Introduction: A Watershed Moment in Arbitration Law
In a significant development for India's arbitration landscape, the Supreme Court's five-judge bench in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited (2024 SCC OnLine SC 1681) dated: 30th April, 2025 has finally settled the contentious question of whether courts can modify arbitral awards. This landmark 4:1 majority ruling establishes clear boundaries for judicial intervention while preserving the autonomy of arbitration proceedings.
131. Our conclusions following the above discussion are as under:
(I) A driver holding a license for Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) class, Under Section 10(2)(d) for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight under 7,500 kg, is permitted to operate a 'Transport Vehicle' without needing additional authorization Under Section 10(2)(e) of the MV Act specifically for the 'Transport Vehicle' class. For licensing purposes, LMVs and Transport Vehicles are not entirely separate classes. An overlap exists between the two. The special eligibility requirements will however continue to apply for, inter alia, e-carts, e- rickshaws, and vehicles carrying hazardous goods.
(II) The second part of Section 3(1), which emphasizes the necessity of a specific requirement to drive a 'Transport Vehicle,' does not supersede the definition of LMV provided in Section 2(21) of the MV Act.
(III) The additional eligibility criteria specified in the MV Act and MV Rules generally for driving 'transport vehicles' would apply only to those intending to operate vehicles with gross vehicle weight exceeding 7,500 kg i.e. 'medium goods vehicle', 'medium passenger vehicle', 'heavy goods vehicle' and 'heavy passenger vehicle'.
(IV) The decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is upheld but for reasons as explained by us in this judgment. In the absence of any obtrusive omission, the decision is not per incuriam, even if certain provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules were not considered in the said judgment.
132. The reference is answered in the above terms.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 841 of 2018,
Decided On: 06.11.2024
Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rambha Devi and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I., Hrishikesh Roy, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Pankaj Mithal and Manoj Misra, JJ.
Citation: MANU/SC/1178/2024, 2024 INSC 840, 2024 INSC 840.
In other words, applying the above analogy or principle, the stay order granted in any proceedings would not automatically stand vacated on the expiry of a particular period until and unless an application to that effect has been filed by the other side and is decided following the principles of natural justice by a speaking order. {Para 46}
47. Sometimes, in quest of justice we end up doing injustice. Asian ResurfacingAsian Resurfacing is a clear example of the same. Such a situation created ought to be avoided in the normal course or if at all it arises be remedied at the earliest. In doing so, we have to adopt a practical and a more pragmatic approach rather than a technical one which may create more problems burdening the courts with superfluous or useless work. It is well said that useless work drives out the useful work. Accordingly, it is expedient in the interest of justice to provide that a reasoned stay order once granted in any civil or criminal proceedings, if not specified to be time bound, would remain in operation till the decision of the main matter or until and unless an application is moved for its vacation and a speaking order is passed adhering to the principles of natural justice either extending, modifying, varying or vacating the same.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 3589 of 2023.
Decided On: 29.02.2024
High Court Bar Association, Allahabad Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I., Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.
Authored By : Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, Pankaj Mithal
Citation: MANU/SC/0149/2024.
Print Page
The Supreme Court has held that an accused has a right to cross-examine a police officer as to the recording made in the case diary whenever the police officer uses to refresh his memory.
Similarly, in a case where the court uses a case diary for the purpose of contradicting a police officer, then an accused is entitled to peruse the said statement so recorded which is relevant, and cross-examine the police officer on that count.
Shailesh Kumar v. State of UP (now State of Uttarakhand).
2) Supreme Court: The summons issued by ED needs to be respected and responded to by the person to whom summons were issued.
Directorate of Enforcement v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. | Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1959-1963 of 2024.
30. Four main facets that, in our opinion, constitute the essence of access to justice are:
i) The State must provide an effective adjudicatory mechanism;
ii) The mechanism so provided must be reasonably accessible in terms of distance;
iii) The process of adjudication must be speedy; and
iv) The litigant's access to the adjudicatory process must be affordable.
(i) The need for adjudicatory mechanism: One of the most fundamental requirements for providing to the citizens access to justice is to set-up an adjudicatory mechanism whether described as a Court, Tribunal, Commission or Authority or called by any other name whatsoever, where a citizen can agitate his grievance and seek adjudication of what he may perceive as a breach of his right by another citizen or by the State or any one of its instrumentalities. In order that the right of a citizen to access justice is protected, the mechanism so provided must not only be effective but must also be just, fair and objective in its approach. So also the procedure which the court, Tribunal or Authority may adopt for adjudication, must, in itself be just and fair and in keeping with the well recognized principles of natural justice.
(ii) The mechanism must be conveniently accessible in terms of distance:
The forum/mechanism so provided must, having regard to the hierarchy of courts/tribunals, be reasonably accessible in terms of distance for access to justice since so much depends upon the ability of the litigant to place his/her grievance effectively before the court/tribunal/court/competent authority to grant such a relief. (See D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal MANU/SC/0799/2015 : (2015) 8 SCC 744.
(iii) The process of adjudication must be speedy.
"Access to justice" as a constitutional value will be a mere illusion if justice is not speedy. Justice delayed, it is famously said, is justice denied. If the process of administration of justice is so time consuming, laborious, indolent and frustrating for those who seek justice that it dissuades or deters them from even considering resort to that process as an option, it would tantamount to denial of not only access to justice but justice itself. In Sheela Barse's case (supra) this Court declared speedy trial as a facet of right to life, for if the trial of a citizen goes on endlessly his right to life itself is violated. There is jurisprudentially no qualitative difference between denial of speedy trial in a criminal case, on the one hand, and civil suit, appeal or other proceedings, on the other, for ought we know that civil disputes can at times have an equally, if not, more severe impact on a citizen's life or the quality of it. Access to Justice would, therefore, be a constitutional value of any significance and utility only if the delivery of justice to the citizen is speedy, for otherwise, the right to access to justice is no more than a hollow slogan of no use or inspiration for the citizen. It is heartening to note that over the past six decades or so the number of courts established in the country has increased manifold in comparison to the number that existed on the day the country earned its freedom. There is today almost invariably a court of Civil Judge junior or senior division in every taluka and a District and Sessions Judge in every district. In terms of accessibility from the point of view of distance which a citizen ought to travel, we have come a long way since the time the British left the country. However, the increase in literacy, awareness, prosperity and proliferation of laws has made the process of adjudication slow and time consuming primarily on account of the over worked and under staffed judicial system, which is crying for creation of additional courts with requisite human resources and infrastructure to effectively deal with an ever increasing number of cases being filed in the courts and mounting backlog of over thirty million cases in the subordinate courts. While the States have done their bit in terms of providing the basic adjudicatory mechanisms for disposal of resolution of civil or criminal conflicts, access to justice remains a big question mark on account of delays in the completion of the process of adjudication on account of poor judge population and judge case ratio in comparison to other countries.
(iv) The process of adjudication must be affordable to the disputants:
Access to justice will again be no more than an illusion if the adjudicatory mechanism provided is so expensive as to deter a disputant from taking resort to the same. Article 39A of the Constitution promotes a laudable objective of providing legal aid to needy litigants and obliges the State to make access to justice affordable for the less fortunate Sections of the society. Legal aid to the needy has been recognized as one of the facets of access to justice in Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0119/1978 : (1978) 3 SCC 544 where this Court observed:
If a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment, is virtually unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal, inclusive of special leave to appeal, for want of legal assistance, there is implicit in the Court Under Article 142, read with Articles 21, and 39A of the Constitution, power to assign counsel for such imprisoned individual for doing complete justice. This is a necessary incident of the right of appeal conferred by the Code and allowed by Article 136 of the Constitution. The inference is inevitable that this is a State's duty and not government's charity. Equally affirmative is the implication that while legal services must be free to the beneficiary, the lawyer himself has to be reasonably remunerated for his services. Surely, the profession has a public commitment to the people but mere philanthropy of its members yields short mileage in the long run. Their services, especially when they are on behalf of the State, must be paid for. Naturally, the State concerned must pay a reasonable sum that the court may fix when assigning counsel to the prisoner. Of course, the court may judge the situation and consider from all angles whether it is necessary for the ends of justice to make available legal aid in the particular case. In every country where free legal services are given it is not done in all cases but only where public justice suffers otherwise. That discretion resides in the court.
31. Affordability of access to justice has been, to an extent, taken care of by the State sponsored legal aid programmes under the Legal Service Authorities Act, 1987. Legal aid programmes have been providing the much needed support to the poorer Sections of the society in the accessing justice in Courts.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Transfer Petition (C) No. 1343 of 2008,
Decided On: 19.07.2016
Anita Kushwaha and Ors. Vs. Pushap Sudan and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
T.S. Thakur, C.J.I., F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, A.K. Sikri, S.A. Bobde and R. Banumathi, JJ.
Author: T.S. Thakur, C.J.I.
Citation: MANU/SC/0797/2016,AIR2016SC3506,(2016)8SCC509.
Print PageHaving said so, we wish to clearly state that grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage by this Court is not a matter of right, but a discretion which is to be exercised with great care and caution, keeping in mind several factors ensuring that 'complete justice' is done to both parties. It is obvious that this Court should be fully convinced and satisfied that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead and beyond salvation and, therefore, dissolution of marriage is the right solution and the only way forward. That the marriage has irretrievably broken down is to be factually determined and firmly established. For this, several factors are to be considered such as the period of time the parties had cohabited after marriage; when the parties had last cohabited; the nature of allegations made by the parties against each other and their family members; the orders passed in the legal proceedings from time to time, cumulative impact on the personal relationship; whether, and how many attempts were made to settle the disputes by intervention of the court or through mediation, and when the last attempt was made, etc. The period of separation should be sufficiently long, and anything above six years or more will be a relevant factor. But these facts have to be evaluated keeping in view the economic and social status of the parties, including their educational qualifications, whether the parties have any children, their age, educational qualification, and whether the other spouse and children are dependent, in which event how and in what manner the party seeking divorce intends to take care and provide for the spouse or the children. Question of custody and welfare of minor children, provision for fair and adequate alimony for the wife, and economic rights of the children and other pending matters, if any, are relevant considerations. We would not like to codify the factors so as to curtail exercise of jurisdiction Under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, which is situation specific. Some of the factors mentioned can be taken as illustrative, and worthy of consideration.{Para 33}
(iii) Whether this Court can grant divorce in exercise of power Under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India when there is complete and irretrievable breakdown of marriage in spite of the other spouses opposing the prayer?
This question is also answered in the affirmative, inter alia, holding that this Court, in exercise of power Under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, has the discretion to dissolve the marriage on the ground of its irretrievable breakdown. This discretionary power is to be exercised to do 'complete justice' to the parties, wherein this Court is satisfied that the facts established show that the marriage has completely failed and there is no possibility that the parties will cohabit together, and continuation of the formal legal relationship is unjustified. The Court, as a court of equity, is required to also balance the circumstances and the background in which the party opposing the dissolution is placed.
Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1118 of 2014,
Decided On: 01.05.2023
Shilpa Sailesh Vs. Varun Sreenivasan
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, Vikram Nath and J.K. Maheshwari, JJ.
Author: Sanjiv Khanna, J.
Citation: : MANU/SC/0502/2023,
Print Page(f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’, or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.
In the Supreme Court of India
(Before S. Abdul Nazeer, B.R. Gavai, A.S. Bopanna, V. Ramasubramanian and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.)
Criminal Appeal No. 1669 of 2009
Neeraj Dutta Vs State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi)
Decided on December 15, 2022
Citation: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1724
Print PageIII. What are the guidelines that the competent court must follow while exercising power Under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure?"
(i) If the competent court finds evidence or if application Under Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure is filed regarding involvement of any other person in committing the offence based on evidence recorded at any stage in the trial before passing of the order on acquittal or sentence, it shall pause the trial at that stage.
(ii) The Court shall thereupon first decide the need or otherwise to summon the additional Accused and pass orders thereon.
(iii) If the decision of the court is to exercise the power Under Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure and summon the Accused, such summoning order shall be passed before proceeding further with the trial in the main case.
(iv) If the summoning order of additional Accused is passed, depending on the stage at which it is passed, the Court shall also apply its mind to the fact as to whether such summoned Accused is to be tried along with the other Accused or separately.
(v) If the decision is for joint trial, the fresh trial shall be commenced only after securing the presence of the summoned Accused.
(vi) If the decision is that the summoned Accused can be tried separately, on such order being made, there will be no impediment for the Court to continue and conclude the trial against the Accused who were being proceeded with.
(vii) If the proceeding paused as in (i) above is in a case where the Accused who were tried are to be acquitted and the decision is that the summoned Accused can be tried afresh separately, there will be no impediment to pass the judgment of acquittal in the main case.
(viii) If the power is not invoked or exercised in the main trial till its conclusion and if there is a split-up (bifurcated) case, the power Under Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked or exercised only if there is evidence to that effect, pointing to the involvement of the additional Accused to be summoned in the split up (bifurcated) trial.
(ix) If, after arguments are heard and the case is reserved for judgment the occasion arises for the Court to invoke and exercise the power Under Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the appropriate course for the court is to set it down for re-hearing.
(x) On setting it down for re-hearing, the above laid down procedure to decide about summoning; holding of joint trial or otherwise shall be decided and proceeded with accordingly.
(xi) Even in such a case, at that stage, if the decision is to summon additional Accused and hold a joint trial the trial shall be conducted afresh and de novo proceedings be held.
(xii) If, in that circumstance, the decision is to hold a separate trial in case of the summoned Accused as indicated earlier;
(a) The main case may be decided by pronouncing the conviction and sentence and then proceed afresh against summoned Accused.
(b) In the case of acquittal the order shall be passed to that effect in the main case and then proceed afresh against summoned Accused.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 885 of 2019,
Decided On: 05.12.2022
Sukhpal Singh Khaira Vs. The State of Punjab
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S. Abdul Nazeer, B.R. Gavai, A.S. Bopanna, V. Ramasubramanian and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.
Author:A.S. Bopanna, J.
Citation: MANU/SC/1577/2022.
Read full Judgment here: Click here
I. Whether the trial court has the power Under Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure for summoning additional Accused when the trial with respect to other co-Accused has ended and the judgment of conviction rendered on the same date before pronouncing the summoning order?
The power Under Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure is to be invoked and exercised before the pronouncement of the order of sentence where there is a judgment of conviction of the Accused. In the case of acquittal, the power should be exercised before the order of acquittal is pronounced. Hence, the summoning order has to precede the conclusion of trial by imposition of sentence in the case of conviction. If the order is passed on the same day, it will have to be examined on the facts and circumstances of each case and if such summoning order is passed either after the order of acquittal or imposing sentence in the case of conviction, the same will not be sustainable.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 885 of 2019,
Decided On: 05.12.2022
Sukhpal Singh Khaira Vs. The State of Punjab
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S. Abdul Nazeer, B.R. Gavai, A.S. Bopanna, V. Ramasubramanian and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.
Author:A.S. Bopanna, J.
Whatever that may be, we are concerned in this case not with the report of a Chemical Examiner but with that of a Public Analyst. In so far as the report of the Public Analyst is concerned we have the provisions of section 13 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of that Section provides as follows :
"Any document purporting to be a report signed by a public analyst, unless it has been superseded under sub-section (3), or any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein in any proceeding under this Act or under sections 272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code :
Provided that any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein."
12. This provision clearly makes the report admissible in evidence.
What value is to be attached to such report must necessarily be for the Court of fact which has to consider it.
Sub-section (2) of section 13 gives an opportunity to the accused vendor or the complainant on payment of the prescribed fee to make an application to the court for sending a sample of the allegedly adulterated commodity taken under section 11 of the Act to the Director of Central Food Laboratory for a certificate. The certificate issued by the Director would then supersede the report given by the Public Analyst. This certificate is not only made admissible in evidence under sub-section (5) but is given finality of the facts contained therein by the proviso to that sub-section.
It is true that the Certificate of the Public Analyst is not made conclusive but this only means that the court of facts is free to act on the certificate or not, as it thinks fit.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 113 of 1963
Decided On: 08.02.1965
Mangaldas Raghavji Ruparel and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.C. Shah, J.R. Mudholkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah and S.M. Sikri, JJ.
Author: J.R. Mudholkar, J.
Citation: MANU/SC/0070/1965 : AIR 1966 SC 128
Print Page24. The upshot of the above discussion leads us to the following conclusions:
1) The High Courts are requested to issue practice directions to the Magistrates to record reasons before converting trial of complaints Under Section 138 of the Act from summary trial to summons trial.
2) Inquiry shall be conducted on receipt of complaints Under Section 138 of the Act to arrive at sufficient grounds to proceed against the Accused, when such Accused resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
3) For the conduct of inquiry Under Section 202 of the Code, evidence of witnesses on behalf of the complainant shall be permitted to be taken on affidavit. In suitable cases, the Magistrate can restrict the inquiry to examination of documents without insisting for examination of witnesses.
4) We recommend that suitable amendments be made to the Act for provision of one trial against a person for multiple offences Under Section 138 of the Act committed within a period of 12 months, notwithstanding the restriction in Section 219 of the Code.
5) The High Courts are requested to issue practice directions to the Trial Courts to treat service of summons in one complaint Under Section 138 forming part of a transaction, as deemed service in respect of all the complaints filed before the same court relating to dishonour of cheques issued as part of the said transaction.
6) Judgments of this Court in Adalat Prasad (supra) and Subramanium Sethuraman (supra) have interpreted the law correctly and we reiterate that there is no inherent power of Trial Courts to review or recall the issue of summons. This does not affect the power of the Trial Court Under Section 322 of the Code to revisit the order of issue of process in case it is brought to the court's notice that it lacks jurisdiction to try the complaint.
7) Section 258 of the Code is not applicable to complaints Under Section 138 of the Act and findings to the contrary in Meters and Instruments (supra) do not lay down correct law. To conclusively deal with this aspect, amendment to the Act empowering the Trial Courts to reconsider/recall summons in respect of complaints Under Section 138 shall be considered by the Committee constituted by an order of this Court dated 10.03.2021.
8) All other points, which have been raised by the Amici Curiae in their preliminary report and written submissions and not considered herein, shall be the subject matter of deliberation by the aforementioned Committee. Any other issue relating to expeditious disposal of complaints Under Section 138 of the Act shall also be considered by the Committee.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 2 of 2020
In Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases Under Section 138 of N.I. Act 1881
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.A. Bobde, C.J.I., L. Nageswara Rao, B.R. Gavai, A.S. Bopanna and S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.
Citation: AIR 2021 SC 1957,MANU/SC/0284/2021
Decided On: 16.04.2021
66. To sum up, we answer the reference holding as under:
66.1. Exemption notification should be interpreted strictly; the burden of proving applicability would be on the assessee to show that his case comes within the parameters of the exemption clause or exemption notification.
66.2. When there is ambiguity in exemption notification which is subject to strict interpretation, the benefit of such ambiguity cannot be claimed by the subject/assessee and it must be interpreted in favour of the Revenue.
66.3. The ratio in Sun Export case [Sun Export Corpn. v. Collector of Customs, (1997) 6 SCC 564] is not correct and all the decisions which took similar view as in Sun Export case [Sun Export Corpn. v. Collector of Customs, (1997) 6 SCC 564] stand overruled.
We feel wholly unable to accept the construction suggested of the expression "person guilty of disobedience" in the clause. The reason for the variation in the phraseology employed in cls. (1) and (3) of O. 39, r. 2 is not far to seek. Under the law when an order of injunction is passed, that order is binding on and enforceable not merely against the persons on nominee impleaded as a party to the suit and against whom the order is passed but against "the agents and servants, etc." of such a party. If such were not the law, orders of injunction would been rendered nugatory, by their being contravened by the agents and servants of parties. For that reason, the law provides that in order that a plaintiff might seek to enforce an order against a servant or an agent of the defendant, these latter need not be added as defendants to the suit and an order obtained specifically against them - an order against the defendants sufficing for this purpose. If such agents or servants, etc., are proved to have formal notice of order and they disobey the injunction, they are liable to be proceeded against for contempt, without any need for a further order against them under O. 39. r. 2(1). This legal position is brought out by the terms of an injunction order set out in Form 8 to Appendix F to the Code which reads : "The Court doth order that an injunction be awarded to restrain the defendant C. D., his servants, agents and workmen, from ..................". It is not suggested that the form which the order of the Subordinate Judge took in this case, departed from this model.
28. If such is the scope of an order for injunction, it would be apparent that the expression "person" has in O. 39, r. 2(3) been employed merely compendiously to designate everyone in the group "Defendants, his agents, servants and workmen" and not for excluding any defendant against whom the order of injunction has primarily been passed.
29. The matter may also be approached from a broader angle. Where a Court is empowered by statue to issue an injunction against any defendant, even if the defendant be the State - the provision would be frustrated and the power rendered ineffective and unmeaning if the machinery for enforcement specially enacted did not extend to every one against whom the order of injunction is directed. Apart, therefore, from a critical examination of the phraseology of O. 39. r. 2(3), the obligation on the part of the State of obey the injunction and be proceeded against for disobedience if it should take place would appear to follow by necessary implication. As Maxwell (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, 140. Cf. Moor v. Smith, (1859) 28 L.J.M.C. 126 puts it "The Crown is sufficiently named in a statue when an intention to include it is manifest".
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 83 of 1956
Decided On: 20.09.1960
The State of Bihar Vs. Sonabati Kumari
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.L. Kapur, K. Subba Rao, M. Hidayatullah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and S.K. Das, JJ.
Author: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.
Citation: MANU/SC/0002/1960,1961 AIR 221, 1961 SCR (1) 728
Print PageThis group of matters is at the instance of various parties, viz., Union of India, Public Sector Corporations, Public Sector banks, State Governments and two private parties. By an order dated 5th August, 1991 in Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India v. B.Karunakar MANU/SC/0474/1992 : (1992)1SCC709 , a three Judge Bench of this Court referred that matter to the Chief Justice for being placed before a Larger Bench, for the Bench found a conflict in the two decisions of this Court, viz., Kailash Chander Asthana etc. etc. v. State of U.P. and Ors. etc. etc. MANU/SC/0221/1988 : (1988)IILLJ219SC , and Union of India and Ors. etc. etc. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan MANU/SC/0124/1991 : (1991)ILLJ29SC both delivered by the Benches of three learned Judges. Civil Appeal No. 3056 of 1991 arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 12103 of 1991 along with the other matters in which the same question of law is in issue, has therefore, been referred to this Bench.
2. The basis question of law which arises in these matters is whether the report of the Inquiry Officer/authority who/which is appointed by the disciplinary authority to hold an inquiry into the charges against the delinquent employee, is required to be furnished to the employee to enable him to make proper representation to the disciplinary authority before such authority arrives at its own finding with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the employee and the punishment, If any, to be awarded to him. This question in turn gives rise to the following incidental questions:
(i) Whether the report should be furnished to the employee even when the statutory rules laying down the procedure for holding the disciplinary inquiry are silent on the subject or are against it?
(ii) Whether the report of the Inquiry Officer is required to be furnished to the delinquent employee even when the punishment imposed is other than the major punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank?
(iii) Whether the obligation to furnish the report is only when the employee asks for the same or whether it exists even otherwise?
(iv) Whether the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case (Supra) will apply to all establishments - Government and non-Government, public and private sector undertakings,
(v) What is the effect of the non-furnishing of the report on the order of punishment and what relief should be granted to the employee in such cases?
(vi) From what date the law requiring furnishing of the report, should come into operation?
(vii) Since the decision in Ramzan Khan's case (supra) has made the law laid down there prospective in operation, i.e., applicable to the orders of punishment passed after 20th November, 1990 on which day the said decision was delivered, this question in turn also raises another question, viz., what was the law prevailing prior to 20th November, 1990?
Hence the incidental question raised above may be answered as follows:
(i) Since the denial of the report of the Inquiry Officer is a denial of reasonable opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice, it follows that the statutory rules if any, which deny the report to the employee are against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, invalid. The delinquent employee will, therefore be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject.
(ii) The relevant portion of Article 311(2) of the Constitution is a follows:
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges.
Thus the Article makes it obligatory to hold an inquiry before the employee is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank. The Article, however, cannot be construed to mean that it prevents or prohibits the inquiry when punishment other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is awarded. The procedure to be followed in awarding other punishments is laid down in the service rules governing the employee. What is further, Article 311(2) applies only to members of the civil services of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or to the holders of the civil posts under the Union or a State. In the matter of all punishments both Government servants and others are governed by their service rules. Whenever, therefore, the service rules contemplate an inquiry before a punishment is awarded, and when the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority the delinquent employee will have the right to receive the Inquiry Officer's report notwithstanding the nature of the punishment.
(iii) Since it is the right of the employee to have the report to defend himself effectively, and he would not known in advance whether the report is in his favour or against him, it will not be proper to construe his failure to ask for the report, as the waiver of his right. Whether, therefore, the employee asks for the report or not, the report has to be furnished to him.
(iv) In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the inquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case (supra) should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules governing the disciplinary proceeding or not and whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whether the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the Inquiry Officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly.
(v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the Inquiry Officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Since to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice is a mechanical ritual the theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice.
Hence, in all cases where the Inquiry Officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal, and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, The Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment the Courts/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. Since it is the Court/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate of revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity.
It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment.
Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report.
The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 3056 of 1991
Decided On: 01.10.1993
Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad Vs. Karunakar and Ors.
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