Whether prosecution for defamation can be initiated against Judge for comments made by him in Judgment?

 According to Dr. Saha, the observations of the Supreme Court in the
case of Malay Kumar Ganguly (supra) established that the comments which
were made against him in the judgment delivered on 19 March 2004 were
defamatory and under such circumstances cognizance should have been taken
and process ought to have been issued. In the event the respondent no. 1 wanted
to invoke protection granted under the said statute, it could be tested whether
such comments are made in discharge of his judicial duty or function or not at
that stage.
43. In my opinion, comments forming part of a judgment per se would
constitute “words spoken” or “act committed” in discharge of judicial duty. There
is no allegation in the subject complaint that such comments were prompted or
motivated by any external factor, as was in the case of Ravi Shankar
Srivastava (supra). Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the 1985 would thus prohibit any Court from entertaining any criminal or civil action for use of any expression
used in a judgment. So far as the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the
1985 Act are concerned, the power to institute civil criminal or departmental
proceeding has been preserved for the Central Government, State Government,
the Supreme Court of India, any High Court or any other authority. The
provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, constitute exception to the
provisions of subsection (1) of Section 3. The embargo under Sub-section (1) of
Section 3 of the 1985 Act is on a Court in entertaining any proceeding against a
Judge made in discharge of his official or judicial duty. But Sub-section (2)
thereof permits specified constitutional or statutory authorities to bring such
action, if permitted under the law. In such a proceeding, whether the acts
complained against had reasonable nexus with discharge of judicial or official
duty or function or not could be examined. But a private person is not authorised
under the said provision to initiate action against a Judge by instituting civil or
criminal proceeding in relation to any action taken in discharge of judicial duty.
As I have already observed, comments made in a judgment would ex facie
constitute acts done or words spoken in discharge of judicial duty. The judgment
of the respondent no. 1 itself has been sustained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
In the event the construction contemplated by Dr. Saha on the aforesaid
provision is accepted, such construction would render the provisions of Subsection
(1) of Section 3 of the 1985 Act otiose as the protection given therein in
such a situation would only be illusory. In view of the provisions of Sub-section
(1) of Section 3 of the Act, in respect of a complaint instituted by a private individual under Section 500 of the I.P.C. containing allegation that comments
made in a judgment constitutes offence under the aforesaid provision, a learned
magistrate would have no jurisdiction to entertain the same.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA BOSE
C.R.R. No. 2755 OF 2011

KUNAL SAHA  Vs.  MR. GORA CHAND DEY JUSTICE 

Citation;2016 CRLJ(NOC)126 Cal
Judgment On: 21.09.2012
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.:-

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Whether posting of comment on facebook amounts to criminal intimidation?

 In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of "Criminal intimidation". The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the minds of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on the Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of appellants posting a comment on the Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.

Supreme Court of India

Manik Taneja & Anr vs State Of Karnataka & Anr on 20 January, 2015

Bench: V. Gopala Gowda, R. Banumathi

Citation;2015 ALLSCR 960:AIR 2015 SC(SUPP)671

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Whether Posting comments about ill treatment by Police on their FB page may amount to Assault (S. 353 IPC) or criminal intimidation (S. 503 IPC)?

A Supreme Court Bench comprising of Justice V. Gopala Gowda and Justice R. Banumathi, while quashing an FIR registered against the appellants, observed, “As far as the comments posted on the Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of appellants posting a comment on the Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.”

The Court was hearing a Special Leave Petition against karnataka High Court judgment which had dismissed a petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., holding that it was premature and was filed even before the completion of investigation.

The appellant had met with an accident with an auto rickshaw while she was driving. The passenger of the auto sustained injuries and was duly admitted in the hospital. The appellant had paid all the hospital expenses of the injured and the matter was amicably settled between them. No FIR was lodged. They were however called to the Police Station and were alleged threatened by the officers.

Being aggrieved with the manner with which they were treated, the appellants posted comments on the Bangalore Traffic Police Facebook page, accusing the respondent Police Officer of his and also forwarded an email complaining about the harassment meted out to them at the hands of the Respondent Police Inspector.

A Complaint was hence filed against them by the Police Inspector for posting of the comment on the Facebook by the appellants and FIR was registered against them under Sections 353 and 506 IPC.

It was submitted that such posting of derogatory comments on the Facebook page amounts to ‘threatening’ and ‘criminal intimidation’ within the meaning of Section 506 IPC affecting the complainant’s reputation and integrity

The appellants had contended that the Facebook page of the Bengaluru traffic police itself is a public forum meant for citizens to discuss and post their grievances and therefore, the comment of the appellants posted on the Facebook would not prima facie constitute an offence.

The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant.

The Court observed that there was nothing on record to show that force was used by the appellants or that the appellants assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the respondent from discharging his official duty.

With respect to section 503, it is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “Criminal intimidation”.

The Bench observed that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the minds of the respondent Police Inspector causing obstruction in discharge of his duty.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 141 OF 2015
[Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.6449 of 2014)

MANIK TANEJA vs. STATE OF KARNATKA & ANR.

Dated;January 20, 2015.

Citation: 2015(1)RCR(Criminal)765, 2015(1)SCALE484,2015 CRLJ 1483,(2015)7 SCC 423

R. BANUMATHI, J.

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