Showing posts with label nomination. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nomination. Show all posts

Saturday, 25 October 2025

Revolutionary Changes in Bank Nomination Rules: What November 1, 2025 Brings for Indian Depositors


 The Indian banking sector is witnessing a transformative shift in depositor rights and nomination facilities with the enforcement of key provisions of the Banking Laws (Amendment) Act, 2025 from November 1, 2025. Through a notification issued by the Ministry of Finance on October 23, 2025, the Central Government has brought into force four critical sections—Sections 10, 11, 12, and 13—that fundamentally reshape how depositors can nominate beneficiaries for their bank accounts, lockers, and safe custody articles.

Read Said notification here: Click here.

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Sunday, 4 April 2021

Whether nomination made by an employee can be treated as his will and curtail the right of legal heirs to claim a share in his service benefits?

 The purpose of taking a nomination by an employer is to relieve itself of the obligation to pay the benefits, irrespective of the right of a person who is entitled in law to the Fund. Nomination, in law, cannot be construed as a “Will” of the employee and cannot be treated as a testamentary disposition of the deceased employee with an intent to bestow the benefits on the heirs. Every employee has a right in law to decide how his movable assets should be treated and disbursed in the event of his death

and nomination cannot circumscribe the legal rights of disposition of the assets. The purpose of nomination is only to benefit a custodian so as to enable him to know how and to whom he has to hand over the assets, protecting him from litigations and multiplicity of cases from different people, claiming to be successors to the interest of the employee. Thus,

the liability of the employer / custodian is discharged by disbursing the funds to the ‘nominee’ and thereafter if there is an inter-se disputes between the lawful heirs, they could resort to appropriate remedies for identification of their shares. The concept of appointing a nominee therefore is only to ensure that the amounts are disbursed at the earliest to the nominee and this becomes significant as there may be occasions where it may take time for the legal heirs to resolve their disputes and in the meantime the trustee / Custodian Company or any other Institution may go into liquidation or any other contingency may arise making it difficult to realize the retiral and other dues.


 Whenever provident fund amount is

disbursed the custodian of the fund is anxious to have a good

discharge against all claims from whomsoever claiming

through the member. The Rules nowhere provide that the

nomination is to be construed as a will by the member. If a

nomination is to be taken as a final disposition made by the

member as to how it should be taken by his heir on his death, it

would lead to anomalies, because till the member dies, the

nominee acquires no right to claim the amount. The legal right

of a member to decide from time to time as to how his assets

should be taken consequent to his death, cannot be frozen by a

nomination given, as part of his service conditions. His legal

rights about disposition of his assets cannot be circumscribed

by such nomination, 11 he is to execute a “Will” later on,

contrary to the nomination that has been made earlier, the

terms and conditions of the ‘will’ alone can prevail, and so far

as the trustees of the fund are concerned, their obligation will

be fully discharged by paying it to the nominee, who will in turn

be liable to hand over the funds to the persons entitled to as per

the ‘Will’. In case of intestate succession, the nominee is bound

to hand over the amounts to the heirs of the deceased. The main

purpose of nomination is intended to benefit

 the custodianstrustees

of the fund to know as to how or to whom they should

hand over the amounts and need not make themselves

answerable to multiplicity of claims from different persons

claiming to succeed to the interests of the deceased member. If

there is no nomination, the custodian of the fund cannot decide

as to who are the lawful heirs to succeed and they will have to

wait for a Court order to be produced, and unless finality is

reached, therein, the disbursement of the fund will be delayed

Funds, like the provident fund, in the case of State or other

public institutions, may be sufficiently safe-guarded even if

there is to be a delay in disbursement. But in cases of other

institutions, if the amounts are not immediately disbursed on

the basis of nomination, and before proceedings in Court are

over, if for any reasons, the Companies or institutions are

liquidated, the contributions made by a member of such bodies,

will not enure to the benefit of the legal heirs till finality is

reached in Court proceedings unless the amount is deposited in

Court at the earliest stage. The concept of nomination has been

thought of to achieve the disbursement of the amounts at the

earliest point of time to the nominee, who will be answerable to

claims made by those who are entitled to the amount lawfully.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI


W.P.(C) 6701/2018 and C.M. Nos.25451/2018, 41307/2019 and

11129/2020

SUMAN KUMARI @ SUMAN SINGH  Vs  NAND KISHOR & ORS 

CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH

Pronounced on: 06.11.2020

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Sunday, 17 September 2017

Whether court can direct bank to deposit money of deceased for distribution to legal heirs inspite of nomination?

With regard to the first point, this Court in a Judgment reported in MANU/GH/0183/1997 : 1998 (2) GLT 350 in the case of Smt. Sunita Shambhu Shirodkar v. Shri Madhukar Lotlikar & Ors. has held that the nominee does not step into the shoes of the legal heirs merely on account of his nomination by the depositor. The provisions of Section 45ZA of the Banking Regulations Act relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 1 have also been taken into consideration whilst coming to the conclusion that even though the nominee may have a right to recover the amounts from the Bank, nevertheless, it is always open to the Court to direct such amount to be deposited in the Court for distribution among the legal heirs. The learned Single Judge of this Court has observed at Paras 10, 11, 12 and 13 thus :

"10. Now as far as the State of Goa is concerned, the law of succession which is in force in the State provides that where any person dies without disposing of his properties, or disposing only a part thereof, or having made the disposition, the will is annulled, revoked or lapses, all legal heirs shall have the said properties or part thereof, in respect of which the testator has not made any disposition. The provisions in this regard are found in Article 1968 of Portuguese Civil Code. The order of legal succession is firstly to the descendants, then to the ascendants, followed by brothers and their descendants, then surviving spouse, then to the collaterals and lastly to the State as is provided in Article 1969 of the said Code.

11. Applying the law laid down by the Apex Court in the above referred matter and considering the provisions of the law of succession in force in the State as also the provisions contained in Section 45ZA of the said Act, it is clear that whenever a depositor appoints his nominee and the depositor dies before the maturity of the fixed deposit for release, the nominee so appointed would certainly be entitled to collect the amount payable on such fixed deposit amount on its maturity for release. However, that would not take away the right of the legal heirs of the deceased depositor from claiming right to the amount standing to the credit of the deceased depositor in accordance with the provisions of law of succession in force. This is so because a nominee is merely a representative of the lawful successor of the deceased depositor to receive the payment on the maturity of the deposit for release. The nominee does not step in the shoes of the legal heirs merely on account of nomination by a depositor.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

Second Appeal No. 49 of 2016

Decided On: 15.03.2017

 Vishwanath Yadav and Ors.Vs. Kashinath Yadav and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
F.M. Reis, J.

Citation: 2017(4) MHLJ 162,AIR 2017 Bom 258
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Wednesday, 31 May 2017

Whether bank can refuse to make payment to nominee?

Nomination made by a depositor/account holder is the reflection of his wish upon identification by him of the recipient of the deposit lying in an account in the event of death of such depositor/account holder and to hold the same in his (recipient's) custody for being distributed according to the law of succession. Nomination, which is made without any coercion, undue influence or misrepresentation and is accepted by a banking company upon a satisfaction that the nomination does not suffer from any of the vitiating factors and clothes the nominee to receive the amount, ought to be acted upon after the death of the depositor/account holder, for, that would result in honouring his wish. If at all the nomination is, at a subsequent stage, found to suffer from any technical defect precluding the banking company to act on such nomination, it ought to be the bounden duty of the officials of the bank to get the nomination rectified/altered so as to bring it in conformity with the statutory requirements provided the depositor/account holder is alive. Once the opportunity to get the nomination rectified/altered is lost by the tardy and indolent acts of the officials of the bank, it would not be in the interest of justice to allow the banking officials to refuse to honour the wish expressed by the depositor/account holder.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
W.P. No. 983 of 2015
Decided On: 30.03.2016
Communist Party of India (Marxist)
Vs.
United Bank of India and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dipankar Datta, J.



Citation: AIR 2017(NOC)15 Cal
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Wednesday, 10 May 2017

When property purchased by widow will be treated as property of joint family?

The Plaintiff's suit was resisted by both Srilekha and Madhulekha, primarily, on the ground that the suit property was purchased by their mother Rama Vidyarthi from her own funds and not from any joint family funds. In fact, the two sisters, who were arrayed as Defendants 1 and 2 in the suit, had specifically denied the existence of any joint family or the availability of any joint family funds.
 Insofar as the merits of the order of the High Court is concerned, the sole question involved is whether the suit property was purchased by Rama Vidyarthi, (Defendant No. 1) out of the joint family funds or from her own income. The affidavit of Rama Vidyarthi in Suit No. 147 of 1968 filed by Savitri Vidyarthi discloses that she was looking after the family as the Manager taking care of the Respondent No. 1, her step son i.e. the son of the first wife of Hari Shankar Vidyarthi. In the said affidavit, it is also admitted that she had received the insurance money following the death of Hari Shankar Vidyarthi and the same was used for the purchase of the suit property along with other funds which she had generated on her own. The virtual admission by the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellant of the use of the insurance money to acquire the suit property is significant. Though the claim of absolute ownership of the suit property had been made by Rama Vidyarthi in the aforesaid affidavit, the said claim is belied by the true legal position with regard to the claims/entitlement of the other legal heirs to the insurance amount. Such amounts constitute the entitlement of all the legal heirs of the deceased though the same may have been received by Rama Vidyarthi as the nominee of her husband. The above would seem to follow from the view expressed by this Court in Smt. Sarbati Devi and Anr. v. Smt. Usha Devi MANU/SC/0231/1983 : 1984 (1) SCC 424 which is extracted below. (Paragraph 12)
12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected Under Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case and in Uma Sehgal case do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made Under Section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.
16. The fact that the family was peacefully living together at the time of the demise of Hari Shankar Vidyarthi; the continuance of such common residence for almost 7 years after purchase of the suit property in the year 1961; that there was no discord between the parties and there was peace and tranquility in the whole family were also rightly taken note of by the High Court as evidence of existence of a joint family. The execution of sale deed dated 27.9.1961 in the name of Rama Vidyarthi and the absence of any mention thereof that she was acting on behalf of the joint family has also been rightly construed by the High Court with reference to the young age of the Plaintiff-Respondent (21 years) which may have inhibited any objection to the dominant position of Rama Vidyarthi in the joint family, a fact also evident from the other materials on record. Accordingly, there can be no justification to cause any interference with the conclusion reached by the High Court on the issue of existence of a joint family.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal Nos. 3162-3163 of 2010
Decided On: 16.12.2015
Shreya Vidyarthi Vs. Ashok Vidyarthi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Ranjan Gogoi and N.V. Ramana, JJ.
Citation; AIR 2016 SC139:2015 SCCONLINESC 1324,
(2015) 16 SCC 46
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Sunday, 7 May 2017

Whether person who is nominated by deceased is entitled to succession certificate?

The court below has further held that nomination will not make the nominee as the owner of the property. I also agree with this conclusion of the court below that nomination is not a Will in law inasmuch as this is the settled legal position in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Sarbati Devi v. Smt. Usha Devi (1984) 1 SCC 424 : AIR 1984 SC 346.
4. The present case is indeed a hard case because the petitioners of the succession certificate case are walking away with the property of the deceased Smt. Kamla Devi although Smt. Kamla Devi had separated from the petitioners of the succession certificate case before 35 years prior to the death of Smt. Kamla Devi, however, in the view of the settled legal position that nomination is not a Will, and in the absence of the any Will of Smt. Kamla Devi in favour of the present appellant who is the real sister of the deceased Smt. Kamla Devi, only those persons who are legal heirs under the Hindu Succession Act inherit the properties, accordingly this Court has no option but to dismiss the present appeal.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
(Before Valmiki J. Mehta, J.)

Rampali v. The State Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. 

FAO No. 184/2017
Decided on April 24, 2017
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Sunday, 12 February 2017

Whether brother of government servant above 18 years can claim pensionary benefits?

The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent would draw the attention of this Court to the counter affidavit and also invited the attention of this Court to the Rule 45(5) of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules and would submit that as per the said sub-rule, the family in relation to the Government Servants means brothers below the age of 18 years including the step brothers and admittedly the petitioner, even at the time of nomination, has crossed that age and as such, he cannot be given pensionary benefits and prays for dismissal of the writ petition.
 As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, as per sub rule 5 of Rule 45 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, the petitioner herein cannot be considered as a family member unless at the time of nomination he was below the age of 18 years and admittedly it was not so. Though it is the vehement submission of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that in terms of Rule 48 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, the petitioner falls under the category of specified nominee, in the considered opinion of this Court, the said stand lacks merits and substance for the reasons that the proviso should be read inconsonance with the main provision and it cannot fall on exception and in the light of the definition of family members as per Rule 45(5), Rule 48 should be read in consonance with Rule 45 and therefore, the petitioner herein cannot be construed as a family member, though he was nominated along with his brother-in-law Sundaramoorthy, who according to the petitioner is no more.
In the High Court of Madras at Madurai
(Before M. Sathyanarayanan and J. Nisha Banu, JJ.)
B. Senthil Kumar 
v.
The District and Sessions Judge, III Additional District Court, District Court Premises, Madurai-625 020 .

W.P.(MD) No. 5372 of 2013
And
M.P.(MD) No. 1 of 2013
Decided on November 14, 2016
Citation: 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 10391
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Sunday, 22 January 2017

Rights of nominee V rights of legal heirs

In the said affidavit, it is also admitted that she
had received the insurance money following the death of
Hari Shankar Vidyarthi and the same was used for the
purchase of the suit property along with other funds which
she had generated on her own. The virtual admission by the
predecessor-in-interest of the appellant of the use of the
insurance money to acquire the suit property is significant.
Though the claim of absolute ownership of the suit property
had been made by Rama Vidyarthi in the aforesaid affidavit,
the said claim is belied by the true legal position with regard
to the claims/entitlement of the other legal heirs to the
insurance amount. Such amounts constitute the
entitlement of all the legal heirs of the deceased though the
same may have been received by Rama Vidyarthi as the
nominee of her husband. The above would seem to follow
from the view expressed by this Court in Smt. Sarbati Devi
& Anr. vs. Smt. Usha Devi1
 which is extracted below.
(Paragraph 12)
“12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance
in this case which dissuades us
from taking a view contrary to the decisions of
all other High Courts and accepting the view
expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two
recent judgments delivered in the year 1978
and in the year 1982. The Act has been in
force from the year 1938 and all along almost
all the High Courts in India have taken the
view that a mere nomination effected under
Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their
rights in the amount payable under a life insurance
policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen
to make any amendment to the Act. In such a
situation unless there are strong and compelling
reasons to hold that all these decisions
are wholly erroneous, the Court should be
slow to take a different view. The reasons
given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing.
We, therefore, hold that the judgments of
the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case and
in Uma Sehgal case do not lay down the law
correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We
approve the views expressed by the other High
Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the
Act and hold that a mere nomination made
under Section 39 of the Act does not have the
1 1984 (1) SCC 424
effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial
interest in the amount payable under the
life insurance policy on the death of the assured.
The nomination only indicates the
hand which is authorised to receive the
amount, on the payment of which the insurer
gets a valid discharge of its liability under the
policy. The amount, however, can be claimed
by the heirs of the assured in accordance with
the law of succession governing them.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3162-3163 OF 2010
SHREYA VIDYARTHI 
VERSUS
ASHOK VIDYARTHI & ORS. 
Citation; AIR 2016 SC139:2015 SCCONLINESC 1324:(2015) 16 SCC 46
Dated;DECEMBER 16, 2015.

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Thursday, 22 December 2016

Whether estate will vest in nominee instead of legal heirs in case of nomination?


The provisions relating to nominations under the various Enactments have been consistently interpreted by the Apex Court by holding that the nominee does not get absolute title to the property subject matter of the nomination. The reason is by its very nature, when a share holder or a deposit holder or an insurance policy holder or a member of a Co-operative Society makes a nomination during his life time, he does not transfer his interest in favour of the nominee. It is always held that the nomination does not override the law in relation to testamentary or intestate succession. The provisions regarding nomination are made with a view to ensure that the estate or the rights of the deceased subject matter of the nomination are protected till the legal representatives of the deceased take appropriate steps. None of the provisions of the aforesaid Statutes providing for nominations deal with the succession, testamentary or non-testamentary. As observed by the Apex Court, the legislative intention is not to provide a third kind of succession. In Sarbati Devi, the Apex Court held in paragraph 5 which reads thus:
" ......But the summary of the relevant provisions of Section 39 given above establishes clearly that the policy-holder continues to hold interest in the policy during his lifetime and the nominee acquires no sort of interest in the policy during the lifetime of the policy-
holder. If that is so, on the death of the policy-holder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. There is no warrant for the position that Section 39of the Act operates as a third kind of succession which is styled as a 'statutory testament' in para 16 of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Uma Sehgal case [AIR 1982 Del 36 : ILR (1981) 2 Del 315] . If Section 39 of the Act is contrasted with Section 38 of the Act which provides for transfer or assignment of the rights under a policy, the tenuous character of the right of a nominee would  become more pronounced. It is difficult to hold thatSection 39 of the Act was intended to act as a third mode of succession provided by the statute. The provision in sub-section (6) of Section 39 which says that the amount shall be payable to the nominee or nominees does not mean that the amount shall belong to the nominee or nominees. We have to bear in mind here the special care which law and judicial precedents take in the matter of execution and proof of wills which have the effect of diverting the estate from the ordinary course of intestate succession and that the rigour of the rules governing the testamentary succession is not relaxed even where wills are registered."
(emphasis added) The object of the provisions of the Companies Act is not to either provide a mode of succession or to deal with succession. The object of the Section 109A is to ensure that the deceased shareholder is represented by some one as the value of the shares is subject to market forces. Various advantages keep on accruing to shareholders. For example, allotment of Bonus shares. There are general meetings held of the Companies in which a shareholder is required to be represented.
The provision is enacted to ensure that the commerce does not suffer due to delay on the part of the legal heirs in establishing their rights of succession and claiming the shares of a Company.
35. Considering the consistent view taken by the Apex Court while interpreting the provisions relating to nominations under various Statutes (including the view in the recent decision in the case of Indrani Wahi), there is no reason to make a departure from theconsistent view. The provisions of the Companies Act including Sections 109A and109B, in the light of the object of the said Enactment, do not warrant any such departure. The so called vesting under Section 109A does not create a third mode of succession. It is not intended to create a third mode of succession. The Companies Act has nothing to do with the law of succession. We have gone through every decision and material relied upon by the Appellants to which we have not made a specific reference in this Judgment. We hold that there was no reason to take a view which is contrary to the view taken in the long line of the decisions of the Apex Court on interpretation of provisions regarding nominations. Hence, the view taken in Kokate's case is not correct. We answer the first question in the negative and the third question in the affirmative. The second question is answered accordingly.
Bombay High Court
Shakti Yezdani And Anr vs Jayanand Jayant Salgonkar on 1 December, 2016
Bench: A.S. Oka
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Tuesday, 13 September 2016

Rights of Nominee V. Rights of legal heirs

 Having recorded the above conclusion, it is imperative
for us to deal with the conclusion recorded in paragraph 6 (already
extracted above) of the judgment of this Court in the Usha Ranjan
Bhattacharjee case (supra). In this behalf, it is necessary to
clarify that transfer of share or interest, based on a nomination
under Section 79 in favour of the nominee, is with reference to the
concerned Cooperative Society, and is binding on the said society.
The Cooperative Society has no option whatsoever, except to
transfer the membership in the name of the nominee, in consonance
with Sections 79 and 80 of the 1983 Act (read with Rules 127 and
128 of the 1987 Rules). That, would have no relevance to the issue
of title between the inheritors or successors to the property of
the deceased. Insofar as the present controversy is concerned, we
therefore hereby direct `the Cooperative Society' to transfer the
share or interest of the society in favour of the appellant –
Indrani Wahi. It shall however, be open to the other members of the
family (presently only the son of Biswa Ranjan Sengupta – Dhruba
Jyoti Sengupta; we are informed that his mother – Parul Sengupta
has died), to pursue his case of succession or inheritance, if he
is so advised, in consonance with law.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVILAPPEAL No.4646 OF 2006

INDRANI WAHI V REGISTRAR OF COOP. SOCIETIES & ORS.

Citation:(2016) 6 SCC440
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Sunday, 21 August 2016

Whether husband is entitled to get family pension even though there is no nomination in his favour?



The sole question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant, who happens to be the husband of the deceased Government servant, is entitled to family pension under the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules (for short "the rules") notwithstanding the fact that the deceased wife in her nomination did not include the husband. The forums below have taken the view agreeing with the authorities that since the nomination was not in favour of the husband and the husband was staying separate from the wife, the husband would not be entitled to family pension in question. This view cannot be sustained in view of the provisions contained in Rule 54 of the rules. It is too well settled that where rights of the parties are governed by statutory provisions, the individual nomination contrary to the statute will not operate.



SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dated :  23.4.1999.

G.L. Bhatia  v. Union of India & anr

Citations  : 1999(5) SCC 237, 1999 SCC (L&S) 996,  1999(3) LLN 835,  2001(1) All. C.J. 840,  1999(9) Supreme 308

Before :- G.B. Pattanaik and Umesh C. Banerjee, JJ.


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Whether nomination is necessary for family pension?

 With regard to grant of family pension nomination is not necessary it has also been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in G.L. Bhatia v. Union of India and Anr. . After considering Rule 54 of the Central Civil Service (Pension) Rules as under:
"2. The sole question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant, who happens to be the husband of the deceased Government servant, is entitled to family pension under the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules (for short "the Rules") notwithstanding the fact that the deceased wife in her nomination did not include the husband. The forums below have taken the view agreeing with the authorities that since the nomination was not in favour of the husband and the husband was staying separate from the wife, the husband would not be entitled to family pension in question. This view cannot be sustained in view of the provisions contained in Rule 54 of the Rules. It is too well settled that where rights of the parties are governed by statutory provisions, the individual nomination contrary to the statute will not operate.
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Girijabai vs State Of M.P. And Ors. on 8 April, 2008
Equivalent citations: 2008 (3) MPHT 83

Bench: S Gangele
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Saturday, 30 July 2016

Whether nomination for retiral benefits made by husband in favour of second wife is valid?

The Supreme Court in Bakulabai and another v. Gangaram and another, 1988 (25) ACC 119, held that the marriage of a Hindu woman with a Hindu male with a living spouse performed after the coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is null and void and the woman is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.
The Apex Court in Smt. Sarbati Devi and another Versus Smt. Usha Devi, AIR 1984 SC 346, held that a mere nomination made in an insurance policy does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.
This Court in Shakuntala Devi (Smt.) Versus Executive Engineer, Electricity Transmission Ist U.P. Electricity Board, Allahabad and another, [(2001) 1 U.P.L.B.E.C. 8691], while dealing with two wifes wherein the nomination was in favour of the second wife it was held that it cannot defeat the claim of the legally wedded wife, only legally wedded wife is entitled to retiral benefits and provident fund and appointment under Dying-in-Harness Rules.
Similarly, view was expressed in Poonam Devi (Smt.) Versus Chief Engineer, Electricity Board and others, [(2004) 3 U.P.L.B.E.C 2292].
In G.L. Bhatia v. Union of India and another, 2000(1) ESC 135 (SC), the Supreme Court held that if a nomination is made contrary to statutory provision, it would be inoperative. In the facts of that case, the husband of the deceased employee claimed family pension while nomination was not in his favour. The authorities rejected the claim of the husband for the reason that he was staying separately from the wife and thus was not entitled to family pension. The Apex Court held that the husband was entitled to family pension, where the rights of the authorities are governed by statutory provisions, the individual nomination contrary to the statute will not operate.
Allahabad High Court
Manno Singh vs State Of U.P. & Others on 11 September, 2014
Bench: Suneet Kumar
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 23388 of 2012
Citation:I(2015)DMC 654 ALL
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Whether nomination for pension in favour of second wife is valid?

 In fact, Bimla Devi respondent, the second wife, legally has no status and cannot claim any share in the estate of deceased Nanak Chand as her marriage is void ab initio in view of Sections 5 and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
As Smt. Bimla Devi is not the legally wedded wife of deceased Nanak Chand, therefore, there could not be a valid nomination in her favour for the payment of the pension. Please see : Rampyari Bai v. Municipal Corporation and Anr. Even otherwise also the nominee is the trustee for the rightful claimants. Further on examination of the facts on record, we have found that the facts in this case are almost akin to the facts, in Rameshwari Devi v. State of Bihar and Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 431 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that during the subsistence of first marriage, the children born out of second marriage are legitimate as per the provisions of Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956, though the second marriage itself is void. However, the minor children of the second marriage are entitled to the family pension but not the second widow. While upholding the decision of the Division Bench of Patna High Court which had upheld the view of the Single Judge that first wife and minor children from the second wife, would share the family pension of the deceased to the extent of 50:50. Therefore, taking assistance from the above legal position, settled by the Supreme Court, we hold Premi Devi entitled for 50% of the pensionary benefits and the children from the second wife Smt. Bimla Devi, namely, Santosh and Rajesh Kumar to the extent of 50%.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Decided On: 18.12.2006
Appellants: Smt. Premi Devi
Vs.
Respondent: Director of Directorate General Boarder and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Deepak Gupta and S.S. Thakur, JJ.
Citation:2008(1) CIVILLJ419
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Monday, 4 April 2016

When all directors of company can not be directed to pay compounding fees for compounding offences under Legal Metrology Act, 2009?

On hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on a perusal of the provisions of The Legal Metrology Act, 2009, it appears  that the Authorities were not justified in directing all the Directors of the petitioner-company to pay the compounding fees, specially when the petitioner-company had nominated the Director under Section 49(2) of the Act. It is rightly submitted on behalf of the petitioner-
company that when only the director nominated under Section 49(2) of the Act and the Company could have been proceeded against and punished under Section 49(1) of the Act, there was no propriety in seeking the compounding fees from all the Directors of the petitioner-company,. Under Section 49(1) of the Act, only the nominated Director and the Company is deemed to be guilty of the offence and is liable to be proceeded against and punished. Since, the petitioner-company had nominated the Director under Section 49(2) and since, the nomination was certified by the Director of the Legal Metrology, only the nominated Director and the Company could have been proceeded against and punished. If, the other Directors could not have been proceeded against under Section 49(1) after the nomination of the Director under Section 49(2), the imposition of the compounding charges on the other Directors of the Company was not justified. The Appellate Authority-Deputy Controller of Legal Metrology could not not have held that all the Directors of the  petitioner-company were liable to pay the compounding fees, as the provisions of Sections 48 and 49 of the Legal Metrology Act, 2009 are distinct and separate. If only the nominated Director of the Company and the Company could have been proceeded against and punished, the other Directors of the Company could not have been directed to pay the compounding fees. The provisions of Section 49(4) of the Act cannot be relied on, for supporting the impugned order, as it is not the case of the respondents that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to the neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer, not being a person nominated under sub-section (2) of Section 49 of the Act. In the absence of any allegation in regard to the commission of the offence by any director, manager, secretary or other officer, not being the person nominated under Section 49(2) of the Act, it cannot be said that the compounding charges should have been paid by all the Directors of the Company. Also, if compounding is permissible after the institution of the prosecution and if the prosecution could have been instituted only against the nominated Director, there was no propriety in directing all the Directors of the Company to pay the compounding fees.
Bombay High Court
Maruti Suzuki India Ltd vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr on 5 February, 2015
Bench: V.A. Naik
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION 
WRIT PETITION NO.2444 OF 2014

Citation 2016(1) ALLMR 681
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Tuesday, 26 January 2016

Whether Nominee can exclude legal heirs of deceased from getting insurance amount?

Insofar as the merits of the order of the High Court is
concerned, the sole question involved is whether the suit
property was purchased by Rama Vidyarthi, (defendant
No.1) out of the joint family funds or from her own income.
The affidavit of Rama Vidyarthi in Suit No. 147 of 1968 filed
by Savitri Vidyarthi discloses that she was looking after the
family as the Manager taking care of the respondent No.1,
her step son i.e. the son of the first wife of Hari Shankar
Vidyarthi. In the said affidavit, it is also admitted that she
had received the insurance money following the death of
Hari Shankar Vidyarthi and the same was used for the
purchase of the suit property along with other funds which
she had generated on her own. The virtual admission by the
predecessor-in-interest of the appellant of the use of the
insurance money to acquire the suit property is significant.
Though the claim of absolute ownership of the suit property
had been made by Rama Vidyarthi in the aforesaid affidavit,
the said claim is belied by the true legal position with regard
to the claims/entitlement of the other legal heirs to the
insurance amount. Such amounts constitute the
entitlement of all the legal heirs of the deceased though the
same may have been received by Rama Vidyarthi as the
nominee of her husband. The above would seem to follow
from the view expressed by this Court in Smt. Sarbati Devi
& Anr. vs. Smt. Usha Devi 1984 (1) SCC 424
 which is extracted below.
(Paragraph 12)
“12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance
in this case which dissuades us
from taking a view contrary to the decisions of
all other High Courts and accepting the view
expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two
recent judgments delivered in the year 1978
and in the year 1982. The Act has been in
force from the year 1938 and all along almost
all the High Courts in India have taken the
view that a mere nomination effected under
Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their
rights in the amount payable under a life insurance
policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen
to make any amendment to the Act. In such a
situation unless there are strong and compelling
reasons to hold that all these decisions
are wholly erroneous, the Court should be
slow to take a different view. The reasons
given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing.
We, therefore, hold that the judgments of
the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case and
in Uma Sehgal case do not lay down the law
correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We
approve the views expressed by the other High
Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the
Act and hold that a mere nomination made
under Section 39 of the Act does not have the

effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial
interest in the amount payable under the
life insurance policy on the death of the assured.
The nomination only indicates the
hand which is authorised to receive the
amount, on the payment of which the insurer
gets a valid discharge of its liability under the
policy. The amount, however, can be claimed
by the heirs of the assured in accordance with
the law of succession governing them.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3162-3163 OF 2010
SHREYA VIDYARTHI ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
ASHOK VIDYARTHI & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS
Citation; AIR 2016 SC139
Dated;DECEMBER 16, 2015.

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