Grasping the Nettle: Supreme Court’s New Roadmap for Summary Judgments under Order XIII‑A CPC in Commercial Suits

 1. Background: From Jarndyce v. Jarndyce to Jasola Plot

The Supreme Court’s April 2026 judgment Reliance Eminent Trading and Commercial Private Limited Vs. Delhi Development Authority, Citation: 2026 INSC 436,Decided On: 29.04.2026, arises from a commercial suit where an auction purchaser sought refund of about ₹165 crores from DDA after the underlying land acquisition had lapsed under section 24(2) of the 2013 Land Acquisition Act.

The High Court had refused summary judgment under Order XIII‑A, holding that the issues of possession and limitation were “triable” and required oral evidence. The Supreme Court reverses this, using the case as a vehicle to (a) restate the philosophy of commercial adjudication and (b) lay down a practical, judge‑friendly checklist on when to “grasp the nettle” and decide summarily.

For a district judge dealing with commercial disputes, this judgment is as much a jurisprudential essay on proportionality and case‑management as it is a fact‑specific decision.

2. Order XIII‑A: Purpose and Structure

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Supreme Court guidelines for deciding an application for summary judgment as per O 13A of Commercial courts Act

 It may not be out of context to note that the use of summary judgment will not be against the interest of justice if it will lead to a fair and just result, and serve the goals of timeliness, affordability and proportionality in light of the litigation as a whole. {Para 58}

59. Therefore, while considering an application for summary judgment Under Order XIII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, the following non-exhaustive guidelines have to be complied -

(i) That the procedural mandate Under Order XIII-A, Code of Civil Procedure be strictly complied.

(ii) The Court should consider,

(a) Whether Plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or

(b) Whether the Defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue; and

(iii) The Court should also consider whether there is no other reason why the case or issue(s) should be allowed to go to trial.

(iv) While ascertaining above, the Court does not have to take everything on the face value, but it must also not conduct a mini trial at the same time.

(v) That the Court has to differentiate between a cause of action/defence respectively, which is real as opposed to fanciful prospect.

(vi) That the Court ought to grasp the nettle, when dealing with the summary judgment applications to decide short points of law and interpretations.

(vii) The Court must take into account not only the evidence before it but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be led/available at the trial.

(viii) That the Court's usage of power Under Order XIII-A, Code of Civil Procedure is exceptional as it cuts short the process of trial and ought to be exercised where oral evidence and full trial is not required.

(ix) In order to ascertain the need for full trial over summary judgment, the Court has to see whether, in the interest of justice, it is more suited to conduct trial to -

(a) Weigh the evidence,

(b) Evaluate the credibility of a deponents,

(c) Draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6812 of 2026 

Decided On: 29.04.2026

Reliance Eminent Trading and Commercial Private Limited Vs. Delhi Development Authority

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.K. Maheshwari and A.S. Chandurkar, JJ.

Author: J.K. Maheshwari, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 436,MANU/SC/0426/2026

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Supreme Court: A fresh application seeking a rejection of a plaint, having the same substantive issue, is not maintainable despite being filed by a different applicant.

The High Court, in the impugned order, sought to avoid the application of res judicata on the ground that the first application was filed by Defendant Nos. 1 to 3, whereas the second was filed by the legal representatives of Defendant No. 4. This reasoning does not commend itself to us. All Defendants are sons (or their legal representatives) of the same propositus. They share a common interest: they defend the same Partition Deed, resist the same suit for partition, and assert the same plea that the daughters have no right to the suit properties. They litigate under the same title within the meaning of Explanation VI to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as reproduced above.{Para 37}

38. In Singhai Lal Chand Jain v. Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, Panna and Ors.   MANU/SC/0323/1996 : 1996:INSC:266 : (1996) 3 SCC 149, this Court clarified that if litigation was conducted bona fide to protect a common interest, the decision operates as res judicata against all persons interested in that right. In the present case, the Defendants collectively resisted the suit and participated in the first Order VII Rule 11 proceedings. The legal representatives of Defendant No. 4 cannot be heard to say that the 2013 order does not bind them merely because their predecessor did not file the application that gave rise to that order. The interest asserted is indivisible; the parties litigate under the same title.

39. We may further observe that Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit." The Respondents' submission that the two applications were filed under different sub-clauses of Order VII Rule 11, the first under clause (d) alone and the second under clauses (a), (b) and (d) is of no consequence. The ground that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action [clause (a)] or is defective [clause (b)] could have been, and indeed ought to have been, raised in the first application. The mere invocation of additional sub-clauses in the second application does not take the matter outside the scope of res judicata. The substance of the issue, whether the plaint should be rejected on the ground that the suit is barred by Section 6(5) of the H.S. Act, remains the same. A party cannot circumvent the finality of an adverse order by re-framing the same challenge under a different procedural provision.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7939 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23709 of 2024)

B.S. Lalitha and Ors. Vs. Bhuvanesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Augustine George Masih and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499, MANU/SC/0483/2026

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances a subsequent change of law will not render an earlier decision on a pure question of law ineffective as res judicata

The second limb of the High Court's reasoning, that Vineeta Sharma constitutes a 'change in law' which overrides res judicata is equally unsustainable. It is true that in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal (supra), this Court in Para 9 held that a subsequent change in law can render an earlier decision on a pure question of law ineffective as res judicata. However, this exception applies only where the legal basis of the earlier decision has been undermined by the subsequent pronouncement. {Para 40}

41. The question, therefore, is whether Vineeta Sharma effects any change in the law relevant to the 2013 order. The answer, in our view, is in the negative. The 2013 order proceeded on the basis that even assuming the daughters are not coparceners and the partition is valid, the father died intestate and the daughters have a right in the father's share Under Section 8 of the H.S. Act. Vineeta Sharma (supra) deals with the scope of the 2005 Amendment vis-à-vis coparcenary rights and the saving clause for pre-2004 partitions. It holds, inter alia, that daughters become coparceners by birth, that the 2005 Amendment is retroactive in nature, and that Section 6(5) saves only partitions effected before 20.12.2004 by registered deed or court decree. What Vineeta Sharma (supra) does not do is alter the settled position which was the foundation of the 2013 order, that where a Hindu male dies intestate, his property devolves Under Section 8 on all Class I heirs including daughters. The "basis" of the 2013 judgment remains entirely undisturbed by Vineeta Sharma. The High Court's reasoning that Vineeta Sharma (supra) did away with the basis of the 2013 order is, with respect, erroneous.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7939 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23709 of 2024)

B.S. Lalitha and Ors. Vs. Bhuvanesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Augustine George Masih and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499, MANU/SC/0483/2026

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: What is basic concept of Interlocutory Res Judicata?

The provision embodies a rule of conclusiveness

that is founded in considerations of public

policy. It rests upon the salutary doctrine that

there must be a finality to litigation, and that a

party which has once succeeded or failed on an

issue should not be permitted to re-agitate the

same at a subsequent stage. The principle

applies not only between two separate suits but

also between two stages of the same litigation

what is referred to as ‘interlocutory res judicata.’{Para 35}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.23709 OF 2024)

B.S. LALITHA AND OTHERS Vs  BHUVANESH AND OTHERS 

Author: AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499.

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.

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Precedent Is Not Res Judicata: A Civil Judge’s Guide to Finality, Issue Estoppel, and Re-agitation of Issues

The Supreme Court’s decision in M/s Eminent Colonizers Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajasthan Housing Board is a valuable reminder that courts must not confuse the doctrine of precedent with the rule of res judicata. The judgment shows that even where another court has taken a different view on a similar clause, an issue already decided between the same parties cannot be reopened if that adjudication has attained finality.​

What makes the ruling especially important is that it goes beyond arbitration law and offers a broader lesson for civil adjudication. It helps judges distinguish among issues of law, issues of fact, and mixed questions of law and fact, and explains how each may operate in later proceedings through the doctrine of res judicata.

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Supreme Court: What are exceptions to the principle of Res Judicata on issue of law?

 34.1. The general Rule is that all issues that arise directly and substantially in a former suit or proceeding between the same parties are res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding between the same parties. These would include issues of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, and issues of law.

34.2. To this general proposition of law, there are certain exceptions when it comes to issues of law:

34.2.1. Where an issue of law decided between the same parties in a former suit or proceeding relates to the jurisdiction of the court, an erroneous decision in the former suit or proceeding is not res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding between the same parties, even where the issue raised in the second suit or proceeding is directly and substantially the same as that raised in the former suit or proceeding. This follows from a reading of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself, for the Court which decides the suit has to be a court competent to try such suit. When read with Explanation I to Section 11, it is obvious that both the former as well as the subsequent suit need to be decided in courts competent to try such suits, for the "former suit" can be a suit instituted after the first suit, but which has been decided prior to the suit which was instituted earlier. An erroneous decision as to the jurisdiction of a court cannot clothe that court with jurisdiction where it has none. Obviously, a civil court cannot send a person to jail for an offence committed under the Penal Code. If it does so, such a judgment would not bind a Magistrate and/or Sessions Court in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, where the Magistrate sentences the same person for the same offence under the Penal Code. Equally, a civil court cannot decide a suit between a landlord and a tenant arising out of the rights claimed under a Rent Act, where the Rent Act clothes a special court with jurisdiction to decide such suits. As an example, Under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, the Small Cause Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide proceedings between a landlord and a tenant in respect of rights which arise out of the Bombay Rent Act, and no other court has jurisdiction to embark upon the same. In this case, even though the civil court, in the absence of the statutory bar created by the Rent Act, would have jurisdiction to decide such suits, it is the statutory bar created by the Rent Act that must be given effect to as a matter of public policy. [See, Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios at SCR p. 482]. An erroneous decision clothing the civil court with jurisdiction to embark upon a suit filed by a landlord against a tenant, in respect of rights claimed under the Bombay Rent Act, would, therefore, not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit filed before the Small Cause Court between the same parties in respect of the same matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit.

34.2.2. An issue of law which arises between the same parties in a subsequent suit or proceeding is not res judicata if, by an erroneous decision given on a statutory prohibition in the former suit or proceeding, the statutory prohibition is not given effect to. This is despite the fact that the matter in issue between the parties may be the same as that directly and substantially in issue in the previous suit or proceeding. This is for the reason that in such cases, the rights of the parties are not the only matter for consideration (as is the case of an erroneous interpretation of a statute inter partes), as the public policy contained in the statutory prohibition cannot be set at naught. This is for the same reason as that contained in matters which pertain to issues of law that raise jurisdictional questions. We have seen how, in Natraj Studios, it is the public policy of the statutory prohibition contained in Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act that has to be given effect to. Likewise, the public policy contained in other statutory prohibitions, which need not necessarily go to jurisdiction of a court, must equally be given effect to, as otherwise special principles of law are fastened upon parties when special considerations relating to public policy mandate that this cannot be done.

34.3. Another exception to this general Rule follows from the matter in issue being an issue of law different from that in the previous suit or proceeding. This can happen when the issue of law in the second suit or proceeding is based on different facts from the matter directly and substantially in issue in the first suit or proceeding. Equally, where the law is altered by a competent authority since the earlier decision, the matter in issue in the subsequent suit or proceeding is not the same as in the previous suit or proceeding, because the law to be interpreted is different.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 753 of 2026 

Decided On: 04.02.2026

Eminent Colonizers Private Limited Vs. Rajasthan Housing Board and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.

Author: K.V. Viswanathan, J

Citation: 2026 INSC 116, MANU/SC/0116/2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme court explains the distinction between the doctrine of Precedent and Res Judicata

There is a clear conceptual distinction between precedent and res judicata. Salmond on Jurisprudence P.J. Fitzgerald (12th Edition) page 141 states "a judicial precedent speaks in England with authority; it is not merely evidence of the law but a source of it, and the courts are bound to follow the law that is so established". A decision between two parties which sets out a principle of law will operate as a precedent for disputes between two other parties too. A precedent operates in rem. In contrast, a res judicata operates in personam between the same parties either in the later stage of the same litigation between them or in a different litigation between them. That is the essential distinction between the two. {Para 24}

Res judicata operates in personam i.e. the matter in issue between the same parties in the former litigation, while law of precedent operates in rem i.e. the law once settled is binding on all under the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court. Res judicata binds the parties to the proceedings for the reason that there should be an end to the litigation and therefore, subsequent proceeding inter se parties to the litigation is barred. Therefore, law of res judicata concerns the same matter, while law of precedent concerns application of law in a similar issue. In res judicata, the correctness of the decision is normally immaterial and it does not matter whether the previous decision was right or wrong, unless the erroneous determination relates to the jurisdictional matter of that body. [See Makhija Construction & Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Indore Development Authority,   MANU/SC/0302/2005 : (2005) 6 SCC 304]]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 753 of 2026 

Decided On: 04.02.2026

Eminent Colonizers Private Limited Vs. Rajasthan Housing Board and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.

Author: K.V. Viswanathan, J

Citation: 2026 INSC 116, MANU/SC/0116/2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances an issue of law relating to jurisdiction of court erroneously decided in the former proceeding will not amount to res judicata?

28. In an erudite judgment, speaking for this Court Rohinton Fali Nariman, J. in Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Anr.   MANU/SC/0433/2018 : 2018:INSC:385 : (2018) 16 SCC 228, summarised the principles thus:

34. Given the conspectus of authorities that have been referred to by us hereinabove, the law on the subject may be stated as follows:

34.1. The general Rule is that all issues that arise directly and substantially in a former suit or proceeding between the same parties are res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding between the same parties. These would include issues of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, and issues of law.

34.2. To this general proposition of law, there are certain exceptions when it comes to issues of law:

34.2.1. Where an issue of law decided between the same parties in a former suit or proceeding relates to the jurisdiction of the court, an erroneous decision in the former suit or proceeding is not res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding between the same parties, even where the issue raised in the second suit or proceeding is directly and substantially the same as that raised in the former suit or proceeding. This follows from a reading of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself, for the Court which decides the suit has to be a court competent to try such suit. When read with Explanation I to Section 11, it is obvious that both the former as well as the subsequent suit need to be decided in courts competent to try such suits, for the "former suit" can be a suit instituted after the first suit, but which has been decided prior to the suit which was instituted earlier. An erroneous decision as to the jurisdiction of a court cannot clothe that court with jurisdiction where it has none. Obviously, a civil court cannot send a person to jail for an offence committed under the Penal Code. If it does so, such a judgment would not bind a Magistrate and/or Sessions Court in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, where the Magistrate sentences the same person for the same offence under the Penal Code. Equally, a civil court cannot decide a suit between a landlord and a tenant arising out of the rights claimed under a Rent Act, where the Rent Act clothes a special court with jurisdiction to decide such suits. As an example, Under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, the Small Cause Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide proceedings between a landlord and a tenant in respect of rights which arise out of the Bombay Rent Act, and no other court has jurisdiction to embark upon the same. In this case, even though the civil court, in the absence of the statutory bar created by the Rent Act, would have jurisdiction to decide such suits, it is the statutory bar created by the Rent Act that must be given effect to as a matter of public policy. [See, Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios at SCR p. 482]. An erroneous decision clothing the civil court with jurisdiction to embark upon a suit filed by a landlord against a tenant, in respect of rights claimed under the Bombay Rent Act, would, therefore, not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit filed before the Small Cause Court between the same parties in respect of the same matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 753 of 2026 

Decided On: 04.02.2026

Eminent Colonizers Private Limited Vs. Rajasthan Housing Board and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.

Author: K.V. Viswanathan, J

Citation: 2026 INSC 116, MANU/SC/0116/2026

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Res Judicata vs Constructive Res Judicata: Key Differences

 Res Judicata

Meaning and Definition

Res Judicata is derived from Latin where "Res" means "subject matter" and "judicata" means "adjudged" or decided, together meaning "a matter adjudged". The principle ensures that once a matter is finally decided by a competent court, no party can be permitted to reopen it in subsequent litigation.

Legal Basis

Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) embodies the doctrine of Res Judicata. The section provides that "No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit".

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Applicability of Res Judicata in Income Tax Assessments: Insights from BSNL v. Union of India (2006)

 Introduction

The doctrine of res judicata—which prevents the same issue from being litigated multiple times—plays a pivotal role in civil law. However, its application in the context of income tax assessments is nuanced and limited. This article explores the applicability of res judicata to income tax proceedings, with a special focus on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in BSNL v. Union of India (AIR 2006 SC 1383).

Understanding Res Judicata in Taxation

What is Res Judicata?

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Supreme Court: K.V. George v. Secretary: Cementing Res Judicata in Indian Arbitration Law

 The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Arbitration: An Analysis of K.V. George v. Secretary (AIR 1990 SC 53)

Introduction

Arbitration is widely recognized as an efficient alternative to traditional litigation, offering parties a streamlined and final resolution to their disputes. However, the question often arises: can issues already decided in one arbitration be re-litigated in another? The Supreme Court of India, in the landmark case of K.V. George v. Secretary to Government, Water and Power Department (AIR 1990 SC 53), addressed this very issue by affirming the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata to arbitration proceedings. This article explores the facts, legal principles, and far-reaching implications of this judgment.

Background of the Case

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Supreme Court: Public Interest at Stake: Res Judicata’s Relaxed Application in PILs

 Res Judicata and Public Interest Litigation: Lessons from Rural Litigation & Entitlement Kendra vs. State of UP (AIR 1988 SC 2187)

Introduction

The landmark case of Rural Litigation & Entitlement Kendra (RLEK) vs. State of Uttar Pradesh is a cornerstone in Indian environmental jurisprudence and the evolution of Public Interest Litigation (PIL). One of its most significant contributions is the Supreme Court’s clarification on the doctrine of res judicata and its limited application in the context of PILs. This article examines the case background, the legal reasoning, and the broader implications for procedural law in matters of public interest.

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Allahabad HC: Revisional Court Can't Assume Jurisdiction To Reject O.21 R.97 Application When It Is Pending Before Executing Court

In the instant case the revisional court had assumed the jurisdiction of executing court and dismissed the application filed under Order XXI Rule 97, though observing that the issue of res judicata should have been decided first. The revisional court at the most could have remanded the matter with certain directions, it cannot assume the role of a executing court while exercising revisional jurisdiction, as the order dated 16.05.2024 does not fall in the category of case decided. {Para 33}

34. After giving thoughtful consideration, I find that the revisional court had exceeded its jurisdiction by dismissing the application filed under Order XXI Rule 97 by the petitioner before the executing court while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. However, the executing court has also failed in its endeavour to decide the execution case pending before it since the year 2014, and after framing the issue of res judicata had postponed the matter to be decided at the final stage.

35. In such a case where it is an admitted fact that the property was transferred during pendency of the suit and petitioner is a transferee pendente lite and hit by provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the executing court should have, at the very outset, proceeded to pass the order in pursuance of Rule 102 CPC.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Matters Under Article 227 No. 11807 of 2024

Decided On: 11.03.2025

Santosh Awasthi Vs. Urmila Jain

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohit Ranjan Agarwal, J.

Citation:  MANU/UP/0397/2025,- 2025:AHC:35146.

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Whether legal heirs have right to file fresh motor accident claim petition after death of injured even though petition filed by him for injury claim is pending?

Here in this case, the claimants, as legal heirs and representatives, have filed a subsequent claim petition while the original was still pending, the right to sue arose on the death of the original claimant and survived on the date when subsequent claim petition was filed. As was held in the case of Surpal Singh (supra), maxim action personalis mortiur cum persona cannot be imported to defeat the purpose and the object of a social welfare legislation of the M.V. Act to give advantage to the wrong doer. Once the status of the claimants as legal heirs or legal representatives are conceded and acknowledged, to deny benefit of compensation, on the ground that injury was personal to the claimant, will be giving a premium to the wrong committed, which would itself defeat the very purpose and object of the legislation. The subsequent petition was filed at the time when the original petition was yet pending. It is not the case that the original petition filed by the original injured came to be dismissed as abated. The cause of action still survived on the day when MACP no.292/17 was filed. The only diversion made by the petitioners is filing of MACP no.292/17 by paying extra Court fees. Thus, the registration number of the petition stood to be different than that of the original and subsequently, the original petition was withdrawn. So filing of another petition on the cause of action, which arose on the death of the injured would be maintainable under Section 166(1). {Para 23}

(c) of the M.V. Act.

 GUJARAT HIGH COURT

Jiteshkumar Rajubhai Parmar vs Bhavnaben Dilipbhai Vyas on 6 April, 2023

C/SCA/6993/2019

Author: Gita Gopi

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Kerala HC: The Appellate court can not consider appeal against rejection of counter claim if no court fees is paid on said appeal

In the light of these decisions let us consider as to whether non payment of Court-fee on the plea of counter claim in the appeal will work as res judicata. By non-payment of Court-fee on the counter claim in appeal, the appellate Court is not in a position to consider the question of counter claim. Thus it has to be held that the counter claim as rejected by the lower Court has become final. That portion of the discharge of the suit amount as raising the counter claim cannot be considered by the appellate Court on the principle of res judicata. But at the same time the question of discharge of the decree amount can be considered by the appellate Court. {Para 6}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

A.S. No. 291 of 1993

Decided On: 31.03.1997

Nherapoyil N.P. Moideen Vs. K. Narayanan Nair

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

T. Ramachandran, J.

Citation:  MANU/KE/0068/1997,AIR 1997 Ker 318.

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Under which circumstances second motor accident claim petition filed by legal heirs of deceased claimant is not barred by res judicata?

To our understanding of the situation, the claimants subsequent to the death of S. Gangadhara by not amending the petition to make claim under the heads of loss of dependency, loss of love and affection, loss of consortium did not commit any error. This claim made in the present case is independent of the other claims made by them in M.V.C. No. 109/2002. It was a new cause of action that arose for them subsequent to the death of S. Gangadhara and not earlier to it. Hence, we are of the firm opinion that the claim made in the present petition could not have been made in the earlier petition filed by the injured himself Hence, the question of constructive res judicata has no vital role in the present petition. {Para 16}

17. The Motor Vehicles Act being a Social Legislation, the technicalities and the niceties of the Civil Procedure Code cannot allowed to be raised in order to defeat the purpose of the very Act. The Act was enacted for the purpose of enforcing the principles of social justice. The observation of the Tribunal that the claimants could have amended their claim petition in M.V.C. No. 109/2002 and claimed compensation in respect of loss of dependency, loss of love and affection and loss of consortium, in our considered opinion, such amendment would have enlarged the scope of the petition, which was filed for a cause of action falling under Section 166(1)(a) of the M.V. Act, 1988 and the nature of the proceedings by such amendment if allowed would have shifted from Section 166(1)(a) to 166(1)(c) of the Act. Wherefore, we hold that filing of the second claim petition consequent upon the death of the injured S. Gangadhara was maintainable. In similar circumstances, the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Smt. Prabha and Others v. Sri. P.L. Nagesh and Others in M.F.A. No. 1271/2005 (MV) D.D. 8.6.2010 have taken a similar view by setting aside the order of dismissal of the second claim petition passed by the Tribunal under the ground of res judicata. There was no legal bar for the claimants herein to file second petition on the cause of action arising for them on the death of the injured during the pendency of M.V.C. No. 109/2002.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Misc. First Appeal No. 10280/2013 (MV)

Decided On: 26.06.2015

V. Anitha Gangadhara and Ors. Vs. S. Srirama Reddy and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.K. Patil and Rathnakala, JJ.

Author: Rathnakala, J.

Citation: MANU/KA/1621/2015,2016 ACJ 790 (Kar).

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Whether petition on the ground of fault liability is barred by res judicata if earlier petition on the ground of no fault liability is dismissed?

The learned Presiding Officer has recorded his affirmative findings to the issue Nos. 1 and 2 and negative findings to the issue No. 3. The observations of the learned Presiding Officer on issue No. 3 read thus:

"A bare reading of Section 163-A would show that the claimant is entitled for compensation under this Section only in case of a death or permanent disablement due to the accident arising out of use of motor vehicle. In this particular case it is admitted fact that the claimant has not sustained any permanent disability. Therefore, ex facie it appears that the claimant is not entitled for any compensation."

Further, it is an admitted fact that the claimant/appellant has not preferred any appeal against the findings recorded by the learned Presiding Officer who has decided the petition under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Without filing an appeal, the claimant/appellant has filed a fresh petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act based upon fault liability.

{Para 10}

11. It is material to note that the issue relating to the permanent disability has already been decided by the learned Presiding Officer and the negative findings were recorded, still the claimant/appellant under the provisions of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, has filed petition for compensation on account of permanent disability. Therefore, in my opinion the things which are already decided cannot be decided again and again in the subsequent proceedings.

13. So looking to the short controversy, I am of the opinion that the things which were already adjudicated by the competent Court cannot be adjudicated in the subsequent suit. Therefore, the subsequent petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is barred by principle of res judicata. I have gone through the reasons recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, from which it appears that the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal has rightly dismissed the petition. Hence, there is no substance in the present appeal. As such, the appeal stands dismissed.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

First Appeal No. 11 of 2010

Decided On: 23.07.2015

P. Beenitha Vs. Jose C.R. Pires and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.L. Wadane, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2520/2015,2016 ACJ 1343 (Bombay – Goa).

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Under which circumstances the court can decide a suit on merit if any party fails to adduce further evidence?

 The power conferred on Courts Under Rule 3 of Order 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure to decide the suit on the merits for the default of a party is a drastic power which seriously restricts the remedy of the unsuccessful party for redress. It has to be used only sparingly in exceptional cases. Physical presence without preparedness to co-operate for anything connected with the progress of the case serves no useful purpose in deciding the suit on the merits and it is worse than absence. In any contingency, the discretion is always with the Court to resort to Rule 2 or 3 respectively or to grant an adjournment for deciding the suit in a regular way in spite of default. Rules 2 and 3 respectively are only enabling provisions. In order to decide the suit on the merits, the mere existence of the conditions enumerated in Rule 3 alone will not be sufficient. There must be some materials for a decision on the merits, even though the materials may not be technically interpreted as evidence. Sometimes the decision in such cases could be on the basis of pleadings, documents and burden of proof. Anyhow, it is appreciable for the Court to indicate by the judgment that the decision is for default or on the merits. The only alternative of the Court in cases covered by Rule 3 or the explanation to Rule 2 is not to decide on the merits alone. If such an interpretation is given, it will amount to an unjustified preference to one who purposely absents than to one who presents but unable to proceed with the case. 'Appearance' and 'presence' have well recognised meanings. They imply presence in person or through pleader properly authorised for the purpose of conducting the case. Rule 3 comes into play only when presence is to proceed with the case, but default is committed in any one of the three ways mentioned in Rule 2 or explanation to Rule 2 is extracted. Those are cases in which some materials are there for the Court to decide the case on the merits and not cases where decision could only be for default. That is clear from a combined reading of Rules 2 and 3 respectively and the explanation. In this case, none of these conditions were present and the decision was evidently for default. Rule 2 alone is attracted. (see: R. Ravindran v. M. Rajamanickam, MANU/TN/8351/2006) {Para 52}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1948 of 2013

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Prem Kishore and Ors. Vs. Brahm Prakash and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sudhanshu Dhulia and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0327/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether subsequent suit will be barred by res judicata if previous suit was not decided on merit?

The general principle of res judicata Under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure contain Rules of conclusiveness of judgment, but for res judicata to apply, the matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must be the same matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit. Further, the suit should have been decided on merits and the decision should have attained finality. Where the former suit is dismissed by the trial court for want of jurisdiction, or for default of the Plaintiff's appearance, or on the ground of non-joinder or mis-joinder of parties or multifariousness, or on the ground that the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the Plaintiff to produce probate or letter of administration or succession certificate when the same is required by law to entitle the Plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or on the ground of improper valuation, or for failure to pay additional court fee on a plaint which was undervalued, or for want of cause of action, or on the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any), the decision, not being on the merits, would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit.{Para 34}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1948 of 2013

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Prem Kishore and Ors. Vs. Brahm Prakash and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sudhanshu Dhulia and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0327/2023.

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