It is clear that when s. 17(1) refers to the requirement that the premises must be occupied by the landlord, the occupation intended by the provision is different from possession, because the first clause of 17(1) makes a clear distinction between occupation and delivery of possession. The effect of this clause is that when a landlord who has obtained a decree for possession executes the decree and obtains possession of the premises in question he must occupy them in terms of the case made out by him under s. 13(1)(g) and held proved at the trial. Whether or not the occupation by the landlord should be for the same purpose which he set out at the trial or can be for a different purpose, is a question which it is unnecessary to decide in the present appeal. What is, however, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf and this overt act was, on the finding of the District Court, done by the appellant on October 24, 1957. That means that the appellant occupied the premises beyond the period of one month prescribed by s. 17(1).
Besides, the scheme of s. 17(1) clearly supports this construction. Section 13(1) has allowed the landlord to eject the tenants from the premises in their possession for specified reasons and s. 17(1) affords a protection to the tenants where a decree for ejectment has been passed against them under clause (g) or (i) of s. 13(1). If the legislature thought it necessary to require the landlord to commence the work of erection if he has obtained a decree for possession under s. 13(1) within one month, there is no reason why the legislature should not have provided for the same or similar period in respect of occupation which is referable to the decree passed under s. 13(1)(g). Mr. Setalvad contends that the occupation could be effected within a reasonable time for he suggests that no limitation having been prescribed in that behalf, the general rule would be that it should be done within a reasonable time. We think this construction cannot be accepted because it is extremely unlikely that the legislature should have provided the period of one month for one category of decrees and should have made no specific provision in that behalf in respect of decrees of the other category.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 804 of 1962
Decided On: 18.01.1963
Krishanlal Ishwarlal Desai Vs. Bai Vijkor and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B.P. Sinha, C.J., J.C. Shah, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah and P.B. Gajendragadkar, JJ.
Citation: [1964]1SCR553
P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.
