The liability of public utilities in contract under Indian law is primarily governed by the Indian Contract Act, 1872, alongside specialized consumer protection laws. Public utilities operate under a contractual relationship with consumers that is often characterized by standard form contracts where the terms are fixed unilaterally by the utility, with little bargaining power for consumers.
Thursday, 2 October 2025
Tuesday, 30 September 2025
LLM Notes: Public Utilities and Consumer Protection: Rights under Contract and Tort Law
Public utilities form the backbone of modern society, providing essential services such as electricity, water, gas, telecommunications, and transportation that are indispensable for daily life. The intersection of public utility services with consumer protection law creates a complex legal framework that operates at the convergence of contract law, tort law, and constitutional principles. This framework ensures that consumers have adequate protection and redressal mechanisms when dealing with public utility corporations, which often operate as natural monopolies with significant market power.
Saturday, 9 April 2022
Whether one party can withhold performance bank guarantee if it has acknowledged due performance of contract?
In view of the above, the Arbitral Tribunal had rightly directed
refund of the amount recovered by BSNL from invocation of the
Performance Bank Guarantee in question. There is no principle in law whereby BSNL could be permitted to retain the Performance Security after it had acknowledged due performance of the Contract. {Para 19}
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment delivered on: 28.03.2022
O.M.P. (COMM) 431/2019 & I.A. 14326/2019
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LIMITED Vs TERACOM LIMITED
CORAM
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU
Print PageMonday, 24 May 2021
Does the corporation postpone payment to the contractor, saying that it will pay him after receiving money from the government?
The learned Judge in North Delhi Municipal Corporation Vs.
Vipin Gupta (supra) was dealing with a batch of appeals passed in similar suits wherein the appellant-corporations were relying on clause 7 and clause 9 to delay payment to contractors who had executed the work as per their respective work orders. The relevant portion of the judgment dated 22nd March, 2018 in RFA 160/2017 is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“Conclusions and Findings
“56. The General Conditions of Contract i.e., clauses 7 and
9 which are admittedly part of the work orders issued by
both the NrDMC and the EDMC are being tested in these
batch of cases. A contract which stipulates that the
consideration would be paid in an unforeseen time in the
future based on certain factors which are indeterminable,
would in effect be a contract without consideration. Even if
the contract is held to be a valid contract, then the concept of
`reasonableness' has to be read into the same. Section 46 of
the Contract Act and the explanation thereto is clear that
“what is a reasonable time is a question of fact in each
case.” A Corporation which gets works executed cannot
therefore include terms in the contract which are per se
unconscionable and unreasonable as –
a) There is no fixed time period as to when the
funds would be available;
b) There is also no fixed mechanism to determine
as to when and in what manner the head of
account is to be determined and as to how the
Contractor would acquire knowledge of these two
facts;
c) There is also no certainty as to how many
persons are in the queue prior to the Contractor
and for what amounts;
d) There is enormous ambiguity in the receipt
under the particular heads of accounts.
57. These clauses in effect say that the Contractor is left with
no remedy if the Corporation does not pay for the work that
has been executed. Such a Clause would be illegal and
contrary to law. Such clauses, even in commercial contracts,
would be contrary to Section 25 read with Section 46 of the
Contract Act.
58. The clauses do not specify an outer time limit for
payment. The expression reasonable time has to be `a time'.
The concept of time itself is ensconced with specificity and
precision. Clause 9 is the opposite of being precise. It is as
vague and ambiguous as it could be because it depends on
factors which are totally extraneous to the contract, namely
Allotment of funds to the Corporation by
the Government;
Allotment of funds in a particular head;
Allotment of funds for payments who are
in queue prior to the contractor;
59. Thus, these factors, which are beyond the control of the
Contractor and which would govern the payment of
consideration, make the said clauses of the contract
completely unreasonable. The clauses have to thus, be read
or interpreted in a manner so as to instill reasonableness in
them. {Para 9}
The learned Single Judge of this Court in North Delhi Municipal Corporation Vs. Vipin Gupta (supra) took note of this fact and observed as under:-
“33. It is slightly unfathomable as to how the Corporation can
postpone the payment to the Contractor, indefinitely. The
issuance of the tender and the work order in favour of the
Contractor has to be on the pre-condition that funds are
available with the Corporation. To ask the Contractor to wait
endlessly for his payment is wholly arbitrary. The
Corporation which hands over the works contract to the
Contractor cannot say “Do the work now, I will pay when I
have the money”. Even if such a clause has been signed and
accepted by the Contractor, it does not make the clause valid
inasmuch as it would render a fundamental condition of
contract being hit by provisions of the Indian Contract Act,
1872 (hereinafter, „Contract Act‟). Every contract, to be
valid, has to have consideration and the indefinite
postponement of consideration would be wholly
unconscionable.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
RFA (COMM) 6/2021 & CM APPLs. 10185-10188/2021
NORTH DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Vs M/S. BARAHI CONSTRUCTION
Date of Decision: 15th March, 2021
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE ASHA MENON
Author: MANMOHAN, J (Oral):
Print PageSunday, 17 January 2021
Supreme court: Acceptance Of A Conditional Offer With A Further Condition Does Not Result In A Concluded Contract
The Trial Court relied on Section 4 of the Contract Act, but
completely overlooked Section 7. Section 7 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872 is set out hereinbelow for convenience:-
“7. Acceptance must be absolute.—In order to convert a
proposal into a promise the acceptance must— —In order to
convert a proposal into a promise the acceptance must—"
(1) be absolute and unqualified;
(2) be expressed in some usual and reasonable manner, unless
the proposal prescribes the manner in which it is to be accepted.
If the proposal prescribes a manner in which it is to be accepted,
and the acceptance is not made in such manner, the proposer
may, within a reasonable time after the acceptance is
communicated to him, insist that his proposal shall be accepted
in the prescribed manner, and not otherwise; but, if he fails to do
so, he accepts the acceptance.”
56. It is a cardinal principle of the law of contract that the offer
and acceptance of an offer must be absolute. It can give no room for doubt. The offer and acceptance must be based or founded on three components, that is, certainty, commitment and communication. However, when the acceptor puts in a new condition while accepting the contract already signed by the proposer, the contract is not complete until the proposer accepts that condition, as held by this Court in Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui and Ors. AIR 1972 SC 1242 An acceptance with a variation is no acceptance. It is, in effect and substance, simply a counter proposal which must be accepted fully by the original proposer, before a contract is made.
57. In Union of India v. Bhim Sen Walaiti Ram(1969) 3 SCC 146, a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that acceptance of an offer may be either absolute or conditional. If the acceptance is conditional, offer can be withdrawn at any moment until absolute acceptance has taken place.
59. The High Court also overlooked Section 7 of the Contract Act.
Both the Trial Court and the High Court over-looked the main point
that, in the response to the tender floated by the Respondent-Port
Trust, the Appellant had submitted its offer conditionally subject to
inspection being held at the Depot of the Appellant. This condition
was not accepted by the Respondent-Port Trust unconditionally. The
Respondent-Port Trust agreed to inspection at the Depot of the
Appellant, but imposed a further condition that the goods would be
finally inspected at the showroom of the Respondent-Port Trust. This
Condition was not accepted by the Appellant. It could not, therefore,
be said that there was a concluded contract. There being no
concluded contract, there could be no question of any breach on the
part of the Appellant or of damages or any risk purchase at the cost
of the Appellant. The earnest deposit of the Appellant is liable to be
refunded.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7469 OF 2008
M/s. Padia Timber Company(P) Ltd. Vs The Board of Trustees of Visakhapatnam Port Trust
Dated: JANUARY 05, 2021
Author: Indira Banerjee, J.
Print PageSunday, 12 November 2017
What is basic concept of novation sub silentio?
The plea of the Respondents for novation of the contract referring to Section 8 and 62 of the Act, sub silentio finds support from the observations in McDermott International Inc. (supra) as follows:
