Showing posts with label delegated legislation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label delegated legislation. Show all posts

Tuesday, 3 June 2025

The Doctrine of Repugnancy Under Article 254 of Indian constitution: Recent Supreme Court Developments and Constitutional Interpretation

 The Supreme Court of India has significantly evolved the interpretation of Article 254 and the doctrine of repugnancy through a series of landmark judgments in recent years. These decisions have not only clarified the constitutional framework for resolving conflicts between Union and State laws but have also established comprehensive tests and principles that guide contemporary federal jurisprudence in India.

Foundational Framework: Article 254's Constitutional Architecture

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Sunday, 18 December 2022

What is basic concept of doctrine of ultra vires and how it is applicable to delegated legislation?

 Delegated legislation has come to stay as a necessary component of the modern administrative process. Therefore, the question today is not whether there ought to be delegated legislation or not, but that it should operate under proper controls so that it may be ensured that the power given to theAdministration is exercised properly; the benefits of the institution may be utilised, but its disadvantages minimised. The doctrine of ultra vires envisages that a rule making body must function within the purview of the rule making authority conferred on it by the parent Act. As the body making rules or regulations has no inherent power of its own to make rules, but derives such power only from the statute, it has to necessarily function within the purview of the statute. Delegated legislation should not travel beyond the purview of the parent Act. If it does, it is ultra vires and cannot be given any effect. Ultra vires may arise in several ways; there may be simple excess of power over what is conferred by the parent Act; delegated legislation may be inconsistent with the provisions of the parent Act or statute law or the general law; there may be noncompliance with the procedural requirement as laid down in the parent Act. It is the function of the courts to keep all authorities within the confines of the law by supplying the doctrine of ultra vires. {Para 65}

66. In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision in General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and Another v. Dr. Subhash Chandra Yadav and Another reported in (1988) 2 SCC 351, wherein it has been held as follows:-

“14. ….before a rule can have the effect of a statutory provision,

two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) it must conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed; and (2) it must also come within the scope and purview of the rule making power of the authority framing the rule. If either of these two conditions is not fulfilled, the rule so framed would be void…..”

67. In Additional District Magistrate (Rev.) Delhi Admn. v. Siri Ram

reported in (2000) 5 SCC 451, it has been ruled that it is a well recognised principle that the conferment of rule-making power by an Act does not enable the rule-making authority to make a rule which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act or which is inconsistent therewith or repugnant thereto.


74. In this context, it would be apposite to refer to a passage from State of T.N. and Another v. P. Krishnamurthy and Others reported in (2006) 4 SCC 517 wherein it has been held thus:-

“16. The court considering the validity of a subordinate

legislation, will have to consider the nature, object and scheme of

the enabling Act, and also the area over which power has been

delegated under the Act and then decide whether the subordinate

legislation conforms to the parent statute. Where a rule is directly inconsistent with a mandatory provision of the statute, then, of course, the task of the court is simple and easy. But where the contention is that the inconsistency or non-conformity of the rule is not with reference to any specific provision of the enabling Act, but with the object and scheme of the parent Act, the court should proceed with caution before declaring invalidity.”


76. In Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative

Council and Others reported in (2004) 8 SCC 747, this Court explained the

concept of delegated legislation thus:

“13. …..Underlying the concept of delegated legislation is the

basic principle that the legislature delegates because it cannot

directly exert its will in every detail. All it can in practice do is to

lay down the outline. This means that the intention of the

legislature, as indicated in the outline (that is the enabling Act),

must be the prime guide to the meaning of delegated legislation

and the extent of the power to make it. The true extent of the power governs the legal meaning of the delegated legislation. The

delegate is not intended to travel wider than the object of the

legislature. The delegate's function is to serve and promote that

object, while at all times remaining true to it. That is the rule of

primary intention. Power delegated by an enactment does not

enable the authority by regulations to extend the scope or general operation of the enactment but is strictly ancillary. It will authorise the provision of subsidiary means of carrying into effect what is enacted in the statute itself and will cover what is incidental to the execution of its specific provision. But such a power will not support attempts to widen the purposes of the Act, to add new and different means of carrying them out or to depart from or vary its ends. (See Section 59 in chapter “Delegated Legislation” in Francis Bennion's Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edn.)……."


78. A delegated power to legislate by making rules or regulations ‘for carrying out the purpose of the Act’, is a general delegation without laying down any guidelines; it cannot be exercised so as to bring into existence the substantive rights or obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of the Act 2003 itself. The Court, considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, will have to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling Act, and also the area over which power as has been delegated under the Act and then decide whether the subordinate legislation conforms to the parent statute.

79. It is important to keep in mind that where a rule or regulation is directly inconsistent with a mandatory provision of the statute, then, of course, the task of the Court is simple and easy. But where the contention is that the inconsistency or non-conformity of the rule is not with reference to any specific provision of the enabling Act, but with the object and scheme of the parent Act, the Court should proceed with caution before declaring the same to be invalid.

80. Rules or regulation cannot be made to supplant the provisions of the enabling Act but to supplement it. What is permitted is the delegation of ancillary or subordinating legislative functions, or, what is fictionally called, a power to fill up details.


12. Rules, regulations, schemes, bye-laws, orders made under

statutory powers are all comprised in delegated legislation. The

need for delegated legislation is that statutory rules are framed

with care and minuteness when the statutory authority making the rules is after the coming into force of the Act in a better position to adapt the Act to special circumstances. Delegated legislation permits utilisation of experience and consultation with interests affected by the practical operation of statutes.


15. The words “rules” and “regulations” are used in an Act to limit the power of the statutory authority. The powers of statutory bodies are derived, controlled and restricted by the statutes which create them and the rules and regulations framed thereunder. Any action of such bodies in excess of their power or in violation of the restrictions placed on their powers is ultra vires. The reason is that it goes to the root of the power of such corporations and the declaration of nullity is the only relief that is granted to the aggrieved party.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 9252-9253 OF 20222

KERALA STATE ELECTRICITY  BOARD & ORS.

Vs  THOMAS JOSEPH ALIAS  THOMAS M. J. & ORS.

Author: J.B. PARDIWALA, J.,

Date: December 16, 2022.

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Wednesday, 18 October 2017

Whether state government can delegate powers of investigation U/SC &ST Act to officer below rank of DYSP?

The question however is, whether the State Government, could in its discretion, in furtherance of the power vested with it under Section 9 of the 'SCST Act', relax the provision made by Rule 7 of the 'SCST Rules'.
18. It is imperative to emphasise, that as against the national character of the rule making power vested with the Central Government under Section 23 of the 'SCST Act', the delegated power contemplated under Section 9 of the 'SCST Act', is State specific. The power exercised by a State, keeps in mind the circumstances prevailing in the concerned State. The legitimacy and validity of the exercise of the instant delegated power (vested in a State Government), has therefore to be determined, with reference to the peculiar facts and circumstances prevailing in an individual State.
In exercise of the power vested under Section 9 of the 'SCST Act', each individual State Government, was vested with the authority, to extend to officers other than the officers contemplated under the provisions of the 'SCST Act', powers of arrest, investigation and prosecution. A reasonable and legitimate understanding of the scope of the power of arrest, investigation and prosecution, will necessarily require a conjoint reading of the provisions of the 'SCST Act' and the 'SCST Rules'. After the promulgation of the 'SCST Rules', undoubtedly, the Central Government provided for investigation, at the hands of an officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. But, the rightful approach to the issue in hand would emerge from the query, whether a provision made under a rule, can negate a right extended through the parent legislation? The answer obviously has to be in the negative.
This simple reasoning, unfolds the answer of the issue being debated. In our considered view, Section 9(1)(b) confers on the State Government, the power to further delegate the power of arrest, investigation and prosecution. This power vested with the State Government, through a non obstante clause, cannot be neutralized by any rule framed under Section 23 of the 'SCST Act'. The non obstante clause, would allow a State Government to exercise the power conferred on it - irrespective of the provisions of the 'SCST Act', and also irrespective of the provisions of the 'SCST Rules', to delegate to
"... any officer of the State Government ...", the power of arrest, investigation and prosecution. We are of the view, that the non obstante clause, extended to the State Government, power to overlook and provide differently, from the position contemplated under the 'SCST Act', as well as the 'SCST Rules'.
The issue whether the State Government was competent to relax the above rule, requiring that investigation be not carried out, by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, and thereby, extend the power of investigation to officers below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, has therefore to be answered in the affirmative.
19. Having concluded as above, we are satisfied to uphold, not only Rule 7 of the 'SCST Rules', but also the notification dated 03.06.2002, issued by the State Government, in exercise of the power vested in it under Section 9(1)(b) of the 'SCST Act'. Accordingly, we find no merit in the challenge raised on behalf of the appellant-accused, to the notification dated 03.06.2002.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
State of Bihar and Others etc. Vs. Anil Kumar and Others etc.
[Civil Appeal Nos. 4397-4400 of 2017 arising from SLP (C) Nos. 27524-27 of 2011]
[Civil Appeal No. 4401 of 2017 arising from SLP (C) No.7317 of 2017]
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Saturday, 25 June 2016

When legislative amendment shall be presumed to have retrospective or prospective effect?

 Legislature has plenary powers of legislation within the fields assigned to it and can legislate prospectively or retrospectively, the general rule is that in the absence of the enactment specifically mentioning that the concerned legislation or legislative amendment is retrospectively made, the same is to be treated as prospective in nature. It would be more so when the statute is dealing with substantive rights. No doubt, in contrast to statute dealing with substantive rights, wherever a statute deals with merely a matter of procedure, such a statute/amendment in the statute is presumed to be retrospective unless such a construction is textually inadmissible. At the same time, it is to be borne in mind that a particular provision in a procedural statute may be substantive in nature and such a provision cannot be given retrospective effect. To put it otherwise, the classification of a statute, either substantive or procedural, does not necessarily determine whether it may have a retrospective operation. 
 It needs to be emphasized that even where the Rules are procedural, some of the provisions therein may be of substantive nature. An error is committed by the High Court in holding that fixation of period of lease is also procedural. When a decision to grant lease is substantive in nature, the period for which the lease is to be granted would also be substantive. Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is contrary to law.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 453 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3674 of 2010), 
Decided On: 20.01.2016

 District Collector, Vellore District Vs. K. Govindaraj

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:T.S. Thakur, C.J.I., A.K. Sikri and R. Banumathi, JJ.


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