Showing posts with label exemption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label exemption. Show all posts

Tuesday, 30 April 2019

To what extent Bombay Port trust can claim exemption from rent Act?

 By its very nature, rent legislation covers the relationship between landlord and tenant. It does not deal with creation of tenancy but it places either a restriction or embargo on the right of the landlord under the general law relating to revision of rents and eviction. The Rent Act also deals with the question of charging of rent and to that extent it also encroaches upon the field of general law as to the creation of tenancy because creation may be according to general law but that part of the transaction where the tenant agrees to pay a certain amount of rent will be regulated and controlled by the provisions of the Rent Act. Unless therefore it is shown that in the Major Port Trusts Act there are similar provisions as to the control, regulation or revision of rent and relating to eviction, obviously the said theory and occupied field cannot have any place whatsoever. We, therefore, reject this submission.

76. In view of the aforesaid finding the appellant trust will stand governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. To the extent permissible therein, the appellant trust can certainly increase the rent periodically and the occupants of the plots on whatever terms and conditions at present will also have to abide by the same. We also hold that the appellant trust cannot claim any exemption from the provisions of the Rent Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal Nos. 258, 313-327 of 1991
Decided On: 01.08.2000

The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay  Vs. Jayantilal Dharamsey and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
N.J. Pandya and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.

Citation : AIR 2001 Bom 26
Print Page

Sunday, 3 September 2017

Basic principles for deciding application for grant of exemption to bring legal heirs of deceased defendant on record

At this stage it would not be inapposite to read Order XXII, CPC with particular emphasis on the object sought to be achieved by introduction of sub-rule (4) in Rule 4 thereof. The provision reads as follows:

"4. Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant.- (1) Where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.

(2) Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant.

(3) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant.

(4) The Court whenever it thinks fit, may exempt the plaintiff from the necessity of substituting the legal representatives of any such defendant who has failed to file a written statement or who, having filed it, has failed to appear and contest the suit at the hearing; and judgment may, in such case, be pronounced against the said defendant notwithstanding the death of such defendant and shall have the same force and effect as if it has been pronounced before death took place.

(5) Where-

(a) the plaintiff was ignorant of the death of a defendant, and could not, for that reason, make an application for the substitution of the legal representative of the defendant under this rule within the period specified in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), and the suit has, in consequence, abated, and

(b) the plaintiff applies after the expiry of the period specified therefor in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), for setting aside the abatement and also for the admission of that application under Section 5 of that Act on the ground that he had, by reason of such ignorance, sufficient cause for not making the application within the period specified in the said Act,

the Court shall, in considering the application under the said Section 5, have due regard to the fact of such ignorance, if proved."

18. What Order XXII Rule 4 postulates, in the contextual facts, is that when one of two or more defendants in a suit dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. The object of bringing the legal representative of the deceased defendant on record under Order XXII Rule 4 is to have the estate of the deceased represented in the suit. If despite being seized of information of death of one of several defendants the plaintiff omits to bring his legal representative on record in the manner prescribed by law, the suit would abate as against the deceased defendant. This is what sub-rule (3) of Rule 4 ordains.

19. Sub-rule (4) was inserted in Rule 4 by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 and conferred discretionary power on the Court to exempt a plaintiff from bringing the legal representative of a deceased defendant on record, who has either not filed written statement or having filed it, has abstained from contesting the suit by his non-appearance. Once exemption is granted, the judgment in the suit may be pronounced against all the defendants including the deceased defendant, and notwithstanding his death, such judgment shall have the same force and effect as if the judgment has been pronounced before the death of the deceased defendant. Therefore, sub-rule (4) is in the nature of an exception to the general rule laid down in sub-rule (3).

20. In Mata Prasad Mathur (supra), one of the defendants (Virendra Singh) was not contesting the suit. He died whereupon the plaintiff approached the trial court for deletion of his name from the array of defendants and for setting aside abatement. The matter having reached the Supreme Court, it was held that "substitution of the legal representatives of such a defendant could be legitimately dispensed with by the trial court in view of the provisions of Order 22 Rule 4 sub-rule 4" (see paragraph 3). In paragraph 9 once again, the Court observed that "in the absence of any compelling reason to the contrary the courts below could and indeed ought to have exercised the power vested in them to avoid abatement of the suit by exempting the plaintiff from the necessity of substituting the legal representative of the deceased defendant".

21. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in Mata Prasad Mathur (supra) upon noticing the several reports of the Law Commission leading to insertion of sub-rule (4) in Rule 4 of Order XXII, expedition in disposal of a suit which is not being contested by a defendant and the plaintiff not being required to bring on record the legal representatives of such non-contesting deceased defendant was the primary reason for insertion of sub-rule (4) in Rule 4 of Order XXII, CPC. The relevant observation reads as follows:

"9. It would appear from the above that the legislature incorporated the provision of Order 22 Rule 4(4) with a specific view to expedite the process of substitution of the LRs of non-contesting defendants.***"
22. There cannot be any quarrel of any nature with regard to the power that is conferred by sub-rule (4) in Rule 4 of Order XXII, CPC. But, can the power conferred by sub-rule (4) be exercised at any stage of the suit? There does not appear to be any express restriction in the statute. The statute, as read and interpreted in the decisions cited by Mr. Sen, seems to make the position clear that the power could be exercised any time prior to pronouncement of the judgment in the suit. The only check to the exercise of the power is that an order under sub-rule (4) can be passed when the judge thinks it fit. It cannot be gainsaid that grant of exemption being a matter in the discretion of the trial judge, in dealing with an application for exemption the judge ought to exercise discretion judiciously. Care must obviously be exercised to ensure that on the one hand, the object of the rule to assist the expeditious disposal of a suit is not defeated and on the other hand real and genuine defences are not shut out by passing unduly severe orders.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

R.V.W.O. No. 44 of 2016, G.A. No. 2924 of 2016 arising out of GA 1950 of 2016 in APO 212 of 2016 arising out of GA No. 932 of 2016 in CS No. 136 of 2006

Decided On: 17.05.2017

A.K.R. Consultants (P) Ltd. and Ors.
Vs.
 Asha Keshri and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dipankar Datta and Arijit Banerjee, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2017 Cal 176
Print Page

Sunday, 20 August 2017

Whether it is necessary to hear tenant of agricultural tenancy before granting exemption to charitable trust?

The main contention raised by the advocate for the petitioner is that the petitioner had not been given any notice when the order under Section 88B was passed. Reliance is placed on the judgements of this Court in the case of Keraba Dattu Borachata and Ors. v. Shri Sheshashai & Vishnu Trust MANU/MH/0710/1990 : 1990 Mh.L.J. 1183 and Dattu Hari Mali @ Dattu Rau Mali since deceased by his legal heirs and Ors. v. Peer Alli Darga Masjid (Powai Peer) through its Vahiwatdar MANU/MH/1101/2004 : 2005(2) Bom.C.R. 442 in support of his submission that the rules of natural justice must be observed before any order can be passed under Section 88B of the act since the tenants must be given notice as they would effectively be deprived of their valuable right to purchase the tenanted properties. It was further contended that the trust was registered only in 1960, much after the tillers day and therefore the petitioner could not be evicted as he had been denied the opportunity to exercise his right to purchase the property.

6. On the other hand, the learned advocate for the respondent pointed out that the possession of the land in question had been taken after due process on 28th may 1995 and therefore the petition has become infructuous. He submitted that the petitioner had been inducted in 1966-67 and therefore the question of the petitioner exercising his right to purchase the property did not arise since the petitioner was not in possession of the lands on the Tillers day.

7. It is true that before an order is passed under Section 88B of the act a tenant occupying the land's of the charitable trust must be given notice as his valuable right or purchase the lands occupied by him under Section 32 of the act would be seriously affected. In fact the judgement of the division bench of this Court relied by the learned advocate the petitioner takes this view. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 5381 of 1994

Decided On: 07.07.2009

 Shri Murgappa Shivarudrappa
Vs.
 Shri Amarsihna Babasaheb Dafale

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
N.N. Mhatre, J.
Citation: 2009(5) MHLJ 400
Print Page

Saturday, 24 October 2015

Whether exemption granted to educational institution under Income tax Act can be withdrawn if educational institution is making surpluses?

 Coming closer to the section at hand, in Aditanar
Educational Institution v. Additional Commissioner of
Income Tax, (1997) 224 ITR 310, this Court while construing
the predecessor Section, namely, Section 10(22) of the Income
Tax act, held:
“The High Court has made an observation that any
income which has a direct relation or incidental to
the running of the institution as such would qualify
for exemption. We may state that the language of

Section 10(22) of the Act is plain and clear and the
availability of the exemption should be evaluated
each year to find out whether the institution existed
during the relevant year solely for educational
purposes and not for the purposes of profit. After
meeting the expenditure, if any surplus results
incidentally from the activity lawfully carried on by
the educational institution, it will not cease to be one
existing solely for educational purposes since the
object is not one to make profit. The decisive or acid
test is whether on an overall view of the matter, the
object is to make profit. In evaluating or appraising
the above, one should also bear in mind the
distinction/difference between the corpus, the
objects and the powers of the concerned entity.”
10. In American Hotel & Lodging Assn. Educational
Institute v. CBDT, (2008) 301 ITR 86, this Court dealt with
Section 10(23C)(vi) as follows:
“29. In CIT v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers'
Assn. [(1980) 2 SCC 31 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 170 :
(1980) 121 ITR 1] it has been held by this Court that
test of predominant object of the activity is to be
seen whether it exists solely for education and not
to earn profit. However, the purpose would not lose
its character merely because some profit arises
from the activity. That, it is not possible to carry on
educational activity in such a way that the
expenditure exactly balances the income and there
is no resultant profit, for, to achieve this, would not
only be difficult of practical realisation but would
reflect unsound principles of management. In order
to ascertain whether the institute is carried on with
the object of making profit or not it is the duty of the
prescribed authority to ascertain whether the

balance of income is applied wholly and exclusively
to the objects for which the applicant is established.
30. In deciding the character of the recipient, it is
not necessary to look at the profits of each year, but
to consider the nature of the activities undertaken in
India. If the Indian activity has no correlation with
education, exemption has to be denied (see
judgment of this Court in Oxford University
Press [(2001) 3 SCC 359 : (2001) 247 ITR 658] ).
Therefore, the character of the recipient of income
must have character of educational institution in
India to be ascertained from the nature of the
activities. If after meeting expenditure, surplus
 remains incidentally from the activity carried on by
the educational institution, it will not cease to be one
 existing solely for educational purposes. In other
words, existence of surplus from the activity will not
mean absence of educational purpose (see
judgment of this Court in Aditanar Educational
Institutionv. CIT [(1997) 3 SCC 346 : (1997) 224 ITR
310] ). The test is—the nature of activity. If the
activity like running a printing press takes place it is
not educational. But whether the income/profit has
been applied for non-educational purpose has to be
decided only at the end of the financial year.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5167 OF 2008
M/S. QUEEN’S EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY …APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX …RESPONDENT
WITH
C.A. NO.5168 OF 2008
Citation;AIR 2015 SC 3253
R.F.Nariman, J.
Print Page

Saturday, 11 July 2015

Whether instrumentality of state is entitled to get exemption from deposit of security in case of stay of decree?


Equivalent Citation: 2014III AD (S.C.) 358, 2014 (103) ALR 270, 2014(1)ARBLR134(SC), 2014 2 AWC1494SC, 2014-3-LW182, 2014(2)RCR(Civil)173, 2014 123 RD116, 2014(1)SCALE207, (2015)5SCC267
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 26 of 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 27572 of 2013
Decided On: 03.01.2014
Appellants: Kanpur Jal Sansthan and Anr.
Vs.
Respondent: Bapu Construction
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Anil R. Dave and Dipak Misra, JJ.


Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XXVII, Rules 8A and 8B and Order XLI, Rule 5--Arbitration--Applicability of Order XXVII, Rules 8A and 8B and Order XLI, Rule 5 of C.P.C.--When appellant is 'Jal Sansthan' which come within extended wing of Government or agency of State--Order XXVII, Rules 8A and 8B and Order XLI, Rule 5 of C.P.C. applicable only to Government and not to instrumentality or agency of State--There is difference between concept of "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution and "Government" as used in Order XXVII, Rules 8A and 8B of C.P.C.--Division Bench of High Court fallen into error by directing appellants to deposit entire amount awarded by arbitrator in court below and release of 50% of same without furnishing security and remaining half after furnishing security--Appellants directed to furnish security for entire amount to satisfaction of concerned District Judge--Impugned order of Division Bench of High Court modified accordingly.

Calling in question the defensibility of the order passed by the High Court whereby the Division Bench, after admitting the appeal, while dealing with the application for stay, directed the appellants to deposit the entire amount awarded by the arbitrator in the Court below with a further direction permitting the claimant-respondent to withdraw half of the said amount without furnishing security and remaining half after furnishing security to the satisfaction of the District Judge, with a further stipulation that in case of default in making the deposit, the order of stay shall automatically stand vacated.

From the language employed in Order XXVII, Rules 8A and 8B. Cr.P.C. it only means the "Government". In fact, Rule 8B clearly states "in relation to any suit by or against the Central Government or against a public officer in the service of the Government" and similar language is used for the State Government. Hence, the Legislature has deliberately used a restrictive definition and its scope cannot be expanded to cover an agency or instrumentality of the State by interpretative process.

The counsel for the appellants has relied on the decision in State of Kerala v. Kuruvilla, AIR 2000 Ker. 233, of the High Court of Kerala wherein the Division Bench placing reliance on the decision in Collector, Cuttack v. Padma Charan Mohanty's, 50 (1980) CLT 191, has basically dealt with the applicability of Order XXVII, Rule 8A and grant of stay under Order XLI, Rule 5 when the State is the appellant. The Supreme Court does not intend to express any opinion on the correctness of the said decisions as the controversy does not arise in the present case because it is neither the Central Government nor the State Government in that sense in appeal. It is the "Jal Sansthan" which claims to be an extended wing or agency of the State has preferred the appeal. It was observed Order XXVII, Rules 8A and 8B are applicable only to the Government and not to instrumentality or agency of the State. That is the specific and definite language employed by the Legislature and for that purpose there is a distinction between the concept of "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution and the "Government" as used in Order XXVII, Rules 8A and 8B of C.P.C.

Coming to the legal validity of the impugned order this Court finds the High Court has directed for deposit of the money and withdrawal of the 50% of the same without furnishing security and remaining half after furnishing security. The High Court has not given any justifiable reason for permitting such withdrawal. Without commenting on the merits of the grounds sought to be urged the Supreme Court only modify the order that the appellant shall furnish the security for the entire amount to the satisfaction of the concerned District Judge within a period of six weeks.
Print Page