confirmed.

76. The applicant took the matter to this Court as a Civil Revision Application. The applicant brought to this Court's notice a statutory change: Under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, the State Government directed the Municipal Corporations in the State not to permit the change of use of the properties being used as fuel filling stations. So the applicant contended that even if the respondent recovered the leased property, he could not use it for any purposes other than for setting up a filling station. According to the applicant, this subsequent material change goes to the root of the matter.

77. This Court, then, has held that the respondent's effort to evict the applicant are legal, and "there is no challenge on that aspect." In the absence of any protection under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, the decree for possession must follow. On the issue of change of use, it has held that "the direction issued by the State Government will not affect the merits of the decree for eviction. The result of the said direction is that as and when the Respondent seeks permission to redevelop the suit property in question, the Mumbai Municipal Corporation will not be entitled to permit change of present user of the property." But it has nothing to do with the decree for eviction.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 561 of 2018 and 562 of 2016 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 237 of 2005 in Regular Civil Suit No. 149 of 1998

Decided On: 27.04.2020

 K.B. Lahoti and Company and Ors. Vs. Champalal Vithuram Jajoo and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dama Seshadri Naidu, J.

Citation: 2020(5) MHLJ 196,MANU/MH/0535/2020

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When change of user of tenanted premises should not be inferred?

 The main point urged on behalf of the Appellant is that the premises which was let out for saw mill is now being utilized for the purpose of manufacturing of grills which amount to change of user. Submissions were made before us by both sides on the interpretation of terms of the rent agreement. On a perusal of the agreement, we are convinced that there is no restriction placed on the Respondents-tenant to run business only relating to the saw mill. The tenant was given the liberty to carry on any other business as well. In the absence of any negative covenant the user does not amount to user for the purpose other than for which the premises was leased.1 A premises taken on rent for 'sugarcane crushing' was used for cloth business in which case the landlord's contention that there was change of user was rejected2. We agree with the judgments of the Courts below which are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 9598 of 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 19594 of 2008)

Decided On: 18.09.2018

Ravi Chand Mangla  Vs. Dimpal Solania and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

L. Nageswara Rao and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 10 SCC 610

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When tenant should not be evicted on ground of change of user from one business to another business?

 The main point urged on behalf of the Appellant is that
the premises which was let out for saw mill is now being
utilized for the purpose of manufacturing of grills which
amount to change of user. Submissions were made before
us by both sides on the interpretation of terms of the rent
agreement. On a perusal of the agreement, we are
convinced that there is no restriction placed on the
Respondents-tenant to run business only relating to the
saw mill. The tenant was given the liberty to carry on any
other business as well. In the absence of any negative
covenant the user does not amount to user for the purpose
other than for which the premises was leased.
Non - Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No.9598 of 2018

RAVI CHAND MANGLA Vs DIMPAL SOLANIA & ORS.

Dated:SEPTEMBER 18, 2018

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

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Whether removal of wall from tenanted premises amounts to damage to suit premises resulting in eviction of tenant?

As observed by the Courts below the front room as used for conducting the shop, appears to be intact, and on the rear side, there is now only one room which is a bigger room instead of two rooms. In my opinion, considering the evidence on record, the appellate Court has correctly negatived the findings as recorded by the learned trial judge on the issue of the petitioner changing the nature of the suit premises by converting into two residential rooms into one big room without the prior written consent of the respondent-landlord as the law would require, thereby causing damage to the suit premises. The observation and findings of the learned trial judge in answering issue No. 4 were patently erroneous and were rightly interfered by the appellate Court. The learned trial judge on the sole basis of the respondent's notice dated 14.10.1985 could not have come to a conclusion that the removal of the wall was a new theory and/or an afterthought and was subsequently introduced by the respondent, when there was a clear admission on the part of the petitioner in the written statement, in accepting the description of the suit tenancy as granted being of three rooms. However, the clear position on record was that there were only two rooms in existence. The Petitioner could not prove that this was not the correct factual position. There was no explanation from the petitioner much less acceptable, to show as to how the nature of the suit premises changed from three rooms into only two rooms. Thus the indefeasible conclusion which could be drawn was that the petitioner had removed one wall to convert the two residential rooms into a one bigger room. There cannot be any other conclusion, which could be deduced from the evidence available on record and as rightly observed by the appellate Court. It is significant that there was no material to show that the petitioner had taken prior permission to undertake any structural change or removal of the wall between the two residential rooms and thus as held by the appellate Court, rightly the provisions of Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act were applicable. The contention as urged on behalf of the petitioner that such structural alteration would not amount to waste of the suit premises to seek eviction under Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act, also cannot be accepted. This for the simple reason that the petitioner could not have made a permanent structural alteration of such nature to the suit premises, demised to him. The law does not confer any right on a tenant to act in such manner unless permitted by the landlord to undertake such changes, which only the landlord can do.

18. Thus, it was not open to the petitioner to structurally alter the suit premises by converting two rear rooms into one room by removing one wall. The wall is admittedly part of a building and definitely act of removal of wall amounts to causing a damage to the suit premises and a permanent injury to the larger premises of which the suit premises is a part. Further the nature of the structural alteration, as undertaken by the petitioner has substantially changed the character of the demised premises and thus, necessarily such acts on the part of the petitioner amounted to waste of the suit premises attracting Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act and entitling the respondent to a decree of eviction of the residential premises.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 6464 of 1999

Decided On: 28.11.2017

 Prafulkumar Damaji Gala Vs. Narayan Govind Gavate and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Kulkarni, J.

Citation: 2018(2) MHLJ 735

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How to ascertain dominant or primary use of tenanted premises in case of composite use?

At this stage the counsel on either side addressed me on the wording of the two relevant sub-clauses of Section 13(1). Section 13(1)(a) provides a ground for eviction when the tenant commits an act contrary to the provisions of Clause (o) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. Clause (o) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act in so far as is relevant requires the lessee not to use or permit another to use the property for a purpose other than that for which it was leased. Turning toSection 13(1) of the Rent Act, it is evident that the tenant can be evicted when the premises have not been used for the purpose for which they were let. It is true that to a certain extent the two clauses over-lap each other. Both speak of change of use. Section 13(1) has a wider connotation and covers not only positive but also negative aspect. When it is a case of mere failure to use or change of use then the tenant cannot be evicted, if he pleads and, establishes that he had a reasonable cause for the failure to use or change of use. There may be cases where even under Section 13(1) the premises are used wholly for a purpose for which they were not let. In such a case the Court will not find any difficulty in passing a decree in ejectment. But in the present case the premises are put to an additional or a different use and they are still used for the purpose for which they were let. In other words, it is a case of composite use. Whether the case falls within the ambit of Section 13(1)(a) or under Section 13(1)the Court will have to consider the dominant or primary use to find out whether there is a change of use so as to attract the provisions of either of the two sub-clauses.

20. As stated above, the wording of the two clauses of the sub-section provide no guidelines. But the object of the Rent Act is to protect tenants against indiscriminate eviction by landlords. Whenever the landlord complains that the tenant has changed the use of the premises, then the Courts must find out in the first instance the original purpose for which the premises are let. If the tenant is found to use the premises for an additional purpose or a purpose different from the purpose for which the premises were let, then it must be found as a fact in every case as to what is the dominant or primary use of the premises vis-a-vis the purpose of letting. It will be a question of fact to be decided in each particular case having regard to all the circumstances. It is not possible to give a list of all the relevant factors but Courts must bear in mind that the Rent Act is enacted primarily for protecting tenants against indiscriminate eviction. The tenants have no such protection under the general law which applies to all leases. It may be that a landlord has rushed to the Court on flimsy or superficial grounds. Or it may be that a tenant in a given case is trying to exploit the situation. In all such cases the Courts have to record a finding about the dominant or primary use of the premises vis-a-vis the purpose of letting. Some times the extent or mode of use may be a relevant factor. But it is difficult to lay down any definite objective test in this behalf.

Bombay High Court

Babhutmal Raichand Oswal vs Laxmibai Raghunath Tarte on 19 November, 1971

Equivalent citations: (1972) 74 BOMLR 214,1972 MHLJ 382

Bench: Bhasme

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Whether tenant can be evicted from tenanted premises on ground of change of user?

Counsel for Plaintiffs relied on the case of Vora Rahimbhai Haji Hasanbhai Popat vs. Vora Sunderlal Manilal and another, reported in MANU/SC/0391/1985 : A.I.R. 1986 S.C. Page No. 174, to submit that if the premises are not used without reasonable cause for more than six months prior to the date of suit, the tenant is liable to be evicted. The counsel further relied on the case of Bhaskar Wamanrao Rithe and another vs. Smt. Indira Iyer, reported in MANU/MH/1111/2005 : 2006(1) Mh.L.J. Page No. 155, to submit that if the premises were being used by third person or for a purpose other than the one for which the same were let out, it would amount to non using the premises for the purpose for which the same were let out.

9. Point for consideration is:

Whether the impugned Judgment and order of the District Court is illegal or suffers from material irregularity?

10. Section 13(1)(k) of the Bombay Rent Act, provided that the landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of the premises if the Court is satisfied that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let out for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit.

11. Non user for the purpose would take within its sweep even change in user. Judgment in the matter of Hari Rao vs. V. Govindachari and others (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for Defendant, related to Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act which prohibited conversion of residential building into a non residential building except with the permission in writing of the controller, any covenant in that behalf entered into by the tenant and the nature of the tenancy. Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the matter in that context and held that:

"Merely because a tenant, who has taken a building for the purpose of running a trade, alters the commodity in which he was trading when he took the building on lease or trades in other commodities also, he could not be held to be using the premises for the purpose other than the purpose for which it was let. The purpose has to be understood, as the purpose of trade and in the absence of a covenant barring the using of it for any other trade, it will be open to the tenant to use the premises for expanding his trade or even for taking up other lines of trade as befits a prudent trader."

12. The present matter is under Section 13(1)(k) of the Bombay Rent Act, which relates to non user of the premises for the purpose for which they were let out. There is no dispute regarding the fact that the ground floor part of the suit premises was let out for running a Khanawal i.e. eating house and later on by an agreement, the tenant was allowed to construct on the first floor where he was allowed to run a lodge. No doubt the letting out was for the purpose of trade but the tenant changed the user of the part of the premises on the ground floor from Khanawal into running a permit room. The Defendant tried to avoid accepting that he was running a permit room but the evidence as discussed by both the Courts below concurrently shows is that it has been proved that the Defendant was indeed running a permit room in part of the premises on the ground floor. The Appellate Court found that the Defendant closed the business of eating house and started permit room and there was also a murder in the same, for which the Defendant No. 1 and his brother faced sessions trial. It was found that the permit room continued till 1986 and from 1986 Defendant started business of hardware. The suit was filed on 16th January 1986 and in view of the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below, it is clear that in the six months prior to the date of filing of the suit, the Defendant had been running permit room in the suit premises. No reasonable cause for not using it as eating house is shown.

13. Defendant wanted to avoid accepting that he was running the permit room and in his pleadings appears to have kept silent on that count and even denied Plaint pleadings that he was running permit room. When there is a finding of fact that Defendant was running a permit room in the suit premises, Defendant has not brought on record any material to show that he had the necessary license to run the permit room, in his name in the suit premises in order to claim that he was entitled to conduct any other trade in the suit premises. At the time of arguments, learned counsel for contesting Respondents submitted that the permit was in the name of brother of the Defendant and the document was not proved in the trial Court. It would be illegal for the Defendant to run permit room without having excise license in his favour. Although Defendant may be able to say that he is entitled to run any other trade in place of the trade for which the premises were let out, he cannot claim that he can run a trade illegally in the suit premises.

14. Even if it was accepted for a moment that the Defendant had license to run the permit room, still running of a permit room in premises which were let out for the purpose of running a Khanawal or eating house, cannot be said to be any other trade. Looking to the nature of this trade, many landlords would be apprehensive to give their premises for such business. The trade attracts its own problems which is clear from the facts of present matter itself where it is admitted that murder took place in the suit premises and the Defendant along with his brother were sent to trial in a Sessions Case. Their acquittal does not convert a permit room into any other trade vis-à-vis "Khanawal" or eating house. It is for such reasons that landlords are apprehensive. Thus, the Courts below rightly found that the premises were not being used, without reasonable cause for the purpose for which the same were let.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Civil Revision Application No. 8 of 2013

Decided On: 17.02.2015

 Anil Vs. Jashrath and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.I.S. Cheema, J.

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When tenant is liable to be evicted on ground of change of user from residential to commercial?

 I have carefully considered the pleadings, oral evidence and the documentary evidence Exhibit 58. I have also considered the findings recorded by the first appellate Court. It appears that the first appellate Court was weighed with the part of the evidence showing description of the property and therefore, reached a conclusion that the property must have been used for business purposes. The fact remains that the first appellate Court did not refer to the exchange of notices amongst the parties, did not care to find out from the pleadings of the parties the purpose of letting the suit property. In my view, the judgment and order passed by the first appellate Court requires to be quashed and set aside. I am of the opinion that the totality of the pleadings and evidence on record shows that the property was not let out for duel purposes i.e. residential and business.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 981 of 2001 and Civil Application No. 6621 of 2005

Decided On: 11.01.2010

Gopalkrishna Ganpat Gulve  Vs.Shobhachand Raychand Firodiya

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Deshmukh, J.

Citation: 2010 (2 ) ALLMR 69

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Whether it is permissible for landlord to waive change of user from residential to commercial use?

The only question which has to be determined, therefore, is whether the tenant is entitled to urge that there is a waiver by the previous landlord of the breach committed by the tenant, inasmuch as for a period of six years from 1960 to 1967, the landlord has accepted rent without any protest and whether this would mean that breach has been waived and, according to the learned counsel, the present plaintiffs cannot take advantage of that breach since it has already been waived by the previous landlord. This argument was founded on a decision of the Punjab High Court in M/s. New Garage Ltd. v. Khuswant Singh & another MANU/PH/0024/1952 : AIR (1952 P&H. 82, where dealing with provisions of section 9(1)(b) of the Delhi & Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act, the Division Bench took the view that the effect of section 9(1)(b) of that Act was that if it was proved that by consent of the landlord premises have been used for purposes other than that for which they were let, a landlord will not have the right of ejectment. It was held that the consent may be either express or implied and, therefore, section 9(1)(b) would be defeated by waiver on the part of the landlord if it is proved that by his past conduct he had consented to a particular breach of the covenant with regard to user of the premises. Section 9(1)(b) of that Act provided as follows:--

9. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, no Court shall pass any decree in favour of a landlord, or make any order, in favour of a landlord whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting any tenant, whether or not the period of the tenancy has terminated, unless it is satisfied either.

* * * *

(b) that the tenant without the consent of the landlord, has whether before or after the commencement of this Act,

(i) used the premises for a purposes other than that for which they were let, or

Now, while it may not be possible to quarrel with the proposition-laid down in the Punjab decision, the ratio of that decision cannot be applied with full force in the present case in view of the provisions of section 25 of the Bombay Rent Act on which reliance has been placed by Shri Gumaste appearing on behalf of the landlord. Section 25 of the Bombay Rent Act is as follows :--

25. (1) A landlord shall not use or permit to be used for a nonresidential purpose any premises which on the date of the coming into operation of this Act were used for a residential purpose.

(2) Any landlord who contravenes the provisions of sub-section (i) shall, on conviction, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine or with both.

Shri Abhyankar has contended that section 25 is merely a penal provision and will not come in the way of the defendant if he wants to prove a waiver by the landlord. Now, it is clear on the reading of provisions of section 25 that it is in two parts. The first part is prohibitory in character and operates as an injunction against the landlord and prevents him from using or permitting to be used premises which are used for a residential purpose on the date of the coming into operation of the Rent Act to be used for a non-residential purpose. The object appears to be that the accommodation which is available for residential purposes should not be allowed to be reduced by unilateral action on the part of the landlord either by using it or by allowing it to be used for a non-residential purpose. Sub-section (2) of section 25 prescribes the penalty for a contravention of sub-section (1). Now, while it may not be disputed that a right of termination of lease flowing out of a breach or the lease by the tenant can be waived by the landlord if he does not want to exercise this right. In so far as the provisions of the Rent Act are concerned, the right of the landlord to allow the premises to be used for any other purpose in a case where the premises were originally taken for residential purposes is now controlled or indeed taken away by the provisions, of section 25(1). Any waiver which is bound ultimately to result in either temporary or permanent change in the user of residential premises for nonresidential purposes is bound to defeat the provisions of section 25 (1) which has clearly been enacted on the ground of public policy. Any contract between the landlord and the tenant whether expressly made or inferred by implied consent would, therefore, be only impermissible in a case where residential premises are sought to be used or allowed to be used for non-residential purposes in view of the imperative character of section 25 (1). In such a case, there is no question of any waiver because if a landlord cannot legally do anything expressly, the same result could not be brought about by implication. Thus, there is clear indication in section 25 (1) that a tenant cannot be permitted to use residential accommodation for non-residential purpose either by express permission or by permission granted impliedly and in such a case, it is not open, therefore, to the tenant to contend that the landlord has waived the breach so as to defeat his right under section 13 (1) (a) of the Bombay Rent Act, It is not, therefore, possible to accept the contention that the landlord has waived the breach.

11. It was then contended that the house is of 30 khans and only accommodation to the extent of 10 khans is being utilised for non-residential purposes and, therefore, the dominant use of the premises continued to be for residential purposes and consequently section 25 (1) will not be affected. Having regard to the nature of the provisions of section 25 (1) and its object, in my view, the question of either dominant use or ancillary use of the premises becomes wholly irrelevant. Even otherwise so far as the present case is concerned, mere extent of the accommodation will not be very relevant. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Spl. C.A. No. 561 of 1977

Decided On: 21.08.1981

Bansilal Rampratap Rathi Vs.Suratsing Chandanmal and others

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.N. Chandurkar, J.

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When tenant shall not be evicted from tenanted premises on ground of change of user?

Tenancy - Eviction - Change of use - Material Alteration - Sections 10 and 11 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 - Appeal against Order of eviction - Eviction on ground of change of use and wastage committed by installing signboard, racks and taking three phase electricity connection - Building rented for the purpose of trade - Tenant initially started shoe mart - Tenant started readymade business later on - Eviction on ground of change of business can be ordered only in case where change of activity make it totally alien to the purpose for which building was rented - Eviction cannot be ordered if the basic activity remain the same even after change of business by tenant - Putting up of sign board cannot be treated as wastage entitling eviction - Nothing to show that any danger or impairment in the value of building due to three phase connection taken by tenant - Eviction petition devoid of merit and dismissed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5751 of 2005 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 24112 of 2002]

Decided On: 15.09.2005

Hari Rao Vs.N. Govindachari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.N. Srikrishna and P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.

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When tenant is liable to be evicted from tenanted premises for change of user?

The question raised in this appeal is the interpretation of Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960. The question is whether in terms of the rent agreement between the appellant (tenant) and the respondent (landlord), if the tenant uses the shop for a different purpose than the one specified therein will he be liable for eviction?
Having heard learned Counsel for the parties in our considered view the case cited on behalf of the appellants were all those where there was no specific clause restricting the use of the tenanted accommodation. On the other hand, in the case in hand, there is specific prohibition clause in the rent deed. In the present case there is specific clause which states "shall be used by the tenant only for carrying on his own business....and the tenant shall not carry on any other business than the above said business". By the use of the words 'only' with reference to the tenant doing business coupled with the last three lines, namely, "the tenant shall not carry on any other business than the above said business", clearly spells out the intend of the parties which restricts the user of the tenanted premises, only for the business which is stated therein and no other. In order to meet this, learned Counsel for the appellant referred to Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act and language of Section 10(2)(ii)(b) which are similar hence he submits interpretation has to be given in a broader perspective, that is the use of building by the tenant should not be such as to damage it or diminishes its value and restriction if any could be that if it was' given for business it should not be used for residential purpose and vice versa. We have no hesitation to reject this. If such an Interpretation is given, it would make any specific term of a valid agreement redundant. Once parties enter into a contract then every word stated therein has to be given its due meaning which reveals the rights and obligations between the parties. No part of the agreement or words used therein could be said to be redundant.

Same is the position with regard to the ground of eviction contained in Section 13(2) wherein change in user of the building is alone significant for constituting the ground.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 141150 of 1996

Decided On: 29.02.2000

M. Arul Jothi & Anr.Vs. Lajja Bal (Deceased) & Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.P. Misra and N. Santosh Hegde, JJ.
Citation: AIR 2000 SC 1122

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