Showing posts with label special statute. Show all posts
Showing posts with label special statute. Show all posts

Sunday, 22 August 2021

Supreme court: Power Of Compounding Must Be Expressly Conferred By Statute Which Creates Offence

 However, Section 320 provides for the compounding of offences only under the IPC. Hence, in respect of offences which lie outside the IPC, compounding may be permitted only if the statute which creates the offence contains an express provision for compounding before such an offence can be made compoundable. The power of compounding must, in other words, be expressly conferred by the statute which creates the offence. {Para 60}

Reportable
Supreme Court of India
Prakash Gupta vs Securities And Exchange Board Of ... on 23 July, 2021
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Friday, 28 December 2018

Whether right to appeal is available if special statute under which right is claimed which does not confer right to appeal?

In the case of R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar v. R. Chandrmekhara Thevar MANU/PR/0005/1947 : AIR 1948 PC 12, while considering a similar ratio of law Lord Simond observed:

"The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedures applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorized by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special Statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

W.P.(227) No. 249 of 2018

Decided On: 22.03.2018

 Sita Devi Sharma Vs. Mukta Ben

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Goutam Bhaduri, J.

Citation: AIR 2018(NOC) 927 Chh
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Saturday, 16 June 2018

Whether appeal lies even if special statute does not confer right of appeal?

The same view was expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar v. Ra. Chandrasekhara Thevar MANU/PR/0042/1947 : (1947) 74 I.A. 264, wherein it was said:

Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary Rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorized by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not, in terms confer a right of appeal.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil appeal No. 3215 of 2010

Decided On: 16.08.2017

 Terapalli Dyvasahata Kumar  Vs S.M. Kantha Raju (dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rohinton Fali Nariman and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 11 SCC 769
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Tuesday, 28 March 2017

When provisions of limitation Act are applicable to cases of special statute?

 In the process, the Court also explained the expression 'expressly
excluded' appearing in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in
the following manner:
“34. Though, an argument was raised based on
Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming
that Section 29(2) would be attracted, what we
have to determine is whether the provisions of
this section are expressly excluded in the case of
reference to the High Court.
35. It was contended before us that the words
“expressly excluded” would mean that there must
be an express reference made in the special or
local law to the specific provisions of the
Limitation Act of which the operation is to be
excluded. In this regard, we have to see the
scheme of the special law which here in this case

is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the
remedy provided therein is such that the
legislature intended it to be a complete code by
itself which alone should govern the several
matters provided by it. If, on an examination of
the relevant provisions, it is clear that the
provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein
cannot be called in aid to supplement the
provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that
even in a case where the special law does not
exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act by an express reference, it would
nonetheless be open to the court to examine
whether and to what extent, the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their
operation. In other words, the applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be
judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act
but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act
relating to filing of reference application to the
High Court.”
The aforesaid judgment is a complete answer to the
arguments of the appellant.
15. It may be relevant to mention here that after the judgment in
Hongo India Private Limited & Anr., Section 35-H of the Central
Excise Act, 1994 was amended by the Parliament by Act 32 of
2003 with effect from 14.05.2003 giving power to the High Court
to condone the delay by inserting sub-section (2A). It is,
therefore, for the legislature to set right the deficiency, if it intends
to give power to the High Court to condone the delay in filing

revision petition under Section 81 of the VAT Act.
16. Argument predicated on 'no express exclusion' loses its force
having regard to the principle of law enshrined in Hukumdev
Narain Yadav. Therein, the Court made following observations
while examining whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to
the provisions of the Representation of the People Act or not:
“17. … but what we have to see is whether the
scheme of the special law, that is in this case the
Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein
are such that the legislature intended it to be a
complete code by itself which alone should govern
the several matters provided by it. If on an
examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that
the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot
be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the
Act. In our view, even in a case where the special
law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it
would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine
whether and to what extent the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their operation.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 49-50 OF 2017

M/S PATEL BROTHERS Vs  STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS. 

Dated:JANUARY 04, 2017.
Citation:(2017) 2 SCC 350
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Saturday, 25 March 2017

How to ascertain jurisdiction of civil court in cases relating to special statute?

 Learned senior counsel for the appellants have placed much reliance on the Section 34 of the Sarfaesi Act, 2002. Section 34 of the Sarfaesi Act, 2002 provided as follows:
"34. Civil court not to have jurisdiction.- No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993)."
30. The scope and ambit of Section 34 of Sarfaesi Act, 2002 have been considered by this Court in several cases. It is sufficient to refer the judgment of this Court in Nahar Industrial Enterprises Limited Versus Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (2009) 8 SCC 646. This Court held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is plenary in nature, unless the same is ousted, expressly or by necessary implication, it will have jurisdiction to try all types of suits.
31. Following was laid down in para 110 -111:-
"110. It must be remembered that the jurisdiction of a civil court is plenary in nature. Unless the same is ousted, expressly or by necessary implication, it will have jurisdiction to try all types of suits.
111. In Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., this Court opined: (AIR pp. 89-90, para 32) “32. … The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as follows:
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.
Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.”
32. A perusal of Section 34 indicates that there is express bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to the following effect: “(i) Any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter in which Debt Recovery Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine.
(ii) Further, no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.” Thus the bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court has to correlate to the above mentioned conditions. For purposes of this case, we are of the view that this Court need not express any opinion as to whether suits filed by EIH were barred by Section 34 or not, since the issue are yet to be decided on merits and the appeal by Robust Hotels have been filed only against an interim order.
Reportable
Supreme Court of India
Robust Hotels(P) Ltd.& Ors vs E.I.H Limited & Ors on 7 December, 2016

Bench: Pinaki Chandra Ghose, Ashok Bhushan
Citation:(2017)1 SCC 622
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Wednesday, 6 July 2016

How to ascertain whether any statute is special or general?

Shri Viswanathan referred various judgments to us on the
applications of the general versus special principle. In particular
he relied strongly on Life Insurance Corporation of India v. D.J.
Bahadur and Others, (1981) 1 SCC 315. The question that arose
before this Court in that case was whether the Life Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956 is a special statute qua the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 when it came to a dispute regarding conditions
of service of the employees of the Life Insurance Corporation of
India. This Court ultimately held that the Industrial Disputes Act
would prevail over the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act as
the Industrial Disputes Act relates specially and specifically to
industrial disputes between workmen and employers, whereas the
LIC Act is a general statute which is silent on what happens to
disputes between management and workmen. The fact that the
LIC Act must be considered to be a special legislation regulating
the takeover of private insurance business not being relevant to
the subject matter at hand would not make the said Act special in
any sense. The working test laid down by this Court to determine
which statute is general and which special, is laid down in
paragraph 52 of the said judgment thus:-
“In determining whether a statute is a special or a
general one, the focus must be on the principal
subject-matter plus the particular perspective. For
certain purposes, an Act may be general and for

certain other purposes it may be special and we
cannot blur distinctions when dealing with finer points
of law. In law, we have a cosmos of relativity, not
absolutes — so too in life. The ID Act is a special
statute devoted wholly to investigation and settlement
of industrial disputes which provides definitionally for
the nature of industrial disputes coming within its
ambit. It creates an infrastructure for investigation into,
solution of and adjudication upon industrial disputes. It
also provides the necessary machinery for
enforcement of awards and settlements. From alpha to
omega the ID Act has one special mission — the
resolution of industrial disputes through specialised
agencies according to specialised procedures and with
special reference to the weaker categories of
employees coming within the definition of workmen.
Therefore, with reference to industrial disputes
between employers and workmen, the ID Act is a
special statute, and the LIC Act does not speak at all
with specific reference to workmen. On the other hand,
its powers relate to the general aspects of
nationalisation, of management when private
businesses are nationalised and a plurality of problems
which, incidentally, involve transfer of service of
existing employees of insurers. The workmen qua
workmen and industrial disputes between workmen
and the employer as such, are beyond the orbit of and
have no specific or special place in the scheme of the
LIC Act. And whenever there was a dispute between
workmen and management the ID Act mechanism was
resorted to.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.201 of 2005
PANKAJAKSHI (DEAD) THROUGH
L.RS. & OTHERS …
VERSUS
CHANDRIKA & OTHERS …
Citation:(2016) 6 SCC157
R.F. Nariman, J.
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Saturday, 12 March 2016

When civil court can entertain suit even though its jurisdiction is specifically barred under special statute?

A review of all these decisions is taken in the
decision of “Mr. Yogesh Megaji Gada Vs. The Municipal
Corporation of Greater Mumbai and another” in Writ Petition
no.2243 of 2013 and others in respect of bar contained in
Section 515-A of the Mumbai Municipal Act and the position
that the bar of jurisdiction will not apply in aforesaid
circumstances is restated. The jurisdiction has to be
determined on the basis of the plaint. It will have to be seen
whether the Appellant has based its case on the ground that
the action complained is a nullity, being taken in bad faith or
fraud .
 Therefore the approach of the learned District
Judge in dismissing the suit merely relying on the bar, without
examining the pleadings in the plaint as to whether the
grounds enumerated above exist or not, will have to be
corrected.
 In the present case, the Appellant has pleaded that
the action is vitiated by fraud and the officers have acted in
bad faith. The protection to the officers is not available if case
of bad faith is made out and that is a matter to be considered
on merits. The learned Judge will have to consider the effect of
these pleadings, before coming to the conclusion, that the suit
is barred in view of Section 50(1) of the Act.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
FIRST APPEAL NO. 67 OF 2014
Maya Shrikant Sawant Dessai

V e r s u s
 The Chief Secretary

 CORAM: N. M. JAMDAR, J.
 DATE: 25 FEBRUARY, 2015.
Citation;2016(2) MHLJ 420 Bom,2016(1) ALLMR610
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Thursday, 3 March 2016

When jurisdiction of civil court is not barred in view of bar contained in special statute?

 In Addanki Tiruvenkata (supra) while considering the question as
regards jurisdiction of the civil Court being barred in view of such   bar
contained in a special statute, in para 26 it has been observed thus: 
          “The scope of the exception here made was the
subject of examination by this Court in the case of
Firm   of   Illuri   Subbayya   Chetty   v.   State   of   Andhra
Pradesh, C. A. No. 315 of 1962 D/­25­1­1963: (AIR
1964 SC 322) where Gajendragadkar J. speaking for
the Court said: 
“Non­compliance with the provisions of the statute to
which reference is made by the Privy Council must, we
think,   be   non   compliance   with   such   fundamental
provisions   of   the   statute   as   would   make   the   entire
proceedings   before   the   appropriate   authority   illegal
and without jurisdiction.   Similarly, if an appropriate
authority  has  acted  in violation  of  the  fundamental
principles or judicial procedure, that may also tend to
make   the   proceedings   illegal   and   void   and   this
infirmity may affect the validity of the order passed by
the authority in question.  It is  cases of this character
where the defect or the infirmity in the order goes to
the root of the order and makes it in law invalid and
void that these observations may perhaps be invoked
in support of the plea that the civil court can exercise
its   jurisdiction   notwithstanding   a   provision   to   the
contrary contained in the relevant statute.”
In  Shiv   Kumar   Chadha  (supra)   the   Supreme   Court   in
paragraph 28 of its decision observed thus: 
“In spite of the bar prescribed under sub
sections (4) and (5) of Section 343 and Section 347­E
of the Corporation Act over the power of the courts,
under   certain   special   circumstances,   the   court   can
examine, whether the dispute falls within the ambit of
the Act.  But once the court is satisfied that either the
provisions of the Act are not applicable to the building
in   question   or   the   basic     procedural   requirements
which are  vital in nature, have  not  been  followed,  it 

shall   have   jurisdiction,   to   enquire   and   investigate     while
protecting the common law rights of the citizens.”
14] It is well settled that despite exclusion of jurisdiction of the
Civil Court, where the grievance is in relation to failure to comply with
statutory provisions, such cases can be examined by the Civil Court.  In
State of Kerala Vs. M/s. N. Ramaswami Iyer and Sons, AIR 1966 SC
1738 in para 8 it has been held thus:
“8. It is true that even if the jurisdiction of
the civil court is excluded, where the provisions of
the   statute   have   not   been   complied   with   or   the
statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with
the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the
civil courts have jurisdiction to examine those cases:
Secretary of State v. Mask and Co., 67 Ind APP 222:
(AIR 1940 PC 105).  
In Firm Seth Radha Kishan Vs. Administrator, Municipal Committee,
Ludhiana, AIR 1963 SC 1547 which considering the aspect of ouster of
jurisdiction of the Civil Court by a special statute, it was held as under:
“7. Under S. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure
the Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of
civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is
either   expressly   or   impliedly   barred.     A   statute,
therefore, expressly or by necessary implication, can
bar the jurisdiction of civil Courts in respect of a
particular matter.   The mere conferment of special
jurisdiction on a tribunal in respect of the said matter
does   not   in   itself   exclude   the   jurisdiction   of   civil
Courts.     The   statute   may   specifically   provide   for
ousting the jurisdiction of civil Courts, even if there
was no such specific exclusion, if it creates a liability
not existing before and gives a special and particular
remedy for the aggrieved party, the remedy provided
by it must be followed.   The same principle would
apply if the statute had provided for the particular
forum in which the remedy could be had.   Even in
such   cases,   the   Civil   Court's   jurisdiction   is   not

completely ousted.  A suit in a civil Court will always
lie to question the order of a tribunal created by a
statute, even if its order is expressly or by necessary
implication, made final, if the said tribunal abuses its
power or does not act under the Act but in violation
of its provisions.”
Similarly, in Krishanlal Vs. State of J & K (1994) 4 SCC 422, it was
held that violation of a mandatory statutory provision while passing the
impugned order would not amount to an act done under the Act.   In
para 11 it was observed thus:
“11. We may not labour much on this point
because of the aforesaid legal proposition and also
because of what was pointed out by a Constitution
Bench in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. That exclusion of
jurisdiction   of   civil   court   should   not   be   readily
inferred.  So we agree with Shri Mehta that the High
Court erred in law in holding that the civil courts'
jurisdiction was barred, in as much as there being
violation   of   mandatory   provision   as   contained   in
Section 17(5) of the Act, it can well be said that the
respondents   had   no   jurisdiction   to   pass   the
impugned order and by doing so they committed a
“jurisdictional error”.                             
15] From the aforesaid it is clear that the jurisdiction of the civil
Court is available for determining the question as to whether infirmity in
the  action impugned goes to  the root of  the proceedings making  it
invalid or where the basic procedural requirements which are vital in
nature have not been followed.  The jurisdiction to that extent has been
held to be preserved.  

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH
NAGPUR.
SECOND  APPEAL   NO.   491     OF     2012
APPELLANT:
(Org. Plaintiff)

Kishor   S/o   Ramalu   @   Rambhau
Telang,   
                                                                                                 
­VERSUS
(Org. Defendants)

 The   Municipal   Commissioner,

CORAM:   A. S. CHANDURKAR  J.
                                  Dated    :   JANUARY   20, 2015.
Citation;2016(1) ALLMR 175
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