Whether married daughters of landlord are his dependents for the purpose of claiming eviction of tenant?

 The court is of the view that the status of financial well-being of a landlord or his family members-wife and children, who were dependent upon him, is not the test of bonafide requirement. All that was to be seen was whether there was a suitable alternate accommodation available with the landlord, for him to use or for providing the same to his daughters. No such suitable alternate accommodation has been shown. The impugned judgment has misdirected itself in an inquiry about the landlord's, his wife's and of the business of the husband's of the dependent daughters' or their economic well-being or in concluding that simply because the daughters of the petitioner were married, "happy with their matrimonial life" and alternate accommodation was available with their respective husbands, therefore, there was no need for them to start their business or to ask their father to provide them an accommodation for business. {Para 20} 

Ordinarily, for a daughter, irrespective of her matrimonial status, her paternal/maternal home is always a psychological, physical and emotional sanctuary, a place to which she can relate and return to freely, irrespective of how far she is geographically located from her parents. The law provides for eviction of a tenant on the need of dependants. Married daughters are included among dependents of their parents, for commercial/residential space.5 The test in law is about the dependency of the children upon the landlord/landlady when the property of the parent is in question.

22. In the present case, the married daughters are dependent upon their father for space to start their business in Delhi. The dependency was not pleaded on the husbands. The petition is maintainable. The daughters' need continues, so does the need of the petitioner. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023.

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Should the court refuse an eviction decree to the landlord if the husbands of his married daughters have accommodation?

 The landlord wanted his property not only for his daughters but for himself also. Assuming that accommodation was available with the respective husbands of the two daughters, surely it was not expected of the father-in-law to take assistance of his daughters and request them to make available such space through their respective husbands, for him to start a business enterprise. And why should he? The law does not require him to do so. Would it not compromise his self-respect and affect delicate family relations? Furthermore, the nature of the proposed business could be discussed/re-assessed/altered at any stage when the accommodation was made available, the landlord was not required to indicate the nature of business he intended to initiate. {Para 16}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023.

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Should a landlord have all information about the income and assets of his wife and disclose it before the court to seek eviction of a tenant?

 

 The impugned judgment then delves into the examination of nature of business being carried out by the landlord i.e. whether the hotel business was being run from 19 rooms to 13 rooms and how it was being run. It also doubted the credibility of the landlord on the ground that, since his family comprised only his wife and two daughters, he should have known the received income of his wife from her business of running a hotel. It further records that the hotel business was being run from the first and second floor of a building which was rented by the same Wakf-ul-aulad, to a partnership firm in which his brothers, sisters and sister-in-law were partners. The learned ARC inferred dishonesty and concealment on the part of the petitioner because he did not disclose these aspects and of his wife's business. {Para 11}

12. The court is of the view that the aforesaid inquiry was neither relevant nor necessary because for the purposes of a petition under section 141(1)(e) read with section 25B of the DRC Act, only the availability of suitable alternate accommodation is to be seen. It also presupposes that a husband has a right to know all details of his wife's business and financial affairs, as if the wife had no right to financial and business confidentiality or personal independence or privacy. There cannot be an assumption that the wife is subservient to her husband and is obliged to disclose to or share with her husband details of all her financials. In the present case, it was only to be seen: Whether a suitable alternate accommodation was available on the ground floor for the petitioner and/or his daughters for starting the business.

21. A wife is neither an appendage of nor an adjunct to her husband. Her identity does not merge with or get subsumed in her husband's identity. In law, she retains her individual entity. She retains her natural right to pursue her dreams, aspirations and the desire and need to be financially independent or otherwise do some meaningful social work. Idle luxuriation may not be the life-goal of many a woman or to be simply known as a rich man's wife. There is a certain self-worth which a person acquires by running her or his own business/commercial enterprise, vocation and professional activity. This aspiration cannot be questioned in proceedings for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement of the tenanted premises.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023.

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Should a landlord disclose his entire financial transactions and file details of his income tax returns to prove his bona fide need for eviction of a tenant?

 

 The court is of the view that disclosure of his entire financial affairs by a tenant is neither essential in an eviction petition nor is it mandatory for the landlord to disclose all properties owned by her/him. Receipt of rentals from leased properties is a legitimate exercise. A plea of bonafide requirement has to be pivoted on the fact that the landlord had no other suitable alternative accommodation and there was a need for the same, not a mere wish. The landlord was not required to file details of his income tax returns and not filing the same along with the eviction petition would neither whittle away nor cast a doubt on the bonafide need, which is otherwise made out in the eviction petition.1 The "sufficiency" of income of a landlord or that he was well-off cannot be an issue for examination in eviction proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act.2 For who can sit in judgment as to what is sufficient finance for a person or his/her family. There can be no check, hindrance or curtailment to aspirations of an individual.{Para 10}.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023.

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Whether the rent control Court has jurisdiction to decide eviction of tenant proceeding instituted before amendment Act 2013 of S 83 of wakf Act?

 At the outset, the respondent has questioned the maintainability of the eviction petition before the learned ARC on the ground that under section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995 only the Wakf Tribunal had jurisdiction to deal with matters relating to eviction of a tenant of a Wakf property, section 85 of the said Act bars jurisdiction of other courts in respect of the matters which the Wakf Tribunal is empowered to decide, therefore, the eviction petition could not have been decided or entertained by the learned ARC. Reliance is placed by the respondent upon the following judgments: Rashid Wali Beg vs Farid Pindari MANU/SC/1001/2021 : (2022) 4 SCC 414; Syed Amir Ali vs Anjuman-e-Maidan [CM(M) 521/2021 decided on 02.12.2021 by High Court of Delhi; and Mehnish Adil vs Delhi Wakf Board 2002 (286) DLT 654.

6. Refuting the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Gobindram vs Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf MANU/SC/0659/2010 : (2010) 8 SCC 726, which while dealing with an eviction petition prior to the amendment of section 83 of the Wakf Act in November, 2013 held that an eviction petition against a Wakf property would also be maintainable before a Civil Court. In Rashid Wali (supra) the Supreme Court held as under:

"....45. Interestingly, the basis of the decision in Ramesh Gobindram was removed through an amendment under Act 27 of 2013. As we have stated elsewhere, Ramesh Gobindram sought to address the question whether a Waqf Tribunal was competent to entertain and adjudicate upon disputes regarding eviction of persons in occupation of what are admittedly waqf properties. Since this Court answered the question in the negative, Section 83(1) was amended by Act 27 of 2013 to include the words, "eviction of tenant or determination of rights and obligations of the lessor and lessee of such property"."

7. However, the 2013 Amendment does not make section 83 of the Wakf Act applicable retrospectively. The eviction petition relates to 24.12.2009, i.e. more than over four years before the amendment came into effect. No notification was issued regarding transfer to the Wakf Tribunal of all cases relating to wakfs pending before the ARC under the DRC Act. Interestingly, this issue was never raised before by the tenant. On 11.02.2015, this court had remanded the matter to the learned ARC for decision on the issue of leave to defend. The said remand and direction received affirmation of the Supreme Court on 07.05.2015.

8. In view of the above, the eviction petition was maintainable before the learned ARC. The tenant's contentions to the contrary are untenable and are rejected. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 367/2018, CM Appls. 13453/2023 and 22041/2023

Decided On: 07.07.2023

 Nisar Ahmed  Vs.  Agya Pal Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Najmi Waziri, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/4291/2023

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Whether Landlord can file composite suit seeking eviction of the tenant from tenanted property and encroached property?

 In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner and others, MANU/SC/0071/2004 : AIR 2004 SC 1801, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a plaint is to be read in its entirety and not in piece. Whether relief could be granted on the pleaded facts and evidence adduced is totally different from the relief claimed. All the relevant claims may not be allowed to a party on the pleadings and evidence adduced. Whether part of the relief cannot be granted by the Civil Court is a different matter from saying that because of a combined claim of reliefs the jurisdiction is ousted or no cause of action is disclosed. Where the main dispute related to the question of continuance of tenancy and the period of tenancy of the appellant with the trust and other reliefs were regarding enquiry into affairs of the trust, the application would not have been rejected on the ground that the civil court lacks jurisdiction on account of institution of composite suit or on account of any misjoinder of cause of action. In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that reliefs relatable to sections 51 and 51 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, ought to have been segregated from the other reliefs in relation to tenancy and continuance of tenancy, since, such other reliefs were well within the jurisdiction of the civil court. Accordingly, adjudication of the suit was restricted only upon question of tenancy, terms of tenancy and the period of tenancy. For rest of the reliefs, plaintiff was permitted to make such application as warranted in law for relinquishment and/or giving up claim of other reliefs. From this, it is quite clear that even assuming that the suit in the present case was a composite suit seeking eviction not only from the tenanted premises but also from the encroached premises, that by itself, was not sufficient to dismiss the entire suit as not maintainable. As noted earlier, upon reading of the plaint in its entirety and the context in which the pleadings appear, it cannot be said that the relief was prayed for even in respect of encroached portion. In any case, the ratio of Sopan Sable (supra) is a clear answer to the issue that the suit could not have been dismissed in its entirety on the alleged ground that the same was a composite suit.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Civil Revision Application No. 60 of 2015

Decided On: 05.02.2018

 Mangilal Mishrimal Bafna  Vs. Nemichand Khetmal Jain 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.S. Sonak, J.

Citation:  2018(4)AllMR 104,

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Whether a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant from tenanted premises used for commercial purpose for his residential use?

 It is settled proposition of law that even if the premises has been let out for commercial purposes and are being used as commercial, a petition under section 14(1)(e) of the Act for bonafide need for use as residential is maintainable.

12. It is an admitted position that the property is situated in a residential area though there are several commercial establishments in and around the property. However, the use premises, as specified in the Master Plan for the subject property, is residential.

13. Even though the building may have been put to commercial use for over 40 years, there is no prohibition in law in reconverting the property and putting the same for residential use.

Delhi High Court

Mohd Yusuf vs Mohd Rehan Siddiqui & Ors on 14 January, 2020

 RC.REV. 207/2018
       

CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA

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Whether transferee landlord can seek eviction of tenant if tenanted property is transferred to it by operation of law?

It is no doubt true that per se Section 109 and 507 of T.P. Act does not apply to the facts of this case. It contemplates transfer of lessor's right inter vivos. But when right, title and interest in immovable property stand transferred by operation of law, the spirit behind Section 109 per force would apply and successor in interest would be entitled to the rights of the predecessor. This is what the learned single Judge of the High Court in the impugned judgment has held and we approve of the view as correct. We, accordingly, hold that the notice terminating the tenancy of Vasantkumar would enure to the benefit of the respondent and it could be availed of by the respondent to lay the suit for ejectment.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1348 of 1990

Decided On: 21.08.1990

Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora Vs. The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.N. Saikia and K. Ramaswamy, JJ.

Citation:  AIR 1991 SC 14.

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Whether court can direct eviction of tenant on basis of statement made by Advocate of tenant?

 It has been held by the Apex Court in Babu Ram Gupta (supra) that even if there was an undertaking given by the counsel on behalf of his client, the undertaking should be carefully construed to find out the extent and nature of the undertaking actually given by the person concerned. It is not open to the Court to assume an implied undertaking when there is none on the record. In the instant case, the Senior Counsel for the bank had not given any undertaking before the Court that the premises shall be vacated within four months or within any specific time.

27. The matter can be looked from another angle also. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent. Statutory provisions cannot be violated by consent. Conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function. Jurisdiction can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court. The Court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute. In such eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply (See Jagmittar Sain Bhagat v. Health Services, Haryana : MANU/SC/0703/2013 : AIR 2013 SC 3060). A wrong concession, on a question of law, made by counsel is not binding on his client (See Uptron India Limited v. Shammi Bhan: MANU/SC/0258/1998 : AIR 1998 SC 1681). Neither the client nor the Court is bound by the lawyer's statements or admissions as to matters of law or legal conclusions. A lawyer generally has no implied or apparent authority to make an admission or statement which would directly surrender or conclude the substantial legal rights of the client unless such an admission or statement is clearly a proper step in accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer was employed (See Himalayan Co-operative Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh : MANU/SC/0609/2015 : AIR 2015 SC 2867). Therefore, immunity from eviction enjoyed by the bank under the provisions of the Act is not lost on account of the statement made by the counsel for the bank in the Court that the premises would be surrendered immediately on construction of currency chest in another building.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

W.A. No. 2598 of 2017

Decided On: 02.07.2019

 Central Bank of India  Vs.  Beena Thiruvenkitam

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.K. Abdul Rehim and R. Narayana Pisharadi, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 Kerala 216

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Whether landlord should have funds in cash for getting eviction of tenant for redevelopment of tenanted premises?

The learned Counsel for the tenants/defendants mainly harped on the conditions in Section 16(6) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, which are required to be complied with by the landlord strictly. The learned Counsel contended that as per the condition (a), no decree for eviction shall be passed unless the Court is satisfied that the necessary funds for the purpose of the erection of new building are available with the landlord. The Courts below have noted that as per the oral evidence on record, two sons and other family members of the plaintiff had actually an amount of Rs. 6 lakh in their bank accounts when the suit was filed. Besides that the Yogiraj Sahakari Patsanstha had given letters Exhibits 45 and 46 that the society had decided to give financial assistance of Rs. 25 lakh to each of the plaintiffs namely, Pandharinath and Vithal, who are the two sons of the original landlord. It shows that besides cash of Rs. 6 lakh with them, the plaintiffs had assurance of financial assistance of Rs. 50 lakh from the co-operative society. As per the estimate submitted by the plaintiff, cost of construction of tenements for the tenants admeasuring 1250 sq.ft. will be Rs. 11,50,000/- and for remaining construction cost is Rs. 33 lakhs. Taking into consideration the estimated cost, the plaintiffs have made sufficient arrangement for meeting the cost of construction. The learned Counsel for the tenants vehemently contended that as per the Clause (a) of Sub-section (6), the funds should be actually available with the landlord. I am unable to accept this contention. The words "necessary funds are available" only mean that the landlord should be in a position to arrange funds for the purpose of demolition of old structure and construction of new building as per the plan within stipulated period of fifteen months. It is not necessary that all the funds should be available with landlord in hard cash and he should be in a position to show that amount to the Court at the time of trial. Nowadays large projects for construction of buildings as well as industries are taken up with assurance of financial aid or assistance from the financial institutions or banks. Therefore, I find no substance in this contention of the learned Counsel for the tenants.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Rev. Appln. Nos. 564, 565, 573 and 574 of 2007

Decided On: 13.12.2007

 Kisan Vanaji Satpure  Vs. Baburao Jakhuji Wakankar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.H. Bhatia, J.

Citation: 2008(2) Bom CR 126

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Whether co-owner who has not inducted a tenant can seek eviction of such tenant?

Examining the proposition from another angle, it may be noticed that the tenancy rights are indivisible and a co-owner is competent to induct tenant in part of whole of the building. The tenant cannot be evicted from part of the tenant premises. An act of the co-owner of inducting a tenant binds all other co-owners. After a tenant has been inducted, he is a tenant under all the co-owners. Therefore, a co-owner who has not inducted a tenant can seek eviction of such tenant. The right and liabilities of the co-owner creates a legal fiction of tenancy against all co-owner.

In view of the rights of the co-owner as explained by the Larger Bench Judgment of this Court as well as by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s India Umbrella Manufacturing Co., Dhannalal's cases (supra) and Mahavir Prasad Jain v. Manohar Lal Jain 2006(2) SCC 724, a co-owner NRI can seek eviction of the tenant in a building  though the tenant was not inducted by such NRI and that it is not necessary that all other co-owners should be Non Resident Indians.

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Smt. Bachan Kaur And Others vs Kabal Singh & Another on 26 April, 2011

Civil Revision No. 4025 of 2006    

CORAM:       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA

             HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARVIND KUMAR

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Whether lessee is liable to be evicted even if he has made construction in tenanted premises with permission of municipal corporation?

 The question whether the construction by itself is a violation of the terms and conditions of the lease deed and whether for such violation any right has accrued to the defendant to terminate the lease or not, is a legal question and in my considered view, is not a triable issue for which no evidence is required. The argument advanced by the learned Counsels appearing for the defendant that inasmuch as permission obtained from the Kolkata Municipal Corporation before making construction the construction cannot be said to be illegal or unauthorized. The word 'unauthorized' should be interpreted not in the context of Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, but in the context of the agreed terms between the parties. In the present case, the terms and conditions incorporated in the lease deed were agreed by the parties and for any breach thereof, the defaulting party is bound to suffer the consequences. Therefore, legality of the construction need not be considered through evidence inasmuch as the defendant has admitted that they have made construction.

17. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Thimmappa Rai (supra) an admission made by a party to the suit in an earlier proceeding is admissible as against him provided such an admission is a relevant fact. The admission made by the defendant is with regard to the construction at the demised premises and this construction has a direct nexus with the prohibition contained under the lease deed which entitles the lessor to re-enter into possession upon termination of lease. Therefore, the defendant is bound to suffer consequence of making such construction in violation of the terms of the lease deed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

G.A. No. 1058 of 2016 and C.S. No. 100 of 2009

Decided On: 14.02.2018

Kanak Projects Limited  Vs.  Hooghly Printing Company Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sahidullah Munshi, J.

Citation: AIR 2018 (NOC) 792 Cal

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Whether family member of tenant can reside in tenanted premises after eviction of tenant?

The Ld. counsel for the appellants/defendants argued that the subject suit could not be decreed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC because it has to be determined as to whether the decree has to be passed against appellant no. 1/defendant no. 1/brother or against the appellant no. 2/defendant no. 2/sister, because it is only against a tenant that a decree can be passed.

6. The trial court, though in my opinion, has rightly observed that the fact of the matter is that either one of the appellants/defendants is a tenant and therefore such a person who is a tenant is liable to vacate the property, and therefore the decree for possession has to be passed. The trial court in this regard has rightly observed in paras 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment which read as under:-

"10. From the stand taken by both the defendants, it is clear that they are trying to create confusion regarding relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. But, it is also manifests from the written statements of both the defendants that one of them is tenant of the plaintiff in the suit property and other is residing therein not in his/her individual capacity but as a family member of the one who is tenant in the property.

11. To the mind of this court, the question under consideration is limited whether the plaintiff is entitled for the decree of possession u/o 12 rule 6 CPC, therefore, the controversy whether it is the defendant no. 1 or the defendant no. 2 is the tenant losses its importance in the pecuniary facts of this case since, as already observed, one of the defendant admittedly is the tenant in the property and other is residing only as family member of the tenant. The defendant no. 2 has stated herself to be tenant of the plaintiff in the suit property w.e.f. 16.01.2014, on the basis of oral tenancy entered between her and plaintiff. The plaintiff has denied any such oral tenancy agreement between her and defendant no. 2. Considering, only for the purpose of point under consideration, the averments of the defendant no. 2 to be correct that she is the tenant of the plaintiff in the suit property, the ingredient of relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant no. 2 stands established."

7. In my opinion, the aforesaid conclusion of the trial court is buttressed by the legal provision of Order I Rule 7 CPC which provides that where the plaintiff is in doubt from whom the relief is to be sought, the plaintiff in such a situation can add more than one parties as defendants to the suit. This provision of Order I Rule 7 CPC reads as under:-

"7. When plaintiff in doubt from whom redress is to be sought. Where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to obtain redress, he may join two or more defendants in order that the question as to which of the defendants is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as between all parties."

8. In my opinion, therefore, the reasoning and conclusion of the trial court is correct because in a suit for possession, a person who has no right to continue in the tenanted premises, as the tenancy of the tenant stands terminated, a decree for possession has to be passed, and the same was therefore rightly passed by the trial court by making relevant observations in paras 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment which are reproduced above, and this reasoning is buttressed by Order I Rule 7 CPC, which has also been reproduced above. The person who is the tenant is evicted and the other appellant living only as a family member of the tenant will also go when the tenant is evicted.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RFA No. 945/2018

Decided On: 07.12.2018

 Ramesh Chander Sethi  Vs. Shashi Grover

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Valmiki J. Mehta, J.

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Whether tenant is entitled to get alternative accommodation if he is evicted for demolition of tenanted building?

 Section 16(1)(i) provided that the decree for eviction may be passed if the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting new building on the premises sought to be demolished. Similarly under Section 16(1)(j), decree can be passed if the premises let out consist of a tenement or tenements on the terrace of a building and such tenement or tenements being is required by the landlord for the purpose of the demolition thereof and erection or raising of a floor or floors on such tenements. In both these cases, building is not required to be demolished because it is in dilapidated condition nor there is any order from the Municipal Corporation to demolish the building. The landlord seeks to demolish the premises or such tenements for the purpose of erection of new building or for erection or raising some additional floors on the existing building. Naturally such work is taken up for his own benefit or for the purpose of optimum utilisation of the land or F.S.I., which may be available to him. When decree of eviction is passed on these two grounds under Section 16(1)(i) and (j), provision is specifically made in Section 16(6)(d)(ii) that after construction of new building or new floor or floors in the existing building, the landlord shall offer the concerned tenant premises in the re-erected building or the floors as the case may be.

14. From this provision, it is clear that wherever legislature wanted to provide protection to the tenants even after passing a decree for eviction, legislature has specifically made provision that he shall be accommodated in the newly constructed building or in new floor or floors in the existing building or in the existing building itself after it is repaired. However, no such provision is made if decree of eviction is passed under Section 16(1)(g) or under Section 16(1)(k). As noted above the learned Appellate Court observed that under Section 16(1) of Bombay Rent Act the tenant has a remedy and can claim possession in newly constructed building or in the proposed building and hence, the right of alternative accommodation which is given by the legislature cannot be taken away. However, the learned Appellate Court also opined that such right given by the legislature cannot be taken away merely because building is demolished by the Municipal Corporation. He further observed that object of Section 16(1)(k) is to save the public and occupant of the building from danger, but it is nowhere stated in the Act that when in such circumstances building is demolished, tenant has no right to claim tenancy. If the observations of the learned Appellate Court are accepted, the Court will have to read something in the statute, which is not there. It is the settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the Court has to give plain meaning to the language used by the legislation and only when the language used by the legislature is ambiguous, the Court may try to interpret the same in such a way that it serves and furthers the purpose and object of the legislation. But when there is no such ambiguity, question of reading something in the statute is not permissible. From different provisions contained in Section 16(1)(h), (i) and (j) read with Section 16(6) and Section 17, it is amply clear that wherever the legislature wanted to give protection to the tenant even after passing a decree for eviction, a specific provision in that respect is made in the Act. When no such provision is made under Section 16(1)(g) and under Section 16(1)(k) it must be held that the legislature did not want to give such protection to the tenant after decree of eviction. If the legislature wanted to provide such protection, it would have specifically provided in the Act, as it is done in case of eviction under Section 16(1)(h),(i) and (j). As no such protection is given to the tenant against whom decree of eviction is passed under Section 16(1)(g) and (k), the Court cannot presume existence of such provision nor it can hold that such provision should be read in the statute. Any such attempt on the part of the Court would amount to modifying provisions of law or amending and adding something t44o the statutes.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Contempt Petition No. 390 of 2006 and Civil Rev. Appln. No. 131 of 2008

Decided On: 13.02.2008

 Sharadchandra Vasant Chitnis Vs. Neela Ashok Korde and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.H. Bhatia, J.

Citation: 2010(1) MHLJ1006:2010(5) ALLMR134

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Whether eviction proceeding can proceed further on other grounds if tenanted premises is demolished?

 The High Court has taken a view that once the delivery of the premises had already been taken in execution and for that matter, in case vacant possession of the premises had been surrendered, no further proceedings for eviction can be pursued on any other ground. In the instant case, the delivery of possession had already been taken. The High Court observed that ".........the subject matter of eviction proceedings itself having become non-est by such demolition, the landlord could not have proceeded further with a claim for eviction on other grounds, inter alia, on ground Under Section 11 (4) (iii) of the Act, which was illegally allowed by the Appellate Authority." In that view of the matter, the Civil Revision Petitions were allowed. The orders passed by the first Appellate Authority were set aside and those of the Rent Control Court were restored. In other words, the Appellants-landlords have been granted eviction only on the ground of demolition and reconstruction Under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act.

9. Thus aggrieved, the Appellants-landlords are before this Court.

10. Heard Sh. R. Basant, learned senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants-landlords and Sh. Ranjith K.C., learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents-tenants.

11. With great respect, we find it difficult to appreciate the view taken by the High Court. The moot question is whether the landlords are entitled to eviction on all the grounds taken by the landlords in the petitions for eviction. It needs to be noted that eviction on the respective grounds under the Act has different ramifications since the grounds being distinct and separate. Therefore, merely because the landlords have taken possession on the basis of an order for eviction granted on one ground, that does not mean that the surviving grounds have become non-est. For all practical purposes and legal consequences, the said grounds do survive to be considered under law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 6819-6820 of 2009

Decided On: 29.03.2017

Valiyavalappil Sarojakshan  Vs. Sumalsankar Gaikevada

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kurian Joseph and R. Banumathi, JJ.

Citation: 2017(1) RCR 514

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Whether it is mandatory for landlord to reconstruct and permit tenants to re-enter if he seeking eviction on ground of demolition?

 A perusal of the aforesaid provisions show that where a building is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the said building, the tenant shall have right of re-entry in the premises on its reconstruction. The language of Sub-clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 is plain and simple and does not suffer from any ambiguity. Therefore, when a landlord requires a building to be demolished, necessarily he has to reconstruct the building on the same site of the building and on reconstruction of new building the tenant has a right to re-enter in the said premises. Learned counsel for the respondent urged that the word "and" occurring in Sub-clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 is disjunctive and it has to be read as "or" meaning thereby that after demolition of the building the landlord is not required to reconstruct the building. If such interpretation is given, then it would encourage the unscrupulous landlord to get eviction of the tenants on the ground of demolition of the building which would be repugnant to the object of the Act which aims to prevent unreasonable eviction of the tenant from the premises. We are, therefore, of the view that where the landlord requires demolition of the building, he has necessarily to reconstruct the same with a right to the tenant to re-enter in the premises.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. Nos. 9987 and 89 of 1995

Decided On: 04.11.1999

Kondeti Suryanarayana  Vs.  Pinninthi Seshagiri Rao

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.N. Khare and S.N. Phukan, JJ.

Citation: AIR2000 SC70:(1999) 8 SCC 658

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Whether landlord will be debarred from seeking eviction of tenant if receives rent after issuance of quit notice?

 The mere fact that the tenant continues in possession and rent is accepted and the suit is not instituted are insufficient circumstances for inferring an intention to create a new tenancy after expiration of the first. An English commentary "Landlord and Tenant", was quoted by the High Court thus: 

"Generally speaking, giving a second notice to quit does not amount to a waiver of a notice previously given unless, with other circumstances, it is the basis for inferring an intention to create a new tenancy after the expiration of the first." 

27. To the same effect are the decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Shiv Jeet Singh vs. Charan Singh (supra) and Bombay High Court in Nanaji Gajanan Upganlawar vs. Shabbir Husain Fida Hussain (supra). The illustrations to Section 113 of the Transfer of Property Act were considered and it was observed that merely because a second notice was given, the first notice cannot be deemed to have been waived. To create a new tenancy, there must be an express or an implied agreement to that effect, and such agreement cannot be unilateral. It has to be bilaterally agreed between the tenant and the landlord for extension of lease. 

28. This High Court in Post Master General vs. District Judge (supra) and Waqf Allal Aulad (supra) has observed that the tenancy would stand terminated on the expiry of the notice period. The Landlord would be justified in receiving the rent for the notice period from the date of service of notice. But merely acceptance of such rent could not be treated as an implied or express consent to treat the lease / tenancy as subsisting on the part of the Landlord. If the Rent Control Act does not apply, then the tenant is liable to be simply evicted after termination of tenancy default or no default in payment of rent, it is wholly immaterial. 

29. In a Full Bench decision in Gokaran Singh vs. 1st Additional District Judge (2000) 40, ALR 405, this Court had observed that even if Rent Control Act applies and in the notice a wrong period of default and a wrong rate of rent is mentioned, still notice does not become invalid. 

31. This kind of reasoning can only be said to be perverse. In Swaroop Singh Gupta vs. S. Gagdish Singh (supra) the Supreme Court has observed that mere acceptance of rent for the period in between the issuance of two notices to vacate would not itself constitute an act on the part of the Landlord showing an evidence to treat the lease as subsisting. The fact remains that even after accepting the rent tendered the landlord filed a suit for eviction. It cannot therefore be said that by accepting the rent he intended to waive the notice and to treat the lease as subsisting. The second notice after which the suit was filed for ejectment was not treated as illegal by the Supreme Court only because the first notice to quit was held as determining the tenancy without creating a new tenancy, by the act of the Landlord to accept the rent in the meantime. 

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Delivered On :22.11.2018 

CIVIL REVISION No. - 564 of 2011 

Praveen Kumar Jain Vs Jagdish Prasad Gupta 

Hon'ble Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra,J.

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When tenant should not be evicted on ground of change of user from one business to another business?

 The main point urged on behalf of the Appellant is that
the premises which was let out for saw mill is now being
utilized for the purpose of manufacturing of grills which
amount to change of user. Submissions were made before
us by both sides on the interpretation of terms of the rent
agreement. On a perusal of the agreement, we are
convinced that there is no restriction placed on the
Respondents-tenant to run business only relating to the
saw mill. The tenant was given the liberty to carry on any
other business as well. In the absence of any negative
covenant the user does not amount to user for the purpose
other than for which the premises was leased.
Non - Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No.9598 of 2018

RAVI CHAND MANGLA Vs DIMPAL SOLANIA & ORS.

Dated:SEPTEMBER 18, 2018

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

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Whether court should order eviction of tenant on ground of compromise if ground for eviction is not made out?

The common thread that runs through the aforesaid pronouncements
of this Court is – in cases where protection under a Rent Act is available, no
eviction can be ordered unless ground seeking eviction is made out, even if
parties had entered into a compromise. Moreover, the invalidity on that
count can even be raised in execution. In the present case, the order dated
28.03.2014 did not remotely note that any particular ground under the Rent
Act was made out.
15. In the circumstances, in our considered view, the order passed by the
appellate court was absolutely correct and did not call for any interference on part of the High Court.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8256-8257 OF 2018

M/s Alagu Pharmacy & Ors. V N. Magudeswari 

Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
Dated:August 14, 2018.
Citation:(2018)8 SCC 311,AIR 2018 SC 3821

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Whether it is necessary for landlord to indicate precise nature of business which he intends to start in tenanted premises?

The Courts below have also taken the view that, in law, it is essential for the landlord to mention about the alleged requirement of the suit premises and in absence thereof no decree could be passed on this ground. Even this principle is no more res integra. The Apex Court, in Raj Kumar Khaitan v. Bibi Zubaida Khatun, has taken the view that it is not necessary for the landlord to indicate the precise nature of the business which he intends to start in the premises and even if the nature of the business had been indicated by the landlord, nobody can bind the landlord to start the same after the suit premises are vacated. {Para 31}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 6286 of 1987

Decided On: 27.06.2001

Shankar Bhairoba Vadangekar Vs. Ganpati Appa Gatare

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