In the process, the Court also explained the expression 'expressly
excluded' appearing in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in
the following manner:
“34. Though, an argument was raised based on
Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming
that Section 29(2) would be attracted, what we
have to determine is whether the provisions of
this section are expressly excluded in the case of
reference to the High Court.
35. It was contended before us that the words
“expressly excluded” would mean that there must
be an express reference made in the special or
local law to the specific provisions of the
Limitation Act of which the operation is to be
excluded. In this regard, we have to see the
scheme of the special law which here in this case
is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the
remedy provided therein is such that the
legislature intended it to be a complete code by
itself which alone should govern the several
matters provided by it. If, on an examination of
the relevant provisions, it is clear that the
provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein
cannot be called in aid to supplement the
provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that
even in a case where the special law does not
exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act by an express reference, it would
nonetheless be open to the court to examine
whether and to what extent, the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their
operation. In other words, the applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be
judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act
but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act
relating to filing of reference application to the
High Court.”
The aforesaid judgment is a complete answer to the
arguments of the appellant.
15. It may be relevant to mention here that after the judgment in
Hongo India Private Limited & Anr., Section 35-H of the Central
Excise Act, 1994 was amended by the Parliament by Act 32 of
2003 with effect from 14.05.2003 giving power to the High Court
to condone the delay by inserting sub-section (2A). It is,
therefore, for the legislature to set right the deficiency, if it intends
to give power to the High Court to condone the delay in filing
revision petition under Section 81 of the VAT Act.
16. Argument predicated on 'no express exclusion' loses its force
having regard to the principle of law enshrined in Hukumdev
Narain Yadav. Therein, the Court made following observations
while examining whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to
the provisions of the Representation of the People Act or not:
“17. … but what we have to see is whether the
scheme of the special law, that is in this case the
Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein
are such that the legislature intended it to be a
complete code by itself which alone should govern
the several matters provided by it. If on an
examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that
the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot
be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the
Act. In our view, even in a case where the special
law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it
would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine
whether and to what extent the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their operation.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 49-50 OF 2017
M/S PATEL BROTHERS Vs STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS.
Dated:JANUARY 04, 2017.
Citation:(2017) 2 SCC 350
Print Page
excluded' appearing in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in
the following manner:
“34. Though, an argument was raised based on
Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming
that Section 29(2) would be attracted, what we
have to determine is whether the provisions of
this section are expressly excluded in the case of
reference to the High Court.
35. It was contended before us that the words
“expressly excluded” would mean that there must
be an express reference made in the special or
local law to the specific provisions of the
Limitation Act of which the operation is to be
excluded. In this regard, we have to see the
scheme of the special law which here in this case
is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the
remedy provided therein is such that the
legislature intended it to be a complete code by
itself which alone should govern the several
matters provided by it. If, on an examination of
the relevant provisions, it is clear that the
provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein
cannot be called in aid to supplement the
provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that
even in a case where the special law does not
exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act by an express reference, it would
nonetheless be open to the court to examine
whether and to what extent, the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their
operation. In other words, the applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be
judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act
but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act
relating to filing of reference application to the
High Court.”
The aforesaid judgment is a complete answer to the
arguments of the appellant.
15. It may be relevant to mention here that after the judgment in
Hongo India Private Limited & Anr., Section 35-H of the Central
Excise Act, 1994 was amended by the Parliament by Act 32 of
2003 with effect from 14.05.2003 giving power to the High Court
to condone the delay by inserting sub-section (2A). It is,
therefore, for the legislature to set right the deficiency, if it intends
to give power to the High Court to condone the delay in filing
revision petition under Section 81 of the VAT Act.
16. Argument predicated on 'no express exclusion' loses its force
having regard to the principle of law enshrined in Hukumdev
Narain Yadav. Therein, the Court made following observations
while examining whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to
the provisions of the Representation of the People Act or not:
“17. … but what we have to see is whether the
scheme of the special law, that is in this case the
Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein
are such that the legislature intended it to be a
complete code by itself which alone should govern
the several matters provided by it. If on an
examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that
the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot
be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the
Act. In our view, even in a case where the special
law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it
would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine
whether and to what extent the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their operation.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 49-50 OF 2017
M/S PATEL BROTHERS Vs STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS.
Dated:JANUARY 04, 2017.
Citation:(2017) 2 SCC 350
