Supreme Court: 'Legal Representative' in Motor accident claim petition Is One Who Suffers Loss; Need Not Be Spouse, Child Or Parent Of Deceased

This Court has clarified in the case of Meena Devi v. Nunu Chand Mahto[(2023) 1 SCC 204], that the objective of granting compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is to ensure that just and fair compensation is paid to the aggrieved party. Another question which arose for our consideration, as for the purpose of loss of dependency, the deduction of annual income should be 1/3rdor 1/4th, as there are five claimants. The Tribunal did not consider appellant Nos.4 and 5, namely, the father and the younger sister, respectively, of the deceased as dependents, stating therein that the father was not dependent on the income of the deceased and since the father is alive, the younger sister is also not dependent on the income of the deceased. This Court inGujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai[(1987) 3 SCC 234],observed that a legal representative is one, who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent or child. {Para 13}

14. Recently in N. Jayasree v. Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Company Ltd. [(2022) 14 SCC 712], this Court observed that :

"16. In our view, the term "legal representative" should be given a wider interpretation for the purpose of Chapter XII of the MV Act and it should not be confined only to mean the spouse, parents and children of the deceased. As noticed above, the MV Act is a benevolent legislation enacted for the object of providing monetary relief to the victims or their families. Therefore, the MV Act calls for a liberal and wider interpretation to serve the real purpose underlying the enactment and fulfil its legislative intent. We are also of the view that in order to maintain a claim petition, it is sufficient for the claimant to establish his loss of dependency. Section 166 of the MV Act makes it clear that every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person in a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation."

15. In our view, in furtherance of the above exposition of law, the appellant Nos.4 and 5 being the father and younger sister of the deceased, both not financially independent, would fall under the definition of legal representatives for the purpose of claiming the compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and they were considered as dependents upon the income of the deceased, as he was doing wholesale business of selling fruits to meet the day-to-day expenses of the family. Therefore, the deduction made towards the personal expenses of the deceased should be 1/4thas the number of dependent family members is five.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3763 of 2025.

Date of Order: 24.01.2025

Sadhana Tomar and Ors. Vs. Ashok Kushwaha and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SCOR/28227/2025.

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Whether Orphanage is entitled to get compensation for death of orphan in motor accident?

 In the circumstances, it would be necessary to examine, whether the claimants are entitled to compensation as legal representatives not dependent on the deceased or as dependents entitled to compensation. It is obvious that the deceased A. Ebenezer was an orphan studying in the school living with the Orphanage maintained by the Trust. The loss of dependency and loss of estate are two different aspects. It is unrealistic to expect the Manager of the Trust as a dependent of the deceased A. Ebenezer, similarly, the paternal aunt who had not played any role during the lifetime of the deceased. It is clear that to claim compensation under Section 166 of the Act, the claimants must fall within the ambit of legal representative' as interpreted in the various Judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court. As per the judgments referred to supra, a legal representative is one who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child. Even if there is no loss of dependency, the claimant if he or she is a legal representative is entitled to compensation, towards loss of estate, the loss of financial contribution made to the claimant is the loss of dependency, the loss of savings by the deceased is the loss of estate. As discussed above, the question of loss of dependency would not arise in the present case. In view of the same, the claimants being not proved to be the dependent legal representatives, are entitled to loss of estate. Loss of estate to be computed as per the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in A. MANAVALAGAN's case (supra), the savings taken as 15% of the income. The annual notional income has to be reckoned at Rs. 30,000/- based on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of KISHAN GOPAL's case (supra). The appropriate multiplier would be 15 as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of RESHMA KUMARI & OTHERS v. MADAN MOHAN & ANOTHER' reported in MANU/SC/0287/2013 : 2013 ACJ 1253. Thus, the loss of estate works to Rs. 67,500/- (Rs. 30,000/- x 15% x 15). The claimants shall be entitled to a sum of Rs. 25,000/- towards transportation of dead body and funeral expenses. Hence, the claimants shall be entitled to total compensation of Rs. 92,500/- as against Rs. 2,25,000/-. The award amount shall carry interest at 6% p.a. from the date of petition till the date of the deposit provided the claimants shall establish in law as legal representatives of the deceased since the person who may or may not be a legal heir competent to inherit to the property of the deceased can represent the estate of the deceased person which includes heirs as well as persons who represent the estate even without title either as executors or administrators in possession of the estate of the deceased as observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in 'CUSTODIAN OF BRANCHES OF BANCO NATIONALULTRAMARINO v. NALINI BAI NAIQUE' reported in MANU/SC/0149/1989 : 1989 (2) SCR 810. The observations made by the Tribunal that the claimants have to approach the competent court and get the succession certificate to claim the award amount of deceased A. Ebenezer is justifiable.

{Para 21}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

M.F.A. Nos. 534/2012, 533/2012, 4066/2012 and 4065/2012 [MV]

Decided On: 18.11.2016

Jacob Vs. The Managing Director, K.S.R.T.C. Depot.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: S. Sujatha, J.

Citation:  MANU/KA/2933/2016.

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Bombay HC: Parents Living Separately Or At Native Place Entitled To Compensation under Motor vehicles Act Upon child's Accidental Death

In the instance case the Claimant’s are Hindus. Under

the Hindu Succession Act the Class I heirs inherits the entire

property of the deceased to the exclusion of all others. Father of

the deceased son is not a Class-I heir under the Hindu

Succession Act. The father of the deceased is a Class II heir.

However, the father who is Class II heir of the deceased is still

entitled to claim compensation under the MV. Act on account his

dependency on his son. It is required to be noted that as a

general principle, the extent of dependency of the unemployed

widow would be highest on account of her age. The dependency

of minor children would be lesser than the widow but more than

parents. The parents of the deceased on account of their old age

would have lesser dependency as compare to the widow and the

children. Any other dependent can also filed a Claim and the

dependency of the Claimant would be a matter of fact to be

determined by the Tribunal. {Para 13}

14. In the instance case the impugned judgment indicates

that there is no issue raised as regard the dependency of the

parents on the deceased. In the ordinary circumstances in the Indian Social system, parents are dependent on their child to take care of them in their old age, irrespective of the fact that they would be staying in the villages/native place away from the son. The parents of the deceased/son are also entitled for filial consortium for loss of love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child.

15. The arguments of the Insurance Company that the claim cannot be filed by the parents of the deceased as they were staying separate from the deceased in a native village as such were not dependent on the deceased cannot be accepted and the same is rejected.  

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FIRST APPEAL NO.571 OF 2023

Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs  Smt.Sunita Virendra @ Birendra Sahani

CORAM : ARUN R. PEDNEKER, J.

DATE : 30th JULY 2024

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Kerala HC: Legal representatives of deceased are not entitled to claim compensation u/s163­A of the Motor vehicles Act.

  Under Section 163A, the persons who are entitled to apply for compensation are the legal heirs, in the case of death of a person and in the case of injury, the victim. Once a claim is made under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, then application for compensation can be filed by the persons enumerated in the section, namely the person who sustained injury, by the owner of the property, where the death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, or by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be. There is wide difference in the words used in both the sections regarding the persons entitled to apply for compensation in the case of death of a person, who died in a motor vehicle accident. Under Section 166, in the case of death, the persons entitled to claim compensation are the legal representatives of the deceased. But in the case of a claim under Section 163A, the persons entitled to claim compensation are the legal heirs. Further, in the case of 166, even if, a person is not a legal heir, if he is able to prove that, he/she is a dependant of the deceased, then irrespective of the fact, whether he/she is a legal heir or not, is entitled to claim compensation, in proportion to the extent of dependency claimed by him/her. In such cases, the dependency will have some relevance for the purpose of assessing compensation. But for a claim under Section 163A, the dependency has no relevancy, because the persons who are entitled to file an application for compensation for the death of the deceased are the legal heirs and not the legal representatives. Once it is proved by the appellants that, they are legal heirs of the deceased then, in a claim under Section 163A, they are entitled to claim compensation for the death of the deceased. Legal representatives include legal heirs as well and not vice versa.{Para 6}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

M.A.C.A. No. 896 of 2008

Decided On: 18.10.2013

Kadeeja and Ors. Vs. Managing Director, KSRTC, Tvm and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Siri Jagan and K. Ramakrishnan, JJ.

Author: K. Ramakrishnan, J.

Citation: 2014 ACJ 1492 (Ker)­, MANU/KE/1078/2013.

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A claim petition u/s 166 of MV Act can be preferred by legal representative of deceased whereas, a claim petition u/s 164 can be preferred by legal heirs of deceased only

As per Section 166(1)(c) of the Act legal representative of the deceased can prefer a claim petition u/s 166 of the M V Act. Whereas, Section 164 can be preferred by the legal heirs of the deceased. There is  difference in the provisions contained u/Ss 166 and 164 of the M V Act. As stated hereinabove a claim petition u/s 166 can be preferred by the legal representative of the deceased whereas, a claim petition u/s 164 can be preferred by the legal heirs of the deceased only.

 164. Payment of compensation in case of death or grevious hurt, etc.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or grievous hurt due to any accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, a compensation, of a sum of five lakh rupees in case of death or of two and a half lakh rupees in case of grievous hurt to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.

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Whether motor accident claim petition will be abated if legal representatives of driver-cum-owner are not brought on record?

Learned counsel for the appellant-insurer argued that the claim petition has abated in view of the death of the driver-cum-owner, who came to be deleted from the array of respondents vide order, dated 2nd December, 2006, and his legal representatives have not been brought on record. The argument is misconceived and devoid of any force for the following reasons: {Para 18}

21. These provisions of law provide that the mandate of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "CPC") is not applicable in such cases. It is for the Tribunal to decide the cases, as early as possible.

22. The Apex Court and other High Courts have held that the Courts should not succumb to the procedural wrangles and tangles, hyper technicalities and mystic maybes and that should not be a ground to dismiss the claim petition and to defeat the rights of the claimants.

24. The High Court of Rajasthan in the judgment delivered in a case titled as Shiv Chandra and another versus Jasvinder Singh and others, reported in MANU/RH/0106/1991 : 1992 ACJ 747, has discussed the provisions of law and the Rules, which were applicable in the State of Rajasthan and held that the appeal had not abated on the failure to bring the legal representatives of the deceased owner on record.

25. The Delhi High Court in a recent judgment in the case titled as Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. versus Biro Devi and others, reported in MANU/DE/0098/2014 : 2015 ACJ 340, has also discussed the provisions of Section 169 of the MV Act and the Rules applicable and held that the death of the owner of the vehicle is not a ground for evading the liability and it has no legal significance in the contractual relationship between the insurer and insured for the purpose of fastening the liability.

28. This Rule provides which of the provisions of the CPC are applicable. Order XXII of the CPC deals with abatement and the provisions of said Order have not been made applicable. Only on this count, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant merits to be turned down.

29. Chapter XII of the MV Act is a complete code and provides the mechanism how to determine the claim petitions and appeals. Section 155 of the MV Act provides what is the effect of death of the insured on cause of action. It specifically provides that Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925) cannot affect the claim petitions or appeals if the insured has died after the happening of the event.

30. It is apt to reproduce Section 155 of the MV Act herein:

"155. Effect of death on certain causes of action. - Notwithstanding anything contained in section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), the death of a person in whose favour a certificate of insurance had been insured, if it occurs after the happening of an event which has given rise to a claim under the provisions of this Chapter, shall not be a bar to the survival of any cause of action arising out of the said event against his estate or against the insurer."

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

FAO No. 17 of 2008

Decided On: 20.03.2015

United India Insurance Company Limited Vs. Brijbala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mansoor Ahmad Mir, C.J.

Author: Mansoor Ahmad Mir, C.J.

Citation: MANU/HP/0132/2015,2016 ACJ 1554 (HP).

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Supreme Court: Sum for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years from the year 2017

 In Pranay Sethi   MANU/SC/1366/2017 : (2017) 16 SCC 680, this Court has awarded a total sum of Rs. 70,000/- (Rupees seventy thousand only) under conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses. It was held that the said sum should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years. It was held thus:

59.8. Reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000, Rs. 40,000 and Rs. 15,000 respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years.

33. The judgment in Pranay Sethi   MANU/SC/1366/2017 : (2017) 16 SCC 680 was rendered in the year 2017. Therefore, the claimants are entitled for 10% enhancement. Thus, a sum of Rs. 16,500/- each is awarded towards loss of estate and funeral expenses. {Para 32}

34. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur @ Satwinder Kaur and Ors.   MANU/SC/0500/2020 : AIR 2020 SC 3076, after considering Pranay Sethi   MANU/SC/1366/2017 : (2017) 16 SCC 680, has awarded spousal consortium at the rate of Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) and towards loss of parental consortium to each child at the rate of Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only). The compensation under these heads also needs to be increased by 10%. Thus, the spousal consortium is awarded at Rs. 44,000/- (Forty-four thousand only), and towards parental consortium at the rate of Rs. 44,000/- each (Total Rs. 88,000/-) is awarded to the two children.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6451 of 2021.

Decided On: 25.10.2021

N. Jayasree and Ors. Vs. Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Company Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari, JJ.

Author: S. Abdul Nazeer, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0966/2021 : AIR 2021 SC 5218,2021 SCC OnLine SC 967.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether mother in law of deceased son in law is entitled to get compensation under motor accident claim petition?

 In the instant case, the question for consideration is whether the fourth Appellant would fall under the expression 'legal representative' for the purpose of claiming compensation. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Anr.   MANU/SC/0469/1987 : (1987) 3 SCC 234 this Court while considering the entitlement of the brother of a deceased who died in a motor vehicle accident to maintain a claim petition under the provisions of the MV Act, held as under:

13. We feel that the view taken by the Gujarat High Court is in consonance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience having regard to the conditions of the Indian society. Every legal representative who suffers on account of the death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident should have a remedy for realisation of compensation and that is provided by Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. These provisions are in consonance with the principles of law of torts that every injury must have a remedy. It is for the Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal to determine the compensation which appears to it to be just as provided in Section 110-B of the Act and to specify the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The determination of the compensation payable and its apportionment as required by Section 110-B of the Act amongst the legal representatives for whose benefit an application may be filed Under Section 110-A of the Act have to be done in accordance with well-known principles of law. 

19. In Hafizun Begum (Mrs) v. Mohd. Ikram Heque and Ors.   MANU/SC/3045/2007 : (2007) 10 SCC 715 it was held that:

7. ...12. As observed by this Court in Custodian of Branches of Banco National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naique   MANU/SC/0149/1989 : 1989 Supp (2) SCC 275 the definition contained in Section 2(11) Code of Civil Procedure is inclusive in character and its scope is wide, it is not confined to legal heirs only. Instead, it stipulates that a person who may or may not be legal heir, competent to inherit the property of the deceased, can represent the estate of the deceased person. It includes heirs as well as persons who represent the estate even without title either as executors or administrators in possession of the estate of the deceased. All such persons would be covered by the expression 'legal representative'. As observed in Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai   MANU/SC/0469/1987 : (1987) 3 SCC 234 a legal representative is one who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child.

17. Tribunal relied not only upon judgments of American and English Courts but also upon Indian judgments for coming to the conclusion that even a religious order or an organisation may suffer considerable loss due to the death of a voluntary worker. The Tribunal also went on to decide who should be entitled for compensation as legal representative of the deceased and for that purpose it relied upon the Full Bench judgment of Patna High Court in Sudama Devi v. Jogendra Choudhary   MANU/BH/0024/1987 : AIR 1987 Pat 239, which held that the term "legal representative" is wide enough to include even "intermeddlers" with the estate of a deceased. The Tribunal also referred to some Indian judgments in which it was held that successors to the trusteeship and trust property are legal representatives within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

21. Coming to the facts of the present case, the fourth Appellant was the mother-in-law of the deceased. Materials on record clearly establish that she was residing with the deceased and his family members. She was dependent on him for her shelter and maintenance. It is not uncommon in Indian Society for the mother-in-law to live with her daughter and son-in-law during her old age and be dependent upon her son-in-law for her maintenance. Appellant No. 4 herein may not be a legal heir of the deceased, but she certainly suffered on account of his death. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that she is a "legal representative" Under Section 166 of the MV Act and is entitled to maintain a claim petition.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6451 of 2021.

Decided On: 25.10.2021

N. Jayasree and Ors. Vs. Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Company Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari, JJ.

Author: S. Abdul Nazeer, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0966/2021 : AIR 2021 SC 5218,2021 SCC OnLine SC 967.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme court: Motor accident claim tribunal should not apply split multiplier for calculation of compensation

 For determination of compensation in motor accident claims Under Section 166 this Court always followed multiplier method. As there were inconsistencies in the selection of a multiplier, this Court in Sarla Verma   MANU/SC/0606/2009 : (2009) 6 SCC 121 prepared a table for the selection of a multiplier based on the age group of the deceased/victim. The 1988 Act, does not envisage application of a split multiplier. {Para 32}

33. In K.R. Madhusudhan v. Administrative Officer   MANU/SC/0129/2011 : (2011) 4 SCC 689 this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 692, paras 14-15)

14. In the appeal which was filed by the Appellants before the High Court, the High Court instead of maintaining the amount of compensation granted by the Tribunal, reduced the same. In doing so, the High Court had not given any reason. The High Court introduced the concept of split multiplier and departed from the multiplier used by the Tribunal without disclosing any reason therefor. The High Court has also not considered the clear and corroborative evidence about the prospect of future increment of the deceased. When the age of the deceased is between 51 and 55 years the multiplier is 11, which is specified in the 2nd column in the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, and the Tribunal has not committed any error by accepting the said multiplier. This Court also fails to appreciate why the High Court chose to apply the multiplier of 6.

15. We are, thus, of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court deserves to be set aside for it is perverse and clearly contrary to the evidence on record, for having not considered the future prospects of the deceased and also for adopting a split multiplier method.

34. We, therefore, hold that in absence of any specific reason and evidence on record the tribunal or the court should not apply split multiplier in routine course and should apply multiplier as per decision of this Court in Sarla Verma   MANU/SC/0606/2009 : (2009) 6 SCC 121 as affirmed in Reshma Kumari   MANU/SC/0287/2013 : (2013) 9 SCC 65.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6451 of 2021.

Decided On: 25.10.2021

N. Jayasree and Ors. Vs. Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Company Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari, JJ.

Author: S. Abdul Nazeer, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0966/2021 : AIR 2021 SC 5218,2021 SCC OnLine SC 967.

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Whether revisionist should bring legal representatives of deceased complainant on record in criminal revision?

The question for determination, in fact, is whether the legal representatives of the deceased respondent must be impleaded as party respondents in the present revision petition or not? As already stated hereinabove, there is no provision in the Code providing for substituting the legal representatives of a deceased respondent in a criminal revision petition. It is also settled position in law that even in a private complaint if the accused is convicted and sentenced and he prefers an appeal or revision, the State has to take care of defending the conviction and it has to be heard in support of the conviction and sentence even if the complainant does not put in appearance to support the conviction and sentence, Nevertheless, in my view, the complainant in such a case at least must be served with a notice of the appeal/ revision. It is so because while deciding a case, the Court has to keep in mind two principles viz. (i) no person should be condemned unheard, and (ii) justice should not only be done but it must seem to have been done. Therefore, the application to and the legal representatives of the deceased respondent as such in the revision petition has to be examined against this background.

{Para 7}

8. The petitioner was tried on the basis of a private complaint in a non-cognizable offence and was finally convicted and sentenced. The impugned order provides that out of the amount of fine of Rs. 35,000/-, a sum of Rs. 25,000/- be paid to the complainant, evidently as compensation on account of the dishonour of the cheque issued by the petitioner in favour of the deceased respondent. Thus, a fiscal interest in favour of the deceased had accrued by virtue of the impugned order itself. After his death and in the event of maintaining the impugned order, his legal representatives will be entitled to the amount ordered to be refunded/paid to the deceased respondent. In case the revision petition is allowed, the interest so accrued in favour of the deceased respondent and after his death in favour of his legal representatives, shall stand extinguished. In view of this situation, I am of the view that it will be in the interest of justice in such cases that a person who is interested as a legal representative of the deceased complainant is being heard and defending the order, must be given an opportunity of being heard in the interest of justice.

9. Though the Code does not provide for impleading the legal representatives of a deceased party in a criminal revision petition, yet at the same time the Code also does not provide that the successors of the deceased complainant/respondent in a criminal case were the accused has been convicted and sentenced and financial benefit has accrued by the order of conviction and sentence in favour of the complainant or his legal representatives, they cannot be heard as party respondent in the petition, or the Court is debarred from hearing them. I am, thus, of the view that in the given circumstances of the case, the legal representatives of the deceased respondent must be substituted as party respondents in the revision petition and must be given an opportunity of being heard. This Court under its inherent powers, in my opinion, is fully competent to do so and to afford them an opportunity of being heard in the interest of justice.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

Cri. M.P.(M) Nos. 416 and 417 of 2001 in Crl. Revn. No. 104 of 1999

Decided On: 12.10.2001

Mohinder Dutt Sharma Vs. Bhagat Ram and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Verma, J.

Citation:  MANU/HP/0033/2001,– 2002 Cri L J 529 (HP).

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Whether legal representatives of deceased who was murdered are entitled to claim compensation under motor accident claim petition?

The term use of motor vehicle has been explained by the Apex Court in the case of Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, MANU/SC/0402/1991 : 1991 3 SCC 530, the term use of motor vehicle means where the term use of motor vehicle has been explained even leakage of petrol and, thereafter, where the explosion in the place and fire occurred resulting in death of certain villagers. This involved the petrol tanker and one another truck was held to be accident arising out of use of motor vehicle and, therefore, there is a casual relationship between earlier event of accident which was due to collision and later incident of explosion and fired such connection need not be direct or immediate once. If it is demonstrated that the death occurred due to use of motor vehicle, then prima facie claim petition would be maintainable. It goes without saying that it is because of use of motor vehicle that accident occurred. Later on while deciding the matter finally, also the Apex Court in Judgment titled New India Assurance Company Limited Versus Yadu Sambhaji More reported in, MANU/SC/0019/2011 : (2011) AIR SC 666 has taken similar view which goes to show that the tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain such petitions, that to in use or arising out of use of the motor vehicle has been consistently followed in the later judgment. The Apex Court has criticised the finding by the tribunal of rejecting the claim petitions. {Para 20}

The learned tribunal with utmost respect has not taken holistic view in the matter while holding that the truck was used as a weapon, the accident is by the use of vehicle and it has to be turned to be an accident. The term 'negligence' would assume significance the term negligence in common parlance would go to show that the driver drove the vehicle negligently as narrated herein-below.

27. Just because the charge sheet is laid under Section 302 will not take the case from the purview of using the vehicle negligently. The evidence of all the witnesses go to show that the driver of the vehicle drove the vehicle rashly and negligently and came from behind and dashed with the jeep deliberately may be he had not caused murder that is not the subject matter of our concerned but the death occurred due to the ante mortem injuries caused due to use of truck in which the truck which dashed with the police vehicle in which the deceased was seated.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

First Appeal From Order No. 966 of 2016

Decided On: 08.07.2022

Renu Devi and Ors. Vs. Gufran Ahmad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker and Ajai Tyagi, JJ.

Author: Ajai Tyagi, J.

Citation: MANU/UP/2195/2022.

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Whether major sons of deceased who are gainfully employed or earning can claim compensation under Motor vehicles Act?

The legal representatives of the deceased could move application for compensation by virtue of Clause (c) of Section 166(1). The major married son who is also earning and not fully dependant on the deceased, would be still covered by the expression "legal representative" of the deceased. This Court in Manjuri Bera (supra) had expounded that liability to pay compensation under the Act does not cease because of absence of dependency of the concerned legal representative. Notably, the expression "legal representative" has not been defined in the Act. In Manjuri Bera (supra), the Court observed thus: {Para 14}

9. In terms of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 166 of the Act in case of death, all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased become entitled to compensation and any such legal representative can file a claim petition. The proviso to said Sub-section makes the position clear that where all the legal representatives had not joined, then application can be made on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased by impleading those legal representatives as Respondents. Therefore, the High Court was justified in its view that the Appellant could maintain a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Act.

11. According to Section 2(11) Code of Civil Procedure, "legal representative" means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. Almost in similar terms is the definition of legal representative under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 i.e. Under Section 2(1)(g).

12. As observed by this Court in Custodian of Branches of BANCO National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naique [MANU/SC/0149/1989 : 1989 Supp (2) SCC 275 the definition contained in Section 2(11) Code of Civil Procedure is inclusive in character and its scope is wide, it is not confined to legal heirs only. Instead it stipulates that a person who may or may not be legal heir competent to inherit the property of the deceased can represent the estate of the deceased person. It includes heirs as well as persons who represent the estate even without title either as executors or administrators in possession of the estate of the deceased. All such persons would be covered by the expression "legal representative". As observed in Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai [MANU/SC/0469/1987 : (1987) 3 SCC 234 a legal representative is one who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent and child.

In paragraph 15 of the said decision, while adverting to the provisions of Section 140 of the Act, the Court observed that even if there is no loss of dependency, the claimant, if he was a legal representative, will be entitled to compensation. In the concurring judgment of Justice S.H. Kapadia, as His Lordship then was, it is observed that there is distinction between "right to apply for compensation" and "entitlement to compensation". The compensation constitutes part of the estate of the deceased. As a result, the legal representative of the deceased would inherit the estate. Indeed, in that case, the Court was dealing with the case of a married daughter of the deceased and the efficacy of Section 140 of the Act. Nevertheless, the principle underlying the exposition in this decision would clearly come to the aid of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (claimants) even though they are major sons of the deceased and also earning.

15. It is thus settled by now that the legal representatives of the deceased have a right to apply for compensation. Having said that, it must necessarily follow that even the major married and earning sons of the deceased being legal representatives have a right to apply for compensation and it would be the bounden duty of the Tribunal to consider the application irrespective of the fact whether the concerned legal representative was fully dependant on the deceased and not to limit the claim towards conventional heads only. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 242-243 of 2020 

Decided On: 13.01.2020

National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Birender and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Khanwilkar and Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ.

Author:A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Citation: Citation: 2020 INSC 34, MANU/SC/0028/2020,AIR 2020 SC 434.

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Whether Legal representative of claimant should produce Succession certificate for getting compensation under motor accident claim petition?

We cannot approve the said view of the High Court, for, Succession Certificate as envisaged in the Indian Succession Act can be granted only in respect of "debts" or "securities" to which a deceased was entitled. The amount involved in this case was not a debt or security to which the deceased was entitled. This was a compensation sanctioned on amount of the death of the deceased and is, therefore, not an asset belonging to the deceased but an amount which the legal representatives of the deceased can claim on their own account. The civil court will only decide as to who are the legal representatives and in what shares they are entitled to as per the Personal Law applicable to them. The Parties will move appropriate application before the court concerned for expediting the procedure regarding disbursement of the amount. With these observations we set aside the impugned order. {Para 3}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 402-03 of 2000.

Decided On: 17.01.2000

Rukhsana and Ors. Vs. Nazrunnisa and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.T. Thomas and M.B. Shah, JJ.

Author:  K.T. Thomas, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/2586/2000,2000 (9) SCC 240.

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Whether order passed in an inquiry under O 22 R 5 of CPC is a decree?

 In the present case, an application under Order XXII of the C.P.C. has been dismissed on the ground that the adoption deed was not executed in accordance with the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The adjudication made by the trial court, in my opinion, does not amount to a decree as contemplated under Section 2(2) of the C.P.C. nor does it finally determine the question as to who is the legal representative of the deceased under Order XXII, Rule 5 of the C.P.C. In any case, an enquiry under Order XXII, Rule 5 of the C.P.C. is only summary in nature and is not an appealable order. The question whether a person could be permitted to be brought on the record as a legal representative of the deceased is only for the purpose of continuing with the proceedings that had already begun and any adjudication, arrived in the course of such enquiry under Order XXII, Rule 5 of the C.P.C. is not an adjudication contemplated under Section 2(2) of the C.P.C. Consequently, an order passed under Order XXII, Rule 5 of the C.P.C., being summary in nature, could not amount to a decree, as contemplated under Section 2(2) of the C.P.C. {Para 7}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Decided On: 11.01.2007

Ashwani Kumar Vs. Vidya and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Tarun Agarwala, J.

Citation : AIR 2007 All 105, MANU/UP/0285/2007.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether the court can permit A legal representative with conflicting interest with that of the deceased to represent his estate?

  The reliefs claimed in the present suit by Late Shri S.K. Beri were specifically against Deepak Beri and his family members. Deepak Beri has contested the suit by filing a written statement controverting the averments made in the plaint and seeking dismissal of the present suit. Where the

interest of the legal representative is in conflict with the interest of the deceased plaintiff and he was a party in the suit as a defendant, he cannot be permitted to represent the estate of the deceased plaintiff. Therefore, in my considered view, the ‘right to sue’ in the present case cannot accrue in favour of Deepak Beri. The ‘right to sue’ can only accrue in favour of Atul Beri, who was neither a party in the suit, nor had any conflict with the interest of Late Shri S.K. Beri.{Para 15}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 + CS(OS) 162/2018

S.K. BERI Vs DEEPAK BERI & ORS.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT BANSAL

AMIT BANSAL, J. 

Dated : 9th February, 2023

Citation: 2023/DHC/000991

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Can the second appellate court restore an appeal if the first appellate court has decided abated appeal on merit?

  This appeal is filed by the legal representatives of

original plaintiff against the Judgment and order dated

23/11/2018 passed by the learned Ad-hoc District Judge-1,

Kelapur, whereby the learned District Judge was pleased to

dismiss Regular Civil Appeal No.8/2013.

The short question which arises for consideration in

this appeal is "Whether the impugned Judgment and order of

learned Ad-hoc District Judge-1, Kelapur is legally sustainable in

law ?." In other words, the question is whether learned Ad-hoc

District Judge-1, Kelapur had jurisdiction to decide the appeal

when the appellant had expired during the pendency of appeal

and their legal representatives were not brought on record ?

16. In Kiran Singh and others Vrs. Chaman Paswan and

others, reported in AIR 1954 SC 340, fundamental principle of law is laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court that decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity can be questioned in any proceeding including in execution proceedings or even in a collateral proceedings whenever such decree is sought to be enforced by the decree holder, the reason that the defect of this nature affects the very authority of the Court in passing the said decree and goes to the root of the case.

18. The above principle in my considered view,

squarely applies to this case because it is settled law that the

decree passed against the dead person is a nullity.

19. The sum and substance of the discussion is that the

appellants who are legal representatives of the deceased - plaintiff and to whom right to sue has devolved, had therefore right to question the legality of the impugned Judgment and order, inter alia on the ground of it being a nullity.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,

NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR

SECOND APPEAL NO. 208 OF 2019

Narhari s/o Shrawan Moon Vs  Silas s/o Kannobaji Punwatkar,

CORAM : V. G. BISHT, J.

DATED : 10/03/2022

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Whether Legal representative of deceased judgement debtor impleaded in Execution proceedings can challenge decree which has attained finality against his predecessor in interest?

  In our considered opinion the right which had been adjudicated in the suit in the present matter and the findings which have been recorded as basis for grant of injunction as to the disputed property which is heritable and partible would enure not only to the benefit of the legal heir of decree-holders but also would bind the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor. It is apparent from section 50 CPC that when a judgment-debtor dies before the decree has been satisfied, it can be executed against legal representatives. Section 50 is not confined to a particular kind of decree. Decree for injunction can also be executed against legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor. The maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" is limited to certain class of cases as indicated by this Court in Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary (supra) and when the right litigated upon is heritable, the decree would not normally abate and can be enforced by LRs. of decree-holder and against the judgment-debtor or his legal representatives. It would be against the public policy to ask the decree-holder to litigate once over again against the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor when the cause and injunction survives. No doubt, it is true that a decree for injunction normally does not run with the land. In the absence of statutory provisions it cannot be enforced. However, in view of the specific provisions contained in section 50 CPC, such a decree can be executed against legal representatives. {Para 26}

(SUPREME COURT)

ARUN MISHRA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.

Prabhakara Adiga Vs. Gowri & Ors.

Civil Appeal Nos.3007-3008 of 2017

20th February, 2017.

Citation: 2017(2) ALL MR 878 (S.C.),2017(4) MHLJ 792

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Is the sale deed executed by the deceased defendant's son invalid by the doctrine of lis pendens even if he was not added as a party to suit within limitation?

LIS PENDENS

92. The Doctrine of Lis Pendens is based on the maxim “pendente lite nihil innovetur”. This means that pending litigation, nothing new should be introduced. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, ‘the TP Act’), which incorporates the Doctrine of Lis Pendens, is based on equity and public policy. It pours complete efficacy to the adjudicatory mechanism. This is done by finding that any disposition of property, as described in the Section by a party to the litigation will, in not any way, detract from the finality of the decision rendered by the court. It is clear that it is not based on the ground of Notice as laid down by Lord Craanworth in Bennamy v. Sabine, which has been followed by the Privy Council in the decision in 34 Indian Appeals 102. We may notice the following discussion in this regard in “The Transfer of Property, by Mulla, 12th Edition:
“The rule is, therefore, based not on the doctrine of notice, but on expediency, ie, the necessity for fine adjudication. It is immaterial whether the alienee pendente lite had, or had not, notice of the pending proceeding. This is, of course, no longer the case in England, or in Gujarat and Maharashtra, where the doctrine only affects transactions pendente lite if the lis has been duly registered.”

93. It is further important to notice that when a transaction is done, lis pendens or pending a case, the transaction is, as such, not annulled. The transaction is, in other words, not invalidated. In fact, as between the transferor and the transferee, it does not lie in the mouth of the transferor to set up the plea of lis pendens to defeat the disposition of property. Equally, the Principle of Lis Pendens is, not to be confounded with the aspect of good faith or bonafides. In other words, the transferee or the beneficiary of the property, which is disposed of by a party, cannot set up the case that he acted bonafide or in good faith. This enables the court and the parties in a Suit or a proceeding, which otherwise is in conformity with requirements of Section 52, to proceed in the matter on the basis that the adjudication by the court, will not, in any way, be subverted or delayed, when the day of final reckoning arrives.

94. In fact, the Special Bench of the Madras High Court in Manjeshwara Krishnaya v. Vasudeva Mallya and Four Others, AIR 1918 Madras 578, puts the Doctrine of Lis Pendens as an extension of the Doctrine of Res Judicata. Thus, the sine qua non for the Doctrine of Lis Pendens to apply is that the transfer is made or the property is otherwise disposed of by a person, who is a party to the litigation. The Doctrine of Lis Pendens, only subject, however, the transfer or other disposition of property to the final decision that is rendered. The person/party, who finally succeeds in the litigation, can ask the court to ignore any transfer or other disposition of property by any party to the proceeding. This is subject to the condition that transfer or other disposition is made during the pendency of the lis. 95. The first defendant died pending the Suit on 06.08.1994. Her death was reported before the Court on 16.01.1995. The plaintiff brought on record, the husband of the first defendant by Order dated 25.08.1995, as defendant No. 1(a). Defendant No. 1(b), who is the son of the second defendant, sold the property on 19.09.1996, in favour of the appellant. It is thereafter that on 09.04.1997, the predecessor in interest of the appellant, viz., the son of the first defendant, and the second defendant were impleaded on 09.04.1997. The transfer made in favour of the second defendant was, therefore, made at a time, when the son of the first defendant was not a party to the Suit. Therefore, it is that the contention was taken before the Trial Court successfully by appellants that the transfer in favour of the appellant was not hit by Doctrine of Lis Pendens.

96. The High Court in the impugned Judgment reversed this finding. The High Court, in doing so, employs, inter alia, the following reasoning:
“78. The position of law with regard to the rights and obligation of a dead person can be succinctly stated thus: The rights which a dead man thus leaves behind him vests in his representative. They pass to some person whom the dead man, or the law on his behalf, has appointed to represent him in the world of the living. This representative bears the person of the deceased, and therefore, has vested in him all the inheritable rights, and has imposed upon him all the inheritable liabilities of the deceased. Inheritance is in some sort a legal and fictitious continuation of the personality of the dead man, for the representative is in some sort identified by the law with him whom he represents. The rights which the dead man can no longer own or exercise in propria persona, and the obligations which he can no longer in propria persona fulfil, he owns, exercises, and fulfils in the person of a living substitute. To this extent, and in this fashion, it may be said that the legal personality of a man survives his natural personality, until, his obligations being duly performed, and his property duly disposed of, his representation among the living is no longer called for. Just as many of a man's rights survive him, so also do many of his liabilities; and these inheritable obligations pass to his representative, and must be satisfied by him. As far as the estate of a dead man is concerned, there are two class of persons who are entitled to it, namely, creditors and beneficiaries. A beneficiary possesses a dual capacity, while he may benefit by inheriting the dead man's estate is also liable to the dead man's obligations. He survives even after his death, especially the obligations concerning immovable property. The beneficiaries who are entitled to the residue after satisfaction of the creditors, are of two classes: (1) those nominated by the last will of the deceased and (2) those appointed by the law in default of any such nomination. They succeed respectively by testamentary succession (ex testamento) or intestate succession (ab intestate) (source: Salmond on Jurisprudence Twelfth Edition, P.J. Fitzgerald). Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) defines legal representative to mean a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of • the party so suing or sued. The aforesaid definition is both exhaustive as well as an inclusive definition. It is exhaustive in the sense that a legal representative means a person who in law represents the estate of immovable property. The beneficiaries who are entitled to the residue after satisfaction of the creditors, are of two classes: (1) those nominated by the last will of the deceased and (2) those appointed by the law in default of any such nomination. They succeed respectively by testamentary succession (ex testamento) or intestate succession (ab intestate) (source: Salmond on Jurisprudence Twelfth Edition, P.J. Fitzgerald).”

97. Thereafter, the High Court proceeded to consider the distinction between a legal representative as defined in Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and legal heirs. Still further, the Court also considered the scheme of Order XXII of the CPC and finally proceeds to find as follows:
“79. … Even though defendant No. 1(b) was not arrayed along with his father as a legal heir of the deceased defendant No.1, the fact remains that the estate of defendant No.1, which also includes the suit schedule property was represented through defendant No. 1(a), the husband of defendant No.1. Therefore, the contention that the sale that was made by defendant No. 1(b) in favour of defendant No.2 when defendant No. 1(b) was not a party to the suit is not subject to any direction that may be issued in the suit, and that Sec. 52 of the Act would not apply in the instant case is not a correct understanding of the position of law. Further, in the instant case, defendant No.1(a) also did not inform the trial court that his son was also a legal representative of deceased defendant No.1 and therefore, he also ought to be brought on record as the heir of the deceased defendant No.1 when the application was filed by the plaintiff to bring only him on record as legal heir of deceased defendant No.1. Therefore, it is held that in ' the instant case, the estate of the defendant No.1 was represented through defendant No.1(a) in the suit and that the alienation made by defendant No.1(b) to defendant No.2, even in the absence of defendant No.1(b) being made a party to the suit has no significance.

The High Court has relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in Nallakumara Goundan v. Pappayi Ammal and Another, AIR 1945 Mad 219. In the said case, after the death of the party, a legal representative disposed of the plaint schedule property within the period provided for substituting the dead person with the legal representative. It was in the said context held by the Madras High Court as under:
“…The same principle should, I think, apply to a case where as here the original defendant died and the alienation was made after his death and before the filing of the application to bring his legal representative on record. The suit must be deemed to be pending against the legal persona of the deceased i.e., against his legal representative and must be deemed to continue until at least the expiration of the time limited by any law of limitation to bring him on record. Whether if an application is made long after the expiration of the time fixed for bringing the legal representative on record and an alienation is made by the legal representative and later on the plaintiff in the action seeks to set aside the abatement and to bring the legal representative on record, and that is ordered, the doctrine of lis pendens applies or not does not arise and need not be considered. There may be difficulties in such a case, but where the alienation is made within the time prescribed for bringing the legal representative on record, it is a clear case and there can be no doubt whatever that the rule does apply…”

98. Thereafter, the Court concluded that in the circumstances, Section 52 of the TP Act squarely applied.

99. It would appear that the High Court has, in arriving at the finding that the transfer in favour of the appellant is hit by lis pendens, taken into consideration the Doctrine of Notice/Constructive Notice. We have already observed that the Doctrine of Notice and Constructive Notice would be inapposite and inapplicable. Neither the fact that the transferee had no notice nor the fact that the transferee acted bonafide, in entering into the transaction, are relevant for applying Section 52 to a transaction. This is unlike the requirement of Section 19(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act whereunder these requirements are relevant.

100. The decision of the Madras High Court in Nallakumara Goundan (supra) turned on in its own facts as indicated by the said court itself. In other words, that was a case where even within the period of limitation for substitution of the legal representative of a deceased party in a suit, the legal representative purported to deal with the property. It was in the said context that the court proceeded to hold that lis pendens would apply. In this case the transfer in favour of the second defendant took place on 16.09.1996. The vendor and the vendee namely defendant 1(b) and the second defendant were not parties on the date of the transaction. They were impleaded only almost one year thereafter. No doubt we are not oblivious to the role played by defendant 1(a) namely the husband of the first defendant who gave his ‘no objection’ to the assignment of the entire rights in favour of his son namely defendant 1(b) without which BDA could not have assigned the right in favour of defendant 1(b). Though not urged by the plaintiff, could it be said that as defendant 1(a) was already a party and this must be treated as a case were defendant 1(a) as ‘otherwise dealt’ with the property within the meaning of Section 52 without which the title would not vest in defendant 1(b). A transfer which is made lis pendens it is settled law, is not a void document. It does create rights as between the parties to the sale. The right of the party to the suit who conveys his right by a sale is extinguished. All that Section 52 of the Transfer Property Act provides is that the transfer which is made during the pendency of the proceeding is subjected to the final result of the litigation. Even assuming for a moment that the conduct of defendant 1(a) the father of defendant 1(b), in giving a no objection and thereby enabling defendant 1(b) to derive the title exclusively to the property and which title stood conveyed to the second defendant attracted, the principle of lis pendens, it would still not invalidate the sale. At best, the plaintiff can contend that, should he be entitled for a decree of performance the sale in favour of the second defendant should be subjected to such decree. As far as the transfer is made by defendant 1(b) to the second defendant in his own right and in so far as defendant 1(b) was not a party and by the time the sale was effected the period of limitation for impleading defendant 1(b) had already clearly expired even the principle laid down in the decision of the Madras High Court would not apply and the High Court was not correct in finding that the sale by defendant 1(b) in favour of second defendant was hit by lis pendens. 

Supreme Court

JUSTICE K. M. JOSEPH JUSTICE PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA

G. T. GIRISH Vs. Y. SUBBA RAJU (D) BY LRs. & ANR.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 380 OF 2022

18th January 2022

Author: K. M. JOSEPH, J.

Citation: 2022 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 53

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Questions and answers on law part 21

 

Q 1:- Whether first appellate court can conduct enquiry on application filed under Order 22 Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure? 

Ans:- O 22 R 5 of CPC DETERMINATION OF QUESTION AS TO LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE.

Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or a deceased defendant, such question shall be determined by the Court:

Provided that where such question arises before an Appellate Court, that Court may, before determining the question, direct any subordinate Court to try the question and to return the records together with evidence, if any, recorded at such trial, its findings and reasons therefor, and the Appellate Court may take the same into consideration in determining the question.

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