Supreme Court: Criminal Revision Filed By Informant Doesn't Abate On His Death; Other Victims Can Continue It

 Since strict rule of locus does not apply to a revision proceeding, on death of a revisionist, the law of abatement that applies to an appeal does not apply to a revision proceeding, more particularly when revision is not at the instance of an Accused. However, where the revision is at the instance of an Accused/convict, the revisional court may refuse to continue the proceedings on his death, inter alia, where (a) the revisional proceeding emanates from an order passed during trial; or (b) the revisional proceeding is against an order of conviction, or affirmance of conviction. In situation (a) (supra), on death of Accused the trial would abate and so would ancillary proceedings emanating therefrom. In situation (b) (supra), the sentence or fine cannot be executed against a dead person, therefore, in absence of any application from a person seeking leave to pursue the revision, the court may terminate the proceedings as having abated. However, where the revision is at the instance of an informant or a complainant, on his death, the proceedings will not abate and, therefore, revisional court may exercise its discretion and proceed to test the correctness, legality or propriety of an order passed by the court subordinate to it. {Para 17}

18. In so far as substitution in place of the deceased revisionist is concerned, there is no specific provision in the Code for substitution. Therefore, no one can claim substitution as of right. However, what is important is that there is no provision for abatement as well, as is there for an appeal (see Section 394). Hence, once a revision is entertained, in our view, the Court exercising revisional power has discretion to proceed with the revision and test the correctness, legality or propriety of the order under challenge before it, regardless of the death of the person who had invoked the revisional jurisdiction. However, while doing so, the Court may, in its discretion, allow a person to assist it in discharge of its statutory functions provided that person has no conflict of interest. In that context, a victim of the crime would ordinarily be the most suitable person to provide assistance because of his interest in overturning a decision that went against him. Therefore, when revisional powers are invoked by a victim of the crime, and he dies during pendency of the revision, other victims of that crime, who fall within the scope of its definition, as provided in Section 2 (wa) of Code of Criminal Procedure, may be allowed to assist the Court in effectively discharging its statutory function. In that regard, the Court would be well within its jurisdiction in granting leave to such a person to pursue the revision. However, in absence of a provision for substitution, though a person may not have a legal right to claim substitution as a revisionist, there is no legal restriction on revisional court's power in allowing a person to assist the Court in furthering the cause of justice, more particularly, when strict rule of locus does not apply to a criminal revision.

19. In light of the discussion above, the impugned order of the High Court dismissing the revision as having abated on death of the revisionist is held unsustainable in law. More so, because the trial against the Accused-Respondents is pending.

20. As far as rejection of the application of the Appellant to assist the Court as a substitute for the deceased revisionist is concerned, suffice it to say that the original revisionist (i.e., the informant) had alleged that the Accused had set up a fabricated sale deed to stake a false claim to his property. Challenge in the revision was to an order of discharge of the Accused from offences other than cheating. Since on revisionist's death, his son (i.e., the Appellant herein) would inherit an interest in the property, in our view, the Appellant is a victim of the crime and, therefore, has vital interest in the outcome of the proceeding. Hence, in our view, the revisional court could have allowed him to assist the court in the capacity of a victim of the crime.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 5589-5590 of 2025 

Decided On: 19.12.2025

Syed Shahnawaz Ali Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: Manoj Misra, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1484, MANU/SC/1719/2025.

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Whether court can allow party to be impleaded as co-plaintiff if there is conflict of interest between original plaintiff and that party?

There is a serious dispute as to whether the plaintiff Nos. 2, 7 to 10 and 12 have assigned their entire rights in the suit premises in favour of GITCPL as contended by Mr. Ankhad who represents plaintiff Nos. 4 to 6 in the suit or whether the plaintiff Nos. 2, 7 to 10 and 12 have only assigned 75% of their rights to the suit premises as contended by both Mr. Godbole and Mr. Dhakephalkar. GITCPL relying upon the deeds of assignment, has applied for impleadment and relied upon the provisions in Order XXII Rule 10 of CPC. At the stage of deciding whether leave is to be granted under Order XXII Rule 10 of CPC, a detailed enquiry is really not contemplated. Only a prima facie satisfaction would normally suffice. From this perspective, it will be only appropriate that both GITCPL as well as plaintiff Nos. 2, 7 to 10 and 12 continue as parties in the suit. The question really is about capacity in which they ought to continue in this suit.

16. There is also no warrant for the proposition that a party to the suit who may have assigned its interest in favour of a third party, is required to be necessarily struck out from the array of parties. The party to the suit who may have assigned its interest is entitled to continue as a party in the suit, because, in a given case, the covenant to supply a good title to the assignee and to assign property free from any encumbrances or litigations may continue upon such party. In the present case, there is a serious dispute as to whether the plaintiff Nos. 2, 7 to 10 and 12 have assigned their 100% rights or the assignment is restricted to only 75% of the rights which they claim to have in the suit premises. In these circumstances, there was no justification to order deletion of the plaintiff Nos. 2, 7 to 10 and 12 from the array of parties in the suit.

17. Although, GITCPL is entitled to become a party, the learned trial Judge, was not at all justified in impleading the GITCPL as 'co plaintiff' particularly when there is a serious conflict of interest between plaintiff Nos. 4 to 6 on one hand and GITCPL on the other. Although, the exercise of power under Order I Rule 10 of CPC is discretionary, the discretion in such matters, cannot be exercised in unreasonable manner. In fact, this is what is held in Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. (supra) upon which reliance was placed by Mr. Godbole. In Bayajabai Patil (supra) Chief Justice M.C. Chagla, in the context of exercise of power under Order I Rule 10 of CPC has held that a party may be added as a co-plaintiff, when the plaintiff does not dispute the right of the co-plaintiff to the decree which might be passed; but where his right to property in suit is disputed by the plaintiff, the proper procedure is to join him as a defendant and not as a co-plaintiff. The principle in such matters appears to be that the original plaintiff, who is even otherwise dominus litis, cannot be compelled to proceed with the suit with a co-plaintiff, with whom, such original plaintiff may have a conflict of interest.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Nos. 5917 of 2017 and 13794 of 2016

Decided On: 20.09.2017

Daksha Keshrichand Jhaveri  Vs.  Nikhilesh Keshrichand Jhaveri and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.S. Sonak, J.

Citation: Manu/MH/2165/2017:2017 SCC Online Bom 8448

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When doctrine of Res judicata will be applicable between co-defendants?

 It is true that Under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when the matter has been directly or substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, the decree in the former suit would operate as res judicata between the Plaintiff and the Defendant or as between the co-plaintiffs or co-defendants. For instance, if in a suit by P against D1 and D2, the matter is directly and substantially in issue between D1 and D2 and adjudication upon that matter was necessary to determine the suit to grant relief to P, the adjudication would operate as res judicata in subsequent suits between D1 and D2 in which either of them is Plaintiff or Defendant. In other words, if a Plaintiff cannot get his claimed relief without trying and deciding a case between the co-defendants, the court will try and decide the case in its entirety including the conflict of interest between the co-defendants and the co-defendants will be bound by the decree. But if the relief given to the Plaintiff does not require or involve a decision of any case between co-defendants, the co-defendants will not be bound as between each other. This Court in the case of Mahboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail and Ors. MANU/SC/0698/1995 : (1995) 3 SCC 693, considering the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata between co-defendants held that the following four conditions must be satisfied, namely,

(1) there must be a conflict of interest between the Defendants concerned;

(2) it must be necessary to decide the conflict in order to give the reliefs which the Plaintiff claims;

(3) the question between the Defendants must have been finally decided; and

(4) the co-defendants were necessary or proper parties in the former suit.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5276 of 2008

Decided On: 23.10.2018

 Govindammal  Vs Vaidiyanathan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.

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Whether one party can insist court to direct opposite party to remove his lawyer?

The short question to be considered in the matter is whether the lawyer who is appearing for a party can be removed at the instance of the opposite party. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance upon judgment of this Court in Abdhu v.Veeravu (1991 (1) KLT 116). In the said case, the question considered was whether a counsel appearing in a case can be summoned as witness by the opposite party. While considering the said matter, this Court also considered the question whether the Court can direct the Advocate to relinquish the vakalath and withdraw from the case. It was held at para 7 as under:-

“7. The next aspect that falls for consideration is whether the court can direct the Advocate to relinquish the vakalath and withdraw from the case. This Court inMarikar (Motors) Ltd. v. Ravikumar (1988 (2) KLT 986) held that the advocate shall not be asked to relinquish the vakalath if the court or the authority concerned, after enquiry in the lines suggested above, is of the opinion that the disengagement of the Advocate from the case would jeopardise the interests of the party for whom the advocate appears. It was further held that if the court or the authority finds that an examination of the advocate as a witness is indispensable and hence the disengagement of the advocate from the case would not jeopardise the interest of the party for whom he appears, then the court or the authority concerned can ask the advocate to relinquish the vakalath. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court had occasion to consider this aspect in Chhatrapati Shivaji v. State (AIR 1990 Patna 157). It was held: “If it appears that the evidence to be given by the counsel is of formal nature, or that the application has been made with the intention of depriving the party of that counsel's assistance or with some ulterior motive, then such an application is liable to be rejected. Close scrutiny and examination of the situation is a must in this case. But if the Court finds that the prayer for the withdrawal of the counsel for the case is bona fide and without any ulterior motive and not to cause prejudice, but to advance the cause of justice, then it will be the duty of the court to order that the lawyer who has become a relevant and material witness should not appear as a counsel in the case further more”. It has not been shown that the withdrawal of the advocate for defendant from the case would jeopardise the client's interests. The court has therefore every right to direct the advocate to relinquish the vakalath and withdraw from the case for appearing as a witness on the side of the plaintiff. The order passed by the court below earlier permitting the plaintiff to summon the Advocate for the defendant as a witness has therefore to be restored.”

8. Therefore, it is clear that if the Court has to issue a direction to the Advocate to relinquish the vakalath, necessary enquiry in that regard has to be conducted and the Court will have to form an opinion that the disengagement of the Advocate from the case would not jeopardize the interest of the party for whom the Advocate appears. Further, it was held that if the Court or the authority finds that an examination of the Advocate as a witness is indispensable and therefore disengagement of the Advocate from the case would not jeopardise the interest of the party for whom he appears, then the Court concerned can ask the Advocate to relinquish the vakalath.

9. Two conditions therefore have to be complied with for directing an Advocate to relinquish his vakalath. One is that the direction to relinquish the vakalath by the counsel appearing should not jeopardise the interest of the party for whom he appears and secondly the examination of the Advocate as a witness is indispensable and that the disengagement would not jeopardise the interest of the party for whom he appears. In the case on hand, the Family Court had come to the conclusion that the petitioner had not filed any witness list citing Advocate as witness on his side and secondly in order to consider the reliefs sought for, there is no necessity to examine the Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent as he is not a material witness to prove the contentions raised in the written statement. Further, it is also held that if the counsel is directed to relinquish the vakalath, it will jeopardise the interest of the respondent. That apart, evidence of witnesses on behalf of the petitioner was also over.

Going by the findings of the Family Court, we do not find error on the part of the Family Court to enable us to interfere with the said order.

In the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam

(Before A.M. Shaffique and K. Ramakrishnan, JJ.)

Kabeer  v. Nazrin 

OP(FC) No. 702 of 2016

Decided on January 5, 2017

Citation: 2017 SCC OnLine Ker 41

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Whether Advocate can take brief from opposite party of his former client?

 Regulation 33 of Section II of Part VI of Bar Council of India Rules, which is said to have been violated by the Appellant, reads as under:

An advocate who has, at any time, advised in connection with the institution of a suit, appeal or other matter or has drawn pleadings, or acted for a party, shall not act, appear or plead for the opposite party.

 The spirit contained in the Rule 33, quoted above, is that where a lawyer has committed breach of his duty in respect of fiduciary obligation arising out of the relationship between himself and his client, he is guilty of misconduct of conflict of interest. The above rule restrains a lawyer from acting for another client on the ground of conflict of interest as the duty of the lawyer owed to his former client, not to act prejudicially to his interest, does not come to an end with the termination of the earlier case of his client with whom he had shared confidential information. The basis of Rule 33 is that there is likelihood or possibility of misuse of the instructions given to the lawyer by his former client.

 In V.C. Rangadurai v. D. Gopalan and Ors. MANU/SC/0029/1978 : (1979) 1 SCC 308, this Court has held that where advocate finds there would be conflict of interest in taking up a case of his client, he should not accept the brief of such client, against interest of his earlier client. Defining the word "misconduct", this Court in Noratanmal Chourasia v. M.R. Mulri and Anr.MANU/SC/0361/2004 : (2004) 5 SCC 689, has explained that misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action.

 In O.P. Sharma and Ors. v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana MANU/SC/0571/2011 : (2011) 6 SCC 86, this Court has made following observations in paragraphs 37 to 39 relating to ethical standards in the judicial system, and the same are reproduced as under:

37. A court, be that of a Magistrate or the Supreme Court is sacrosanct. The integrity and sanctity of an institution which has bestowed upon itself the responsibility of dispensing justice is ought to be maintained. All the functionaries, be it advocates, Judges and the rest of the staff ought to act in accordance with morals and ethics.
38. An advocate's duty is as important as that of a Judge. Advocates have a large responsibility towards the society. A client's relationship with his/her advocate is underlined by utmost trust. An advocate is expected to act with utmost sincerity and respect. In all professional functions, an advocate should be diligent and his conduct should also be diligent and should conform to the requirements of the law by which an advocate plays a vital role in the preservation of society and justice system. An advocate is under an obligation to uphold the rule of law and ensure that the public justice system is enabled to function at its full potential. Any violation of the principles of professional ethics by an advocate is unfortunate and unacceptable. Ignoring even a minor violation/misconduct militates against the fundamental foundation of the public justice system.
39. An advocate should be dignified in his dealings to the court, to his fellow lawyers and to the litigants. He should have integrity in abundance and should never do anything that erodes his credibility. An advocate has a duty to enlighten and encourage the juniors in the profession. An ideal advocate should believe that the legal profession has an element of service also and associates with legal service activities. Most importantly, he should faithfully abide by the standards of professional conduct and etiquette prescribed by the Bar Council of India in Chapter II, Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules.

 In Dhanraj Singh Choudhary v. Nathulal Vishwakarma MANU/SC/1490/2011 : (2012) 1 SCC 741, discussing the nobility of the profession of lawyers, this Court has made following observations:

25. Any compromise with the law's nobility as a profession is bound to affect the faith of the people in the rule of law and, therefore, unprofessional conduct by an advocate has to be viewed seriously. A person practising law has an obligation to maintain probity and high standard of professional ethics and morality.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2581 and 2633 of 2005

Decided On: 17.03.2015

Chander Prakash Tyagi
Vs.
 Benarsi Das and Ors.

Coram:T.S. Thakur and Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.

Citation;AIR2015 SC 2297 , (2015 )8 SCC506

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When doctrine of res judicata is applicable between co-defendants?

 In the case reported as A.I.R.
(37) 1950 PC 17 (Chandu Lal v. Khalilur Rahaman) the
Privy Council has observed that doctrine of res judicata
applies as between parties who have been co-defendants
in a previous suit provided tests laid down by the Privy
Council are satisfied. The Privy Council has laid down
following three tests :-
(1) existence of conflict of interests between
co-defendants;
(2) the necessity to decide that conflict in
order to give the plaintiff the appropriate relief;
and
(3) decision given on the said question
between the co-defendants.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
Second Appeal No.644 of 2004
 Gurudayalsing s/o Mehersing Bindra V Basant Singh s/o Mehersingh Bindra
CORAM: T.V. NALAWADE, J.
DATE : 21st APRIL 2014
Citation;2014 (4) ALLMR 692 Bom

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When principle of res judicata has been held to bind Co-plaintiffs?

It is true that under s. 11 C.P.C. when the matter has been directly or substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claimed litigating under the same title, the decree in the former suit would be res judicata between the plaintiff and the defendant or as between the co-plaintiff or co-defendant. But for application of this doctrine between co-defendants four con- ditions must be satisfied, namely, that (1) there must be a conflict of interest between the defendants concerned; (2) it must be necessary to decide the conflict in order to give the reliefs which the plaintiff claims; (3) the question between the defendants must have been finally decided; and (4) the co-defendants were necessary or proper parties in the former suit. Ibis is the settled law as held in SM. Sadat Ali Khan v. Mirza Wiquar Ali, AIR 1943 PC 115,Shashibushan Prasad Mishra v. Babuji Rai & Ors., 1969 (2) SCR 971; and Iftikhar Ahmed & Ors. v. Syed Meharban Ali, 1974 (2) SCC 151. Take for instance that if in a suit by 'A' against 'B & C', die matter is directly and substantially in issue between B & C, and an adjudication upon that matter was necessary to determine the suit to grant relief to 'A'; the adjudication would operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit between B & C in which either of them is plaintiff and the other defendant. in other words, if a plaintiff cannot get at his right without trying and deciding a can between co-defendants, the court will try and decide the case, and the co-defendants will be, bound by the decree. But if the relief given to the plaintiff does not require or involve a decision of any case between co- defendants, the codefendants will not be bound as between each other.

9.Where the above four conditions did not exist the decree does not operate as res judicata. It must, therefore., be that all the persons who have right title and interest are made parties to the suit and that they should have knowledge that the right, tide and interest would be in adjudication and the finding or the decree therein would operate as a res judicata to their right, title and interest in the subject- matter of theformer suit. Even in their absence a decree could be passed and it may be used as an evidence of the plaintiffs title either accepted or negatived therein. The doctrine of res judicata would apply even though the party against whom it is sought to be enforced, was not eo-nomine made a party nor entered appearance nor did he contest the question. The doctrine of res judicata must, however, be applied to co- defendants with great care and caution. The reason is that fraud is an extrinsic collateral act, which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. If a party obtains a decree from the court by practicing fraud or collusion, be cannot be allowed to say that the matter is res judicata and cannot be re-opened. There can also be no question of res judicata in a case where signs of fraud or collusion are transparently pregnant or apparent from the facts on record.

10. Therefore, in applying the doctrine of res judicata between co-defendant or co-plaintiff, care, must, of necessity, be taken by the courts to see that there must in fact be a conflict of interest between the codefendants or co-plaintiffs concerned and it is necessary to decide the conflict in order to give relief which the plaintiff in the suit claimed and the question must have been directly and substantially in issue and was finally decided therein

Supreme Court of India

Mahboob Sahab vs Syed Ismail & Ors on 23 March, 1995

Equivalent citations: 1995 AIR 1205, 1995 SCC (3) 693

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