Showing posts with label insurance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label insurance. Show all posts

Friday, 21 May 2021

Whether Insurance Company is bound to give coverage for mental illness along with physical illness?

Can mental illness be treated differently from physical illness for medical insurance purposes, is the question that arises in the present petition.

3. The petition raises an important issue relating to insurance coverage for mental illnesses and the provision of non-discrimination qua such illnesses as enshrined in Sections 21(1)(a) and 21(4) of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 (hereinafter, ‘MHA, 2017’).

27. It is clear from a perusal of the provisions of MHA, 2017, as also the provisions of the IRDAI Act, 1999 that immediately upon the MHA, 2017 coming into force, all insurance products ought to have extended the same treatment for mental and physical illnesses and remove any clause that discriminate between the same. The Insurance Ombudsman’s order which holds that the provisions of the MHA are not relevant to the present Petitioner is untenable. The MHA, 2017 has come into effect from May/July, 2018, and thus the exclusion in the Healthcare Policy of NICL with respect to “all psychiatric and psychosomatic disorders/diseases”, under Clause 4.10 as noted above, is contrary to law.

31. The Insurance Ombudsman’s order failed to consider the fact that the MHA, 2017 recognised the rights of the Petitioner and the conclusion of the Insurance Ombudsman that the provisions of the MHA, 2017 are not relevant, is completely contrary to law and is untenable. The MHA, 2017 and the provisions thereof, are absolutely relevant for a person who was suffering from Schizoaffective Disorder. Thus, the Petitioner was entitled for reimbursement of her claim as per the provisions of the MHA, 2017.

33. It is made clear that NICL and all insurance companies are liable to give effect to Section 21(4) of the MHA, 2017 with effect from the date when it has come into force i.e., 29th May, 2018. Mental illnesses ought to be covered without any discrimination. IRDAI would circulate a copy of this order in order to enable compliance by all the insurance companies.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

W.P.(C) 3190/2021

SHIKHA NISCHAL Vs NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED

CORAM:

JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH

Date of decision: 19th April, 2021

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Sunday, 23 June 2019

Guidelines of Supreme Court as when pay and recover can be ordered in case of motor accident

The question whether the insurer can avoid its liability in the
event it raises a defence as envisaged in sub section 2 of section 149 of

the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been considered by the three Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court in Swarana Singh (Supra). The law laid
down in Swarna Singh has been reiterated in Shamanna v/s.
Divisional Manager, the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) as
under :6.
In the case of third party risks, as per the decision in
National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and
others (2004) 3 SCC 297, the insurer had to indemnify the
compensation amount payable to the third party and the
Insurance Company may recover the same from the insured.
Doctrine of "pay and recover" was considered by the Supreme
Court in Swaran Singh case wherein the Supreme Court
examined the liability of the Insurance Company in cases of
breach of policy condition due to disqualifications of the
driver or invalid driving licence of the driver and held that in
case of third party risks, the insurer has to indemnify the
compensation amount to the third party and the Insurance
Company may recover the same from the insured.
Elaborately considering the insurer's contractual liability as
well as statutory liability visavis
the claims of third parties,
the Supreme Court issued detailed guidelines as to how and
in what circumstances, “pay and recover” can be ordered. In
para (110), the Supreme Court summarised its conclusions
as under:“
110. The summary of our findings to the various issues as
raised in these petitions is as follows:
(i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 providing
compulsory Insurance of vehicles against thirdparty
risks is a
social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to
victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The
provisions of compulsory Insurance coverage of all vehicles are
with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to
be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object.
(ii) An insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petition

filed under Section 163A
or Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988, inter alia, in terms of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the
said Act.
(iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of the
driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in
subsection
(2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have
been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the
insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or
disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time,
are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against
either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability
towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured
was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care
in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding
use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not
disqualified to drive at the relevant time.
(iv) Insurance companies, however, with a view to avoid their
liability must not only establish the available defence(s)
raised in the said proceedings but must also establish "breach"
on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof
wherefore would be on them, 

(v) The court cannot lay down
any criteria as to how the said burden would be discharged,
inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.
(vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the
part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding
holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to
drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be
allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the
said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence
is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the
cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy
conditions would apply "the rule of main purpose" and the
concept of "fundamental breach" to allow defences available
to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act.
(vii) The question, as to whether the owner has taken
reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence
produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not
fulfill the requirements of law or not will have to be

determined in each case.
(viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a
person having a learner's licence, the Insurance companies
would be liable to satisfy the decree.
(ix) The Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165 read
with Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in
respect of the accidents involving death or of bodily injury or
damage to property of third party arising in use of motor
vehicle. The said power of the Tribunal is not restricted to
decide the claims inter se between claimant or claimants on
one side and insured, insurer and driver on the other. In the
course of adjudicating the claim for compensation and to
decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer,
the Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to
decide disputes inter se between the insurer and the insured.
The decision rendered on the claims and disputes inter se
between the insurer and insured in the course of adjudication
of claim for compensation by the claimants and the award
made thereon is enforceable and executable in the same
manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for
enforcement and execution of the award in favour of the
claimants.
(x) Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the
Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has
satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the
provisions of Section 149(2) read with subsection
(7), as
interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that
the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the
compensation and other amounts which it has been
compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the
Tribunal. Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will
be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from
the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the
Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section
174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate will
be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if,
as required by subsection
(3) of Section 168 of the Act the
insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the
insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of
the award by the Tribunal.

(xi) The provisions contained in subsection
(4) with the
proviso there under and subsection
(5) which are intended
to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable
the insurer to recover the amount paid under the contract of
Insurance on behalf of the insured can be taken recourse to
by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of
the insurer against the insured by relegating them to the
remedy before regular court in cases where on given facts
and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might
delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims,”
(Underlining added)
7. As per the decision in Swaran Singh case, onus is always
upon the Insurance Company to prove that the driver had no
valid driving licence and that there was breach of policy
conditions. Where the driver did not possess the valid driving
licence and there are breach of policy conditions, “pay and
recover” can be ordered in case of third party risks. The
Tribunal is required to consider as to whether the owner has
taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving
licence produced by the driver, does not fulfill the
requirements of law or not will have to be determined in
each case. ”
15. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Laxmi Narayan Dhut
(2007) 3 SCC 700, the Apex Court has drawn a distinction between
own damage claim not involving any third party visàvis
the liability in
respect of the third party risk. In the aforestated case the Supreme
Court relied upon the decision in Swarana Singh (supra) to hold that
even in cases of willful breach the insurer's liability visàvis
third party
was statutory and that it is for the Insurance Company to satisfy the
award and then recover the compensation from the insured.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
FIRST APPEAL NO. 50 OF 2016

National Insurance Co. Ltd. V/s.  Pallavi Anand Hegde & Ors. 

CORAM: SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.

JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 21st JUNE, 2019.

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Monday, 29 January 2018

Basic concept of Under-insurance and averaging out under Insurance law

 The only legal issue which arises for consideration is "what is under-insurance-and the effect thereof?". Under-insurance basically means that the insured has taken out an insurance policy in which he has valued the insured items for a sum which is less than the actual value of the insured item. In a country like India this is normally done to pay a lesser premium. This is, in fact, harmful to the policy holder and not to the Insurance Company because even if the entire insured property is lost, the policy holder will only get the maximum sum for which the property has been insured and not a paisa more than the sum insured. To give an example, in case a person takes out the householder policy covering fire insurance and gives the value of the structure of his house and goods stored therein at Rs. 50,00,000/- even though the value of the same is Rs. 1,00,00,000/- then even if the entire house and goods are completely lost in a fire, he cannot get an amount above Rs. 50,00,000/- even though the value may be more.

9. If all the insured goods are lost then there is no problem. The insured is entitled to the amount for which the goods were insured even if that be less than the actual value of the goods. In case a person gets a painting insured for Rs. 1,00,000/- though the value of the same is Rs. 10,00,000/-, if the painting is lost the insured is entitled to Rs. 1,00,000/- only. If all the insured goods falling under one head are stolen or lost then the insurance company cannot apply the principle of averaging out because, though the loss may be Rs. 10,00,000/-, the claimant will get only one Rs. 1,00,000/- as per the value assessed and the insurance premium paid by him.

10. The Insurance Company can however apply the principle of averaging out when all the goods are not destroyed. Supposing the entire house was insured for Rs. 50,00,000/-, but on valuation it is found that the value of the structure and the goods was Rs. 1,00,00,000/- and if the policy holder claims that he has suffered loss of Rs. 40,00,000/- then he will be entitled to only Rs. 20,00,000/-, by applying the principle of averaging out. What this means is that if the value of the goods is more than the sum for which they are insured then it is presumed that the policy holder has not taken out insurance policy for the un-insured value of the goods. The claim is allowed by applying the principle of averaging out, i.e. the insured is paid an amount proportionate to the extent of insurance as compared to the actual value of the goods insured.

11. To clarify the matter further, we may give another example. Supposing, the insurer owns two paintings of Rs. 5,00,000/- each but pays premium for insurance cover of Rs. 1,00,000/- for both the paintings. If one painting is lost, even though the value of the painting may Rs. 5,00,000/- he will not get Rs. 1,00,000/- but will get only Rs. 50,000/-, as proportionate amount. Therefore, when a group of items is insured under one heading and only some of the items and not all items are lost/stolen then the principle of under-insurance will apply. However, if all or most of the items of value covered under the policy are stolen, then the insurance company is bound to pay the value of the goods insured.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3167 of 2017

Decided On: 10.01.2018

 I.C. Sharma Vs. The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Madan B. Lokur and Deepak Gupta, JJ.

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Tuesday, 26 January 2016

Whether Nominee can exclude legal heirs of deceased from getting insurance amount?

Insofar as the merits of the order of the High Court is
concerned, the sole question involved is whether the suit
property was purchased by Rama Vidyarthi, (defendant
No.1) out of the joint family funds or from her own income.
The affidavit of Rama Vidyarthi in Suit No. 147 of 1968 filed
by Savitri Vidyarthi discloses that she was looking after the
family as the Manager taking care of the respondent No.1,
her step son i.e. the son of the first wife of Hari Shankar
Vidyarthi. In the said affidavit, it is also admitted that she
had received the insurance money following the death of
Hari Shankar Vidyarthi and the same was used for the
purchase of the suit property along with other funds which
she had generated on her own. The virtual admission by the
predecessor-in-interest of the appellant of the use of the
insurance money to acquire the suit property is significant.
Though the claim of absolute ownership of the suit property
had been made by Rama Vidyarthi in the aforesaid affidavit,
the said claim is belied by the true legal position with regard
to the claims/entitlement of the other legal heirs to the
insurance amount. Such amounts constitute the
entitlement of all the legal heirs of the deceased though the
same may have been received by Rama Vidyarthi as the
nominee of her husband. The above would seem to follow
from the view expressed by this Court in Smt. Sarbati Devi
& Anr. vs. Smt. Usha Devi 1984 (1) SCC 424
 which is extracted below.
(Paragraph 12)
“12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance
in this case which dissuades us
from taking a view contrary to the decisions of
all other High Courts and accepting the view
expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two
recent judgments delivered in the year 1978
and in the year 1982. The Act has been in
force from the year 1938 and all along almost
all the High Courts in India have taken the
view that a mere nomination effected under
Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their
rights in the amount payable under a life insurance
policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen
to make any amendment to the Act. In such a
situation unless there are strong and compelling
reasons to hold that all these decisions
are wholly erroneous, the Court should be
slow to take a different view. The reasons
given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing.
We, therefore, hold that the judgments of
the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case and
in Uma Sehgal case do not lay down the law
correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We
approve the views expressed by the other High
Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the
Act and hold that a mere nomination made
under Section 39 of the Act does not have the

effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial
interest in the amount payable under the
life insurance policy on the death of the assured.
The nomination only indicates the
hand which is authorised to receive the
amount, on the payment of which the insurer
gets a valid discharge of its liability under the
policy. The amount, however, can be claimed
by the heirs of the assured in accordance with
the law of succession governing them.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3162-3163 OF 2010
SHREYA VIDYARTHI ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
ASHOK VIDYARTHI & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS
Citation; AIR 2016 SC139
Dated;DECEMBER 16, 2015.

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Sunday, 6 December 2015

Golden rules for interpretation of Insurance contract

 At the outset, it may be stated that contracts of
insurance are contracts of uberrima fides and every material
fact is required to be disclosed. In United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M.K.J. Corpn.(1996) 6 SCC 428
, a two-Judge Bench
has observed:-
“It is a fundamental principle of Insurance law
that utmost good faith must be observed by
the contracting parties. Good faith forbids
either party from concealing (non-disclosure)
what he privately knows, to draw the other
into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact
and his believing the contrary. Just as the
insured has a duty to disclose, “similarly, it is
the duty of the insurers and their agents to
disclose all material facts within their
knowledge, since obligation of good faith
applies to them equally with the assured”.”
Regard being had to these principles, the authorities
cited by Mr. Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellant
are to be seen.
 In Amalgamated Electricity Co. v. Ajmer
Municipality (1969) 2 SCR 430 = AIR 1969 SC 227
, though in a different context, it has been
held that:-
“In construing the true nature of the contract
entered into between the parties, the contract has
to be read as a whole and if so read it is clear
that what the plaintiff undertook was to pump
water from the wells in question and not to
supply any electrical energy. Hence we are in
agreement with the learned Judges of the High
Court that the plaintiff's case in this regard
should fail.”
11. In Bay Berry Apartments (P) Ltd. and Another v.
Shobha and others  (2006) 13 SCC 737
, the Court has observed that in
construing a document, the Court cannot assign any other
meaning; and a document as is well known must be
construed in its entirety.
12. In Polymer India (P) Ltd. and Another v. National
Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others  (2005) 9 SCC 174
, this Court has held
thus:-
“19. In this connection, a reference may be made
to a series of decisions of this Court wherein it
has been held that it is the duty of the court to
interpret the document of contract as was
understood between the parties. In the case of
General Assurance Society Ltd. v. Chandumull
Jain  (1996) 3 SCR 500 : AIR 1966 SC 1644
, it was observed as under:
“In interpreting documents relating to a
contract of insurance, the duty of the court
is to interpret the words in which the
contract is expressed by the parties, because
it is not for the court to make a new
contract, however reasonable, if the parties
have not made it themselves.”
20. Similarly, in the case of Oriental Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Samayanallur Primary Agricultural
Coop. Bank (1999) 8 SCC 543
, it was observed as under:
“The insurance policy has to be construed
having reference only to the stipulations
contained in it and no artificial far-fetched
meaning could be given to the words
appearing in it.”
21. Therefore, the terms of the contract have to
be construed strictly without altering the nature
of the contract as it may affect the interest of
parties adversely.”
13. Learned senior counsel for the appellant has also
drawn inspiration from the decision in General Assurance
Society Ltd. v. Chandmull Jain  (1966) 3 SCR 500 = AIR 1966 SC 1644
, rendered by the
Constitution Bench wherein it has been held that:-
“In other respects there is no difference between
a contract of insurance and any other contract
except that in a contract of insurance there is a
requirement of uberrima fides i.e. good faith on
the part of the assured and the contract is likely
to be construed contra proferentem that is against
the company in case of ambiguity or doubt. A
contract is formed when there is an unqualified
acceptance of the proposal. Acceptance may be
expressed in writing or it may even be implied if
the insurer accepts the premium and retains it.
In the case of the assured, a positive act on his
part by which he recognises or seeks to enforce
the policy amounts to an affirmation of it. This
position was clearly recognised by the assured
himself, because he wrote, close upon the expiry
of the time of the cover notes that either a policy
should be issued to him before that period had
expired or the cover note extended in time. In
interpreting documents relating to a contract of
insurance, the duty of the court is to interpret
the words in which the contract is expressed by
the parties, because it is not for the court to
make a new contract, however reasonable, if the
parties have not made it themselves. Looking at
the proposal, the letter of acceptance and the
cover notes, it is clear that a contract of
insurance under the standard policy for fire and
extended to cover flood, cyclone etc. had come
into being.”
14. Mr. Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellant
has also drawn our attention to Baj (Run Off) Ltd. v.
Durham and others  (2012) UKSC 14
, wherein the Supreme Court of
United Kingdom, while interpreting the contract of
insurance has opined:-
“To resolve these questions it is necessary to
avoid over-concentration on the meaning of single
words or phrases viewed in isolation, and to look
at the insurance contracts more broadly. As Lord
Mustill observed in Charter Reinsurance Co. Ltd.
v. Fagan [1977] AC 313, 384
, all such words “must be set in the
landscape of the instrument as a whole” at p.381,
any “instinctive response” to their meaning “must
be verified by studying the other terms of the
contract, placed in the context of the factual and
commercial background of the transaction”. The
present case has given rise to considerable
argument about what constitutes and is
admissible as part of the commercial background
to the insurances, which may shape their
meaning. But in my opinion, considerable
insight into the scope, purpose and proper
interpretation of each of these insurances is to be
gained from a study of its language, read in its
entirety. So, for the moment, I concentrate on
the assistance to be gained in that connection.”
 Relying on the authorities which have been stated by
Mr. Gupta, it is submitted by him that the policy between
the parties is required to be read as a whole and on a
reading of the policy in entirety, it is clear that the
declaration of all the shipments whether covered under the
policy or not, is not mandatory and only the shipments in
respect of which claims are lodged are required to be As has been held in Chandmull Jain (supra) by the
Constitution Bench that in a contract of insurance, there is
a requirement of good faith on the part of the insured and
in case of ambiguity, it has to be construed against the
company. As per other authorities, the insurance policy
has to be strictly construed and it has to be read as a whole
and nothing should be added or subtracted. That apart, as

has been held in Polymer India (P) Ltd. (supra), it is the
duty of the Court to interpret the document as is
understood between the parties and regard being had to the
reference to the stipulations contained in it.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2729 OF 2009
M/s. BHS Industries ... Appellant
Versus
Export Credit Guarantee Corp. & Anr. ... Respondents
Citation;(2015) 9 SCC414
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Sunday, 3 May 2015

When Insurance company can not be made liable to pay compensation?



In   the   present   case,   the   owner   has   neither   filed 
written   statement   nor   has   participated   in   the   proceedings   nor 
has adduced any evidence in support of a plea that the premium 
was   paid   on   23.01.2008   in   response   to   which   the   policy   was 
issued   on   28.01.2008.     The   owner   has   failed   to   discharge   his 
burden and hence the Insurance Company cannot be held jointly 
and   severally   liable   to   pay   the   compensation   along   with   the 
committed  an   error   in  holding  that   the  Insurance   Company  is 
liable for payment of compensation.   The award to that extent 
cannot, therefore, be sustained.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH
FIRST APPEAL  NO.  1334  OF  2013


Bajaj Allianz General Insurance
Co. Ltd., 
Vs
Smt. Pushpa @ Bebi Bholanath

CORAM :   R.K. DESHPANDE, J.
SEPTEMBER 10, 2014.
        Citation;2015(2) ALLMR895
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Wednesday, 1 April 2015

Whether apprentice is employee for the purposes of Insurance contract?


In various enactments, the word 'employee', has no doubt, been defined to include an apprentice, but that is only a deeming provision and a legal fiction by which the meaning of the word 'employee' has been extended.
Legal fictions are well-knwon in law. For example, Section 43 (3) of the Income Tax Act defines 'plant' to include a book. Ordinarily a plant means a factory, and by no stretch of imagination can we call a factory a book. However, the Income Tax Act deems a book to be a plant for the purpose of depreciation.
Many such illustrations of deeming clauses or legal fictions can be given. The definition of employee in various enactments which include an apprentice within the ambit of the definition is such a piece of legal fiction. That, however, does not mean that in common parlance an apprentice is an employee.
In the present case, since the word 'employee' has not been defined in the contract of insurance, we have to give it the meaning which it has in common parlance. In common parlance, an apprentice is a trainee and not an employee. Even if he is given a stipend, that does not mean that there is a relationship of master and servant between the firm and the apprentice. Hence, we cannot agree with the view taken by the National Commission. In our view , the claim before the National Commission was not maintainable.
Supreme Court of India
New India Assurance Co. Ltd vs M/S. Abhilash Jewellery on 22 January, 2009

Bench: Markandey Katju, R.M. Lodha
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