Showing posts with label informant. Show all posts
Showing posts with label informant. Show all posts

Saturday, 27 December 2025

Supreme Court: Criminal Revision Filed By Informant Doesn't Abate On His Death; Other Victims Can Continue It


 Since strict rule of locus does not apply to a revision proceeding, on death of a revisionist, the law of abatement that applies to an appeal does not apply to a revision proceeding, more particularly when revision is not at the instance of an Accused. However, where the revision is at the instance of an Accused/convict, the revisional court may refuse to continue the proceedings on his death, inter alia, where (a) the revisional proceeding emanates from an order passed during trial; or (b) the revisional proceeding is against an order of conviction, or affirmance of conviction. In situation (a) (supra), on death of Accused the trial would abate and so would ancillary proceedings emanating therefrom. In situation (b) (supra), the sentence or fine cannot be executed against a dead person, therefore, in absence of any application from a person seeking leave to pursue the revision, the court may terminate the proceedings as having abated. However, where the revision is at the instance of an informant or a complainant, on his death, the proceedings will not abate and, therefore, revisional court may exercise its discretion and proceed to test the correctness, legality or propriety of an order passed by the court subordinate to it. {Para 17}


18. In so far as substitution in place of the deceased revisionist is concerned, there is no specific provision in the Code for substitution. Therefore, no one can claim substitution as of right. However, what is important is that there is no provision for abatement as well, as is there for an appeal (see Section 394). Hence, once a revision is entertained, in our view, the Court exercising revisional power has discretion to proceed with the revision and test the correctness, legality or propriety of the order under challenge before it, regardless of the death of the person who had invoked the revisional jurisdiction. However, while doing so, the Court may, in its discretion, allow a person to assist it in discharge of its statutory functions provided that person has no conflict of interest. In that context, a victim of the crime would ordinarily be the most suitable person to provide assistance because of his interest in overturning a decision that went against him. Therefore, when revisional powers are invoked by a victim of the crime, and he dies during pendency of the revision, other victims of that crime, who fall within the scope of its definition, as provided in Section 2 (wa) of Code of Criminal Procedure, may be allowed to assist the Court in effectively discharging its statutory function. In that regard, the Court would be well within its jurisdiction in granting leave to such a person to pursue the revision. However, in absence of a provision for substitution, though a person may not have a legal right to claim substitution as a revisionist, there is no legal restriction on revisional court's power in allowing a person to assist the Court in furthering the cause of justice, more particularly, when strict rule of locus does not apply to a criminal revision.


19. In light of the discussion above, the impugned order of the High Court dismissing the revision as having abated on death of the revisionist is held unsustainable in law. More so, because the trial against the Accused-Respondents is pending.


20. As far as rejection of the application of the Appellant to assist the Court as a substitute for the deceased revisionist is concerned, suffice it to say that the original revisionist (i.e., the informant) had alleged that the Accused had set up a fabricated sale deed to stake a false claim to his property. Challenge in the revision was to an order of discharge of the Accused from offences other than cheating. Since on revisionist's death, his son (i.e., the Appellant herein) would inherit an interest in the property, in our view, the Appellant is a victim of the crime and, therefore, has vital interest in the outcome of the proceeding. Hence, in our view, the revisional court could have allowed him to assist the court in the capacity of a victim of the crime.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 5589-5590 of 2025 

Decided On: 19.12.2025

Syed Shahnawaz Ali Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: Manoj Misra, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1484, MANU/SC/1719/2025.

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Saturday, 28 September 2024

Bombay HC: As per S.193 BNSS, police must inform progress in Investigation To Informant or victim

The essential grievance of the petitioner in the aforesaid petition is that the police are not complying with the mandate of Section 173(2)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ('Cr.PC').{Para 2}

3. Perused the papers. The said section of which noncompliance by the police is alleged, reads thus:-

“173. Report of police officer on completion of investigation. -

(2) (i) ---- ---- ----

(ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner as

may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken

by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information relating

to the commission of the offence was first given.”

4. After the repeal of Cr.PC; under the new ‘The Bharatiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (‘BNSS’), the corresponding section is Section 193(3)(ii) & (iii). The said provision in the new BNSS, is identical to that of Section 173(2)(ii) of the Cr.PC.

5. Mr. Saste, learned Additional Public Prosecutor states that

a Circular dated 23rd August 2024 has been issued for scrupulous compliance of the provisions of Section 193(3)(ii) & (iii) of the BNSS. The said Circular is taken on record.

6. In view of the aforesaid, nothing survives for further consideration in the aforesaid petition. Petition stands disposed of accordingly.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION (STAMP) NO.16212 OF 2024

Nirmala Bhavesh Parmar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors.

CORAM : REVATI MOHITE DERE &

 PRITHVIRAJ K. CHAVAN, JJ.

 DATE : 29th AUGUST 2024

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Monday, 24 June 2024

Important changes brought about by Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023{Part 2}

1) Recording of evidence of successor of public servant

In order to expedite trials, a very timely provision has been added by way of Section 336 of BNSS. Whenever a report/document prepared by a public servant, scientific expert, or investigating officer is supposed to be used as evidence in a court, the maker of such document needs to testify before such court. However, due to unavoidable circumstances such as death, retirement, inordinate delay etc. in getting such person, the court can secure the attendance of the successor officer of such person. 

2) Another step taken to expedite trials is that now as per revised Section 274 of BNSS or Section 251 of CrPC regarding summons cases, a magistrate after recording reasons can now discharge the accused in case of groundless accusations.

3) In multiple instances, the role of other laws and agencies has been explicitly recognised by BNSS. For instance, earlier as per Section 268(2) of CrPC only state government could have passed a notification regarding prisoners, but now as per the revised corresponding Section 303(2) of BNSS even “Central government in cases instituted by its central agency” can do the same.

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Sunday, 2 June 2024

Whether Magistrate can grant B Summary report without giving notice and hearing informant?

The impugned order does not show that, any notice was given to the informant before accepting the proposal by the investigating officer. It has been held in Bhagwant Singh's case (Supra) as under;

"In a case where the Magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under sub-sec. (2) of S. 173 decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the First Information Report, the Magistrate must give notice to the information and provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report. However, either from the provisions of the Criminal P.C. Or from the principles of natural justice, no obligation on the Magistrate to issue notice to the injured person or to a relative of the deceased for providing such person an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report can be spelt out, unless such person is the informant who has lodged the F.I.R. But, even if such person is not entitled to notice from the Magistrate, he can appear before the Magistrate and make his submissions when the report is considered by the Magistrate for the purpose of deciding what action he should take on the report."

"If the magistrate decides that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drops the proceeding or takes the view that though there is sufficient ground for proceeding against some, there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against others mentioned in the First Information Report, the informant would certainly be prejudiced because the First Information Report lodged by him would have failed of its purpose, wholly or in part. Moreover, when the interest of the informant in prompt and effective action being taken on the First Information Report lodged by him is clearly recognized by the provisions contained in sub-sec. (2) of S. 154, sub-sec. (2) of S. 157 and sub-sec. (2) (ii) of S. 173 in that the officer of the police station has under S. 157 (2) to notify the fact to the first informant that he is not going to investigate the case or cause it to be investigated and under S. 173 (2) (ii), the said officer is obligated to communicate to the informant the action taken by him and the report forwarded by him to the Magistrate, it must be presumed that the informant would equally be interested in seeing that the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and issues process, because that would be culmination of the First Information Report lodged by him. There can, therefore, be no doubt that when, on a consideration of the report made by the officer in charge of a police station under sub-section (2)(i) of S. 173, the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the offence and issue process, the informant must be given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process."

{Para 8}

9. Further this Court had set aside the order of discharging accused without giving notice and hearing informant. Thus the legal position as has been enumerated in Bhagwant Sing, Gangadhar Mhatre and Abhinandan Zha ought to have been followed by the learned Magistrate. Therefore, the said order is required to be set aside and the matter is required to be relegated to the Judicial Magistrate First Class to be dealt with according to the above said authorities.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Application No. 1264 of 2018

Decided On: 06.08.2018

Saleha Kausar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vibha Kankanwadi, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/2377/2018.

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Tuesday, 1 November 2022

Whether the court can convict accused even if informant is not examined by prosecution?

Merely because the original complainant is not examined cannot be a ground to discard the deposition of PW1. As observed hereinabove, PW1 is the eye witness to the occurrence at both the places. Similarly, assuming that the recovery of the weapon used is not established or proved also cannot be a ground to acquit the Accused when there is a direct evidence of the eye witness. Recovery of the weapon used in the commission of the offence is not a sine qua non to convict the Accused. If there is a direct evidence in the form of eye witness, even in the absence of recovery of weapon, the Accused can be convicted. Similarly, even in the case of some contradictions with respect to timing of lodging the FIR/complaint cannot be a ground to acquit the Accused when the prosecution case is based upon the deposition of eye witness.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1750-1751 of 2022

State through the Inspector of Police  Vs. Laly and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and Krishna Murari, JJ.

Author: M.R. Shah, J.

Decided On: 14.10.2022

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Sunday, 1 August 2021

Whether Will trial be vitiated if the complainant/informant is investigating officer?

  Coming to his second argument viz the complainant and the Investigating Agency cannot be same, I may refer to Mukesh Singh vs State (NCT) of Delhi 2020 (10) SCC 120 wherein it was held:-

“8. The question which is referred to the larger Bench is, whether in case the investigation is conducted by the informant/police officer who himself is the complainant, the trial is vitiated and in such a situation, the accused is entitled to acquittal? xxxx

10.5. Therefore, as such, the NDPS Act does not specifically bar the informant/complainant to be an investigator and officer in charge of a police station for the 

investigation of the offences under the NDPS Act. On the contrary, it permits, as observed hereinabove. To take a contrary view would be amending Section 53 and the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act and/or adding something which is not there, which is not permissible. 13.2. (II) In a case where the informant himself is the investigator, by that itself cannot be said that the investigation is vitiated on the ground of bias or the like factor. The question of bias or prejudice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, merely because the informant is the investigator, by that itself the investigation would not suffer the vice of unfairness or bias and therefore on the sole ground that informant is the investigator, the accused is not entitled to acquittal. The matter has to be decided on a case-to-case basis. A contrary decision of this Court in Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab [Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab, (2018) 17 SCC 627 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 215] and any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case the accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically overruled.”{Para 11}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 

Decided on : 30th July, 2021 

 BAIL APPLN. 112/2021 and CRL.M.(BAIL) 81/2021; 

BIMAL KUMAR JAIN and NARESH JAIN Vs DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT 

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Tuesday, 10 November 2020

Whether police can further investigate the criminal case even though Magistrate has issued Summary in said case?

 Let us now consider the submissions of the learned Senior

Advocate for the petitioner that the Investigating Officer is not justified in reinvestigating the offence in which the jurisdictional Magistrate has already accepted the “A” summary.

49. Reference to some of the provisions of the Code would be

necessary in the context of the contention of the learned Senior Advocate

appearing for the petitioner. Before we deal with the relevant provisions, at

the cost of repetition, it would be necessary to mention that “A” summary was

granted by the jurisdictional Magistrate on 16.4.2019. The said order reads

thus:

:ORDER:

1. The report submitted by DYSP is accepted.

2. “A” Summary as prayed for is granted.”

50. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagwant Singh (supra) and

Gangadhar (supra) and in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. A.S. Peter (2008) 2 SCC 383

has held that when the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the

offence and issue process, the informant must be given an opportunity of being

heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take

cognizance of the offence and issue process. In the facts of the case in hand,

admittedly, the informant was neither given any notice nor heard when the “A”

summary was granted. Even the aforesaid order was not communicated to the

first informant. The victim i.e. first informant, when became aware about the “A” summary, though some tweets as submitted by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Gupte, requested the State Government and Superior officer of police that the case should be properly and thoroughly investigated. 

On the instructions of superior officers of the Investigating Officer, the local Crime Investigation Branch, Alibaug filed a report before the jurisdictional Magistrate for conducting further investigation of the said offence and accordingly, intimated to the jurisdictional Magistrate that further investigation of the offence under section 173(8) of the Code is being carried out. The jurisdictional Magistrate recorded the endorsement as “seen and filed”. In this

context, it would be relevant to refer to section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads thus:

“SECTION 173 (8) CRPC

(8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude

further investigation in respect of an offence after a

report under sub- section (2) has been forwarded to the

Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the

officer in charge of the police station obtains further

evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the

Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such

evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of

sub- sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in

relation to such report or reports as they apply in

relation to a report forwarded under sub- section (2).”

 

55. Thus, there is no manner of doubt in our minds that the State

Government can always direct a further investigation to the concerned policeofficers, as done in the present case.

 56. Insofar as the provision regarding grant of “A” summary is

concerned, the procedure thereof is mentioned under Rule 219 of the

Bombay Police Manual, 1959. Rule 219, dealing with final reports, more

particularly, clause (3) reads thus:


“RULE 219 (3) OF BOMBAY POLICE MANUAL

(3) The final report should be written up carefully by the officers incharge

of the Police Station personally and should be accompanied by

all the case papers numbered and indexed methodically. If the accused

has been released on bail, the Magistrate should be requested to cancel

the bail bond. He should also be requested to pass orders regarding the

disposal of property attached, unless any of the articles, e.g., blood

stained clothes, are required for further use in true but undetected

cases. A request should also be made to the Magistrate to classify the

case and to issue an appropriate summary of his order, viz:-

“A’ True, undetected (where there is no clue whatsoever about the

culprits or property or where the accused in known but there is no

evidence to justify his being sent up to the Magistrate (for trial).

“B” Maliciously false.

“C” Neither true nor false, e.g., due to mistake ot fact or being of a

civil nature.

“Non-cognizable” Police investigation reveals commission of only

non-cognizable offence.”

(emphasis supplied)

57. Reading of clause (3) would indicate that “A” summary is

granted in a case where the offence is committed but the same is undetected,

in that, where there is no clue whatsoever about the culprits or property or

where the accused is known but there is no evidence to justify the same for

being sent to the Magistrate (trial). The jurisdictional Magistrate has

classified the case and issued “A” summary in this case. Consequent upon

receiving instructions pursuant to the complaint made by the victim to the

superiors, the local Crime Branch intimated the jurisdictional Magistrate that

they want to the carry out further investigation in the offence.


58. The intimation thereon was given to the Magistrate who had

made an endorsement of “seen and file”. Not only that but even when the

application was made by the Investigating Officer for recording the

statements under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the same

was recorded by the Magistrate. Their Lordships in the case of State of

Andhra Pradesh vs. A.S. Peter (supra) have in the context of section 173 of

Code of Criminal Procedure held that the law does not mandate taking prior

permission of Magistrate for further investigation. Their Lordships further

held that carrying out further investigation even after filing of chargesheet, is

a statutory right of the police. A distinction also exists between further

investigation and reinvestigation. It is observed that whereas reinvestigation

without prior permission is necessarily forbidden, further investigation is not.

59. We find that before carrying out the said investigation, the

Magistrate was intimated about the further investigation. Thereafter, even

the statements are recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure after obtaining permission from Chief Judicial Magistrate. In our

opinion, the further investigation cannot be termed as illegal and without

seeking permission of the Magistrate. The same is in consonance with the

power conferred by section 173 (8) of Code of Criminal Procedure, which is

extracted hereinabove. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPLICATION STAMP NO. 4278 OF 2020

IN

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION STAMP NO. 4132 OF 2020

Arnab Manoranjan Goswami  Vs The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

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Monday, 31 August 2020

Orissa HC: Parameters for grant of the opportunity of hearing to victim/informant in an anticipatory bail application

I am of the view that in the absence of any provisions in Cr.P.C. in debarring an informant or de facto complainant or victim or an aggrieved party an opportunity of hearing in an application for anticipatory bail but keeping in view the criminal justice delivery system and public policy, it can be held as follows:--

"i. There is no mandate in law to issue notice to the informant/victim/aggrieved party by the Court before passing any interim order or final order in an application for anticipatory bail.

ii. While adjudicating an anticipatory bail application, if the Court feels that the informant/de facto complainant/victim/aggrieved party is required to be heard for an effective adjudication, then the Court can issue notice to such person for giving him a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

iii. If the informant/de facto complainant/victim/aggrieved party suo motu appears in Court in an application for anticipatory bail either to support or oppose such application and prays before the Court to give him an opportunity of hearing, the Court may accept such prayer if it feels the necessity of hearing such person in the interest of justice and for the just decision of the case.

iv. The counsel for the informant/de facto complainant/victim/aggrieved party can always appear during hearing of the anticipatory bail application and assist the State Counsel even if he is not awarded a right of audience in the matter by the Court. He can also assist the Court if any query is put forth to him.

v. Where it appears that there are a lot of aggrieved persons and all of them pray before the Court to give them an opportunity of hearing in an application of anticipatory bail, the Court may be reluctant to give them such opportunity if it feels that it would be a time consuming affair or in view of the time constraints, it would not be feasible to give each of them an opportunity of hearing or it would delay the disposal of such application. However if the Court feels in such cases to hear one of the aggrieved parties who can highlight the common grievances of all which is not properly addressed by the State Counsel, the Court can give an opportunity of hearing to such party.

vi. No particular category of cases can be enumerated as to where the informant/de facto complainant/victim/aggrieved party can be given an opportunity of hearing in an application for anticipatory bail inasmuch as it would depend upon the nature and gravity of the offences as well as the discretion of the Court which is to be exercised judiciously with reasonable care and caution.

vii. If a person is neither an informant nor victim but claims himself to be an aggrieved party and prays for an opportunity of hearing, the Court has to decide whether such person is an aggrieved party in the context of the case or not and if so, whether a right of hearing is to be given to him or not to take a right decision in the matter.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA

B.L.A.P.L. No. 19817 of 2014

Decided On: 15.12.2014

Pramod Kumar Panda  Vs.  Republic of India

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.K. Sahoo, J.

Citation:MANU/OR/0782/2014,
2015ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL289
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Friday, 10 July 2020

Supreme Court has given prospective effect to its judgment passed in the case of Mohan Lal Vs. The State of Punjab

1) The only issue surviving for consideration is with regard to the prosecution being vitiated because PW-10 was the informant as also the Investigating Officer, in view of Mohan Lal (supra).   Societal interest therefore mandates that the law laid down in Mohan Lal (supra) cannot be allowed to become a spring board by an Accused for being catapulted to acquittal, irrespective of all other considerations pursuant to an investigation and prosecution when the law in that regard was nebulous. Criminal jurisprudence mandates balancing the rights of the Accused and the prosecution. If the facts in Mohan Lal (supra) were telling with regard to the prosecution, the facts in the present case are equally telling with regard to the Accused. There is a history of previous convictions of the Appellant also. We cannot be oblivious of the fact that while the law stood nebulous, charge sheets have been submitted, trials in progress or concluded, and appeals pending all of which will necessarily be impacted.


2)  Prospective declaration of law is a device innovated by this Court to avoid reopening of settled issues and to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It is also a device adopted to avoid uncertainty and avoidable litigation. By the very object of prospective declaration of law, it is deemed that all actions taken contrary to the declaration of law, prior to the date of the declaration are validated. This is done in larger public interest. Therefore, the subordinate forums which are bound to apply law declared by this Court are also duty-bound to apply such dictum to cases which would arise in future. Since it is indisputable that a court can overrule a decision there is no valid reason why it should not be restricted to the future and not to the past. Prospective overruling is not only a part of constitutional policy but also an extended facet of stare decisis and not judicial legislation. These principles are enunciated by this Court in Baburam v. C.C. Jacob, MANU/SC/0175/1999 : (1999) 3 SCC 362 and Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., MANU/SC/1176/1997 : (1997) 5 SCC 201.

18. The criminal justice delivery system, cannot be allowed to veer exclusively to the benefit of the offender making it uni-directional exercise. A proper administration of the criminal justice delivery system, therefore requires balancing the rights of the Accused and the prosecution, so that the law laid down in Mohan Lal (supra) is not allowed to become a spring board for acquittal in prosecutions prior to the same, irrespective of all other considerations. We therefore hold that all pending criminal prosecutions, trials and appeals prior to the law laid down in Mohan Lal (supra) shall continue to be governed by the individual facts of the case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2450-2451 of 2010

Decided On: 11.02.2019

 Varinder Kumar  Vs.   State of Himachal Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Ranjan Gogoi, C.J.I., Navin Sinha and K.M. Joseph, JJ.

Citation: (2020) 3 SCC 321
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Supreme Court: Criminal trial will vitiate if informant does the investigation

In view of the conflicting opinions expressed by different two Judge Benches of this Court, the importance of a fair investigation from the point of view of an Accused as a guaranteed constitutional right Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it is considered necessary that the law in this regard be laid down with certainty. To leave the matter for being determined on the individual facts of a case, may not only lead to a possible abuse of powers, but more importantly will leave the police, the Accused, the lawyer and the courts in a state of uncertainty and confusion which has to be avoided. It is therefore held that a fair investigation, which is but the very foundation of fair trial, necessarily postulates that the informant and the investigator must not be the same person. Justice must not only be done, but must appear to be done also. Any possibility of bias or a predetermined conclusion has to be excluded. This requirement is all the more imperative in laws carrying a reverse burden of proof.

26. Resultantly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The prosecution is held to be vitiated because of the infraction of the constitutional guarantee of a fair investigation. The Appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in any other case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1880 of 2011

Decided On: 16.08.2018

 Mohan Lal  Vs.  The State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Ranjan Gogoi, R. Banumathi and Navin Sinha, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2018 SC 3853, MANU/SC/0857/2018
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Friday, 11 October 2019

Whether a person can be called U/S 319 of CRPC if he is implicated by informant or other witness?

 Observing that for exercising jurisdiction and its discretion
in terms of Section 319 Cr.P.C., the courts are required to apply
stringent tests, in Sarabjit Singh and Another vs. State of
Punjab and Another (2009) 16 SCC 46, it was held as under:-
“21. An order under Section 319 of the Code, therefore, should
not be passed only because the first informant or one of the
witnesses seeks to implicate other persons(s). Sufficient and
cogent reasons are required to be assigned by the court so as to
satisfy the ingredients of the provisions. Mere ipse dixit would
not serve the purpose. Such an evidence must be convincing
one at least for the purpose of exercise of the extraordinary
jurisdiction. For the aforementioned purpose, the courts are
required to apply stringent tests; one of the tests being whether
evidence on record is such which would reasonably lead to
conviction of the person sought to be summoned.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 395 OF 2019

SUNIL KUMAR GUPTA Vs  STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

R. BANUMATHI, J.
Dated:February 27, 2019.
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Monday, 25 December 2017

Whether FIR can be lodged without disclosing source of information and name of informant?

Another ground on which criminal prosecution is assailed is regarding the locus of complainant to lodge the complaint. Submission of the applicants is that FIR is lodged on the basis of source information which has never been disclosed at any time and for the offences particularly of cheating and forgery, it was incumbent on the prosecution agency to disclose the source of information and the name of informant. In support thereof, reliance is placed on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Joseph Salvaraja vs. State of Gujarat and others, MANU/SC/0719/2011 : (2011) 7 SCC 59 : [2011 ALL SCR 1601] and Mohammed Ibrahim and others vs. State of Bihar and another, MANU/SC/1604/2009 : (2009) 8 SCC 751.
19. On going through both the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it can be seen that the facts were not identical to the present controversy and in the given facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the first case held that FIR was an abuse of process of law, dispute was purely of civil nature, commission of criminal offence to wreak vengeance was alleged and in such a case refusal of High Court to quash FIR under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with liberty to file discharge application was to be quashed and set aside.

In another decision, the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court were that criminal courts should ensure that criminal proceedings are not misused for settling scores or pressurising parties to settle civil disputes. The ingredients of the offence of cheating and forgery defined under Section 415 and punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, came to be reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case.

20. In the case on hand, FIR has been lodged by Superintendent of Police, CBI, Nagpur. Learned counsel refers to the provisions of Section 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and attempts to demonstrate that offences relating to cheating and forgery are not covered by this prevision and, therefore, it was incumbent on the aggrieved person to come forward and lodge report. Section 39 requires public to give information of certain offences and speaks that every person aware of the commission of, or of the intention of any other person to commit any offence punishable under the section mentioned in Section 39 shall forthwith give information to the nearest Magistrate or public officer of such commission or intention. The offences under Sections 420, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code are cognizable. As these offences are cognizable, offence alleged under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code is also cognizable. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure relates to information in cognizable cases. The provisions of Section 154 of Cr.P.C. read thus:

154. Information in cognizable cases.- (1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf.

(2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant.

(3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence.

21. The proposition of law relating to information in cognizable cases is well settled and any person orally or in writing can set criminal law into motion. In this background, we do not find any infirmity regarding the locus to lodge the report. The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicants is, therefore, negatived in the above background.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Application [Apl] Nos. 218 and 320 of 2015

Decided On: 20.03.2017

 Amit Suresh Arya Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B.R. Gavai and Indira Jain, JJ.
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Friday, 20 October 2017

Whether will be effect of overwriting in inquest report?

The next factual lacunae raised was overwriting in the inquest report. The inquest report by the police officer is prepared Under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The scope of the section is investigation by the police in cases of unnatural or suspicious death. However, the scope is very limited and aimed at ascertaining the first apparent signs of the death. Apart from this the police officer has to investigate the place wherefrom the dead body is recovered, describe wounds, fractures, bruises and other marks of injury as may be found on the body, stating in what manner or by what weapon or instrument, such injuries appear to have been inflicted. From the above, it thus becomes clear, that the section aims at preserving the first look at the recovered body and it need not contain every detail. Mere overwriting in the name of the informant would not affect the proceedings. The fact of homicidal death was not in dispute and the manner in which the death was occurred is also not disputed. Then merely name being overwritten will not help the defence, when the contents of the inquest report was supported by the eye witnesses and also the medical evidences.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1033 of 2010, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1034-1036 of 2010, 

Decided On: 16.12.2015

 Bimla Devi and Ors. Vs. Rajesh Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Pinaki Chandra Ghose and R.K. Agrawal, JJ.

Citation: (2016) 15 SCC 448.
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Tuesday, 22 November 2016

Whether police can insist illiterate informant to give FIR in writing written by someone else?

Section 154 of CrPC contemplates that if the information is given orally to the officer in-charge of a police station it shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction. The informant was an illiterate person. He stated that when the police officers arrived there he told the police officers that accused Nani Kanta and Tukan murdered Gopi Mohan and so it was the duty of the police officers to record the FIR themselves as per the statement of Bidhu but they insisted for an FIR in writing and one can just imagine under that circumstances where a brutal murder occurred in the house of Bidhu he might not be in a position to narrate the occurrence arithmetically. It was obvious that hearing cries many people would gather since the cry was raised saying 'thief thief" whereas the accused persons only chased behind the deceased Gopi Mohan and searched for him and they have only killed the deceased.
In the given facts and circumstances of this case while an information was already received by police at P.S. and Exbt. 10 G.D. entry was made which was definite about a cognizable offence the subsequent collection of writing ejahar from Bidhu which is proved as Exbt. 1/1 by PW. 9 is clearly hit by Section 162 of CrPC and cannot be regarded as FIR.
This Court on several earlier occasions insisted that the law requires the FIR should be recorded by the police officer himself or by any person under his direction and a police officer should not insist upon an illiterate person to give an FIR in writing written by somebody else.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AT AGARTALA
Crl. A (J) Nos. 4 and 11 of 2014
Decided On: 05.04.2016
Tukan Sharma and Ors.
Vs.
The State of Tripura
Coram:Deepak Gupta, C.J. and S.C. Das, J.
Citation: 2016 CRLJ4019
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Saturday, 2 April 2016

When court can frame additional charge on basis of application made by informant in state case?

 From the aforesaid, it is graphic that the court can
change or alter the charge if there is defect or something is
left out. The test is, it must be founded on the material
available on record. It can be on the basis of the complaint
or the FIR or accompanying documents or the material
brought on record during the course of trial. It can also be
done at any time before pronouncement of judgment. It is
not necessary to advert to each and every circumstance.
Suffice it to say, if the court has not framed a charge
despite the material on record, it has the jurisdiction to add
a charge. Similarly, it has the authority to alter the charge.
The principle that has to be kept in mind is that the charge
so framed by the Magistrate is in accord with the materials
produced before him or if subsequent evidence comes on
record. It is not to be understood that unless evidence has
been let in, charges already framed cannot be altered, for
that is not the purport of Section 216 CrPC.
17. In addition to what we have stated hereinabove,
another aspect also has to be kept in mind. It is obligatory
on the part of the court to see that no prejudice is caused to
the accused and he is allowed to have a fair trial. There are
in-built safeguards in Section 216 CrPC. It is the duty of
the trial court to bear in mind that no prejudice is caused to
the accused as that has the potentiality to affect a fair trial.
It has been held in Amar Singh v. State of Haryana (1974) 3 SCC 81
that the accused must always be made aware of the case
against them so as to enable him to understand the defence
that he can lead. 
 As is evident, an application was filed
by the informant to add a charge under Section 406 IPC as
there were allegations against the husband about the
criminal breach of trust as far as her stridhan is concerned.
It was, in a way, bringing to the notice of the learned
Magistrate about the defect in framing of the charge. The
court could have done it suo motu. In such a situation, we
do not find any fault on the part of learned Magistrate in
entertaining the said application. It may be stated that the
learned Magistrate has referred to the materials and
recorded his prima facie satisfaction. There is no error in
the said prima facie view. We also do not perceive any
error in the revisional order by which it has set aside the
charge framed against the mother-in-law. Accordingly, we
affirm the order of the High Court in expressing its

disinclination to interfere with the order passed in revision.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.131 of 2016

Anant Prakash Sinha @ Anant Sinha V State of Haryana.

Dated;March, 4, 2016.
Citation:(2016) 6 SCC105
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Friday, 19 February 2016

Whether accused whose name is not mentioned in FIR can be prosecuted?

In Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P. , after referring to the authorities Rotash, Rattan Singh v. State of H.P., Pedda Narayana v. State of A.P., Sone Lal v. State of U.P., Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish Singh and Kirender Sarkar v. State of Assam, the Court opined that: (Ranjit Singh case, SCC p.344, para 14) "14....in case the informant fails to name a particular accused in the FIR, and the said accused is named at the earliest opportunity, when the statements of witnesses are recorded, it cannot tilt the balance in favour of the accused."
(Emphasis added)
When we apply the above principles to the facts of this case, we are convinced that the implication of all the five accused was perfectly justified and was supported by legal evidence as was spoken to by the relevant witnesses which was duly corroborated by the medical evidence. Therefore, mere non mentioning of two of the names in the F.I.R cannot be fatal to the case of the prosecution. 

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Susanta Das & Ors. Vs. State of Orissa

[Criminal Appeal No.244 of 2009]
Coram:
FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA
Dated;January 06, 2016
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Monday, 6 October 2014

Whether the court must hear the accused in hearing for the issue of B summary report by investigating officer?



In my opinion, the Respondent No.2 had no  locus­ standi  to 
participate in the proceedings that would take place before the Magistrate 
for deciding whether or not to accept ‘B’ summary report.   The reason is 
obvious.  It is well settled that until a formal accusation is levelled against 
an accused, or until a decision to proceed against the him is taken, the 
accused would not have any say in the matter.   It would not be for the 
accused   to   appear   before   the   Court   and   contend   that   the   proceedings 
against him should not be initiated, when the Court is yet undecided, as to 

whether such proceedings should be initiated or not.  The reason why the 
first informant needs to be heard when a ‘B’ summary report is filed, is 
obvious.  It is because the the report of the investigating agency is adverse 
to the claims and contentions of the first informant.   Fairness, therefore, 
requires that he should be given an opportunity of being heard and to point 
out  how  the conclusion arrived at by the investigating agency is wrong. 

The   case  of   the   accused  at   that  stage,   would  be   totally  different.     The 
investigating agency having already come to a conclusion, which is in his 
favour, the contest would be between the investigating agency and the first 
informant.  It is the first informant who is aggrieved by the decision of the 
investigating   agency   and   it   is   therefore   that   he   is   required   to   be   heard 
before the conclusion arrived at by the investigating agency, is accepted. 
The accused is not at all aggrieved by the filing of a ‘B’ summary report. 
Therefore, there would be no parity between him and the first informant. 
Merely because the first informant is required to be heard, at that stage, 
the accused cannot claim that he also should be heard.  The position of the 
accused   in   such   a   case   would   be   totally   different   from   that   of   the   first 
informant and therefore, on the view that since the first informant is to be  

heard, principles of natural justice require that the accused should also be  
heard, cannot be accepted.
In my opinion, the order passed by the Magistrate, which was 
based only on the decision as aforesaid of the Rajasthan High Court in the 
case of  Hardev Singh Sandhu (supra), which decision was not followed, 

even by the same High Court subsequently, needs to be interfered with. 
The learned Additional Sessions Judge has also placed reliance only on 
the said decision of the Rajasthan High Court, without noticing the decision 
of   the   Supreme   Court   in  Chandra   Deo   Singh   Vs.   Prakash   Chandra  
Bose alias Chabi Bose and another, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1430. 
From   the   observations   made   by   their   Lordships   in   the   said   reported 
judgment, the principle that an accused cannot have any right to participate  
in any proceedings, which are taking place before it is decided that the  
accused should be proceeded against,  can be deduced.   The position of 
law   that  till   a   Magistrate   decides   to   proceed   against   an   accused,   the  
accused should have no say in the proceedings which take place before  
such a decision by a Magistrate is arrived at, seems to be well settled.  In 
the light of this position, simply on the ground that the first informant is 

being given a hearing in the matter, it would not be proper to give hearing 
to an accused. 

THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
BENCH AT AURANGABAD.
APPELLATE SIDE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.  732  OF  2011

Gopal Bhagwan Sonar, V  The State of Maharashtra,

­­­­­
CORAM  : ABHAY M. THIPSAY, J.
DATE      : 26th  September, 2013. 
Citation;2014 CRLJ(NOC)453 Bom
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Sunday, 15 December 2013

Whether magistrate can allow complainant/ informant to add additional sections of IPC into chargesheet?

But if a case is registered by the police based on the FIR registered at the Police Station under Section
154 Cr.P.C. and not by way of a complaint under Section 190 (a) of the Cr.P.C. before the magistrate,
obviously the magisterial enquiry cannot be held in regard to the FIR which had been registered as it is
the investigating agency of the police which alone is legally entitled to conduct the investigation and,
thereafter, submit the chargesheet unless of course a complaint before the magistrate is also lodged where
the procedure prescribed for complaint cases would be applicable. In a police case, however after
submission of the chargesheet, the matter goes to the magistrate for forming an opinion as to whether it is
a fit case for taking cognizance and committing the matter for trial in a case which is lodged before the
police by way of FIR and the magistrate cannot exclude or include any section into the chargesheet after
investigation has been completed and chargesheet has been submitted by the police.
14. The question, therefore, emerges as to whether the complainant/informant/prosecution would be
precluded from seeking a remedy if the investigating authorities have failed in their duty by not including
all the sections of IPC on which offence can be held to have been made out in spite of the facts disclosed
in the FIR. The answer obviously has to be in the negative as the prosecution cannot be allowed to suffe
prejudice by ignoring exclusion of the sections which constitute the offence if the investigating authorities
for any reason whatsoever have failed to include all the offence into the chargesheet based on the FIR on
which investigation had been conducted. But then a further question arises as to whether this lacunae can
be allowed to be filled in by the magistrate before whom the matter comes up for taking cognizance after
submission of the chargesheet and as already stated, the magistrate in a case which is based on a police
report cannot add or substract sections at the time of taking cognizance as the same would be permissible
by the trial court only at the time of framing of charge under section 216, 218 or under section 228 of the
Cr.P.C. as the case may be which means that after submission of the chargesheet it will be open for the
prosecution to contend before the appropriate trial court at the stage of framing of charge to establish that
on the given state of facts the appropriate sections which according to the prosecution should be framed
can be allowed to be framed. Simultaneously, the accused also has the liberty at this stage to submit
whether the charge under a particular provision should be framed or not and this is the appropriate forum
in a case based on police report to determine whether the charge can be framed and a particular section
can be added or removed depending upon the material collected during investigation as also the facts
disclosed in the FIR and the chargesheet.

Supreme Court of India
State Of Gujarat vs Girish Radhakishan Varde on 25 November, 2013
Bench: G.S. Singhvi, Gyan Sudha Misra
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Thursday, 12 December 2013

Whether accused will be entitled to be acquitted if informant is not examined?


Non-examination of the informant is once again stressed by the appellants in defence. The informant is, as claimed by the appellants, a member of Sawarna Liberation Front, and was the accused in the carnage known as Miyanpur Narsanghar. Non examination of S.I. Ram Japit Kumar also weakens the prosecution’s case, because according to the counsel for appellants he was entrusted with the preliminary investigation, but neither the case diary was brought in, nor was he examined.
15. The learned senior counsel for the State Mr. Rai on the other hand submitted that the above submission is completely misconceived, and reiterated the findings of the Apex Court in para 35 of Krishna Mochi v. State (supra) viz. that an F.I.R is not a substantial piece of evidence, and non-examination of the informant would not entitle the appellants to an order of acquittal on this ground alone. The case should be examined on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. 1

Supreme Court of India
Vyas Ram @ Vyas Kahar & Ors. vs State Of Bihar on 20 September, 2013
Author: H Gokhale
REPORTABLE
Citation; 2013 (4) Crimes 304 (SC)
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Sunday, 13 October 2013

Whether prosecution against accused can be quashed if police has failed to give Copy of FIR to informant?

The principal legal contention urged before the High Court in the Cr.M.P. filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR proceedings is that sub-section (2) of Section 154, Cr.P.C. contemplate that a copy of such information recorded shall be issued forthwith, free of cost to the informant, is a mandatory requirement. 

 The law on this issue can be summarised that in order to declare a provision mandatory, the test to be applied is as to whether non-compliance of the provision could render entire proceedings invalid or not. Whether the provision is mandatory or directory, depends upon the intent of Legislature and not upon the language for which the intent is clothed. But the circumstance that Legislature has used the language of compulsive force is always of great relevance.
If we apply this test to the provisions of Section 154 Cr.P.C., we reach inescapable conclusion that the provisions of Section 154(2) are merely directory and not mandatory as it prescribes only a duty to give the copy of the FIR.

Supreme Court of India
State Rep.By Insepctor Of ... vs N.S. Gnaneswaran on 9 January, 2013
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