Bombay HC: Special Court or High Court have jurisdiction to grant ad-interim relief to protect liberty of applicant in offences under Atrocities Act in appropriate cases

Therefore, this court is of the view that the provision of issuance of notice is to be observed at every proceeding as is contemplated by Section 15A(3) of the Act, cannot be construed that it should be at all stages of the same proceedings, and the same would preclude the court to pass any order including grant of ad-interim protection. Any such interpretation would lead to an absurd situation such as without hearing the victim even notice cannot be issued. In absence of any provision creating an embargo on the court to grant such relief, which has been done specifically in provision of Section 18, where the case prima facie case is made out of commission of offence under Atrocities Act, court ceases to have jurisdiction to grant pre-arrest bail, it cannot be so interpreted as sought to be asked by Counsel for Appellant.

{Para 14}

15. There could be variety of situations and eventualities in which for the grant of relief it would become imperative for the court to pass an order without waiting for the service of notice to the informant/ victim. For example, prima facie case is not made out under the act and liberty of such individual is at stake. At various stages different orders are to be passed not affecting rights of the parties, etc.

16. In considered view of this court, appropriate interpretation to Section 15A(3) and (5) would be that right of parties involved in the proceedings cannot be decided finally without notice/hearing to the victim. This however would not take away power of the court to protect the liberty of person in appropriate cases keeping in mind the right under Article 21 of the Constitution.

17. Moreover, it is well settled principle that the prima facie observations made by the Court at interim stage are not binding on the same court while deciding the application finally. Hence, the Special Court is within is power to grant ad-interim bail and issue notice at the same instance.

Ratio: While victims have a statutory right to notice and hearing under Section 15A(3) & (5), this does not curtail the court’s power to grant urgent ad‑interim relief to protect liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The balance lies in hearing the victim before final disposal, but not necessarily before interim protection. Thus, the Special Court/High Court can grant ad‑interim bail and simultaneously issue notice to the victim.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 951 of 2025

Decided On: 27.02.2026

Sahil Ramesh Sonavane Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.M. Joshi, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/1970/2026,2026:BHC-AS:10270.

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Bombay HC: Under which circumstances the court should not grant interim relief in copyright suit when plaintiff has approached the court at eleventh hour?

 In such a situation, this Court is unable to accept the contention of the plaintiff that although the film “Sky Force” was based on the very story in respect of which he had prepared the script “Fire Bird” and given it to the defendant No.1 way back in the year 2014, it did not occur to him after noticing such material in the public domain, starting from 2nd October 2023, that his original work could have been used for the film “Sky Force”. Being a person entrenched in the entertainment and film industry, even as per his own pleadings, it cannot lie in the mouth of the plaintiff that he was not aware about such material on websites concerning the said industry or even the print media, including well circulated newspapers like Times of India and the Statesman. {Para 19}

21. This Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff waited during

the aforesaid period of time from October 2023 till the film “Sky

Force” was completed and he has chosen to approach this Court

to seek stay on release of the film at the eleventh hour, only a

couple of days before the release date of 24th January 2025. In the meanwhile, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 have invested substantial sums of money. In fact, in the limited affidavits filed on their behalf, it is indicated that an amount of about Rs.250 crores has been invested in the film and that the domestic and overseas theatrical rights have been licensed to specific parties with more than 2500 domestic theatrical screens being booked. The music rights of the film have been assigned to a company and advance bookings for the theater screens have already begun with the deliveries of the film material for theatrical exhibition having been completed.

22. This Court is of the opinion that the above referred law pertaining to the manner in which the Court is expected to deal with such proceedings initiated at the eleventh hour, applies in full force to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It can be said that the present proceedings, in view of the aforesaid position of law, are not only delayed, but can be treated as litigation strategy on the part of the plaintiff to claim urgent circulation and to seek ad-interim reliefs at the eleventh hour when the film is about to be released.

23. Apart from this, it is relevant to note that in the plaint at

paragraph 46, the plaintiff has referred to an amount of Rs.10

crores in the backdrop of the discussions with the defendants.

Although the prayer clause of the plaint does not specifically

quantify an amount as regards the copyright claimed by the

plaintiff, a direction is sought from the defendants to disclose the

profits and revenue earned from the film “Sky Force”, thereby

indicating that ultimately the plaintiff would indeed be pressing

for monetary relief.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION

INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 2143 OF 2025

IN

COMMERCIAL IP SUIT (L) NO. 2130 OF 2025

Sandeep Gangatkar  Vs  Sandeep Kewlani & Ors.

 CORAM: MANISH PITALE, J.

 DATE : 23rd JANUARY 2025

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Whether Occupier Of Flat is Entitled To Transit Rent For Period Of Dispossession During Redevelopment?

The fact remains that as respondent no. 3 is in possession of the tenement in question and would now be handing over possession of such tenement to the petitioner/society. Hence considering the consistent view taken by this Court in Heritage Lifestyles and Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Amar-Villa Co-Operative Housing Society and others MANU/MH/0380/2011 : 2011 (3) Mh.L.J. 865 and in Saikripa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. V/s. Osho Developers & Ors.1, the party who is dispossessed, would be entitled to the transit rent as it is such party who is put to hardship.{Para 9}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Commercial Arbitration Petition (L.) No. 4301 of 2022

Decided On: 16.03.2022

Maniar Associates LLP  Vs. Vijay Niwas Co-op. Hsg. Soc. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Kulkarni, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1454/2022

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Can the court continue interim relief to the plaintiff if the defendant fails to file his written statement?

 Admittedly the application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC is still pending consideration, since the written statement had not been filed by the parties disclosing their true stand. In such circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that interim protection which has been granted shall be liable to be continued, though the present revision petition is being disposed of. {Para 11}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

Civil Revision No. 1556 of 2021 (O&M)

Decided On: 06.09.2021

Sainik Textile Mills (P) Ltd.  Vs.  Prestige Developers and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, J.

Citation: MANU/PH/1809/2021

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Bombay HC: Undisputed Claims Can't Be Set-Off Against Unliquidated Damages That Are Not Ascertained

 Thus adverting to the above principles of law in their applicability to the facts of the present case, in my opinion, the petitioner has clearly made out a prima facie case for the relief, that the ONGC needs to deposit the undisputed invoice amounts in this Court pending the arbitral proceedings. There cannot be any justification for the ONGC to withhold such amount and more particularly on the premise that it has a claim of unliquidated damages against the petitioner on account of the incident which had taken place on 1 September 2019. The damages so claimed by the ONGC are certainly neither admitted nor ascertained in a manner known to law. {Para 27}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 135 of 2022

Decided On: 06.06.2022

 Ocean Sparkle Limited  Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Kulkarni, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1776/2022

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Whether the court can grant interim relief U/S 9 of Arbitration Act if the contract is determinable?

 However, even in these circumstances, when a question arises before the Court, to consider granting of reliefs in the nature as prayed for by the petitioner, in my opinion, the basic consideration for the Court would be to examine as to what is the nature of the contract between the parties. Perusal of the contract and the general terms and conditions as appended thereto, more particularly, Clause (5) thereof, clearly indicate that the parties have provided that either of the parties can terminate the contract with a fifteen days notice to be served on the other party. Further such clause also provides for the validity of the contract up to 30 June 2022. It is thus clear that nature of the contract in question is determinable. If that be so, then Mr.Nankani would be correct in his contention that the provisions under sub-clause (d) of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act which provides that a contract which is in its nature determinable,cannot be specifically enforced becomes applicable.

19. In the context of Section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, another

provision which would become relevant is Section 41 of the Specific

Relief Act, which provides as to when an injunction would be refused or when it cannot be granted. Section 41(e) provides that an

injunction cannot be granted by the Court to prevent the breach of a contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. Thus once the nature of the contract itself is such, that it cannot be specifically enforced, Section 41 (e) of the Specific Relief Act would stare at the petitioner when the petitioner claims a relief of an injunction. Certainly the principles which are embodied in Section 14(d) read with Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act are applicable even when the Court considers an application under Section 9 of the Act for interim measures. It is a settled principle of law that although Section 9 is a remedy available to the parties having an arbitration agreement between them, however, when a relief for grant of an injunction is prayed for, certainly the Court would be guided by the principles as contained in the Specific Relief Act read with the provisions of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO. 1366 OF 2022

Chetan Iron LLP  V/s. RC Ltd. 

CORAM : G.S.KULKARNI, J.

PRONOUNCED ON: 24 January, 2022

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Whether court can direct interim relief of deposit of money while granting relief U/S 9 of arbitration Act?

 The second argument canvassed by Mr. Andhyarujina was that before any order of deposit is made, the principles underlying the provisions of Order 38 Rules 1, 2 & 5 must be complied with by the Petitioner. He submitted that in the facts of the present case, there is nothing on record to show that the Petitioner has complied with the aforesaid provisions and therefore the Petitioner is not entitled to an order of deposit. I do not think that this argument holds any substance. It is true that the broad principles of Order 38 ought to be kept in mind whilst passing an order under Section 9 for securing the amount in dispute in the proposed arbitration. As far as Section 9 of Indian Arbitration Act is concerned, whilst considering a relief thereunder, it cannot be said that the Court is strictly bound by the provisions of Order 38 Rules 1, 2 and/or 5. The scope of Section 9 of the Act is very broad and the Court has the discretion to grant thereunder a wide range of interim measures of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. Of course, the discretion to be exercised by the Court under Section 9 has to be judicious and not arbitrary. Though, for considering interim measures, the Court would be guided by the principles which the Civil Courts ordinarily employ for considering grant or refusal of interim relief, particularly Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 and Order 38 Rule 5, the Court, however, is not unduly bound by their texts. Whilst exercising its power under Section 9, the Court must have due regard to the underlying purpose of the conferment of the power in the Court which is to promote the efficacy of arbitration as a form of dispute resolution. In an appropriate case, where the Court is of the view that there is practically no defense to the payability of the amount and where it is in the interest of justice to secure the amount, which forms part of the subject matter of the proposed arbitration reference, even if no case strictly within the letter of Order 38 Rules 1 or 2 is made out, though there are serious allegations concerning such a case, it is certainly within the power of the Court to order a suitable interim measure of protection. There is no requirement that for a relief of deposit, an ironclad case under Order 38 Rule 5 must be made out. The provisions of Order 38 are guides to a Section 9 Court and not fetters upon its discretion. To my mind, the position in law, is that, when there is a clear and unequivocal admission of liability or there is no real dispute with reference to the amounts payable, then in such a case an order of deposit may not only be made, but in the interest of justice, ought to be made. Where the defense raised is prima facie untenable and the Petitioner has a good chance of success, an order of deposit to secure the claim can and indeed should be made under Section 9. {Para 21}

22. In the view that I take, I am supported by several decisions of this Court. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Jagdish Ahuja v. Cupino Limited [2020 SCC OnLine Bom 849] held as under:—

“6. As far as Section 9 of the Act is concerned, it cannot be said that this court, while considering a relief thereunder, is strictly bound by the provisions of Order 38 Rule 5. As held by our Courts, the scope of Section 9 of the Act is very broad; the court has a discretion to grant thereunder a wide range of interim measures of protection “as may appear to the court to be just and convenient”, though such discretion has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. The court is, no doubt, guided by the principles which civil courts ordinarily employ for considering interim relief, particularly, Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Order 38 Rule 5; the court, however, is not unduly bound by their texts.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before B.P. Colabawalla, J.)

Ultra Deep Subsea Pte Ltd. Vs Hindustan Oil Exploration Company Ltd.

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Whether Indian courts should grant interim relief U/ S 9 of arbitration Act in foreign seated arbitration governed by foreign law?

 For Section 9 to be excluded, there must be a specific agreement between the parties, ousting the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 9. Simply put, there must be something more than an Arbitration Agreement being governed by foreign law and with a foreign seat. The Agreement must indicate in clear and express terms that the parties intended to exclude the operation of Part I of the Indian Arbitration Act. Merely because an Arbitration Agreement is governed by foreign law or the seat of the arbitration is outside India, without anything more, cannot be construed to mean that the parties agreed to exclude the application of Section 9 of the Indian Arbitration Act and thereby close the gates to a party to approach this court thereunder. If I was to accept the submission of Mr. Andhyarujina, namely, that because the Arbitration Agreement is governed by foreign law and the seat of arbitration is outside India, the same would amount to an “agreement to the contrary” as contemplated under the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act, it would effectively mean that in all foreign seated arbitrations, Part I of the Indian Arbitration Act would stand excluded. This would effectively mean that the proviso to Section 2(2) would be a dead letter. In fact, the interpretation of Mr. Andhyarujina would defeat the very purpose for which the proviso was brought on the statute book i.e. to permit parties to an arbitration to be held outside India to approach the Courts in India inter alia under Section 9 of the Indian Arbitration Act and seek interim relief, pending the said foreign seated arbitration. In fact, the reason why the aforesaid provision was brought on the statute book can be discerned from the discussion on this subject by the Law Commission in its 246th Report. The relevant portion of this Report reads as under:—

“While the decision in BALCO is a step in the right direction and would drastically reduce judicial intervention in foreign arbitrations, the Commission feels that there are still a few areas that are likely to be problematic.

(i) Where the assets of a party are located in India, and there is a likelihood that that party will dissipate its assets in the near future, the other party will lack an efficacious remedy if the seat of the arbitration is abroad. The latter party will have two possible remedies, but neither will be efficacious. First, the latter party can obtain an interim order from a foreign Court or the arbitral tribunal itself and file a civil suit to enforce the right created by the interim order. The interim order would not be enforceable directly by filing an execution petition as it would not qualify as a “judgment” or “decree” for the purposes of sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure (which provide a mechanism for enforcing foreign judgments). Secondly, in the event that the former party does not adhere to the terms of the foreign Order, the latter party can initiate proceedings for contempt in the foreign Court and enforce the judgment of the foreign Court under sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Neither of these remedies is likely to provide a practical remedy to the party seeking to enforce the interim relief obtained by it. That being the case, it is a distinct possibility that a foreign party would obtain an arbitral award in its favour only to realize that the entity against which it has to enforce the award has been stripped of its assets and has been converted into a shell company.

(ii) While the decision in BALCO was made prospective to ensure that hotly negotiated bargains are not overturned overnight, it results in a situation where Courts, despite knowing that the decision in Bhatia is no longer good law, are forced to apply it whenever they are faced with a case arising from an arbitration agreement executed pre-BALCO.”

(emphasis supplied)

17. It is for this very reason that I have opined that merely because an Arbitration Agreement is governed by foreign law and the seat of arbitration is outside India, without anything more, cannot amount to an “agreement to the contrary” as contemplated under the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Indian Arbitration Act.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before B.P. Colabawalla, J.)

Ultra Deep Subsea Pte Ltd. Vs Hindustan Oil Exploration Company Ltd.

Commercial Arbitration Petition (L) No. 22272 of 2021

Decided on December 13, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 5481

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What are essential prerequisites for grant of interim reliefs under the Arbitration Act?

 The legal proposition, as advanced by Mr. Mehta appears, at first blush, to be almost axiomatic. It appears incongruous that, in the absence of a substantive challenge (in the form of a Section 23 Statement of Claim), an application for interlocutory relief would lie. Possibly for this reason, the Bombay High Court, speaking through G.S. Patel, J., has observed, in Tasty Korner v. Merwan's Confectioners Pvt. Ltd.12, that “it also goes without saying that Section 17 Application cannot be disposed of or even taken up unless a statement of claim has (sic been?) filed to begin with”.{Para 55}

56. Despite the high estimation in which I hold Patel, J., I regret my inability to agree with this proposition.

57. Empirically, in ordinary civil law, an application for interlocutory relief would lie only in substantive proceedings, claiming the main relief. The arbitral protocol, under the 1996 Act is, however, somewhat peculiar in its dispensation. Section 9 itself envisages grant of interim protection, by a Court, before institution of arbitral proceedings and can be invoked, in an appropriate case, even before the notice of arbitration, under Section 21, is issued. The reason is that, while considering the prayer for interim protection under the 1996 Act, whether under Section 9 or under Section 17, apart from the troika of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss, the Court, or Arbitral Tribunal, is also required to preserve the sanctity of the arbitral process, which is the very raisond' etre of the 1996 Act. All efforts to foster and promote the arbitral process, and prevent its interception or interdiction have, therefore, to be made. The Court under Section 9, or the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 is also, therefore, empowered to grant interim protection where any possibility of the arbitral proceedings being frustrated is found to exist, whether such frustration be before the arbitral process is initiated, during the arbitral process or even after the passing of the Award. If, therefore, before a Statement of Claim is filed, the situation that presents itself is such that interim protection has to be granted, to ensure the preservation of the arbitral process, the Court under Section 9, and the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17, is empowered to grant such protection. In view of this peculiar dispensation, unique to arbitration, I am of the opinion that the filing of Statement of Claim under Section 23 cannot be treated as a sine qua non for the maintainability of an application for interim protection under Section 17.

Remarkable insight: 
 Interim relief orders under S.9 or S.17 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 need a 4th element that the relief be in the aid of the arbitral process. This is in addition to the usual troika required for interim relief: prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before C. Hari Shankar, J.)

Sanjay Arora and Another  Vs Rajan Chadha and Others

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Whether arbitrator should decide the application for interim relief in arbitration relying on principles for grant of temporary injunction?

Being an arbitral tribunal and having a trooping of Civil Court, while making decisions, the arbitral tribunal has to follow the procedure as contemplated under law.  If any interim Order of injunction is to be passed exparte, certainly, the tribunal has to keep in mind the well settled principles of law.  While granting interim injunctions, only on being satisfied that there is a prima facie case in favour of the applicant and that balance of convenience is in his favour and irreparable loss or injury is likely to occur in the event of injunction not granted and  only on being satisfied with the above grounds, interim Order of injunction can be granted by the tribunal.  Whereas, in many Orders, this Court has come across, particularly in the arbitration cases, arising out of hire purchase and finance agreement, the arbitrator nominated by the financiers are passing Orders mechanically, without following any rule of law.  Any such Order, in my view, cannot be sustained in the eye of law.  Therefore, while passing any Order in the nature of interim injunction, the basic well established principles have to be followed by the arbitrator. 

42.  While passing any order for preservation or interim custody or a sale of any goods, which is subject matter of arbitral agreement or to secure any amount, also preservation, the well established principles have to be followed by the arbitrators.  Similarly, whenever the arbitral tribunal finds that such interim measures have to be passed, the arbitrator has to satisfy himself prima facie case of the applicant.  The tribunal also has to find out the actual dispute and bonafide contest existing between the parties.  Prima facie in the sense, the tribunal has to satisfy that the plaintiff has made positive averments that he has a strong case and legal right over the property, which has to be preserved or protected.  To find out balance of convenience, the tribunal has to find out whether there is any bonafide contest between the parties and on which side the balance of convenience lies.  Similarly, the tribunal also has to weigh whether in the event of not granting any injunction, the applicant will be really put to irreparable loss and injury.  Only on being satisfied with these facts, interim Orders, particularly in the nature of injunction, can be granted.  

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED : 17.09.2020

CORAM :

 MR.JUSTICE N.SATHISH KUMAR

C.M.A.Nos.25 to 28, 30 and 66 to 88 of 2020

and C.M.P.Nos.271, 273, 275, 277, 289,

617 to 621, 623 to 640 of 2020

Flywheel Logistics Solutions Pvt. Ltd.  Vs M/s.Hinduja Leyland Finance Ltd.,

 

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Whether injunction application to restrain daughter-in-law from entering the marital home is maintainable?

 In the present case, the first defendant has squarely questioned the title, of the plaintiff, to the suit property, and has contended that it is joint family property. She has claimed her right, therein, not merely on the ground that it is her matrimonial home, but as the mother of a coparcener to the joint family. These disputes required to be adjudicated, in the suit, and no order, interlocutory or otherwise, can be passed on the premise that the plaintiff is right, and the first defendant is wrong.

35. In my opinion, it is not necessary to enter, deeply, into the circumstances in which mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction, can be granted at an interim stage, as these principles are well settled. The decisions, on which Ms. Rajkotia relies, and which have been cited hereinabove, clearly indicate that, essentially, a plaintiff, in order to be justified to claim an interlocutory mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction, has to establish (i) a strong case in his favour, the standard being higher than that of a prima facie case, (ii) that denial of prohibitory injunction would result in irreparable loss to her, and (iii) that the balance of convenience is decidedly in favour of grant of mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction at the interlocutory stage. Additionally, grant of mandatory or prohibitory injunction, at an interim stage, has been approved where the failure, to do so, would result in the suit becoming infructuous, or the final relief, sought therein, being rendered illusory. None of these criteria are satisfied, in the present case. Most importantly, the first defendant had been residing with the plaintiff, since 2002 (or, at the latest, 2014, even if the plaintiff's stand were to be accepted), and it was only on 10th May, 2020 the first defendant left the house of the plaintiff, to visit her mother. It cannot, therefore, be said, by any stretch of imagination, that, by allowing the defendant to return to the house, where she had been staying till 10th May, 2020, irreparable harm would ensue, to the plaintiff. Mere bald assertions, to the effect that the first defendant was harassing the plaintiff, can hardly suffice. Given the option between allowing the first defendant to return to her matrimonial home, where she had been residing since 2002, or 2014, and banishing her, at least during the pendency of the suit, therefrom, the balance of convenience is also, decidedly, in favour of the former, rather than the latter, alternative.

36. Ms. Rajkotia had sought to submit that, were injunction, as prayed by her, in this application, not granted at this stage, the suit would be rendered effectively infructuous, as it would linger on for years. The submission fails to impress. The prayer, in the suit, is for a decree of possession, in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, in respect of the suit property, and for the decree of permanent injunction, restraining the first defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit property, by the plaintiff. In fact, the prayer, in the present application, effectively seeks grant of the prayers in the suit, before the suit is tried and at an interlocutory stage. If this Court were to restrain the first defendant, at this stage itself, from returning to the suit property, the plaintiff would secure possession thereof, and, effectively, a permanent injunction, in terms of prayer (b) in the suit, would also be granted. The plaintiff, therefore, effectively seeks decreeing of the suit without a trial.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

I.A. 4618/2020 in CS (OS) 506/2018

Decided On: 02.07.2020

Anita Chopra  Vs.  Rohini Chopra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C. Hari Shankar, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1332/2020

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Delhi HC: Court may issue interim orders against the third parties to arbitration only in exceptional circumstances

 Undoubtedly, section 9 provides that the court shall have the same powers for making interim orders under section 9 as a civil court has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it, and the powers of a civil court in this regard are very wide. The civil courts as and when required, and deemed appropriate in the facts and circumstances of a particular case have been making interim orders in respect of third parties, such as: interim injunction restraining third party-banks from honouring bank guarantees; attaching defendant's monies/property in hands of third party trustee, debtor, agent etc; restraining third party-subsequent transferee/person claiming rights in suit property from disposing of the same, and the like. As a corollary, the power of the court to issue interim orders under section 9 cannot be confined only to the parties to arbitration agreement. However, a significant parameter inherent in section 9, for exercise of this power against a non-signatory to arbitration agreement, is that the purpose of section 9 is to aid arbitration between the parties thereto, and the interim orders there under have to be with regard to subject matter of arbitration/in connection with the arbitral proceedings. In this context, it is relevant to draw a distinction between orders granting interim relief against a party to the arbitration agreement which incidentally affects a third party, on one hand, and orders granting relief directed against a third party, on the other. While the former is ordinarily acceptable as being within the scope of section 9, the power with respect to the latter should be exercised sparingly. For instance, an order appointing a third party as a receiver or guardian of a minor/person of unsound mind is not an order against the third party, or detrimental to its rights as such. Rather, it is a relief granted to the petitioner in support of the arbitral proceedings and affects the party to the arbitration agreement. Similarly, when a subsequent transferee, or a person claiming title under a party to arbitration is ordered to maintain status quo, or not to dispose of property which is subject matter of arbitration, it is again ancillary to arbitral proceedings in as much, as, it is for protection of the subject matter of arbitration that the order is passed. An injunction, or order of attachment with respect to the properties belonging to/monies owed to a party to arbitration, but in hands of a third party for/on behalf of the said party, is effectively a relief against the said party, which incidentally affects the third party. Pertinently, it is expressly provided in the C.P.C., that attachment before judgment shall not affect the prior existing rights of third parties in the property of the defendant sought to be attached. Injunction against a third party bank from honouring a bank guarantee is consequential to interim relief of restraining a party from encashing the same against the petitioner. To sum up, the court may issue interim orders against the third parties to arbitration only in exceptional circumstances which are such that denial thereof might frustrate the petitioner's rights in arbitration; defeat the very object of arbitration between the parties thereto; render the arbitration proceedings infructuous; lead to gross injustice; and/or, leave the petitioner remediless, depending on facts of each case."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

O.M.P. (I) (COMM) No. 35/2020 and I.A. 3251/2020

Decided On: 10.06.2020

Blue Coast Infrastructure Development Pvt. Ltd.  Vs.  Blue Coast Hotels Ltd. and Ors.

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What is distinction between power of court and arbitrator to grant interim relief to party to arbitration against third party?

Reading of Section 9 of the Act as well as the judgments in Value Advisory (supra) and Gatx India (supra) makes it clear that the scope of power of a Court under Section 9 of the Act is not limited to parties to an Arbitration Agreement and the Court can issue interim directions even against a third party. The distinction between the powers under Section 9 of the Act and Section 17 of the Act has a clear rationale. An Arbitrator is a creature of the contract between the parties and therefore cannot venture outside the contract to issue directions to parties who are non-parties to the Arbitration Agreement. This limitation is not applicable to a Court exercising power under Section 9 of the Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

O.M.P. (I) (COMM) No. 35/2020 and I.A. 3251/2020

Decided On: 10.06.2020

Blue Coast Infrastructure Development Pvt. Ltd.  Vs.  Blue Coast Hotels Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jyoti Singh, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1259/2020

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How doctrine of Election is applicable to interim relief in Arbitration?

After hearing the parties, the Emergency Arbitrator passed a very detailed and reasoned order on 02.04.2020, declining to grant relief to the Applicants. Respondents, in my view, are right in their contention that having invoked the mechanism of the Emergency Arbitrator and invited a detailed and reasoned order, it is not open for the Applicants to take a second bite at the cherry. There has been no change of circumstance after the said order as none has been pleaded or even argued. Having excluded the applicability of Part I of the Act and agreeing to be governed by different Rules and procedures, binding on the parties and having invoked the same, jurisdiction of this Court under Section 9 of the Act cannot be invoked and the petition is not maintainable.

56. Even on the anvil of Doctrine of Election, Applicants have to fail. Applicants had consciously chosen to tread on a path and cannot turn around only because they were unsuccessful. It also needs a mention that the pleadings in the petition are really in the nature of an appeal pointing out flaws and infirmities in the order of the Emergency Arbitrator. Respondents are right that this Court in a petition under Section 9 of the Act cannot sit as a Court of Appeal to examine the order of the Emergency Arbitrator.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

OMP (I) (COMM.) 90/2020

Decided On: 12.05.2020

Ashwani Minda   Vs.  U-Shin Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jyoti Singh, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1043/2020

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Supreme Court: The family Court should not give final relief at interim stage

 By the impugned order, the court has directed the Court Receiver to take possession of the flat from the appellant and induct respondent-wife in the flat during the pendency of the appeal.

{Para 3}

4. In the appeal filed, the appellant has called in question the correctness or otherwise of the findings and the conclusion reached by the Family Court in Petition No. A-1072/2000 dated 6.2.2007, wherein the Family Court has reached the conclusion that both the husband and wife are joint owners of flat bearing No. 303, Rajesh Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Borivali (West), Mumbai.

Even before giving a verdict on the findings and the conclusions reached by the Family Court, by way of interim relief, the court has granted the main relief itself. This, in our opinion is unsustainable. It is settled legal position, that by way of interim relief, final relief should not be granted till the matter is decided one way or the other.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1788 of 2009 

Decided On: 23.03.2009

 Mehul Mahendra Thakkar  Vs. Meena Mehul Thakkar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Tarun Chatterjee and H.L. Dattu, JJ.

Citation: 2009 (14) SCC 48: MANU/SC/0425/2009

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Whether court can grant interim relief even if arbitration agreement is insufficiently stamped?

1st Question
“Whether a court, under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, can entertain and grant any interim or ad-interim relief
in an application under Section 9 of the said Act when a
document containing arbitration clause is unstamped or
insufficiently stamped?”

2nd Question
“Whether, inter alia, in view of Section 11 (6A) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, inserted by Arbitration
and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2016, it would be
necessary for the Court before considering and passing final
orders on an application under Section 11(6) of the Act to
await the adjudication by the stamp authorities, in a case
where the document objected to, is not adequately stamped?
Hence, the above two questions, firstly falling under
Section 9 of the ACA and secondly falling under Section 11 of
the ACA and having common features, namely, as to what is
the effect and consequence of the document being not
sufficiently stamped, when the court is called upon to exercise
jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 9 and Section 11 of
the ACA, are issues falling for consideration of this Bench.

Answer
Taking a overall view of the scheme of the ACA,
judgments delivered by the Supreme Court, we are of the view
that the party need not be put to a disadvantage merely
because an objection has been raised in respect of
insufficiency of the stamp on the agreement presented before
the court. Neither a contesting party could deprive legitimate
rights of a litigant in praying for timely intervention of the
court by praying for appointment of an arbitral tribunal nor for

interim reliefs in the fact situation of a case. That would be
rendering a party without any forum and in a given situation
the outcome would be, at times, catastrophic and disastrous
and the damage could be irreparable one. A balanced
approach, keeping in view the legislative intent and the view
adopted by the Supreme Court, needs to be adopted, so that
the purpose of enacting the provisions of Sections 11 and 9 of
the ACA as amended by the Amendment Act is not defeated.
119. If an application under Section 11 or under Section
9 is required to be postponed till the order of adjudication is
passed by the learned Collector of Stamps with such
uncertainty of the time it would take to decide and the
hierarchy of remedies after such order, as it would be subject
to an appeal or a revision, as the case may be and till such
time no order either under Section 11 of under Section 9
should be passed, then the Legislature would not have
provided for speedy disposal of the applications under Section
11 or under Section 9 of the Act by inserting sub-Section (13)
in Section 11 and sub-Section (2) in Section 9 of the Act.

(L) ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS FRAMED :
120. In view of the above deliberation, we answer the
questions as framed by us as follows :-
Sr. No.
Question Answer
1 Whether a court, under the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, can entertain and grant any
interim or ad-interim relief in an
application under Section 9 of the
said Act when a document
containing arbitration clause is
unstamped or insufficiently
stamped
In the Affirmative
2 Whether, inter alia, in view of
Section 11 (6A) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996,
inserted by Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Act,
2016, it would be necessary for
the Court before considering and
passing final orders on an
application under Section 11(6) of
the Act to await the adjudication
by the stamp authorities, in a case
where the document objected to,
is not adequately stamped?
In the Negative
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
ARBITRATION PETITION NO.466 OF 2017

Gautam Landscapes Private Limited.  Vs. Shailesh S.Shah 

CORAM : NARESH H. PATIL, CJ.,
R. D. DHANUKA &
G. S. KULKARNI, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON: APRIL 04, 2019.

JUDGMENT: (PER NARESH H. PATIL,CJ.)
This judgment is held not good law in view of Supreme court Judgment.Please see the link: https://www.lawweb.in/2019/04/sc-court-cant-appoint-arbitrator-when.html

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Whether court can grant interim relief as per S 9 of arbitration Act even after passing of arbitral award?

 The question, that arises for adjudication before us is, as to whether the proceedings initiated Under Section 9 of the Act, (whilst the arbitral proceedings were pending) survive, after the arbitral proceedings come to a closure. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, the answer thereto has to emanate from Section 9 of the Act. The above provision is extracted hereunder:

9. Interim measures, etc. by Court.--(1) A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36, apply to a court--

(i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or a person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or

(ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:--

(a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement;

(b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration;

(c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence;

(d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver;

(e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the court to be just and convenient, and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it.

(2) Where, before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, a Court passes an order for any interim measure of protection under Sub-section (1), the arbitral proceedings shall be commenced within a period of ninety days from the date of such order or within such further time as the Court may determine.

(3) Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall not entertain an application under Sub-section (1), unless the Court finds/that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided Under Section 17 efficacious.

A perusal of the above provision reveals, that interim measures can be allowed in favour of a party (who moves an application Under Section 9 of the Act), either before the commencement of the arbitration proceedings, or during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings, and even after the making of the arbitral award "... but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36...". It is therefore apparent, that an interim arrangement, can be made Under Section 9 of the Act, not only before and during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings, but also after the arbitral award has been pronounced.

7. As to whether the orders passed by the different Courts, which culminated in the two orders, extracted hereinabove, dated 13.12.2013 and 14.03.2014, would continue even after the passing of the arbitral award, in our considered view, would depend on the nature of the prayer made by the Appellant, when the application Under Section 9 was filed, before the concerned Court. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 679 of 2017 

Decided On: 19.01.2017

Ultratech Cement Limited Vs.  Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.S. Khehar, C.J.I. and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.

Citation: (2018) 15 SCC 678

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Whether arbitration appeal filed by third party is maintainable?

Insofar as the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 that since the petitioners or the applicants were admittedly not the parties to the arbitration agreement, none of them could be a party to the arbitration proceedings before the learned arbitrator is concerned, there is no dispute about this proposition. However, since the order passed by the learned arbitrator for interim measures at the behest of one of the parties to the arbitration agreement which would prejudice the right, title and interest of a third party, such third party who is not allowed to seek impleadment in the arbitration proceedings or to apply for modification and/or vacating the order of interim reliefs, will have a right of appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 against such order. I am not inclined to accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 that there is any statutory bar against a third party from filing an appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act though an order is passed by the arbitral tribunal in the proceedings filed by the parties to the arbitration agreement under the provisions of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 would affect the rights of such third party. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Arbitration Petition Nos. 619, 633, 642, 621, 622, 623, 668, 667, 643, 646, 574, 634 and 620 of 2017

Decided On: 31.08.2018

 Prabhat Steel Traders Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Excel Metal Processors Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.D. Dhanuka, J.

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Whether interim relief can be granted which is beyond scope of suit?

As already stated, in the absence of MHADA being a party to the suit or any relief having been sought against it, the question of deciding the nature of the suit and jurisdiction of the Court on the assumption that it is a suit between the plaintiff and MHADA, could not and did not arise. Mr. Irani pointed out that although not in the suit but in the notice of motion the plaintiff did seek relief against MHADA, that was not considered by the trial Court. In my opinion, no relief can be asked for in a motion outside and beyond the scope of the suit itself and even if the same was sought, it was not required to be entertained.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

A.O. No. 833 of 1993 with Civil Application No. 3413 of 1993

Decided On: 11.08.1993

Dinyar Behramji Irani Vs.  Kshirsagar Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.G. Chaudhari, J.

Citation: 1994(3) Bom CR 264

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Whether court should grant interim relief if final relief can not be granted?

In The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta MANU/SC/0012/1951 : [1952]1SCR28 a Constitution Bench of this Court clearly spelt out the contours within which interim relief can be granted. The Court said that 'an interim relief can be granted only in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights in a suit or proceedings. If this be the purpose to achieve which power to grant temporary relief is conferred, it is inconceivable that where the final relief cannot be granted in the terms sought for because the statute bars granting such a relief ipso facto the temporary relief of the same nature cannot be granted. To illustrate this point, let us take the relief which the Bank seeks in its suit. The prayer is that the Corporation be restrained by an injunction of the Court from presenting a winding-up petition under the Companies Act, 1956 or under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. In other words, the Bank seeks to restrain the Corporation by an injunction of the court from instituting a proceeding for winding-up of the Bank. There is a clear bar in Section 41(b) against granting this relief. The Court has no jurisdiction to grant a perpetual injunction restraining a person from instituting a proceeding in a court not subordinate to it, as a relief, ipso facto temporary relief cannot be granted in the same terms.

12. The interim relief can obviously be not granted also because the object behind granting interim relief is to maintain status quo ante so that the final relief can be appropriately moulded without the party's position being altered during the pendency of the proceedings.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7348 of 1983

Decided On: 19.09.1983

 Cotton Corporation of India Limited Vs. United Industrial Bank Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

D.A. Desai and V. Balakrishna Eradi, JJ.

Citation:AIR 1983 SC 1272).

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