Whether provisions of limitation Act are applicable to proceedings under Rent Act?

Once it is held that Section 17 is in the nature of provision of limitation, then it necessarily follows .that by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Act. Inasmuch as, those provisions have not been expressly excluded by the present State enactment. This proposition can be discerned from the decision of the Apex Court in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker reported in MANU/SC/0453/1995 : AIR1995SC2272 . The Apex Court has observed that two conditions must be fulfilled then the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act would automatically apply. Those two conditions are, viz; 1) there must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application, 2) the said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the schedule to the Limitation Act. Thus on fulfilment of those two conditions, as observed by the Apex Court, the consequences that would automatically follow are : 1) in such a case Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the Special or local law was the period prescribed by the schedule, 2) for determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Insofar as Section 17 of the Act is concerned, as observed by the Apex Court in Krishanlal Desai's case (supra), the last clause of Section 17(1) provides for period of limitation. A priori, it is a provision for period of limitation under the Special and local law in connection with an application to be filed under that provision. Moreover, the period of limitation prescribed thereunder is different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act in Article 137. Understood thus, I have no hesitation in taking the view that provisions of Limitation Act would apply and the Court will have power to condone the delay in institution of application under Section 17 of the Act, if the fact situation of the case so requires.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

W.P. No. 1450 of 1984

Decided On: 30.08.2002

 Madhukar Narayan Rao Vs.  Ramchandra Rajaram Wani and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Citation: 2002 SCCONLINE Bom 834

Print Page

Whether landlord is liable to be evicted from tenanted premises if he fails to occupy it within period prescribed by statute?

 It is clear that when s. 17(1) refers to the requirement that the premises must be occupied by the landlord, the occupation intended by the provision is different from possession, because the first clause of 17(1) makes a clear distinction between occupation and delivery of possession. The effect of this clause is that when a landlord who has obtained a decree for possession executes the decree and obtains possession of the premises in question he must occupy them in terms of the case made out by him under s. 13(1)(g) and held proved at the trial. Whether or not the occupation by the landlord should be for the same purpose which he set out at the trial or can be for a different purpose, is a question which it is unnecessary to decide in the present appeal. What is, however, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf and this overt act was, on the finding of the District Court, done by the appellant on October 24, 1957. That means that the appellant occupied the premises beyond the period of one month prescribed by s. 17(1).

 Besides, the scheme of s. 17(1) clearly supports this construction. Section 13(1) has allowed the landlord to eject the tenants from the premises in their possession for specified reasons and s. 17(1) affords a protection to the tenants where a decree for ejectment has been passed against them under clause (g) or (i) of s. 13(1). If the legislature thought it necessary to require the landlord to commence the work of erection if he has obtained a decree for possession under s. 13(1) within one month, there is no reason why the legislature should not have provided for the same or similar period in respect of occupation which is referable to the decree passed under s. 13(1)(g). Mr. Setalvad contends that the occupation could be effected within a reasonable time for he suggests that no limitation having been prescribed in that behalf, the general rule would be that it should be done within a reasonable time. We think this construction cannot be accepted because it is extremely unlikely that the legislature should have provided the period of one month for one category of decrees and should have made no specific provision in that behalf in respect of decrees of the other category.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 804 of 1962

Decided On: 18.01.1963

 Krishanlal Ishwarlal Desai  Vs.  Bai Vijkor and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.P. Sinha, C.J., J.C. Shah, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah and P.B. Gajendragadkar, JJ.

Citation: [1964]1SCR553 

P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.

Print Page