Further this Court in the case of Mr. G.S.J. Shapoorjee v. Allahabad Development Authority & Ors., 2016 11 ADJ 524 has held in paragraph 45, 46, 56, 57 and 58 as under:-
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 6183 of 2016
Further this Court in the case of Mr. G.S.J. Shapoorjee v. Allahabad Development Authority & Ors., 2016 11 ADJ 524 has held in paragraph 45, 46, 56, 57 and 58 as under:-
ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 6183 of 2016
In the circumstances, this Court is of the firm view
that when a citizen makes an application for Occupancy
Certificate in respect of a building which was constructed as
per a valid Building Permit issued prior to 30.12.2017, the
respondents cannot take umbrage under Section 14 to deny
Occupancy Certificate to the building on the ground that the
land where the construction is made is a paddy land or
wetland. {Para 14}
15. In view of the above, the petitioners are entitled to
relief. The respondent-Municipality is therefore directed to
issue Occupancy Certificate to the building constructed by the
petitioner in WP(C) No.25545/2020, if the petitioner is
otherwise eligible, within a period of one month.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
WP(C) NO. 25545 OF 2020
USHA RAJAN Vs TRIPUNITHURA MUNICIPALITY
PRESENT
MR.JUSTICE N.NAGARESH
Dated this the 11th day of August, 2022
Print PageHowever, so far as the present matter is concerned, it has to be held that the construction of theatre by Respondent No. 3 in CTS No. 417 is within the prohibited area. He had no authority to construct such theatre. He has faulted the provisions of the M.R.T.P.Act and the M.M.Act. There was no valid permission for construction of the theatre. No permission could have been granted for construction of the theatre by the Municipal Council, Rahuri. Furthermore, even taking into consideration the provisions of section 5(b) of the Cinema Regulation Act, no licence can be issued for having a cinema theatre in that building, because it is not safe place to have cinema theatre. In such circumstance, the licence has to be revoked. So also, the building has to be demolished.{Para 67}
68. The learned Counsel for Respondent No. 3 has argued that this floodline is only imaginary line. No proper survey was made before drawing the floodline. There were no floods since 1947 in the area, where the floodline is provided for; and in such circumstances, merely on technicalities, the reliefs sought in the writ petition should not be allowed. However, we do not agree with this argument. It is amply brought on record that the concerned authorities had taken the survey, especially by the Engineers of the Irrigation Department. The Government also considered the matter on every aspect; and though at one stage, the Government was thinking of removing the floodlines, after reconsideration of the entire matter, decided to retain the floodlines and then the Notification of 1981 was issued. It is a precautionary measure taken by the Government for the safety of the residents of Rahuri town. There were no floods in the past, that does not mean that the precautionary measures be thrown to winds. The construction is unauthorised construction and it has to be treated like that.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY(AURANGABAD BENCH)
V.K. BARDE AND D.S. ZOTING, JJ.
Vithal Ramchandra Devkhar & Anr. Vs. The State Of Maharashtra & Ors.
Writ Petition No. 187 of 1989
18th January, 2001
Citation: 2001(3) ALL MR 872
Print PageMr. Aney the learned counsel for the respondent no.7 countered this argument by saying that action under section 45 is to sanction and what is required by Planning Authority is to see that the development plan as put in with the application under section 44 conforms to the requirements of law, rules, instructions, byelaws etc, framed in that behalf by the Planning authority. That being a pure administrative action there is no question of principles of natural justice being attracted in the consideration of the application under section 45. We are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Tulzapurkar that section 45 postulates grant of hearing of the objectors. Firstly because the process of granting application under that section is purely a mechanical and administrative process. The authority has to process the application for development and on finding it to be in conformity with the requirements of law grant it, and if they are not in conformity, it will be rejected. There is therefore no room for granting any hearing to any person. The provisions of section 45 if read in whole, do not contemplate hearing even to the person applying under section 44 and the only remedy available to such person after the order is made is that, without hearing as contemplated by section 45, it will have to be held that both the applicant and the objectors if any, are entitled to hearing. The very fact that no such hearing as contemplated by provisions of section 45 is evident from the fact that the appeal is made available to persons aggrieved by grant of or refusal of permission under that section. In our opinion putting such prayer under section 45 is also hazard or to put in objections in various multi crore development plan the claim demand and delaying the execution of the development scheme. Such is not the intention of section 45 and therefore we reject the submission that it postulates the hearing. {Para 16}
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
V.G. PALSHIKAR AND P.V. KAKADE, JJ.
The Raja Bahadur Motilal Poona Mills Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State Of Maharashtra & Ors.
Looking to the Court Fee clause of the suit as well as the prayers of the suit reproduced above, it is quite clear that the only relief sought is to cancel the construction permission given to Defendant No.3 and "in consequences of cancellation/suspension" of permission the mandatory injunction to remove structure and further perpetual injunction is claimed that Defendant No.3 should not do any construction at the suit property.
20. I have gone through the impugned order passed by the trial Court. Trial Court referred to the Rulings and in Para 22 of its order, in a cryptic manner observed that the plaintiff was seeking relief in respect of construction permission raising objections in respect of title and not considering the same by Corporation while granting construction permission. Trial Court then went on to observe that the question raised could be decided only by the Civil Court and observed that the Plaintiff is claiming the relief about the title which affects on the construction permission of the suit property. Thus only because plaintiff refers to his title, the trial Court has presumed that the suit was maintainable without seeing the substance of the Suit and prayer clauses and the fact that the suit did not at all claim declaration of title nor Court Fee was paid by the plaintiff. Thus, I find that the order passed by the trial Court is not maintainable.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)
A. I. S. CHEEMA, J.
M/s. Arihant Construction Vs. Shri Subhash Kesharmal Barlota & Ors.
Civil Revision Application No.132 of 2014
20th March, 2015.
Citation: 2015(5) ALL MR 23
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