Supreme Court: 2018 Amendment To Specific Relief Act Is Not Retrospective

 Specific Relief Act, 1963 - 2018 Amendment - Supreme Court clarified that the 2018 amendment to the Act of 1963, which made the grant of specific performance of contracts a mandatory relief, has no retrospective effect and does not apply to suits or transactions that arose before its enforcement on October 1, 2018. [Relied on Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd. 2023 1 SCC 355; Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P.) Ktd. V. Katta Sujatha Reddy 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214; Paras 34-38].

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

SLP (C) No. 26848-26849/2018; 

ANNAMALAI Vs VASANTHI AND OTHERS

J.B. PARDIWALA; J., MANOJ MISRA; J.

Author: MANOJ MISRA, J.

Dated: October 29, 2025

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Supreme Court: Subsequent Judgment Overruling Earlier Judgment Applies Retrospectively Unless Stated Otherwise

 There arises no occasion for us to declare the interpretation given to Section 8 of the NDPS Act and the relevant NDPS Rules, by the decision in Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra), as prospectively applicable. There exists no overwhelming reason for us to do so. On the other hand, in order to meet the ends of justice and with a view to ensure that public interest is safeguarded and to give effect to the salutary object behind the enactment of the NDPS Act, the decision must necessarily be retrospectively applicable. This Court in Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra), perhaps, did not think fit to confine or restrict its interpretation of Section 8 of the NDPS Act to future cases only. This is evinced from the fact that whilst overruling Rajesh Kumar Gupta (supra), it deliberately chose not to discuss the doctrine of prospective overruling let alone resort to it. This conspicuous silence in Sanjeev Deshpande (supra) as regards the prospective or retrospective effect of overruling Rajesh Kumar Gupta (supra) has to be borne in mind and given due deference. As a natural corollary to the aforesaid, we see no reason why we should deviate from the default Rule of retrospectivity and instead, resort to the doctrine of prospective overruling. Therefore, pending cases, if any, which were instituted before the decision of this Court in Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra) would also be governed by the law as clarified by it. {Para 158}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1319 of 2013 and 272 of 2014

Decided On: 17.04.2025

Directorate of Revenue Intelligence Vs. Raj Kumar Arora and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0500/2025,2025 INSC 498.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Whether Subsequent Judgment Overruling Earlier Judgment if applied Retrospectively will affect rights of accused under article 20(1) of constitution?

 Furthermore, the retrospective application of the dictum in Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra) would not give rise to any implications as regards the rights of the Accused persons Under Article 20(1) of the Constitution. This is because while overruling the decision in Rajesh Kumar Gupta (supra), the decision in Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra) has only clarified the law as it stood from its inception and given true effect to the meaning assigned to the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act and the Rules thereunder, by the lawmakers. The same cannot be construed as creating a new offence. Additionally, the overruling of a decision cannot be equated to the enactment of an ex-post facto law, especially when the interpretation given to the statute/provision in the overruling decision is not a novel and unreasonably expansive interpretation of the provision in question such that it was completely unforeseeable. It cannot be reasonably argued that the indiscriminate dealing in of substances which are only mentioned under the Schedule to the NDPS Act and absent under Schedule I of the NDPS Rules, was indubitably legal and allowed by the legislation, prior to the decision in Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra). Therefore, there remains no doubt in our minds that giving retrospective effect to the decision in Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra) would be necessary considering the facts and circumstances in the background of which we are called upon to adjudicate these matters. {Para 159}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1319 of 2013 and 272 of 2014

Decided On: 17.04.2025

Directorate of Revenue Intelligence Vs. Raj Kumar Arora and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0500/2025,2025 INSC 498.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Charges Framed Cannot Be Deleted Invoking S.216 CrPC/S.239 BNSS

  We are in agreement with the view that once charges have been framed by the Trial Court in exercise of the powers Under Section 228 Code of Criminal Procedure, the Accused cannot thereafter be discharged, be it through an exercise of the powers Under Sections 227 or 216 Code of Criminal Procedure. It is reiterated that the language of Section 216 Code of Criminal Procedure provides only for the addition and alteration of charge(s) and not for the deletion or discharge of an Accused. If the Legislature had intended to empower the Trial Court with the power to delete a charge at that stage, the same would have been expressly and unambiguously stated. Therefore, at such a stage of the trial, the Accused must necessarily either be convicted or acquitted of the charges that were so framed against him. No shortcuts must be allowed. {Para 154}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1319 of 2013 and 272 of 2014

Decided On: 17.04.2025

Directorate of Revenue Intelligence Vs. Raj Kumar Arora and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0500/2025,2025 INSC 498.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Dealing With Substance Mentioned In NDPS Act Schedule Is An Offence Though It's Not Listed In Schedule Of NDPS Rules

 It cannot be said that the dealing in of "Buprenorphine Hydrochloride" would not amount to an offence Under Section 8 of the NDPS Act owing to the fact that the said psychotropic substance only finds mention under the Schedule to the NDPS Act and is not listed under Schedule I of the NDPS Rules. There exists nothing to indicate that Rules 53 and 64 of the NDPS Rules respectively, are the governing Rules in their respective Chapters, more so, when the language of the other Rules in Chapters VI and VII respectively, are clear about their application to the substances mentioned under the Schedule to the Act as well. {Para 156}

157. All the psychotropic substances mentioned under the Schedule to the Act have potential grave and harmful consequences to the individual and the society at large, when abused. Some psychotropic substances mentioned under the Schedule to the NDPS Act are also mentioned under the D&C Act and the Rules framed thereunder. This is only because those substances while capable of being abused for their inherent properties could also be used in the field of medicine. However, the mere mention of certain psychotropic substances under the D&C regime would not take them away from the purview of the NDPS Act, if they are also mentioned under the Schedule to the NDPS Act.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1319 of 2013 and 272 of 2014

Decided On: 17.04.2025

Directorate of Revenue Intelligence Vs. Raj Kumar Arora and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0500/2025,2025 INSC 498.

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Supreme Court:Victim can not challenge order of acquittal of accused passed before enactment of proviso to S 372 of CRPC as said proviso has not retrospective effect

  20. She submitted that no right of appeal was available to the victim in law at the time the revision was filed and therefore, there was no scope for the court to even treat the revision as an appeal that 'lay under the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, "the Code of Criminal Procedure" or "Code")' at the time as provided for Under Section 401(5) above.

37. The Proviso to the above had not yet come into effect as on 19.01.2006 when the revision petition was filed, for it was added only w.e.f. 31.12.2009. The Proviso says - [Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the Accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court.]

i. Thus, the statutory right of appeal by a victim against such acquittal arose only from the date of the amendment w.e.f. 31.12.2009. As the said revision was filed by the father of the deceased on 19.01.2006 well before the above amendment, such right was not available at the relevant point of time.

ii. Therefore, the very first condition Under Section 401(5) itself would not have been possible to be fulfilled, i.e. the right of the victim to appeal did not lie under the Code at the time of filing the revision petition.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 5560-5561 of 2024

Decided On: 29.01.2025

Mahabir and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala,  and R. Mahadevan, , JJ.

Author:  J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation MANU/SC/0122/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Once A Law Is Declared Unconstitutional ,it shall have retrospective effect

 Then comes the question as to what is

the effect of an amendment of the

Constitution in the two types of cases. So

far 'as pre-Constitution laws are concerned

the amendment of the Constitution which

removes the inconsistency will result in the

revival of such laws by virtue of the

doctrine of eclipse, as laid down in Bhikaji

Narain's case (1) for the pre-existing laws

were not still-born and would still exist

though eclipsed on account of the

inconsistency to govern_ pre-existing

matters. But in the case of post-

Constitution laws, they would be still

born to the extent of the contravention.

And it is this distinction which results

in the impossibility of applying the

doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution

laws, for nothing can be revived which

never had any valid existence. We are

therefore of opinion that the meaning of the

word "void" is the same both in Art 13 (1)

and Art. 13 (2), and that the application of

the doctrine of eclipse in one case and not

in the other case does not depend upon

giving a different meaning to the word

"void' in the two parts of Art. 13; it arises

from the inherent difference between Art.

13 (1) and Art. 13 (2) arising from the fact

that one is dealing with pre-Constitution

laws, and the other is dealing with post-

Constitution laws, with the result that in

one case the laws being not still-born the

doctrine of eclipse will apply while in the

other case the laws being still born-there

will be no scope for the application of the

doctrine of eclipse. Though the, two clauses

form part of the same Article, there is a

vital difference in the language employed

in them as also in their content and scope.

By the first clause the Constitution

recognises the existence of certain

operating laws and they are declared void,

to the extent of their inconsistency with

fundamental rights. Had there been no

such declaration, these laws would have

continued to operate. Therefore, in the case

of pre- Constitution laws what an

amendment to the Constitution does is to

remove the shadow cast on it by this

declaration. The law thus revives.

However, in the case of the second

clause, applicable to post Constitution

laws, the Constitution does not

recognise their existence, having been

made in defiance of a prohibition to

make them. Such defiance makes the

law enacted void. In their case

therefore there can be no revival by an

amendment of the Constitution, MO

though the bar to make the law is

removed, so far as the period after the

amendment is concerned. In the case

of post- Constitution laws, it would be

hardly appropriate to distinguish

between laws which are wholly void-as

for instance, those which contravene

Art. 31-and those which are

substantially void but partly valid, as

for instance, laws contravening Art.

19. Theoretically, the laws falling

under the latter category may be valid

qua non-citizens; but that is a wholly

unrealistic consideration and it seems

to us that such nationally partial

valid existence of the said laws on the

strength of hypothetical and pedantic

considerations cannot justify the

application of the doctrine of eclipse

to them. All post Constitution laws

which contravene the mandatory

injunction contained in the first part

of Art. 13 (2) are void, as void as are

the laws passed without legislative

competence, and the doctrine of

eclipse does not apply to them. We are

therefore of opinion that the Constitution

(Fourth Amendment) Act cannot be applied

to the Transfer Act in this case by virtue of

the doctrine of eclipse It follows therefore

that the Transfer Act is unconstitutional

because it did not comply with Art. 31 (2),

as it stood at the time it was passed. It will

therefore have to be struck down, and the

petitioner given a declaration in his favour

accordingly.

(emphasis supplied)”

(vii) In the case of State of Manipur (supra),

recently a three-judge Bench of this Court, was

dealing with an appeal against the judgement of

the Manipur High Court which had declared the

Manipur Parliamentary Secretary (Appointment,

Salary and Allowances and Miscellaneous

Provisions) Act, 2012 (Manipur Act No. 10 of

2012) as also the Repealing Act, 2018, as

unconstitutional. Justice L. Nageswara Rao,

speaking for the Bench, observed that where a

statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is

as if it had never been and any law held to be

unconstitutional for whatever reason, whether

due to lack of legislative competence or in

violation of fundamental rights, would be void

ab initio. Paragraph Nos. 22 and 23 of the said

judgment are reproduced hereunder:

“22. Where a statute is adjudged to be

unconstitutional, it is as if it had

never been. Rights cannot be built up

under it; contracts which depend upon it

for their consideration are void; it

constitutes a protection to no one who has

acted under it and no one can be punished

for having refused obedience to it before the

decision was made. Field, J. in Norton v.

Shelby County, observed that “an

unconstitutional act is not law, it

confers no rights, it imposes no duties,

it affords no protection, it creates no

office; it is, in legal contemplation, as

inoperative as though it had never

been passed”.

23. An unconstitutional law, be it

either due to lack of legislative

competence or in violation of

fundamental rights guaranteed under

Part III of the Constitution of India, is

void” ab initio. In Behram Khurshid

Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, it was held

by a constitution bench of this Court that

the law-making power of the State is

restricted by a written fundamental law

and any law enacted and opposed to the

fundamental law is in excess of the

legislative authority and is thus, a nullity.

A declaration of unconstitutionality

brought about by lack of legislative

power as well as a declaration of

unconstitutionality brought about by

reason of abridgement of fundamental

rights goes to the root of the power

itself, making the law void in its

inception. This Court in Deep Chand v.

State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. summarised

the following propositions:

“(a) Whether the Constitution

affirmatively confers power on the

legislature to make laws subject-wise or

negatively prohibits it from infringing any

fundamental right, they represent only

two aspects of want of legislative power;

(b) The Constitution in express terms

makes the power of a legislature to make

laws in regard to the entries in the Lists

of the Seventh Schedule subject to the

other provisions of the Constitution and

thereby circumscribes or reduces the said

power by the limitations laid down in

Part III of the Constitution;

(c) It follows from the premises that a

law made in derogation or in excess

of that power would be ab initio

void…

(emphasis supplied)”

Further after discussing the law laid

down by the previous pronouncements, the

principles were deduced in paragraph no. 28 to

state that a statute declared unconstitutional

by a court of law would be still born and non

est for all purposes. Paragraph 28 of the report

is reproduced hereunder:

“28. The principles that can be deduced

from the law laid down by this Court, as

referred to above, are:

I. A statute which is made by a

competent legislature is valid till it is

declared unconstitutional by a court of law.

II. After declaration of a statute as

unconstitutional by a court of law, it is

non est for all purposes.

III. In declaration of the law, the

doctrine of prospective overruling can be

applied by this Court to save past

transactions under earlier decisions

superseded or statutes held

unconstitutional.

IV. Relief can be moulded by this Court

in exercise of its power under Article 142 of

the Constitution, notwithstanding the

declaration of a statute as

unconstitutional.

(emphasis supplied)”

43. From the above discussion, it is crystal clear

that once a law is declared to be

unconstitutional, being violative of Part-III of the

Constitution, then it would be held to be void ab

initio, still born, unenforceable and non est in

view of Article 13(2) of the Constitution and its

interpretation by authoritative pronouncements.

Thus, the declaration made by the

Constitution Bench in the case of

Subramanian Swamy (supra) will have

retrospective operation. Section 6A of the

DSPE Act is held to be not in force from the

date of its insertion i.e. 11.09.2003.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.377 OF 2007

CBI  Vs R.R. KISHORE 

Author: VIKRAM NATH, J.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2023.

Citation:  2023INSC817.

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Under which circumstances Circulars issued by IRDAI have retrospective effect?

(ix) It has been argued that the instructions in the

circular dated 12th October 2022 come into

force prospectively. This argument must also be

rejected. The IRDAI has been prompted to

issue the directions in the circular for the sole

reason that it was observed by the regulatory

authority that various insurers were repudiating

the claims on the pretext of the so called

‘exclusions’ in the policy document and hence

the regulatory authority was compelled to issue

the said directions. Thus, it stands to reason

that the directions have been issued to rectify

the arbitrary refusal of claims. Hence, the same

obviously applies to past refusals on the grounds

as mentioned in the circular.

REPORTABLE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 2839 OF 2021

Rita Kirit Joshi Vs NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY,

CORAM : G.S.Patel & Neela Gokhale, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 1st March 2023

JUDGMENT ( Per Neela Gokhale J) :-

Citation: 2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 12.

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Supreme Court: Ouster Of Civil Court's Jurisdiction Won't Have Retrospective Effect To Annul A Decree Validly Passed By Civil Court

 It is settled law that ouster of jurisdiction of civil court can be expressed or implied, but it cannot have retrospective effect annulling a decree validly passed by the civil court. Therefore, we do not find any error of law on the part of the High Court in confirming the concurrent judgment and decrees of the Trial Court and the first Appellate Court. Hence, this appeal is dismissed, without any order as to costs.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3936 OF 2013;

ANANTA CHANDRAKANT BHONSULE (D)BY LRS & ANR.

Vs TRIVIKRAM ATMARAM KORJUENKAR (D) BY LRS. & ANR.

Coram: V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN; J., PANKAJ MITHAL; J.

Dated: FEBRUARY 09, 2023

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Supreme Court: S 148 of N I Act as amended in 2018 has retrospective effect

 Having observed and found that because of the delay tactics of unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured cheques due to easy filing of appeals and obtaining stay on proceedings, the object and purpose of the enactment of Section 138 of the N.I. Act was being frustrated, the Parliament has thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the N.I. Act, by which the first appellate Court, in an appeal challenging the order of conviction Under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, is conferred with the power to direct the convicted Accused - Appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court. By the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, it cannot be said that any vested right of appeal of the Accused - Appellant has been taken away and/or affected. Therefore, submission on behalf of the Appellants that amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act shall not be made applicable retrospectively and more particularly with respect to cases/complaints filed prior to 1.9.2018 shall not be applicable has no substance and cannot be accepted, as by amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, no substantive right of appeal has been taken away and/or affected. Therefore the decisions of this Court in the cases of Garikapatti Veeraya (supra) and Videocon International Limited (supra), relied upon by the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Therefore, considering the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act stated hereinabove, on purposive interpretation of Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended, we are of the opinion that Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended, shall be applicable in respect of the appeals against the order of conviction and sentence for the offence Under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, even in a case where the criminal complaints for the offence Under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were filed prior to amendment Act No. 20/2018 i.e., prior to 01.09.2018. If such a purposive interpretation is not adopted, in that case, the object and purpose of amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act would be frustrated. Therefore, as such, no error has been committed by the learned first appellate court directing the Appellants to deposit 25% of the amount of fine/compensation as imposed by the learned trial Court considering Section 148 of the N.I. Act, as amended.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 917-944 of 2019 

Decided On: 29.05.2019

 Surinder Singh Deswal  Vs.  Virender Gandhi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and A.S. Bopanna, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 2956

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Whether Adultery Judgment passed by Supreme Court will operate retrospectively?

Hon'ble Apex Court in Maj. Genl. A.S Gauraya v. S.N Thakur (supra) has held that law laid down by the Supreme Court applies to all pending proceedings even with retrospective effect.

8. There is no dispute about the decision of the Supreme Court in the above cited decisions. In view of the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court holding Section 497 of Indian Penal Code is not an offence, the punishment awarded by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhiwapur in Summary Criminal Case No. 41/2010 is liable to be quashed and set aside. Hence, following order.

In the High Court of Bombay

(Before M.G Giratkar, J.)

Rupesh  Haribhau Mundle, v. Shri Charandas  Fulchand Chandanbawane

Criminal Revision Application No. 2 of 2018

Decided on December 14, 2018

Citation:2018 SCC OnLine Bom 6292

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Whether law laid down by Supreme court or High court can have retrospective or prospective application?

The last contention of Mr. Irani that the judgment of this Court in Anant T. Sabnis v. Vasant Pratap Pandit, delivered in 1979 cannot have retrospective application has no substance, as a judgment only lays down what the law always has been, as such there is no question of retrospective or prospective application. Only in case of any amendment to an enacted law, one can argue whether it has retrospective effect or not, but not in case of any judgment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal No. 46 of 2000 in L.C. Suit No. 1743 of 1992

Decided On: 11.07.2006

 Zahid Ahmedali Mazgaonwalla Vs. Gulshan Pyarali Mazgaonwalla

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Leading judgment on law of pre-emption

The issue to be decided is a legal issue which stands in a narrow compass. Before dealing with the issue itself, it would be pertinent to refer to the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Shyam Sunder and Ors. v. Ram Kumar and Anr., MANU/SC/0405/2001 : (2001) 8 SCC 24 wherein this Court considered the effect of the amendment made to the 1913 Act. This Court held that if Section 15 of the 1913 Act was amended during the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, the decree of pre-emption would not be affected by such amendment. After discussing the entire law, the Constitution Bench culled out the following legal principles:

10. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions referred to in the first category of decisions, the legal principles that emerge are these:

1. The pre-emptor must have the right to pre-empt on the date of sale, on the date of filing of the suit and on the date of passing of the decree by the court of the first instance only.

2. The pre-emptor who claims the right to pre-empt the sale on the date of the sale must prove that such right continued to subsist till the passing of the decree of the first court. If the claimant loses that right or a vendee improves his right equal or above the right of the claimant before the adjudication of suit, the suit for pre-emption must fail.

3. A pre-emptor who has a right to pre-empt a sale on the date of institution of the suit and on the date of passing of decree, the loss of such right subsequent to the decree of the first court would not affect his right or maintainability of the suit for pre-emption.

4. A pre-emptor who after proving his right on the date of sale, on the date of filing the suit and on the date of passing of the decree by the first court, has obtained a decree for pre-emption by the court of first instance, such right cannot be taken away by subsequent legislation during pendency of the appeal filed against the decree unless such legislation has retrospective operation.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2062 of 2009

Decided On: 08.09.2017

Vijay Singh Vs. Shanti Devi and Ors.

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What is exception to rule that amendment in limitation Act are retrospective in nature?

It is settled law that periods of limitation are procedural in nature and would ordinarily be applied retrospectively. This, however, is subject to a rider. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra MANU/SC/0547/1975 : (1975) 2 SCC 840, this Court held:

5. On the plain language of Sections 110-A and 110-F there should be no difficulty in taking the view that the change in law was merely a change of forum i.e. a change of adjectival or procedural law and not of substantive law. It is a well-established proposition that such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it retrospective.

46. In answering a question which arose Under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court held:

7..."(1) Time for the purpose of filing the application Under Section 110-A did not start running before the constitution of the tribunal. Time had started running for the filing of the suit but before it had expired the forum was changed. And for the purpose of the changed forum, time could not be deemed to have started running before a remedy of going to the new forum is made available.

(2) Even though by and large the law of limitation has been held to be a procedural law, there are exceptions to this principle. Generally the law of limitation which is in vogue on the date of the commencement of the action governs it. But there are certain exceptions to this principle. The new law of limitation providing a longer period cannot revive a dead remedy. Nor can it suddenly extinguish a vested right of action by providing for a shorter period of limitation.

47. This statement of the law was referred to with approval in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. MANU/SC/0475/1991 : (1991) 4 SCC 333 as follows:

7. It is true that the Appellant earlier could file an application even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, but can this be treated to be a right which the Appellant had acquired. The answer is in the negative. The claim to compensation which the Appellant was entitled to, by reason of the accident was certainly enforceable as a right. So far the period of limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned, it is adjectival in nature, and has to be governed by the new Act--subject to two conditions. If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right. The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it unpractical for him to avail of the remedy. This principle has been followed by this Court in many cases and by way of illustration we would like to mention New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra [MANU/SC/0547/1975 : (1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2 SCR 266]. The husband of the Respondent in that case died in an accident in 1966. A period of two years was available to the Respondent for instituting a suit for recovery of damages. In March, 1967 the Claims Tribunal Under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was constituted, barring the jurisdiction of the civil court and prescribed 60 days as the period of limitation. The Respondent filed the application in July, 1967. It was held that not having filed a suit before March, 1967 the only remedy of the Respondent was by way of an application before the Tribunal. So far the period of limitation was concerned, it was observed that a new law of limitation providing for a shorter period cannot certainly extinguish a vested right of action. In view of the change of the law it was held that the application could be filed within a reasonable time after the constitution of the Tribunal; and, that the time of about four months taken by the Respondent in approaching the Tribunal after its constitution, could be held to be either reasonable time or the delay of about two months could be condoned under the proviso to Section 110-A(3).

Both these judgments were referred to and followed in Union of India v. Harnam Singh MANU/SC/0216/1993 : (1993) 2 SCC 162, see paragraph 12.

48. The aforesaid principle is also contained in Section 30(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963.

30. Provision for suits, etc., for which the prescribed period is shorter than the period prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.--Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,-

(a) any suit for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, may be instituted within a period of [seven years] next after the commencement of this Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, whichever period expires earlier:

49. The reason for the said principle is not far to seek. Though periods of limitation, being procedural law, are to be applied retrospectively, yet if a shorter period of limitation is provided by a later amendment to a statute, such period would render the vested right of action contained in the statute nugatory as such right of action would now become time barred under the amended provision.

50. This aspect of the matter is brought out rather well in Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India MANU/SC/0427/2011 : (2011) 6 SCC 739 as follows:

22. Law is well settled that the manner in which the appeal has to be filed, its form and the period within which the same has to be filed are matters of procedure, while the right conferred on a party to file an appeal is a substantive right. The question is, while dealing with a belated appeal Under Section 19(2) of FEMA, the application for condonation of delay has to be dealt with under the first proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 52 of FERA or under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of FEMA. For answering that question it is necessary to examine the law on the point.

Substantive and procedural law

23. Substantive law refers to a body of rules that creates, defines and regulates rights and liabilities. Right conferred on a party to prefer an appeal against an order is a substantive right conferred by a statute which remains unaffected by subsequent changes in law, unless modified expressly or by necessary implication. Procedural law establishes a mechanism for determining those rights and liabilities and a machinery for enforcing them. Right of appeal being a substantive right always acts prospectively. It is trite law that every statute is prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation.

24. Right of appeal may be a substantive right but the procedure for filing the appeal including the period of limitation cannot be called a substantive right, and an aggrieved person cannot claim any vested right claiming that he should be governed by the old provision pertaining to period of limitation. Procedural law is retrospective meaning thereby that it will apply even to acts or transactions under the repealed Act.

25. Law on the subject has also been elaborately dealt with by this Court in various decisions and reference may be made to a few of those decisions. This Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry [MANU/SC/0008/1957 : AIR 1957 SC 540], New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [MANU/SC/0547/1975 : (1975) 2 SCC 840], Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra [MANU/SC/0526/1994 : (1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1087], Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State of Bihar [MANU/SC/0643/1999 : (1999) 8 SCC 16] and Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar [MANU/SC/0405/2001 : (2001) 8 SCC 24], has elaborately discussed the scope and ambit of an amending legislation and its retrospectivity and held that every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law. This Court has held that the law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature whereas law relating to right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4367 of 2004

Decided On: 23.04.2015

M.P. Steel Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Sikri and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.

Citation:(2015) 7 SCC 58

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Whether court should rely on electronic evidence adduced without certificate as per S 65B of Evidence Act?

 The interpretation of Section 65B(4) by this Court by a judgment dated 04.08.2005 in Navjot Sandhu held the field till it was overruled on 18.09.2014 in Anvar's case. All the criminal courts in this country are bound to follow the law as interpreted by this Court. Because of the interpretation of Section 65B in Navjot Sandhu, there was no necessity of a certificate for proving electronic records.

A large number of trials have been held during the period between 04.08.2005 and 18.09.2014. Electronic records without a certificate might have been adduced in evidence. There is no doubt that the judgment of this Court in Anvar's case has to be retrospective in operation unless the judicial tool of 'prospective overruling' is applied. However, retrospective application of the judgment is not in the interests of administration of justice as it would necessitate the reopening of a large number of criminal cases. Criminal cases decided on the basis of electronic records adduced in evidence without certification have to be revisited as and when objections are taken by the Accused at the appellate stage. Attempts will be made to reopen cases which have become final. { Para 32}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1418, 1416 of 2013, 1653 and 1652 of 2014

Decided On: 18.07.2017

 Sonu Vs.  State of Haryana

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.A. Bobde and L. Nageswara Rao, JJ.

Citation:(2017)8 SCC 570

                         

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What is distinction between assertion of right and enforcement of right?

In a separate concurring judgment R.M. Sahai, J. after
going into the case law in paragraph 3 of his judgment, made
an extremely perceptive observation. He stated that where the
filing of the suit within limitation is made dependent on any
condition precedent, then such condition precedent not
curtailing the limitation period within which a suit could be filed,
would be valid and not hit by Section 28. In paragraph 8 of the
judgment, the learned Judge put it thus:-
“It does not directly or indirectly curtail the period of
limitation nor does it anywhere provide that the
Corporation shall be precluded from filing suit after
expiry of six months. It can utmost be construed as
a condition precedent for filing of the suit that the
appellant should have exercised the right within the
period agreed to between the parties. The right was
enforced under the agreement when notice was
issued and the company was required to pay the
amount. Assertion of right is one thing than
enforcing it in a court of law. The agreement does
not anywhere deal with enforcement of right in a
court of law. It only deals with assertion of right. The
assertion of right, therefore, was governed by the
agreement and it is imperative as well that the party

concerned must put the other side on notice by
asserting the right within a particular time as
provided in the agreement to enable the other side
not only to comply with the demand but also to put
on guard that in case it is not complied it may have
to face proceedings in the court of law. Since
admittedly the Corporation did issue notice prior to
expiry of six months from the termination of
contract, it was in accordance with the Fidelity
Insurance clause and, therefore, the suit filed by the
appellant was within time.” [para 8]
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.9087-9089 of 2016

UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
V
M/S INDUSIND BANK LTD. & ANR
Dated:September 15, 2016

Citation:(2016) 9 SCC720

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Whether Commissioner can amend or alter assessment entry of petitioner's property with retrospective effect?

The law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Solapur Municipal Corporation and approved by the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of City of Hubli and further re-iterated in Kalyan Municipal Council is applicable on all fours in the light of the statutory provision contained in Rule 20(1)(e) and definition of the expression "official year" occurring in Section 2(44). Any amendment in the assessment book by inserting or altering an entry in respect of any building erected, re-erected, altered, added to or reconstructed in whole or in part of the assessment book shall be and can only be effective during the currency of official year. The expression "official year" defined under Section 2(44) of the Act of 1949 read with Rule 20(1)(e) indicates without doubt the legal position that the property tax being tax for the official year must be levied only during the official year. In view thereof, it was not open for the Commissioner to amend or alter assessment entry of petitioner's property with retrospective effect. In other words, the demand of property tax raised for the period from 1-4-1985 to 31-3-1990 vide demand notices dated 8-1-1991 cannot be justified and to that extent the notices as well as the demand bills have to be modified.

Bombay High Court

Satish Dattatray Shivalkar vs Pimpri-Chinchwad Municipal ... on 6 February, 2002

Equivalent citations: AIR 2002 Bom 244, 2002 (4) BomCR 183, (2002) 2 BOMLR 25, 2002 (2) MhLj 619

Bench: R Lodha, S Bobde

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When legislative amendment shall be presumed to have retrospective or prospective effect?

 Legislature has plenary powers of legislation within the fields assigned to it and can legislate prospectively or retrospectively, the general rule is that in the absence of the enactment specifically mentioning that the concerned legislation or legislative amendment is retrospectively made, the same is to be treated as prospective in nature. It would be more so when the statute is dealing with substantive rights. No doubt, in contrast to statute dealing with substantive rights, wherever a statute deals with merely a matter of procedure, such a statute/amendment in the statute is presumed to be retrospective unless such a construction is textually inadmissible. At the same time, it is to be borne in mind that a particular provision in a procedural statute may be substantive in nature and such a provision cannot be given retrospective effect. To put it otherwise, the classification of a statute, either substantive or procedural, does not necessarily determine whether it may have a retrospective operation. 

 It needs to be emphasized that even where the Rules are procedural, some of the provisions therein may be of substantive nature. An error is committed by the High Court in holding that fixation of period of lease is also procedural. When a decision to grant lease is substantive in nature, the period for which the lease is to be granted would also be substantive. Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is contrary to law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 453 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3674 of 2010), 

Decided On: 20.01.2016

 District Collector, Vellore District Vs. K. Govindaraj

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:T.S. Thakur, C.J.I., A.K. Sikri and R. Banumathi, JJ.

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Whether NI Act Ordinance 2015 is Retrospective?

We are in complete agreement with the contention advanced
at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant. We are
satisfied, that Section 142(2)(a), amended through the Negotiable
Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, vests jurisdiction
for initiating proceedings for the offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, inter alia in the territorial
jurisdiction of the Court, where the cheque is delivered for
collection (through an account of the branch of the bank where the
payee or holder in due course maintains an account). We are also
satisfied, based on Section 142A(1) to the effect, that the
judgment rendered by this Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod’s case,
would not stand in the way of the appellant, insofar as the
territorial jurisdiction for initiating proceedings emerging from
the dishonor of the cheque in the present case arises.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1557 OF 2015

M/S BRIDGESTONE INDIA PVT. LTD. Vs INDERPAL SINGH

Coram: Jagdish Singh Khehar and R. Banumathi

Dated: NOVEMBER 24, 2015.

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Chhatisgarh high court;Amendment of Section 142 NI Act has retrospective effect

The Chattisgarh High Court held that Amendment of section 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, has retrospective effect. Justice Goutam Bhaduri said that it is an amendment of procedural law and not substantive law and hence it will have a retrospective effect.

Factual Background

Section 138 NI Act complaint was filed by the appellant in JMFC Pamgarh. But the Court returned the said complaint with a finding that the cheques which were drawn were dishonoured at Visakhapatnam, consequently, the Court of JMFC, Pamgarh will not have jurisdiction.The Court of JMFC had followed the law laid down in Dashrath Roopsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra. Sessions court dismissed the revision petition filed by appellant which was also dismissed. Thereafter he approached the High Court.

Question of Law

• Whether the amendment carried out in N.I. Act, 1881 on 15.06.2015 would have a retrospective operation or would be prospective in nature. AND whether if such amendment has a retrospective effect whether the complaint filed by the petitioner could have been saved?
• Whether the petitioner can claim restoration of the complaint on the strength of amended Section of 142-A(1)(2) inserted by Negotiable Instrument (Amendment) Ordinance 2015 ?

Section 142 procedural law-has retrospective effect

The court held “Reading of amendment would show that it is an amendment of procedural law and not substantive law”. Relying on (1994) 4 SCC 602 – Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and  AIR 1970 SC 1636 – NaniGopalMitra Vs. State of Bihar 1636, the court held that amendment carried out by Ordinance of 2015 (No.6 of 2015) on 15.06.2015 will have a retrospective effect dealing with procedure.

However, the Court refused to pass any order to continue the proceedings since on the date of promulgation of ordnance no complaint was pending before the Court of JMFC. The court said“If it is done, it would amount to legislation. The petitioner(s), therefore, if so advised may file a fresh complaint before Court having jurisdiction.”

The court further said that “if the complaint has already been returned and was not filed before the appropriate forum as per applicable law in force at the prevailing time no complaint would be presumed to be pending at that time. Therefore, there was no question of enquiring into and trying the offence in absence of a complaint”.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

CRMP No. 620 of 2015

M/s. A.K.R. Transport, Barbhata (Salkhan), 

Versus

M/s Kamakshi Shipping, AM/s. A.K.R. Transport, Barbhata (Salkhan), 

Hon'ble Shri Justice Goutam Bhaduri

Dated; 21 .08.2015
Citation; 2015 ALLMR(CRI) JOURNAL646

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