Bombay HC: When prosecution has failed to prove motive or intention to commit murder?

The alleged motive behind the incident does not appear to be natural and probable. The informant states that the respondents uttered that he had become arrogant and started giving sword blows on his person. When, in what manner and what arrogance was shown by the informant is not made clear before the Court. The informant could have made mention of certain prior incident on the basis of which it could have been inferred that the respondents were prompted to cause deadly assault on the informant. There is absolutely nothing on record to show as to why the respondents would think of killing the informant. Thus, the very ingredient of the offence punishable under Section 307 of the LP. Code, i.e. intention to commit murder, is not established by the prosecution. {Para 19}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Appeal No. 109 of 1999

Decided On: 08.09.2016

The State of Maharashtra Vs. Shivaji and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sambhaji Shiwaji Shinde and Sangitrao S. Patil, JJ.

Author: Sangitrao S. Patil, J.

Citation: 2016 ALL M R (Cri) 4436,MANU/MH/2424/2016.

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Distinguishing Murder from Culpable Homicide: A Supreme Court Clarification on Intention and Knowledge

 A Supreme Court Analysis of the Critical Distinction Under Sections 302 and 304 IPC

Citation: Nandkumar @ Nandu Manilal Mudaliar v. State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 1302 | Bench: N.V. Anjaria, J. and K. Vinod Chandran, J.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

The Opening Shot: Facts That Changed a Life Sentence

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Closing the Loophole: The Virsa Singh Doctrine and the End of Intent-Based Defenses

The Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1958) case is a foundational judgment of the Supreme Court of India that fundamentally shaped the interpretation of murder under Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. This landmark ruling established crucial principles regarding criminal liability that continue to guide Indian criminal jurisprudence today.

Background and Facts

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances accused can be convicted for murder even if prosecution fails to prove his intention to commit murder?

Now, the question is whether in the present case, the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder is made out. Obviously in this case, none of the exceptions to Section 300 are applicable. The issue which is required to be examined is whether the case will be covered by "thirdly" in Section 300. On this aspect, we will make a reference to a decision of this Court in the case of Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab   MANU/SC/0041/1958 : AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 SCR 1495 which has stood the test of time.

Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the said decision which are locus classicus read thus:

12. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case Under Section 300, "Thirdly";

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;

Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations.

Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.

Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and,

Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.

13. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder Under Section 300, "Thirdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional."

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1519 of 2021 

Decided On: 30.11.2021

Vinod Kumar Vs. Amritpal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ajay Rastogi and Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1167/2021

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What is the difference between motive and intention of crime as per indian law?

 In Indian criminal law, motive and intention are distinct concepts that serve different purposes in determining criminal liability. While often used interchangeably in casual conversation, they have specific legal meanings and implications.

Definitions

Intention refers to the immediate, explicit purpose or goal behind an act—the conscious decision or objective that drives an individual to perform a particular action. It represents the deliberate mental state that accompanies an action at the moment it is undertaken. For example, when someone buys a knife, the intention might be to use it for cooking, self-defense, or causing harm.

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Bombay HC: Offence of outraging modesty of a lady depends on intention or knowledge of accused and feeling of woman

From bare reading of the Section, which is identically worded as Section 509 of IPC, the essential ingredients noted are as below :-

i. Intention to insult the modesty of a woman;

ii. The insult must be caused by :

a. uttering any words, or making any sound

b. or gesture.

c. or exhibiting any object

intending that such word or sound shall be heard or that the gesture or object shall be seen by such woman, or

iii. Intruding upon the privacy of such a woman.

The aforesaid provision comprise of three pivotal components for establishing an offence; firstly, the presence of an intention to insult the modesty of a woman; secondly, the manner in which this insult is perpetrated and thirdly, though independently, an intrusion on her privacy, where it is not restricted to utterance or gesture, as it is not qualified by any prescribed manner.

15. In Major Singh (supra), while answering the question whether the Respondent who caused injury to the private parts of a female child of seven and half months is guilty under Section 354 of the Penal Code, an offence of outraging the modesty of a woman, which involves assault or use of criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, Chief Justice A.K. Sarkar, opined that the offence does not depend on the reaction of the woman subjected to the assault or use of criminal force, as the Section contemplate that the act has to be done "intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty" and this intention or knowledge is the ingredient of the offence and not the woman's feeling.

In no uncertain terms, the necessary ingredients of the said offence were carved out in the following words :-

"It would follow that if the intention or knowledge was not proved, proof of the fact that the woman felt that her modesty had been outraged would not satisfy the necessary ingredient of the offence. Likewise, if the intention or knowledge was proved, the fact that the woman did not feel that her modesty had been outraged would be irrelevant, for the necessary ingredient would then have been proved. The sense of modesty in all women is of course not the same; it varies from woman to woman. In many cases, the woman's sense of modesty would not be known to others. If the test of the offence was the reaction of the woman, then it would have to be proved that the offender knew the standard of the modesty of the woman concerned, as otherwise, it could not be proved that he had intended to outrage "her" modesty...."

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 3858 of 2024

Decided On: 09.12.2024

Ratnadeep Ram Patil Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre and Manjusha Ajay Deshpande, JJ.

Author: Bharati H. Dangre, J.

 Citation: 2024:BHC-AS:48668-DB, MANU/MH/7471/2024.

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What is distinction between guilty intention and guilty knowledge as mentioned in part 1 and part 2 of S 304 of IPC and how it affects punishment which can be awarded to accused?

 60. Few important principles of law discernible from the

aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:-

(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what

offence the accused could be said to have committed, the

true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the

accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was

such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of

the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single

injury was caused. To illustrate : 'A' is bound hand and foot.

'B' comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A',

shoots 'A' in his head killing him instantaneously. Here,

there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B'

in shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single injury was

caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling

within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another

instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while

the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest

of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and

runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was

found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause

death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B'

intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be

caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in

the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would

bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the

IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although

only single injury was caused.

(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused

may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC,

the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder,

will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's

case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in

that section. In the event of the case falling within any of

those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide

not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section

304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall

within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would

be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as

to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the

intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that

only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be

attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the

IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable

homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of

the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section,

if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it

would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case

fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.

(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person

falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable

homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is

punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however,

it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the

second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part

of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’

whereas the second part would apply when there is no such

intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.

(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury

was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in

the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the

requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are

fulfilled and the offence would be murder.

(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes

of cases: (i) when the case falls under one or the other of

the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the

exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not

of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the

expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to

cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is

generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and

the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the

IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that

death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause

death or an injury likely to cause death.

To put it more succinctly, the difference between

the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the

first part, the crime of murder is first established and the

accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to

Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the

crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for

the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence

punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC,

the accused need not bring his case within one of the

exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.

(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished

from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even

or greater than its not happening, we may say that the

thing will 'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the

court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and

then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by

the act he was likely to cause death.

(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299

of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always

to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge

under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of

unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide

amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder

would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case

is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the

IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are

pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on

record, the prosecution must still be required under the law

to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section

300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the

prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any

one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely,

1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out

and the case may be one of culpable homicide not

amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the

IPC.

(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens

rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the

assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the

deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct

evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn

from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must

necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used,

part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force

used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the

circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.

(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a

culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury

or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to

cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if

death has actually been caused and intention to cause such

injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts

resulting in the injury or injuries.

(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in

the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle,

can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to

cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in

the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the

required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which

has to be determined on the facts of each case.

(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the

intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily

injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the

ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he

inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the

victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of

Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.

(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had

guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a

single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient

in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact

that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight

or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury

was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a

simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty

knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304

Part II of the IPC.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2043 OF 2023

ANBAZHAGAN Vs THE STATE 

Author: J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :

Dated: JULY 20, 2023.

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Whether the court can hold that the accused caused the death of the victim by accident by relying on his statement made immediately after the incident as res gestae?

 We will also examine the effect of such statements assuming that the same were really made. These statements were allegedly made immediately after the incident. The statements do have a connection with the incident. The statements were allegedly made spontaneously. Therefore, the Courts have treated the statements as relevant by invoking the doctrine of res gestae incorporated in Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. We have held that the theory of the prosecution that the Appellant fired intentionally has not been established. The Appellant was instructed by PW-12 to go to the deceased and to prevent him from continuing the use of the telephone. Therefore, he went near the deceased. It is the reaction or the action of the deceased which resulted in the SAF getting entangled with the chain attached to the Appellant's belt; which led to the accidental fire from SAF. Therefore, the Accused spontaneously reacted by telling PW- 12 what she has got done from him. While implementing the direction issued by PW-12, the accidental fire took place and that is how the Appellant became responsible for the death. It is in this context that the reaction of the Appellant has to be understood. By those words, he has blamed the PW-12. The statement attributed to PW-12 means that she would support the Appellant before the Court by telling the truth. If the theory of accidental firing is accepted, the interpretation of the aforesaid statements as made by us becomes a possible interpretation which is consistent with normal human conduct.

{Para 17}

18. Section 6 of the Evidence Act and illustration (a) below Section 6 read thus:

6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction.--Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.

Illustrations

(a) A is Accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or the by-standers at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact.

PW-5 and PW-13 have attributed the aforesaid statements mentioned in paragraph 16 above to the Appellant and PW-12 Shashi Bala which were immediately made after the incident of firing. The alleged statements are certainly connected with the fact in issue, namely, the alleged act of the Appellant of killing the deceased. Therefore, assuming that the statements attributed to the Appellant and PW-12 were in fact made, the conduct of the Appellant of making the said statement becomes relevant in view of Section 6. Section 5 of the Evidence Act provides that evidence may be given in a proceeding of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue and of such other facts which are declared to be relevant under the provisions of Chapter II of the Evidence Act, 1872. Section 6 is applicable to facts which are not in issue. Such facts become relevant only when the same satisfy the tests laid down in Section 6. Hence, the statement of an Accused to which Section 6 is applicable cannot be treated as a confession of guilt. The statement becomes relevant which can be read in evidence as it shows the conduct of the Appellant immediately after the incident. In any case, in the facts of the case, we have held that the version of the two witnesses who have deposed about the Appellant making such statement does not inspire confidence.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2390 of 2010

Decided On: 17.07.2023

 Arvind Kumar  Vs.  State of NCT, Delhi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0772/2023.

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Supreme court: Circumstances From Which Intention To Cause Death Can Be Gathered

  In the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider the case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and the intention to cause death. It was observed and held by this Court that the intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows.  The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.”In paragraph 29, it was observed as under:

“29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE M.R. SHAH JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA

The State of Uttarakhand Vs. Sachendra Singh Rawat

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 143 OF 2022

4th February 2022

Author: M.R. SHAH, J.

Citation: 2022 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 126

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What is importance of intention in determining whether an offence is murder or culpable homicide?

 The decision in State of Andhra Pradesh v Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr 1976 (4) SCC 382 notes the important distinction between the two provisions, and their differing, but subtle distinction. The court pertinently pointed out that:

"12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, "culpable homicide" is genus and "murder" its specie. All "murder" is "culpable homicide" but not vice- versa.

Speaking generally, "culpable homicide" sans "special characteristics of murder", is "culpable homicide not amounting to murder". For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is,

what may be called, "culpable homicide of the first degree". This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as "murder". The second may be termed as "culpable homicide of the second degree". This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is "culpable homicide of the third degree". This is the lowest type of culpable

homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304..

13. The considerations that should weigh with courts, in discerning whether an act is punishable as murder, or culpable homicide, not amounting to murder, were outlined in Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v State of Andhra Pradesh5. This court observed that:

"29. Therefore, the Court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant

matters - plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance

of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and

group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed,

jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no

intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be

criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder

where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to

put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts

to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are not

converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of

culpable homicide not amounting to murder are treated as murder punishable

under Section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally

from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other,

circumstances; (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was

carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow

is aimed at a vital part of the body;(iv) the amount of force employed in

causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or

sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or

whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior

enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger;(viii) whether there was any

grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix)

whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the

injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual

manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The

above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be

several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which

may throw light on the question of intention.”

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 856 of 2021

MOHD. RAFIQ @ KALLU Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Author: S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

Dated: September 15, 2021.

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Whether court can quash prosecution for abetment of suicide if suicide note bears name of accused?

We now consider the facts of the present case. There are definite allegations that the first Respondent would keep on calling the wife of the victim on her mobile and keep harassing her which allegations are supported by the statements of the mother and the wife of the victim recorded during investigation. The record shows that 3-4 days prior to the suicide there was an altercation between the victim and the first Respondent. In the light of these facts, coupled with the fact that the suicide note made definite allegation against first Respondent, the High Court was not justified in entering into question whether the first Respondent had the requisite intention to aid or instigate or abate the commission of suicide. At this juncture when the investigation was yet to be completed and charge-sheet, if any, was yet to be filed, the High Court ought not to have gone into the aspect whether there was requisite mental element or intention on part of the Respondent.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1487 of 2018 

Decided On: 28.11.2018

 Narayan Malhari Thorat  Vs.  Vinayak Deorao Bhagat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U.U. Lalit and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/1355/2018

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Whether the bank manager refusing to sanction loan can be held guilty for abetment of suicide?

Law is well crystallized by various pronouncements of

the Honourable Apex Court and of this Court. It would be useful

to have a reference of few cases of the Honourable Apex Court

without detailing facts in those cases:

(1) Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of

Madhya Pradesh, reported at 2002(3) Cri.L.J.

2796,

(2) Madan Mohan Singh vs. State of Gujarat and

anr, reported at 2010 ALL MR (Cri) 3245 (SC).

13. One of leading case on this issue is, Dilip s/o Ramrao

Shirasao and ors vs. State of Maharashtra and anr reported at 2016

ALL MR (Cri) 4328, this Court discussed in detail various

pronouncements of the Honourable Apex Court. The ratio of the

said is that it is incumbent upon prosecution to at least show prima

facie case that accused had an intention to aid or instigate or abet

deceased to commit suicide. In the absence of availability of such

material, the accused cannot be compelled to face trial for the

offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code.

14. Admittedly, in this case, the Loan Account of the

complainant was showing outstanding to the tune of

Rs.2,32,689/-. The said aspect is not denied by the prosecution.

Sudhir Gawande, the deceased, was not having any loan

outstanding in his name. Even, according to the prosecution,

Sudhir Gawande, the deceased, went to the Bank of Maharashtra,

Morshi Branch, District Amravati for loan. If previous loan amount

is outstanding and if the applicant, who is Branch Manager of the

said Bank, is refusing to grant any further loan, can be said as act

of a vigilant and prudent banker and if he is not granting any

further loan, it cannot be termed that by such act he instigated

and/or abetted the person to commit suicide.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,

NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR

CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) NO.63 OF 2016

Santoshkumar Raj Kishor Prasad Singh, Vs  The State of Maharashtra 

CORAM : V.M.DESHPANDE, &

ANIL S.KILOR, JJ.

DATE : SEPTEMBER 9, 2020.

ORAL JUDGMENT (Per : V.M.Deshpande, J.)

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Bombay HC: Factors to be considered by the court to ascertain that accused intended to cause death of victim

The intention to
cause death can be gathered generally from a
combination of a few or several of the following,
among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the
weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was
carried by the accused or was picked up from the
spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital
part of the body; (iv) the amount of force
employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act
was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden
fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the
incident occurs by chance or whether there was
any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any
prior enmity or whether the deceased was a
stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and
sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such
provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of
passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the
injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in
a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the
accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The
above list of circumstances is, of course, not
exhaustive and there may be several other special
circumstances with reference to individual cases
which may throw light on the question of
intention. Be that as it may.”

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 314 OF 2018

Mr. Hivraj Kewatram Uikey, Vs   State of Maharashtra,

CORAM :- A. S. CHANDURKAR AND
AMIT B. BORKAR, JJ.
DATE :- 14.08.2020
 (PER : AMIT B. BORKAR, J.):-

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Whether accused can be held guilty for the offence of murder if he had no intention to cause death?

In this backdrop, the short question which falls for consideration is whether the Appellant's act of causing death of Smt. Anita and Khushal Singh tantamounts to offence of 'murder' as held by the trial court and the High Court or any lesser offence as urged by Shri Siddharth Luthra, learned senior Counsel for the Appellant. Sections 299 as well as 300, Indian Penal Code provide for situations in which death is caused by an act with the intention of causing death or such bodily injury which the offender knows is likely to cause death. Both Sections 299 and 300 deal with instances in which death is caused by an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of the person to whom injury is inflicted. These provisions also deal with cases where there is no intention of either causing death or a bodily injury which is ordinarily sufficient to cause death. The absence of intention to cause death or bodily injury which is in the ordinary course of nature likely to cause death is, therefore, not conclusive. What is required to be seen is whether the act is one where the offender must be deemed to have had the knowledge that he was likely, by such act, to cause death.

 The Appellant is, thus, guilty of an act, the likely consequences of which including causing fatal injuries to the persons being in a close circuit, are attributable to him. The offence committed by the Appellant, thus, would amount to 'culpable homicide' within the meaning of Section 299, though punishable Under Section 304 Part 2 of the Indian Penal Code.

17. Incidents of celebratory firing are regretfully rising, for they are seen as a status symbol. A gun licensed for self-protection or safety and security of crops and cattle cannot be fired in celebratory events, it being a potential cause of fatal accidents. Such like misuse of fire arms convert a happy event to a pall of gloom. Appellant cannot escape the consequences of carrying the gun with live cartridges with the knowledge that firing at a marriage ceremony with people present there was imminently dangerous and was likely to cause death.

 Everybody, who carries a gun with live cartridges and even others know that firing a gun and that too in the presence of several people is an act, is likely to cause death, as indeed it did. Guns must be carried with a sense of responsibility and caution and are not meant to be used in such places like marriage ceremonies.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 407 of 2020 

Decided On: 18.03.2020

 Bhagwan Singh  Vs. State of Uttarakhand

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.A. Bobde, C.J.I., B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ.

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Whether Intention to aid commission of offence is essential for conviction of accused U/S.12 of Prevention of corruption Act?

Hon'ble Apex Court found that merely because he was entrusted with
some money to be passed on the accused No.1, it could not be held that
he was guilty of any one of the offences unless it was established that
he was party to the alleged understanding arrived at between
complainant and accused No.1. Hon'ble Apex Court also found that
arrangement if any was between accused No.1 and complainant and
accused No.2 was not party to it.
18. Facts of matter at hand are identical. Here complainant or
panch witness PW3
do not depose that they informed the appellant
that Rs.1500/was
being deposited with him for its transmission to
deceased accused No.1. In this respect, perusal of Section 12 of 1988

Act becomes essential. It contemplates abetment of any offence
punishable under 1988 Act. Hon'ble Apex Court has in the matter of
Central Bureau of Investigation .Vs..Shukla and Ors. reported in
(1998) 3 SCC 410 considered the provisions of section 12 of
Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. Relevant discussion is contained
in paragraph No.50 and 51. Hon'ble Larger Bench of Apex Court finds
that as ''abetment'' is not defined under Prevention of Corruption Act,
it has to refer to its exhaustive definition in Section 107 of Indian
Penal Code. Discussion by Hon'ble Court shows that for first two
clauses of Section 107 of Indian Penal Code, it it not necessary that
offence instigated should have been committed. While considering
clause (iii) of Section 107, Hon'ble Apex Court took aid of explanation
of (2) and arrived at findings that when a person abets by aiding, the
act so aided should have been committed in order to make such aiding
an offence. Said paragraph No.50 reads as under:''
Undoubtedly for a person to be guilty
thereunder it is not necessary that the offences
mentioned therein should have been committed
pursuant to the ''abetment''. Since ''abetment'' has
not been defined under the Prevention of
Corruption Act we may profitabley refer to its
exhaustive definition in Section 107 of the Indian
Penal Code. As per that Section a person abets
the doing of a thing when he does any of the acts
mentioned in the following three clauses;
(i) instigates any person to do that thing, or
(ii) engages with one or more other person or

persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that
thing ........, or
(iii) intentionally aids, by any act or illegal
omission, the doing of that thing.
So far as the first two clauses are concerned it is
not necessary that the offence instigated should
have been committed. For understanding the
scope of the word "aid" in the third clause it
would be advantageous to see Explanation 2 in
Section 107 I.P.C. which reads thus:
''Explanation 2.Whoever,
either prior to or at the
time of the commission of an act, does any thing
in order to facilitate the commission of that act,
and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is
said to aid the doing of that act."
It is thus clear that under the third clause that
when a person abets by aiding, the act so aided
should have been committed in order to make
such aiding an offence. In other words, unlike the
first two clauses the third clause applies to a case
where the offence is committed''.
19. These observations of Hon'ble Apex Court also apply in
present facts. It was never the case of prosecution that the appellant
instigated complainant to pay bribe or then engaged himself and
conspired to facilitate receipt of bribe. In fact there is no charge of
conspiracy at all. The only remaining part therefore, is of aiding and,
the provisions of Clause III
of section107 show that aiding has to be
with intention. Facts necessary to demonstrate that the appellant was
dwelling under such intention are not brought on record. Prosecution

has only established the payment of Rs.1500/by
complainant to
appellant. However, its nature as bribe could not be established.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 408 OF 2005

Abdul  Mannan Mohd.Yusuf  Vs  The  State of Maharashtra,

CORAM
: B.P. DHARMADHIKARI , J.
DATED : 16.05.2019

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Whether Venue of arbitration can change intention of parties to vest jurisdiction in courts of specific region?

A perusal of the above rule shows that the place or venue "shall be India" i.e. any place in India could be the seat. However, for convenience the venue where arbitration was to be held was the office of the CAI. While the Rules and the By-laws of the CAI are applicable for the purpose of appointing of the tribunal, for holding of the proceedings and other procedural matters, the contract clearly expresses the intention of the parties to vest exclusive jurisdiction in Delhi Courts, for any issues arising out of the arbitration proceedings or the award. This clause brooks no ambiguity or vagueness. Thus, unlike a court jurisdiction clause, the parties clearly vested the Courts in Delhi with supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings. The venue cannot change the intention of the parties to vest the Courts in Delhi with exclusive jurisdiction.

Delhi High Court

Spentex Industries Ltd. vs Louis Dreyfus Commodities India ... on 22 February, 2019

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Virsa Singh's judgment on essential ingredients of offence of murder

This Judgment is landmark as after Judgement in this case intention became important for determining whether it is murder or not.

To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under s. 300, "3rdly";

22. First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.

23. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations.

24. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.

25. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and.

26. Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.

This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.

27. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under s. 300, 3rdly.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 1957

Decided On: 11.03.1958

Virsa Singh Vs. The State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.B. Gajendragadkar, Syed Jaffer Imam and Vivian Bose, JJ.

Citation:1958 CriLJ 818 

Vivian Bose, J.

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Whether accused can be held guilty for attempt to murder if he has not caused grievous hurt?

 The evidence establishes that the injuries were caused by a fire-arm. The multiplicity of wounds indicates that the respondent fired at the injured more than once. The fact that hurt has been caused by the respondent is sufficiently proven. The lack of forensic evidence to prove grievous or a life-threatening injury cannot be a basis to hold that Section 307 is inapplicable. This proposition of law has

been elucidated by a two-judge bench of this Court in Pasupuleti Siva Ramakrishna Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh  (2014) 5 SCC 369 :
“18. There is no merit in the contention that the statement of medical officer that there is no danger to life unless there is dislocation or rupture of the thyroid bone due to strangulation means that the accused did not intend, or have the knowledge, that their act would cause death. The circumstances of this case clearly attract the second part of this section since the act resulted in Injury 5 which is a ligature mark of 34 cm × 0.5 cm. It must be noted that Section 307 IPC provides for imprisonment for life if the act causes “hurt”. It does not require that the hurt should be grievous or of any particular degree. The intention to cause death is clearly attributable to the accused since the victim was strangulated after throwing a telephone wire around his neck and telling him that he should die. We also do not find any merit in the contention on behalf of the accused that there was no intention to cause death because the victim admitted that the accused were not armed with weapons. Very few persons would normally describe the Thums up bottle and a telephone wire used, as weapons. That the victim honestly admitted that the accused did not have any weapons cannot be held against him and in favour of the accused.” (Emphasis supplied)
17 In the present case, the nature of the injuries shows that there were eleven punctured wounds. The weapon of offence was a firearm. The circumstances of the case clearly indicate that there was an intention to murder. The presence of 11 punctured and bleeding wounds as well as the use of a fire arm leave no doubt that there was an intention to murder. Thus, the second part of Section 307 of the Penal Code is attracted in the present case. The judgement of the High Court overlooks material parts of the evidence and suffers from perversity.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1589 OF 2018

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Vs KANHA @OMPRAKASH 
Dated:February 04, 2019.

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

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What are essential ingredients of offence U/S 366 of IPC?

In the above backdrop, it is pertinent to mention here the ingredients of Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code which are as under:

366 "Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.--Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent do ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable as aforesaid.

In order to constitute the offence of 'abduction' a person must be carried off illegally by force or deception, that is, to compel a person by force or deceitful means to induce to go from one place to another. The intention of the Accused is the basis and the gravamen of an offence under this Section. The volition, the intention and the conduct of the Accused determine the offence; they can only bear upon the intent with which the Accused kidnapped or abducted the woman, and the intent of the Accused is the vital question for determination in each case. Once the necessary intent of the Accused is established, the offence is complete, whether or not the Accused succeeded in effecting his purpose, and whether or not the woman consented to the marriage or the illicit intercourse.

11. Apart from this, to constitute an offence Under Section 366 Indian Penal Code, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the Accused induced the complainant woman or compelled by force to go from any place, that such inducement was by deceitful means, that such abduction took place with the intent that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse and/or that the Accused knew it to be likely that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse as a result of her abduction. Mere abduction does not bring an Accused under the ambit of this penal section. So far as charge Under Section 366 Indian Penal Code is concerned, mere finding that a woman was abducted is not enough, it must further be proved that the Accused abducted the woman with the intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. Unless the prosecution proves that the abduction is for the purposes mentioned in Section 366 Indian Penal Code, the Court cannot hold the Accused guilty and punish him Under Section 366 Indian Penal Code.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 459 of 2016

Decided On: 24.04.2018

Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani  Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Sikri and R.K. Agrawal, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 6 SCC 664

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What is scope of intention or knowldge for proving offence under SC &ST Atrocities Act?

Prior to the Amendment Act 1 of 2016, the words used in Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act are "...... on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe".

6. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act has now been amended by virtue of Amendment Act 1 of 2016. By way of this amendment, the words "....... on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe" have been substituted with the words "........ knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe". Therefore, if subsequent to 26.01.2016 (i.e. the day on which the amendment came into effect), an offence under Indian Penal Code which is punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more, is committed upon a victim who belongs to SC/ST community and the Accused person has knowledge that such victim belongs to SC/ST community, then the charge of Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act is attracted. Thus, after the amendment, mere knowledge of the Accused that the person upon whom the offence is committed belongs to SC/ST community suffices to bring home the charge Under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.

7. In the present case, unamended Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act is applicable as the occurrence was on the night of 8/9.12.1995. From the unamended provisions of Section 3(2) (v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, it is clear that the statute laid stress on the intention of the Accused in committing such offence in order to belittle the person as he/she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1182 of 2015

Decided On: 08.12.2017

 Asharfi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ranjan Gogoi and R. Banumathi, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 1 SCC 742

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