Showing posts with label copyright Act. Show all posts
Showing posts with label copyright Act. Show all posts

Sunday, 26 January 2025

Bombay HC: Under which circumstances the court should not grant interim relief in copyright suit when plaintiff has approached the court at eleventh hour?

 In such a situation, this Court is unable to accept the contention of the plaintiff that although the film “Sky Force” was based on the very story in respect of which he had prepared the script “Fire Bird” and given it to the defendant No.1 way back in the year 2014, it did not occur to him after noticing such material in the public domain, starting from 2nd October 2023, that his original work could have been used for the film “Sky Force”. Being a person entrenched in the entertainment and film industry, even as per his own pleadings, it cannot lie in the mouth of the plaintiff that he was not aware about such material on websites concerning the said industry or even the print media, including well circulated newspapers like Times of India and the Statesman. {Para 19}

21. This Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff waited during

the aforesaid period of time from October 2023 till the film “Sky

Force” was completed and he has chosen to approach this Court

to seek stay on release of the film at the eleventh hour, only a

couple of days before the release date of 24th January 2025. In the meanwhile, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 have invested substantial sums of money. In fact, in the limited affidavits filed on their behalf, it is indicated that an amount of about Rs.250 crores has been invested in the film and that the domestic and overseas theatrical rights have been licensed to specific parties with more than 2500 domestic theatrical screens being booked. The music rights of the film have been assigned to a company and advance bookings for the theater screens have already begun with the deliveries of the film material for theatrical exhibition having been completed.

22. This Court is of the opinion that the above referred law pertaining to the manner in which the Court is expected to deal with such proceedings initiated at the eleventh hour, applies in full force to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It can be said that the present proceedings, in view of the aforesaid position of law, are not only delayed, but can be treated as litigation strategy on the part of the plaintiff to claim urgent circulation and to seek ad-interim reliefs at the eleventh hour when the film is about to be released.

23. Apart from this, it is relevant to note that in the plaint at

paragraph 46, the plaintiff has referred to an amount of Rs.10

crores in the backdrop of the discussions with the defendants.

Although the prayer clause of the plaint does not specifically

quantify an amount as regards the copyright claimed by the

plaintiff, a direction is sought from the defendants to disclose the

profits and revenue earned from the film “Sky Force”, thereby

indicating that ultimately the plaintiff would indeed be pressing

for monetary relief.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION

INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 2143 OF 2025

IN

COMMERCIAL IP SUIT (L) NO. 2130 OF 2025

Sandeep Gangatkar  Vs  Sandeep Kewlani & Ors.

 CORAM: MANISH PITALE, J.

 DATE : 23rd JANUARY 2025

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Sunday, 7 March 2021

Bombay HC: Offences under laws other than IPC punishable with imprisonment of 3 years or more are cognizable, non-bailable

 Recently, a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court

has also taken a similar view in the case of Nathu Ram S/o Purna

Ram Versus The State of Rajasthan reported in D. B. Cri. Ref.

No.1/2020. A specific question for reference posed before the

division bench of Rajasthan High Court was as follows:-

“What would be the nature of an offence (whether

cognizable or non-cognizable) for which

imprisonment “may extend to three years” is

provided and no stipulation is made in the statute

regarding it being cognizable or non-cognizable.”

After discussion the division bench answered the

reference in paragraph No.25 which reads thus:-

“25. Accordingly, the reference is answered in

terms that unless otherwise provided under the

relevant statute, the offences under the laws other

than IPC punishable with imprisonment to the

extent of three years, shall fall within the

classification II of offences classified under Part II

of First Schedule and thus, shall be cognizable and

non-bailable.”


12. The question, whether the offence is bailable or not

has to be seen in the light of definition of bailable offence provided

under section 2(a) of the Cr.p.c. which reads thus:

“2. Definitions……

(a) “bailable offence” means an offence which is

shown as bailable in the First Schedue, or which is

made bailable by any other law for the time being

in force; and “non bailable offence” means any

other offence;”

13. Thus, the next relevant sections would be sub section 2

of section 4 and section 5 of the Cr.p.c. as they are referred to by

the Division Bench of this court in the case of Mahesh Shivram

Puthran (supra). Part II of the Schedule-I reads thus:-

II – CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCES AGAINST OTHER LAWS

Offence Cognizable or noncognizable

Bailable or nonbailable

By what court

triable

If punishable with

death,

imprisonment for

life, or

imprisonment for

more than 7 years.

Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session.


If punishable with

imprisonment for 3

years and upwards

but not more than 7

years.

Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the

first class.

If punishable with

imprisonment for

less than 3 years or

with fine only.

Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate.

14. Bare reading of this Part II of the Schedule -I of Cr.p.c.

shows that, if the offences in the other laws are punishable with

imprisonment for three years and upwards then the offences are

cognizable and non bailable. Wherever it is possible to impose the

punishment extending to three years, this category would apply,

because in such offences it is possible to impose sentence of exact

three years. In such cases offences would be non-bailable.

15. Therefore, first question raised before me is answered

that the offences under section 63 of the Copyright Act and section

103 of Trade Marks Act are non bailable in nature and, therefore,

since these sections are applied here, the application for

anticipatory bail is maintainable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION NO. 336 OF 2021

Piyush Subhashbhai Ranipa  Vs  The State of Maharashtra 


CORAM : SARANG V. KOTWAL, J.

DATE : 26th FEBRUARY, 2021

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Friday, 30 September 2016

How to ascertain territorial jurisdiction of court in cases of trade mark and copyright?

 What emerges from this discussion is this:

(a) a plaintiff suing under the Trade Marks Act or
Copyright Act can always file the suit in the jurisdiction
where he lives, works for gain or carries on business. In
the context of a company, given the view in Sanjay
Dalia, this would mean where the company has its
principal or registered office. All issues of cause of
action and situs or location of the defendant or the
cause of action are inconsequential. It makes no
difference where the defendant resides. It makes no
difference where the cause of action arose. It certainly
makes no difference that the plaintiff also happens to
have a branch office in another location where the
cause of action may have arisen or where the defendant
may reside or carries on business.
(b) Where the plaintiff has only one office, it presents no
difficulty. Where the plaintiff has multiple offices,
however, he has a limited choice. He may either bring a
Suit under Section 134(2) or Section 62(2), i.e., within
the jurisdiction where he resides; or he may invoke
Section 20 and file a suit where the Defendants reside
or work for gain or where the cause of action arose
wholly or in part. The fact that the Plaintiff has the
choice of bringing a suit based on Section 20 of the
CPC does not mean that his rights under Section
134(2) or Section 62(2) are in any way eroded, curtailed
or restricted.

(c) However, where the plaintiff chooses not to file a Suit
at his or its principal business or where his registered
office is located, and also chooses not to file a suit in a
jurisdiction covered by Section 20 of the CPC but
instead attempts to file the suit at some other location
where the plaintiff happens to have a subsidiary or
satellite office, but where there is absolutely nothing
else (neither cause of action nor any of the defendants)
the Plaintiff cannot invoke Section 134(2) or Section
62(2) to drag the Defendant to that distant location.
That, following the decision of the Supreme Court, is
the abuse that is required to be prevented. That is in
fact the only abuse that is required to be prevented.
(d) The Section 134(2) and Section 62(2) privilege or
advantage attaches to the registered office or principal
place of work. It is a privilege not to be used by
abandoning the registered office situs, abandoning the
Section 20 situs options, and travelling to some remote
location where there is neither defendant nor cause of
action. That is the mischief addressed in Sanjay Dalia.
To illustrate: the plaintiff has its registered office in
Mumbai. The defendant is in Delhi. The cause of
action arose in Delhi. The plaintiff also has another
branch office in Port Blair. A plaintiff can sue in
Mumbai or in Delhi, but not in Port Blair.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 494 OF 2014
IN
SUIT NO. 516 OF 2013
MANUGRAPH INDIA LIMITED,

v
 SIMARQ TECHNOLOGIES PVT.
LTD.,

CORAM: G.S. PATEL, J
DATED: 15th June 2016
Citation:AIR 2016 Bom 217
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Saturday, 26 December 2015

Whether territorial jurisdiction of court in copyright cases can be decided on basis of convenience of lawyers?

It was also submitted that as the bulk of litigation of such a
nature is filed at Delhi and lawyers available at Delhi are having
expertise in the matter, as such it would be convenient to the parties
to contest the suit at Delhi. Such aspects are irrelevant for deciding the
territorial jurisdiction. It is not the convenience of the lawyers or their
expertise which makes out the territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the
submission is unhesitatingly rejected.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.10643-10644 OF 2010
Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. 
Vs.
Sanjay Dalia & Anr.
(With C.A. No.4912/2015 @ SLP [C] No.8253/2013)
Citation;AIR 2015 SC 3479
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Sunday, 26 July 2015

Whether plaintiff can file suit where he is residing as per copyright Act and trade mark Act?

In our opinion, the provisions of section 62 of the Copyright
Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have to be interpreted in
the purposive manner. No doubt about it that a suit can be filed by the
plaintiff at a place where he is residing or carrying on business or
personally works for gain. He need not travel to file a suit to a place
where defendant is residing or cause of action wholly or in part arises.
However, if the plaintiff is residing or carrying on business etc. at a
place where cause of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he has
to file a suit at that place, as discussed above. Thus, for the aforesaid
reasons mentioned by us in the judgment, we are not inclined to
interfere with the orders passed by the High Court. Appeals are hereby
dismissed.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.10643-10644 OF 2010
Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. ... Appellant
Vs.
Sanjay Dalia & Anr. ... Respondents
(With C.A. No.4912/2015 @ SLP [C] No.8253/2013)
Dated;July 01, 2015.
ARUN MISHRA, J.
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