What is provision of jurisdiction of special Act under Crpc/BNSS, Explain jurisdiction of special Act with illustrations

 4. Trial of offences under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and other laws.—(1) All offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.

(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.

Corresponding Law: S. 4 of Act 2 of CRPC1974.

5. Saving.—Nothing contained in this Sanhita shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force.

Corresponding Law: S. 5 of Act 2 of 1974.

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Death penalty under BNS and Other Special Acts

 The death penalty in India is governed by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023 and various special acts, representing the most severe form of punishment for heinous crimes. Here's a comprehensive overview:

Death Penalty Provisions in BNS 2023

The BNS contains multiple sections that prescribe capital punishment for serious offenses:

Sexual Offenses:

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Important features of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

 1. The name of the Act is the “Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023” and it has replaced the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

2. Section 2 of BNSS has been expanded to introduce new definitions for key terms such as ‘audio-video electronic means’ [Section 2(1)(a)], ‘bail’ [Section 2(1)(b)], ‘bail bond’[Section 2(1)(c)], ‘bond’ [Section 2(1)(e)], and ‘electronic communication’ [Section 2(1)(i)]. These changes reflect the evolving landscape of technology in investigation, trial, and court proceedings, covering aspects such as the service of summons, notices, audio-video conferencing for deposition of evidence, and recording of search and seizure. Additionally, previously undefined, terms relating to ‘bail’ have now been defined. Further, the definition of ‘victim’ [Section 2(1)(y)] has been broadened by eliminating the requirement of the accused person being formally charged. This modification expedites the process of victims receiving compensation entitled to them in certain cases.

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Bombay HC: IPC Can Simultaneously Be Invoked If Sections Under IT Act(Cyber crime) Don't Address All Ingredients Of Offence

The common thread deducible from various judgments of the Supreme Court covering similar issues, where an act is an offence under a special statute having an overriding effect over the offence covered by the general law like Indian Penal Code, is that in order to exclude the general law or the offence therein, ingredients of the offence defined under the special statute and the Indian Penal Code will have to be the same. If even one ingredient of an offence under the Indian Penal Code is missing in the act which has been made punishable under the special statute, the Indian Penal Code section will not be excluded and still can be resorted to albeit, the provisions of section 71 of the Indian Penal Code and section 26 of the General Clauses Act will have to be borne in mind by the Courts while imposing the sentences.{Para 37}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 2562 OF 2019

(AWADHESH KUMAR PARASNATH PATHAK V. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER)

CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL, R.G. AVACHAT & SHAILESH P. BRAHME, JJJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 15 APRIL 2024

JUDGMENT (MANGESH S. PATIL, J.) :

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Whether accused is entitled to be released on bail in offence Under NDPS Act on the ground of delay?

 Now we shall come to category (C). We do not wish to deal with individual enactments as each special Act has got an objective behind it, followed by the rigor imposed. The general principle governing delay would apply to these categories also. To make it clear, the provision contained in Section 436A of the Code would apply to the Special Acts also in the absence of any specific provision. For example, the rigor as provided Under Section 37 of the NDPS Act would not come in the way in such a case as we are dealing with the liberty of a person. We do feel that more the rigor, the quicker the adjudication ought to be. After all, in these types of cases number of witnesses would be very less and there may not be any justification for prolonging the trial. Perhaps there is a need to comply with the directions of this Court to expedite the process and also a stricter compliance of Section 309 of the Code. {Para 64}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Miscellaneous Application No. 1849 of 2021 in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 5191 of 2021 

 Satender Kumar Antil  Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M. Sundresh, JJ.

Author: M.M. Sundresh, J.

Decided On: 11.07.2022

Citation: MANU/SC/0851/2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether Magistrate should examine approver if special court has directly taken cognizance of an offence under the Special Act?

 But in cases where a Special Court itself is competent to take cognizance and also empowered to grant pardon, the procedure Under Section 306 of the Code gets by-passed, as held by this Court in State through CBI v. V. Arul Kumar MANU/SC/0632/2016 : (2016) 11 SCC 733. An argument was advanced in Arul Kumar (supra) (as seen from paragraph 20 of the Report) that Section 306 of the Code has no application to cases relating to offences under the PC Act. In support of the said argument, the decision in P.C. Mishra v. State (CBI) MANU/SC/0232/2014 : (2014) 14 SCC 629 was also relied upon. While dealing with the said contention, this Court held in Arul Kumar as follows:

21. Sub-section (1) of Section 5, while empowering a Special Judge to take cognizance of offence without the Accused being committed to him for trial, only has the effect of waiving the otherwise mandatory requirement of Section 193 of the Code. Section 193 of the Code stipulates that the Court of Session cannot take cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code. Thus, embargo of Section 193 of the Code has been lifted. It, however, nowhere provides that the cognizance cannot be taken by the Magistrate at all. There is, thus, an option given to the Special Judge to straightaway take cognizance of the offences and not to have the committal route through a Magistrate. However, normal procedure prescribed Under Section 190 of the Code empowering the Magistrate to take cognizance of such offences, though triable by the Court of Session, is not given a go-by. Both the alternatives are available. In those cases where charge-sheet is filed before the Magistrate, he will have to commit it to the Special Judge. In this situation, the provisions of Section 306 of the Code would be applicable and the Magistrate would be empowered to exercise the power under the said provision. In contrast, in those cases where Special Judge takes cognizance of offence directly, as he is authorised to do so in view of Section 5(2) of the PC Act, 1988, Section 306 of the Code would get bypassed and as the Special Judge has taken cognizance, it is Section 307 of the Code which would become applicable. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the PC Act, 1988 makes this position clear by prescribing that it is the Special Judge who would exercise his powers to tender of pardon as can clearly be spelled out by the language employed in that provision. Section 5(2) is to be read in conjunction with Section 5(1) of the PC Act, 1988. The aforesaid legal position would also answer the argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondent based on the judgment of this Court in A. Devendran [A. Devendran v. State of T.N., MANU/SC/1851/1997 : (1997) 11 SCC 720 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 220]. In that case, this Court held that once the proceedings are committed to the Court of Session, it is that court only to which commitment is made which can grant pardon to the approver. The view taken by us is, rather, in tune with the said judgment.{Para 74}

75. In other words, this Court recognised in Arul Kumar two types of cases, namely (i) those which come through the committal route; and (ii) those where cognizance is taken directly by the Special Judge Under Section 5(1) of the PC Act. In the second category of cases, the Court held that Section 306 of the Code would get by-passed.

76. Therefore, it is clear that when the Special Court chooses to take cognizance, the question of the approver being examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate as required by Section 306(4)(a) does not arise. Shri Padmesh Mishra, learned Counsel for the Respondent is therefore right in relying upon the decisions of this Court in Sardar Iqbal Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) MANU/SC/0131/1977 : (1977) 4 SCC 536 and Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0268/2013 : (2013) 13 SCC 1.

77. In Sardar Iqbal Singh (supra) the offence was triable by the Special Judge who also took cognizance. Therefore, there were no committal proceedings. Though Sardar Iqbal Singh arose under the 1898 Code, Sub-section (2) of Section 337 of the 1898 Code was in pari materia with Section 306(4)(a) of the 1973 Code. Therefore, the ratio laid down in Sardar Iqbal Singh was rightly applied in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon (supra) for coming to the conclusion that where a Special Judge takes cognizance of the case, the occasion for examining the approver as a witness arises only once.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2417 of 2010, 16 of 2011 and 2444 of 2010

Decided On: 15.06.2023

A. Srinivasulu  Vs. The State Rep. by the Inspector of Police

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Author: V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0723/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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HC: Magistrate can’t permit questioning of an accused being tried by Special Court ( PMLA)

  Our conclusion, therefore, is that the Special Court

established under the Act is a court of exclusive jurisdiction.

Sections 6 and 7 confer on that court wide powers. It is a

court of original criminal jurisdiction and has all the powers of

such a court under the Code including those of Sections 306 to

308.”

A Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of HARSHAD S.MEHTA followed the judgment in the case of A.R.ANTULAY (supra) to hold, if a Special Court is created under the provisions of a special enactment, the proceedings falling under that enactment shall be held only before the Special Court. For this purpose the Apex Court holds that the Special Court enjoys all the powers of the court of original jurisdiction and it holds a dual capacity and powers of both the Magistrate and the Court of Session depending upon the stage of the case.

13. In the light of the statutory frame work of the PMLA and

the application filed under Section 50 of the Act, this Court is of the considered view that the application was not maintainable before the learned Magistrate, since the Court did not have the power to direct recording of statements for it to become a record under the PMLA, the order which is passed by the Court which did not have a jurisdiction to even consider any application under the PMLA, is rendered unsustainable. There can be no qualm about the principles laid down in the judgment rendered in the case of NIRANJAN SINGH (supra) relied on by the learned counsel representing the ED to mean what is custody, but the judgment is inapplicable to the facts of the case at hand as it does not deal with issues concerning jurisdiction. Therefore, in view of the preceding analysis, the order passed on the application by the learned Magistrate requires appropriate interference and is to be consequently obliterated. {Para 62}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

WRIT PETITION No.19042 OF 2022 (GM-RES)

HARSHA D., S/O LATE DODDANANJAIHA Vs STATE BY HIGH GROUND POLICE STATION

Coram:  MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

DATED: 17TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2022

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Remand of accused and remand under Special Acts

 Meaning & Purpose of Remand

Meaning : “Remand” is to send back into custody either custody of police or Judicial Custody.

Purpose: to facilitate completion of investigation or unfold the investigation.

Constitutional Validity

Article 21 – Right to life and personal liberty.

Siddharam Mehtre Versus State of Maharashtra and others 2011

SAR (Cri) 118 S.C, the Honourable Apex Court has held that arrest

should be the last option

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Bombay HC: Offences under laws other than IPC punishable with imprisonment of 3 years or more are cognizable, non-bailable

 Recently, a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court

has also taken a similar view in the case of Nathu Ram S/o Purna

Ram Versus The State of Rajasthan reported in D. B. Cri. Ref.

No.1/2020. A specific question for reference posed before the

division bench of Rajasthan High Court was as follows:-

“What would be the nature of an offence (whether

cognizable or non-cognizable) for which

imprisonment “may extend to three years” is

provided and no stipulation is made in the statute

regarding it being cognizable or non-cognizable.”

After discussion the division bench answered the

reference in paragraph No.25 which reads thus:-

“25. Accordingly, the reference is answered in

terms that unless otherwise provided under the

relevant statute, the offences under the laws other

than IPC punishable with imprisonment to the

extent of three years, shall fall within the

classification II of offences classified under Part II

of First Schedule and thus, shall be cognizable and

non-bailable.”

12. The question, whether the offence is bailable or not

has to be seen in the light of definition of bailable offence provided

under section 2(a) of the Cr.p.c. which reads thus:

“2. Definitions……

(a) “bailable offence” means an offence which is

shown as bailable in the First Schedue, or which is

made bailable by any other law for the time being

in force; and “non bailable offence” means any

other offence;”

13. Thus, the next relevant sections would be sub section 2

of section 4 and section 5 of the Cr.p.c. as they are referred to by

the Division Bench of this court in the case of Mahesh Shivram

Puthran (supra). Part II of the Schedule-I reads thus:-

II – CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCES AGAINST OTHER LAWS

Offence Cognizable or noncognizable

Bailable or nonbailable

By what court

triable

If punishable with

death,

imprisonment for

life, or

imprisonment for

more than 7 years.

Cognizable Non-bailable Court of Session.

If punishable with

imprisonment for 3

years and upwards

but not more than 7

years.

Cognizable Non-bailable Magistrate of the

first class.

If punishable with

imprisonment for

less than 3 years or

with fine only.

Non-cognizable Bailable Any Magistrate.

14. Bare reading of this Part II of the Schedule -I of Cr.p.c.

shows that, if the offences in the other laws are punishable with

imprisonment for three years and upwards then the offences are

cognizable and non bailable. Wherever it is possible to impose the

punishment extending to three years, this category would apply,

because in such offences it is possible to impose sentence of exact

three years. In such cases offences would be non-bailable.

15. Therefore, first question raised before me is answered

that the offences under section 63 of the Copyright Act and section

103 of Trade Marks Act are non bailable in nature and, therefore,

since these sections are applied here, the application for

anticipatory bail is maintainable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION NO. 336 OF 2021

Piyush Subhashbhai Ranipa  Vs  The State of Maharashtra 

CORAM : SARANG V. KOTWAL, J.

DATE : 26th FEBRUARY, 2021

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Supreme Court: Prosecution of accused for an offence under IPC can continue even if sanction for prosecution under Prevention of Corruption Act is not forthcoming

We decline to deviate from the view taken by the High

Court that the charge against the petitioner for offence

punishable under the Indian Penal Code can continue

irrespective of the fact that sanction in respect of

offence punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988 is not forthcoming. To that extent, we find no

infirmity in the conclusion reached by the High Court.

Our understanding of the impugned judgment is that

the High Court has made it clear that if sanction to

prosecute the petitioner for offence punishable under

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is not or has not been

granted, the question of proceeding against the

petitioner for that charge does not arise.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 2787/2020

SATYABRAT GUPTA Vs THE STATE OF JHARKHAND 

Dated : 29-07-2020 

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA

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When application for condonation of delay is tenable in proceeding under Special Acts?

As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
case of Mukri Goplanan V. Cheppilat
Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, reported in
(1995) 5 SCC 5 in paragraph no.15 (placetum d&
e) “.. it is not necessary to expressly state
in a special law that the provisions
contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act

shall apply to the determination of
periods under it.” “An express mention in
the special law is necessary only for an
exclusion”.
(iv) The legislature while enacting the
Limitation Act, 1963 made several changes to
the provisions of the old Limitation Act,
1908 (as amended in 1922). One of the
change being that the scope of Section 5 was
made wider. The statement of objects and
reasons of the Limitation Act, 1963 state:
“Instead of leaving it to the different
States or High Courts to extend the
application of Section 5 to the
applications other than those enumerated in
that section as now in force, this clause
provides for the automatic application of this
Section to all applications, other than those
arising under Order 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, relating to execution of
decrees. In case of special or local laws,
it will be open to such laws to provide that
Section 5 will not apply.”
(Refer Para. 10 of (1974) 2 SCC 133
Humkumdev Narain Yadav Vs. Lalit Narain
Mishra)
Thus, Limitation Act, 1963 by virtue of
Section 29(2) seeks to automatically apply
provisions of Limitation Act to special or
local law and it is open for such laws to
provide that Section 5 will not apply. Hence,
it is submitted that exclusion of provisions
of Section 5 must be expressly provided by

the special or local law.
(v) Considering from another angle, it is
submitted that one cannot lose sight of the
fact the legislature while enacting the
Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 was
obviously conscious of the provisions of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963
and therefore, it was not necessary for
legislature to expressly mention in the RCT
Act, 1987 that provisions of Limitation Act,
1963 would be applicable to appeals u/s. 23
before Hon'ble High Court.
(vi) If legislature wanted to exclude
applicability of Limitation Act, 1963
nothing prevented it from putting an express
provisions to that effect.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 12844 of
2015
In
FIRST APPEAL (STAMP NUMBER) NO. 2264 of 2015
TO
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12864 of 2015
 In
FIRST APPEAL (STAMP NUMBER) NO. 2284 of 2015

UNION OF INDIA.
V
GUJARAT STATE ELECTRICITY CORPORATION LIMITED 
CORAM:  MR.JUSTICE S.R.BRAHMBHATT
and
 MR.JUSTICE A.G.URAIZEE
Date : 21/10/2016

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Whether prohibition in special Act for alienation of land bar maintainability of suit for specific performance?

Learned counsel for the appellant, however, further referred to Section 3 of the J & K Prohibition on Conservation of Land and Alienation of Orchards Act, 1975 which is as under: - 3. Prohibition on conversion of land and alienation of orchards.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force

(a) no person shall alienate an orchard except with the previous permission of the Revenue Minister or such officer as may be authorised by him in this behalf;

[Provided that alienation of orchards to the extent of Four Kanals only in favour of one or more persons for residential purposes shall not need any permission.]

(b) Considering the aforesaid section, it is apparent that prohibition on transfer of orchards is not absolute and the question of obtaining previous permission as contemplated under Section 3(1)(a) would arise at the time of execution of the sale deed on the basis of decree for the specific performance. Section 3 does not bar the maintainability of the suit and permission can be obtained by filing proper application after the decree is passed. Therefore, it cannot be stated that decree for specific performance is not required to be passed. Further, under Section 3 of the J & K Prohibition on Conservation of Land and Alienation of Orchards Act, 1975, prohibition on transfer is limited. Firstly, the proviso makes it clear that alienation of orchards to the extent of four kanals only in favour of one or more persons for residential purposes will not require any permission. Secondly, for more than four kanals of land, previous permission of the Revenue Minister or such Officer as may be authorised by him in this behalf is required to be obtained. Dealing with similar contention, this Court in Bai Dosabai v. Mathuradas Govinddas and Others[(1980) 3 SCR 762] observed that even if the Act prohibits alienation of land, if the decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff, it is required to be moulded suitably. 

Supreme Court of India

Manzoor Ahmed Margray vs Gulam Hassan Aram & Ors on 5 October, 1999

Bench: M.B.Shah, D.P.Wadhwa

Citation:(1999) 7 Supreme Court Cases 703       

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