Supreme Court: Injury caused Due To felling of Tree branch On Stationary Vehicle Not 'Motor Accident'; Can't Lodge MACT Claim

 In the context of motor accidents the expressions "caused by" and "arising out of" are often used in statutes. Although both these expressions imply a causal relationship between the accident resulting in injury and the use of the motor vehicle but they differ in the degree of proximity of such relationship. This distinction has been lucidly brought out in the decision of the High Court of Australia in Government Insurance Office of N.S.W. v. R.J. Green case [(1965) 114 CLR 437], wherein Lord Barwick, C.J. has stated : (CLR p. 433)

Bearing in mind the general purpose of the Act I think the expression 'arising out of must be taken to require a less proximate relationship of the injury to the relevant use of the vehicle than is required to satisfy the words 'caused by'. It may be that an association of the injury with the use of the vehicle while it cannot be said that that use was causally related to the injury may yet be enough to satisfy the expression 'arise out of' as used in the Act and in the policy. {Para 34}

35. In the same case, Windeyer, J. has observed as under : (CLR p. 447)

The words 'injury caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle' postulate a causal relationship between the use of the vehicle and the injury. 'Caused by' connotes a 'direct'or 'proximate' relationship of cause and effect. 'Arising out of extends this to a result that is less immediate; but it still carries a sense of consequence.

13. In view of the stated liberal interpretation of this term, will the presence of the Respondent in the auto rickshaw suffice as 'use'. In ordinary circumstances, it probably would have. But take for instance a scenario where the Respondent was a pedestrian and stood near or under the tree in an attempt to take shelter from the heavy rain and now the branch falls on him. This is an entirely likely scenario. In other words, the motor vehicle itself does not play an active role in the accident. It is not part of the proximate cause of the accident. For that reason, a claim Under Section 166 specifically may not be appropriate.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 8455 of 2026 

Decided On: 11.06.2026

The Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Vs. K.K. Umesh Kumar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

Citation:2026 INSC 637, MANU/SC/0627/2026

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Supreme court: Right To Property Under Article 300A Available To A Person Who Isn't A Citizen Of India

 We say so because Article 300-A of the Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The word "law" is with reference to an Act of Parliament or of a State Legislature, a Rule or a statutory order having the force of law. Although, to hold property is not a fundamental right, yet it is a constitutional right. The expression person in Article 300-A covers not only a legal or juristic person but also a person who is not a citizen of India. The expression property is also of a wide scope and includes not only tangible or intangible property but also all rights, title and interest in a property. {Para 18}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2878 of 2024.

Decided On: 22.02.2024

Lucknow Nagar Nigam and Ors. Vs. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0128/2024.

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Important Judgments on imposition of property tax by Municipal Corporation

1)  Whether civil suit is maintainable to challenge assessment and levy of property tax on immovable property?

 10. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Sobha Singh & sons (P) Ltd. vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee [34 (1988) Delhi Law Times 91] had an occasion to consider the question of maintainability of a civil suit challenging the assessment and levy of property tax by the NDMC. Sections 84 and 86 of the Act came in for consideration. It was held that the provision of appeal contained in Section 84(1) of the Act provided a complete remedy to a party aggrieved against the assessment and levy of tax. Section 86 provides that the remedy of appeal is the only remedy to a party to challenge assessment for purposes of property tax. No other remedy was available to a party in such circumstances. It follows that the remedy of civil suit is barred.

11. In view of the aforesaid position in law, we are of the considered view that the civil suit filed by respondent challenging the assessment and demand of property tax by the appellant was clearly barred. 

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Brijesh Kumar J.Arun Kumar J.

N.D.M.C. Vs. Satish Chand(deceased by LR Ram Chand

Appeal (Civil) 2700 of 1997

11th September 2003

Citation:  2003 ALL SCR 313,2003(4) Maharashtra Law Reporter 331.

https://www.lawweb.in/2021/11/whether-civil-suit-is-maintainable-to.html

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What is duty of public authorities regarding waiver of notice issued U/S 80 of CPC or mandatory notice issued under Municipal Corporation Act?

Thereafter various Single Judges of this Court have taken similar views, but there seems to be a slight departure by this Court, in Mohamed Arif H. Modan v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Ors. 1999 (4) LJ 102 the issue of notice had come up for consideration and in the context of public authorities waiving notice, it was observed as under:-

"No public Authority/Officer can abdicate; his duties as a trustee and contend before the Court that if structures come up on public land, on public street on open spaces, they have left the discretion to the advocates appearing in the matter to waive notice or not. I am clearly of the opinion that considering the provisions of the Act and the Development Control Regulations, any area described aforesaid and after a hearing has been given under Section 351 of the Act, neither the Commissioner nor his delegate can waive notice as a matter of course. There will have to be a reason recorded in writing by the Commissioner or the delegate why he is waiving notice. That power cannot be left to the discretion of the Advocates of the Corporation even though they may be its employees."

In other words the exercise of waiving notice is subject to what is stated above.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 1802 of 2002

Decided On: 26.02.2003

Sabira Aslam Sikwani Vs. Mohammed Yusuf Hussain and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

F.I. Rebello, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/0221/2003.

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Delhi HC: Interest is compensatory in nature and is parasitic on the principal amount. The arbitrator is empowered to award interest despite Contractual restrictions

The power of Arbitral Tribunal to award interest for all the three periods namely, pre-reference, pendente lite and post award, is settled, after all. It has been held by Supreme Court, in Reliance Cellulose Products Ltd v. ONGC reported as (2018) 9 SCC 266, that interest is compensatory in nature and is parasitic on the principal amount. Following the “Reliance” ratio, it is seen that arbitrator is empowered under Section 31(7) of the Act to grant interest for all the three periods, unless the contract in so many words prohibits the “arbitrator” from granting interest under Section 31(7) of the Act. A clause in a contract that prohibits payment of interest on delayed payments, does not restrict the “arbitrator” to grant interest since it does not prohibit the “arbitrator” from granting interest under Section 31(7) of the Act and is a restriction on the contracting party to claim interest on delayed payments. As stated above, since interest in compensatory in nature, the arbitrator’s powers are not curtailed by such narrow clauses in the contract. In view thereof, the award of interest by the Arbitral Tribunal for pre-refence, pendente lite and post award periods, is neither contrary to the terms of contract nor is it in breach of Section 31(7) of the Act.

{Para 11}

 Neutral Citation Number of : 2023:DHC:3728

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 FAO 212/2010

M/S MAHESH CONSTRUCTION Vs MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ANR. 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI

Pronounced on : 25.05.2023.

Citation: MANU/DE/3574/2023 

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Whether the court should interfere in notice issued by Municipal Corporation for demolition of dilapidated structure?

This Court has examined the notice dated 18.11.2020, issued by respondent Nos. 3 and 4. It prima facie does not appear to be issued in a mechanical manner. There is reference made to the area of two storied structure, the condition of the structure as being bad and at various places even the walls having cracks in the said structure. It is then stated that demolition of the structure is necessary for larger good and to avoid any danger to human life. A structural audit report dated 27.10.2020 is on the record on the file of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and having applied the same, the said notice has been issued. {Para 20}

21. In this backdrop, there is substance in the reliance placed by the learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 3 and 4 on judgement in the case of M/s. Sai Auto Parts and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra), wherein the Division Bench of this Court has observed that the Court cannot sit in appeal over the satisfaction of the respondent-Corporation in such matters. There is also substance in reliance placed by learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 and 4 on judgment in the case of Dattatray Ambo Mhatre & Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.(supra), wherein the Division Bench of this Court observed that the Municipal Corporation is the only authority empowered to make such structural audits and to arrive at a decision to issue such a notice under Section 264 of the said Act, upon being satisfied, that it is necessary in the facts and circumstances of the individual case. Reliance placed on observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of High Court on its own motion (in the matter of Jilani Building at Bhiwandi) Vs. Bhiwandi Nizampur Municipal Corporation & Ors.(supra) is also apposite for the reason that in the said judgment, it has been laid down as to why Courts ought not to interfere in such matters where safety of human lives is involved. It has been emphasized that a life lost is lost forever and the alternative is unimaginable. The learned counsel is also justified in relying upon the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai Vs. State of Maharashtra(supra), wherein, inter alia, it is indicated that tenancy rights and dispute between the landlords and tenants would have nothing to do with a situation covered under Section 264 of the said Act, because what is important in such cases, is the material indicating satisfaction of the concerned authority, while issuing notice.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1871/2022

Decided On: 22.06.2022

Mahadeo  Vs. Vimalbai and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manish Pitale, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/4921/2022

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Whether UDCPR 2020 specify what area should be given to the members of the society?

 According to them, this Rule does not say what area should be given to the members of the society except that it was mandatory that if the residential tenement in the existing building is less than the carpet area of 27.87 sq. mtrs, then such tenement should get minimum carpet area of 27.87 sq. mtrs. and respondent/developer has already given each member the area measuring 39.12 sq. mtrs. which is more than the required area.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before G.S. Kulkarni and R.N. Laddha, JJ.)

Prashant S. Sawant and Others Vs Thane Municipal Corporation,

Writ Petition No. 136 of 2023

Decided on July 7, 2023

Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1378

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Whether a person can file second suit simply by filing withdrawal pursis in first suit?

 Considering that the suit in question was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction the Application came to be filed for withdrawal of the proceedings under the provisions of Order 23, Rule 1(3) which reads as under.

(3) Where the Court is satisfied,-

(a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or

(b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to

institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a

claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff

permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim

with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subjectmatter

of such suit or such part of the claim.

9. Plain reading of the provisions indicate that where the Court is

satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute the fresh suit for the subject matter of the suit or part of the claim, it may grant permission to the Plaintiff to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject matter of the suit. The provisions contemplate that sufficient ground must be shown for the purpose of allowing the Plaintiff to institute a fresh suit. In the background of the statutory provisions, if we consider the pursis which has been filed on 19th December, 2022 which is annexed at page No. 58 of the Petition the pursis does not gave any reason much less sufficient grounds for permission to withdraw with liberty of the Court to file a fresh suit. In such an event, the City Civil Court, in the absence of the sufficient reasons, was well justified to permit the withdrawal of the suit unconditionally, but refused to grant the leave as prayed. This is for the reason that the litigants cannot be permitted to institute fresh proceedings unless sufficient reasons are made out for the same as the multiplicity of the proceedings vexes on the Defendants again and again. To safeguard the interest of the Defendants by reason of subsequent litigation on same cause of action, the statute has provided that there must be sufficient grounds for permitting a party to withdraw the proceedings with liberty to file fresh suit. It was thus incumbent upon the Petitioner-Plaintiff to raise sufficient grounds in the Application seeking withdrawal with liberty as prayed. It would also be pertinent to note the replies which were filed to the pursis, whereby the Defendants had given no objection only for withdrawal of the suit unconditionally. In such an event, the Petitioner ought to have been put on guard that in the absence of any reason and considering the objection of the Respondents, the liberty as such would not have been granted. Even at that stage the Application could have been withdrawn and detailed Application filed, however, the same was not done.

10. It is apparent that the reason why the Application was not withdrawn was that the Petitioner had already affirmed a suit, and as per the contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner it was filed later on but the fact remains that the Petitioner has made false statement in the plaint that the liberty has been granted by the City Civil Court on 6th December, 2022, knowing fully well that no such liberty is granted and in fact, the pursis itself had been filed on 19th December, 2022.

11. The reliance placed by learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner on the decision in the case of Manohar v. Ravindra Rajaram Gawande, dealt with the case as regards the post facto permission to be granted even after institution of the filing of subsequent suit. The facts in the present case are gross inasmuchas being aware that no such pursis has been filed on 6th December, 2022, a solemn statement on oath is made before this Court that liberty has been granted by the City Civil Court on 6th December, 2022. In my opinion no judgment can assist the case of such a litigant who makes false statement on oath. Pertinently, the Petitioner did not wait for the adjudication of the present Petition which was filed on 5th January, 2023. It was expected that at the outset, a submission would be made that although the suit was affirmed on 19th December, 2022, the same was filed on 11th January, 2023 and unconditional apology would be tendered that inadvertently a false statement is made in the suit. However there was no such submission and it is only upon the said fact being pointed out by the learned counsel for the Respondents that this Court became aware of this fact.

Even if the law laid by the said authority is accepted, considering the pursis which has been filed on record which is completely bereft of any reasons as to why the liberty as sought ought to be granted, in my opinion, the impugned order cannot be said to be legally unsustainable.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 2459 OF 2023

Vijay L. Pawar & Anr Vs Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation 

Coram : Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.

Date : July 20, 2023.

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Whether a person can seek De-Sealing Of Property By Cantonment Board, When Building Plan was not Sanctioned?

 The afore extracted prayer No.(d) under Annexure

P-3 itself would reveal that the writ petitioner had sought

for de-sealing the property only on the approval of its

building plan. We have already noted that the writ

petitioner himself got no case that the building plan

submitted by him was sanctioned. When it was not

sanctioned and the direction to the DCB under Annexure

P-3 order dated 25.09.2020 was only to consider the

application for sanction of the building plan in

accordance with the prevailing building regulations and

bye laws, the writ petitioner cannot be allowed, now, to

contend that the DCB got an obligation to de-seal the

property of the writ petitioner. In the light of the position

obtained from Annexure P-3 order dated 25.09.2020 that

SLP (C) No.8866 of 2020 was disposed of only with a

direction for consideration of his application for sanction

of building plan, even after noting the fact that the

property has been sealed and the Writ Petition (C)

No.723 of 2020 heard along with the SLP was dismissed

as not pressed under the said order, the prayer of the

petitioner to issue a writ of mandamus in the absence of

any legal right at this stage, cannot be granted. There

cannot be any doubt with respect to the fact that the

question of de-sealing is also a matter which is

intertwined with the issues arising for consideration in

the pending Civil Suit, in view of the attendant

circumstances. At any rate, in the light of Annexure P-3

order dated 25.09.2020, the writ petitioner is not legally

entitled to seek such a prayer at this stage. In the said

circumstances, the Writ Petition has to fail as the prayer

sought for therein is not grantable at this stage. {Para 15}

Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal Nos. 4538-4539 of 2023

Ram Kishan (Deceased) Vs Manish Kumar & Anr. 

Author: C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.

Dated: July 24, 2023.

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Whether any person other owner of immovable property can give valid notice U/S 127 of MRTP Act?

 c] In the case of Ramchandra Shankar Joshi and others v. State of Maharashtra and others reported in MANU/MH/2180/2015 : 2016 (1) Mh LJ 765 : 2015 (6) AIR Bom R 364 in paragraph Nos. 7 & 8 the Division Bench of this Court has observed thus:

"7. It is a settled position of law that notice contemplated under Section 127 of the Act of 1966 is to be given by the owner or the person having interest in the land which is reserved, allotted or designated for the particular purpose in the development plan. The object of the notice under Section 127 is to inform the Authority mentioned therein to acquire the land which is designated, reserved or allotted in the final development plan. It is further settled position in law that form of notice under Section 127 is not prescribed. Therefore such notice shall meet sufficient requirement in describing the land in clear terms and require the planning authority or development authority or the appropriate authority, as the case may be, to acquire or compulsorily purchase the land so reserved, allotted or designated in the development plan. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 5312 of 2016

Decided On: 20.03.2018

Mariyam Begum Abdul Jalil Khan and Ors.  Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.V. Gangapurwala and S.M. Gavhane, JJ.

Author: S.M. Gavhane, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1536/2018.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether the condition of attaching the documents of title with the purchase notice notice U/S 127 of MRTP Act is deemed to be waived by the Municipal Corporation if it has not replied to said notice?

d] In the case of M/s. Gupta Loom Industries & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in MANU/MH/3005/2015 : 2016 (6) ALL MR 307 : (2016 (1) ABR 170) the Division Bench of this Court in Paragraph Nos. 13 and 14 has observed as under:

"13. It is true that the notice under subsection (1) of Section 127 has to be construed strictly as non-compliance with the notice has a drastic consequence of lapse of reservation. Therefore, the mandatory requirement of law is that strict compliance must be made of while issuing a notice under sub-section (1) of Section 127. In the facts of the case, we find that specifically on the basis of the said notice dated 7th October, 2010, the General Body of the Municipal Corporation passed a resolution for initiating acquisition proceedings. The proposal for the acquisition specifically refers to the said notice. Hence, even the said Corporation has acted upon the said notice dated 7th October, 2010 by treating it as a notice under Section 127.

14. It is well settled that if certain requirements or conditions are provided by a statute for the benefit of a person, the said requirements or conditions though mandatory, may be waived by the said person if no public interest is involved. In the facts of the case, the Municipal Corporation acted upon the said notice by passing a resolution to initiate acquisition proceedings which shows that the alleged defects in the notice were waived by the said Corporation for whose benefit certain requirements are provided in Section 127."

 31. Learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners relying upon the ratio laid down in the case of M/s. Gupta Loom Industries & Anr cited (MANU/MH/3005/2015 : 2016 (1) ABR 170) (supra) and Supreme Industries Ltd. Through its Authorized Signatory cited (supra)submitted that, in the present case as respondents have not replied purchase notice it can be said that they have waived the condition of attaching the documents of title with purchase notice. In both the above said decisions the respondent Municipal Corporation had passed resolution for initiating acquisition proceedings to acquire the land after receipt of the purchase notice and acted upon the said notice. Therefore, it was held in the said decisions that respondents have waived the alleged defect in the notice. In the present case, it is not the case of any of the respondents that after receipt of the purchase notice the respondent Municipal Corporation has passed resolution to initiate acquisition proceedings to acquire the subject properties. Thus, facts of above decisions are different from facts of this case. Therefore, the arguments advanced as above on behalf of the petitioners is not accepted and the ratio laid down in the above decisions is of no help to say that the respondents have waived the condition of attaching documents of title with the purchase notice.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 5312 of 2016

Decided On: 20.03.2018

Mariyam Begum Abdul Jalil Khan and Ors.  Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.V. Gangapurwala and S.M. Gavhane, JJ.

Author: S.M. Gavhane, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1536/2018.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether purchase notice U/S 127 of MRTP Act is invalid if documents of ownership are not annexed to said notice?

Learned Advocate appearing for respondent No. 4 submits that the petitioners are not owners of the subject properties. They have not annexed the documents of title to the subject properties with the purchase notice under Section 127 of the MRTP Act. Learned Advocate further submits that as per section 127 of the MRTP Act the land owners have to supply copies of documents showing their title or interest in the land with notice. Since the petitioners did not annex documents of their ownership to the subject properties with notice under Section 127 of the MRTP Act there is no compliance of the said provision and therefore the purchase notice given by the petitioners is invalid and therefore, as the petitioners have no locus to file the writ petition they are not entitled to relief of declarations as claimed in the petition to declare that the subject properties are deemed to be de-reserved since no steps have been taken by the respondents to acquire the said properties within one year of service of the said notice. {Para 20}

27. In the first place we shall deal with the objection raised by the contesting respondents that as along with purchase notice the petitioners did not annex the documents of their ownership/title to the subject properties which is mandatory requirement of purchase notice as per Section 127 of the MRTP Act the said notice is invalid and hence the petitioners are not entitled to de-reservation of the subject properties as claimed by them. On perusal of purchase notice (Exh. F) it does not show that alongwith said notice the petitioners had enclosed the documents of their title to the subject properties. Moreover, it is not their case in the petition that along with purchase notice which was sent by them on 29.09.2014 by RPAD they had annexed the documents of their ownership to the subject properties.

32. For the reasons discussed above we hold that the petitioners have failed to prove that the purchase notice (Exh. F) was served on the respondents with the documents of title by hand. Thus, as the purchase notice was not served on the respondents authorities with the documents of title to the subject properties and that ownership of petitioners is disputed by respondent the said notice is invalid. Therefore, there is substance in the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate appearing for respondent No. 4 relying upon the ratio laid down in the case of Jaika Vanijya Ltd. Nagpur and another (MANU/MH/0706/2013 : 2013 (3) AIR Bom R 1432) (supra) and Perfect Machine Tools Co. Ltd., (MANU/MH/0202/2008 : 2008 (2) AIR Bom R 642) (supra) that the purchase notice is invalid as the documents of title were not attached to it.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 5312 of 2016

Decided On: 20.03.2018

Mariyam Begum Abdul Jalil Khan and Ors.  Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.V. Gangapurwala and S.M. Gavhane, JJ.

Author: S.M. Gavhane, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1536/2018.

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Whether unauthorized construction of a person is compounded if offence as per Compounding Byelaws is compounded?

The Act of 1973 does not contain any provision for compounding of constructions. However, there is a provision for composition of offences under Section 32 of the Act 1973 which reads as follows:-

“32. Composition of Offences.- (1) Any offence made punishable by or under this Act may either before or after the institution of proceedings, be compounded-by ¹[the Vice-Chairman (or any officer authorised by him in that behalf by General or Special order)] on such terms, including any terms as regards payment of a composition fee, as ²[the Vice-Chairman] (or such officer) may think fit.

(2) Where an offence has been compounded, the offender, if in custody, shall be discharged and no further proceedings shall be taken against him in respect of the offence compounded.” {Para 24}

27. Therefore, the offences which can be compounded are the offences of prosecution/fine and there is no provision, under which, unauthorized constructions can be compounded at least under the Act. However, at the same time, the effect of Compounding Bye-laws would also be examined but one thing is clear that even in the Bye-laws of 2009 relied upon by the Development Authority as quoted hereinabove, the word “constructions” has not been mentioned, rather the word “अपराध ” (“offence”) has been used, meaning thereby, that even the Bye-laws speak of composition of “offences” and not compounding of “constructions”.

28. This Court finds that there is no provision under the Act, 1973 which entitles the Authority to go for profiteering on an illegal act of encroachment or unauthorized construction in the name of compounding. The compounding contemplated in Section 32 is certainly in respect to offences punishable under the Act. It nowhere provides that once an offence is compounded, an act, which is in violation of Plan, shall also stand regularized or become valid. The effect of compounding is provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 32 that an offender, if in custody, shall be discharged and no further proceedings shall be taken against him in respect to the "offence" compounded. This is with regard to the criminal liability fastened upon the person for committing an offence under the Act, 1973. But the prohibition contained in the Act and statutory obligation upon Authorities to set right a person who has faulted/breached such provision by taking appropriate action, e.g. demolition of building by exercising power under Section 27 has not been made un-operated when an offence is compounded. The proceeding prevented as a result of compounding an "offence" relates to offence and illegality/irregularity so prohibited/controlled under another provision. It may also be noticed that by U.P. Act No. 3 of 1997 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1997"), certain other offences have been provided vide Sections 26D and 28A. However, removal of any construction raised in contravention of Plan and removal of encroachment etc. are governed by a different procedure and steps which would remain uneffected by such compounding. In other words, the compounding under the Act, 1973 is to avoid the criminal liability and punishment on conviction but not to regularize a construction prohibited under the Act for which no relaxation is permissible except when the plan is amended in accordance with Section 13 of the Act.

56. There is another contention that since compounding charges have been paid and therefore, construction whatsoever raised by petitioners must be taken to be valid construction, also has no force for the same reason that petitioners have no right over the land at all. Even otherwise, we are of the view that unauthorized construction would not stand regularized on payment of compounding charges, since concept of compounding charges is not to regularize unauthorized construction but to compound an offence so that otherwise punishment in the Court of law in a trial may not be inflicted.

 ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Case :- WRIT - C No. - 6183 of 2016

 D.B. Kauser Vs  State Of U.P. And 4 Others

Coram: Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra,J.

Delivered on 10.05.2023.

Neutral Citation No.-2023:AHC:102783

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Whether Municipal Corporation can permit Mall to utilize their Open Spaces for temporary ice-cream fest?

 Having perused Regulation 27 and more particularly sub clause (1)(g) (ii), we do not notice any restriction/embargo for the recreation area in the petitioner’s mall to be used for the purpose for which the petitioner has made the application in question, to the MCGM. Admittedly, the activity to be undertaken by the petitioners is for a limited period of about three days, by installation of temporary stalls. The Regulation in fact clearly permits “recreational activities”, as can be clearly noticed from Clause (1)(g)(ii). No restriction as to any temporary commercial activity has been provided in Regulation 27(g)(ii), hence, the same cannot be read in Regulation 27 as sought to be interpreted by the Municipal Corporation. This more particularly when there is no definition of “recreational activities”, under the DCPR 2034. In the absence of such definition, ordinary and natural meaning is required to be given to the words “recreational activities”.{Para 6}

10. We are also informed that to have such activity, stalls would be installed by persons who are already having permanent licensed premises for selling such items inside the petitioners mall. Thus, it is not the case that some temporary unregulated commercial activity is being undertaken by the petitioners. In other words, it is only an activity where the visitors of the mall would enjoy the benefit of a variety of edibles at a common open space, which, in our opinion, is a permissible recreational activity within the meaning of Regulation 27.

11. As noted above such activities are intended to the benefit of the public at large, and more particularly in the city like Mumbai when large segment of the population would be interested to take benefit of such events, being organized in the public places like malls where open areas are available. Certainly such temporary activity subject to any other compliances is required to be permitted, so that the open spaces can also be utilized, as permissible under Regulation 27(1)(g)(ii).

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 11686 OF 2023

R Mall Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai,

CORAM: G. S. KULKARNI & R.N. LADDHA, JJ.

DATED: 26 April, 2023

ORAL ORDER (Per G.S.Kulkarni, J.)

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Whether Open space owned by the Municipality in front of the shopping complex can be used For Dharna Or Public Meetings?

 The issue involved in this writ petition would then

revolve around the question whether an open space in front of

a Shopping Complex, in this case owned by the Municipality,

would be a public place or public space. The Statement filed

by the 3rd respondent-Municipality would clearly indicate that

the open space is intended for parking the vehicles of the

licensees and customers. Though every citizen has a right to

access to the Shops in the building, the open space is

intended for parking of the vehicles of the customers only.

Therefore, such spaces can have a status of semi-public

space only. No organisation or group of citizens can claim a

right to organise Dharna or public meeting in such places,

without the permission of the Municipality. {Para 11}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C) NO. 7181 OF 2023

 PRIYESH B KARTHA Vs THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE N.NAGARESH

Dated:  30th day of March, 2023

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Whether plaintiff must pay ad valorem court fees if he is challenging demand notice issued by municipal corporation for specific amount?

 Suit R.C.S. No. 26 of 2021 has been filed challenging the

notice dated 21.06.2021. By this notice a demand has been

raised by the Municipal Corporation for a sum of Rs. 7,57,203/-

seeking reimbursement of expenses incurred in cleaning the

nallah on the basis that it was obligation of the petitioner to

clean the nala, and as the obligation was not complied by the

petitioner, the said work was undertaken by the Municipal

Corporation.{Para 6}

7. It is clear that although one of grounds of challenge is to

the obligation of the Municipal Corporation by relying upon the

provisions of the Corporation Act, what has been challenged in

effect is a demand notice which has been issued by the Municipal

Corporation seeking to recover the amount. In my view, the

submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner as

regards the authority of the corporation and on the lease deed

are in fact grounds in support of the challenge to the demand

notice. The subject matter of the suit has been valued at Rs.

1,000/- on the ground that the petitioner is claiming declaration

and the notice is not susceptible to the monetary valuation and

as such has been valued under Section 6(iv)(a) of the

Maharashtra Court Fees Act. In my view since the demand

notice which is under challenge seeks to recover a monetary

component, it cannot be said that notice is not susceptible to

monetary valuation as submitted.

10. In my view, the Petitioner seeks adjudication of demand

notice seeking to recover a sum of Rs. 7,57,203/ which is capable

of monetary valuation and hence the impugned order directing

to value the suit as per the provisions of Section 6(iv)(a) of the

Maharashtra Court Fees Act is proper and deserves no

interference at the hands of this Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

WRIT PETITION NO. 3692 OF 2022

The Aurangabad Jilha Chemists and Druggists Association Vs

The Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad

CORAM : SHARMILA U. DESHMUKH, J.

DATE : 16TH JANUARY, 2023.

Citation: 2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 13.

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Whether the court can pass decree the suit or mould the relief on the basis of reneged compromise?

 In view of the aforesaid, a compromise pursis at

Exh.13 duly signed by the parties to the appeal, was

presented before the first appellate Court on 3/9/2020 with

the following prayer therein :

“The appeal be ordered as withdrawn in terms of

the Compromise and the Decree of R.C.S.

No.119/2015 passed by C.J.S.D. (M.C.A.),

Aurangabad on 9.9.2019 be confirmed as per terms

and conditions of this Compromise and oblige.” {Para 25}

26. Thereafter the Law Officer of the AMC submitted a

pursis dated 15/9/2020, whereunder the AMC reneged on the

compromise pursis. The first appellate Court, therefore, did

not endorse the compromise. The appeal was heard on its

merits and came to be dismissed.

35. The subsequent event of the compromise between

the AMC and the plaintiff firm or concessionaire is a fact not in

dispute. Most of the terms of compromise were executed in

nature. True, some of them were executory. To be specific,

additional FSI was to be granted permitting further

construction. It is also true that, the subject matter of the

present appeal is not the enforcement of the terms of the

compromise.

This Court, relying on decision of the Apex Court

in case of Nidhi (supra), finds that, when the AMC went back

on its promise and it has offered every excuse therefor, this

Court finds that, those facts need not be brought on record by

amending the respective pleadings. This subsequent event is

the admitted fact. The defendant AMC is a local authority. It

has a battery of lawyers on its panel to advice it. True, it has

every authority not to take the compromise terms to logical

conclusion. The Court seized of the present Second Appeal,

however, could not be oblivious to the factum of settlement.

 In the present case, a compromise pursis was

submitted for withdrawal of the appeal. Be that as it may.

This Court is neither endorsing the compromise nor enforcing

the same. The factum of compromise, however, is viewed to

hold the defendant – AMC to have diluted its stand on the

decision of cancelling the lease agreement for illegality

committed by the plaintiff firm and/or its sister concern.

In view of the above, the substantial questions of

law are answered accordingly.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

SECOND APPEAL NO.335 OF 2022 WITH

CIVIL APPLICATION NO.8534 OF 2022

M/s Shalaka Engineers and JV Vs Aurangabad Municipal Corporation,

CORAM : R. G. AVACHAT, J .

Dated : 22nd December, 2022

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Whether building plan deemed to have been sanctioned must also satisfy the conditions laid down in the building bye-laws?

 The statute provides as to how and in what manner an application for grant of sanction of building plan should be dealt with. Section 275(3) of the Act, however, raises a legal fiction specifying the period of sixty days within which an application for grant of sanction of building plan should be considered by the appropriate authorities of the Corporation. The legislature, therefore, considered the said period of sixty days to be reasonable one during which the application for grant of sanction for a building plan should be attended to and appropriate order thereupon should be passed. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that when queries are raised or defects are pointed out in the building plan, the owner of the land must reply thereto and/or remove the defects pointed out.

19. A building plan deemed to have been sanctioned must also satisfy the conditions laid down in the building bye-laws.

Although a deeming provision has been provided in Sub-section (1) of Section 247 of the 1994 Act, the same will have restricted operation. In terms of the said provision, the period of sixty days cannot be counted from the date of the original application, when the building plans had been returned to the applicant for necessary clarification and/or compliance with the objections raised therein. If no sanction can be granted, when the building plan is not in conformity with the building bye-laws or has been made in contravention of the provisions of the Act or the laws, in our opinion, the restriction would not apply despite the deeming provision.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 6192-6197 of 2008 

Decided On: 22.10.2008

 Rikhabsao Nathusao Jain  Vs. Corpn. of the City of Nagpur and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Sinha and Cyriac Joseph, JJ.

Author: S.B. Sinha, J.

Citation: 2009(2) MHLJ (SC) 601,MANU/SC/8177/2008

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Whether a person can claim that his construction is authorized as per deemed permission if his construction is on open space?

 Deemed permission to an application under section 44 of  MRTP Act can apply only to cases where permission is otherwise capable of sanctioned in law.

    The provision that the permission shall be deemed to have been granted within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the application if the Planning Authority does not communicate its decision whether to grant or refuse permission can apply only to cases where the permission is otherwise capable of being sanctioned in law. If an application cannot be sanctioned, it certainly cannot be said that it is capable of a deemed sanction. In the present case, it is clear that no permission for development could have been granted by the Planning Authority since the site in question was not buildable at all being reserved as an open space for extension of Maharajbagh.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Public Interest Litigation No. 34 of 2010 & Writ Petition No. 125 of 2011

Decided On: 21.10.2011

The Court on its own motion and Ors. Vs.  The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.A. Bobde & M.N. Gilani, JJ.

Author: S.A. Bobde, J.

Citation : 2012 (1)MhLj 232

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Whether the court can permit demolition of some part of religious places for the purpose of road widening?

 Thus, in the above decision the Court holds that if such places of worship are taken away for the purposes of carrying out the expansion of the road, it would not mean in any manner that a religious structure is being disrespected.

18. In the present case too, this Court is of the view that the larger public interest would outweigh the concerns raised by both the places of worship i.e., the Mandir as also the Masjid. There is no gainsaying that places of worship cannot be encroaching public land and hindering developmental activities meant for the larger segment of the public. In order to make the said pedestrian pathway uniform and so as to not inconvenience the pedestrians on the said busy stretch of the road which also has access to the Delhi Metro station, this Court is of the opinion that the PWD ought to be permitted to make the pedestrian pathway uniform. For the said purpose, if some portion of the Mandir/Masjid is to be broken/demolished, the same would have to be permitted by the Court.

2023/DHC/001358

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

W.P.(C) 16609/2022.

DEVENDRA KUMAR & ORS. Vs  STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ORS.

CORAM:JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH

Date of Decision: 23rd February, 2023

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