Video article: The legacy of Basdev vs State of PEPSU is clear and enduring: voluntary intoxication is not an excuse.

 

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"I Was Drunk": Why Basdev vs The State Of Pepsu AIR 1956 SUPREME COURT 488 Means that This Defense Almost Never Works in India

 

Introduction: A Party, a Pistol, and a Landmark Judgment

Imagine a wedding celebration—the sounds of celebratory drums and loud music, dancing, and plentiful alcohol. Suddenly, a minor argument shatters the festive mood. A gunshot rings out, and in an instant, celebration turns into mourning. This tragic scene raises a difficult question: What happens when a serious crime is committed by someone so intoxicated they might not even be aware of their actions? Does the law see it as a tragic mistake or a calculated crime?

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Distinguishing Murder from Culpable Homicide: A Supreme Court Clarification on Intention and Knowledge

 A Supreme Court Analysis of the Critical Distinction Under Sections 302 and 304 IPC

Citation: Nandkumar @ Nandu Manilal Mudaliar v. State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 1302 | Bench: N.V. Anjaria, J. and K. Vinod Chandran, J.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

The Opening Shot: Facts That Changed a Life Sentence

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Bombay HC: Offence of outraging modesty of a lady depends on intention or knowledge of accused and feeling of woman

From bare reading of the Section, which is identically worded as Section 509 of IPC, the essential ingredients noted are as below :-

i. Intention to insult the modesty of a woman;

ii. The insult must be caused by :

a. uttering any words, or making any sound

b. or gesture.

c. or exhibiting any object

intending that such word or sound shall be heard or that the gesture or object shall be seen by such woman, or

iii. Intruding upon the privacy of such a woman.

The aforesaid provision comprise of three pivotal components for establishing an offence; firstly, the presence of an intention to insult the modesty of a woman; secondly, the manner in which this insult is perpetrated and thirdly, though independently, an intrusion on her privacy, where it is not restricted to utterance or gesture, as it is not qualified by any prescribed manner.

15. In Major Singh (supra), while answering the question whether the Respondent who caused injury to the private parts of a female child of seven and half months is guilty under Section 354 of the Penal Code, an offence of outraging the modesty of a woman, which involves assault or use of criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, Chief Justice A.K. Sarkar, opined that the offence does not depend on the reaction of the woman subjected to the assault or use of criminal force, as the Section contemplate that the act has to be done "intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty" and this intention or knowledge is the ingredient of the offence and not the woman's feeling.

In no uncertain terms, the necessary ingredients of the said offence were carved out in the following words :-

"It would follow that if the intention or knowledge was not proved, proof of the fact that the woman felt that her modesty had been outraged would not satisfy the necessary ingredient of the offence. Likewise, if the intention or knowledge was proved, the fact that the woman did not feel that her modesty had been outraged would be irrelevant, for the necessary ingredient would then have been proved. The sense of modesty in all women is of course not the same; it varies from woman to woman. In many cases, the woman's sense of modesty would not be known to others. If the test of the offence was the reaction of the woman, then it would have to be proved that the offender knew the standard of the modesty of the woman concerned, as otherwise, it could not be proved that he had intended to outrage "her" modesty...."

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 3858 of 2024

Decided On: 09.12.2024

Ratnadeep Ram Patil Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre and Manjusha Ajay Deshpande, JJ.

Author: Bharati H. Dangre, J.

 Citation: 2024:BHC-AS:48668-DB, MANU/MH/7471/2024.

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What is distinction between guilty intention and guilty knowledge as mentioned in part 1 and part 2 of S 304 of IPC and how it affects punishment which can be awarded to accused?

 60. Few important principles of law discernible from the

aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:-

(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what

offence the accused could be said to have committed, the

true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the

accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was

such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of

the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single

injury was caused. To illustrate : 'A' is bound hand and foot.

'B' comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A',

shoots 'A' in his head killing him instantaneously. Here,

there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B'

in shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single injury was

caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling

within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another

instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while

the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest

of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and

runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was

found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause

death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B'

intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be

caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in

the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would

bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the

IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although

only single injury was caused.

(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused

may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC,

the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder,

will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's

case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in

that section. In the event of the case falling within any of

those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide

not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section

304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall

within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would

be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as

to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the

intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that

only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be

attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the

IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable

homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of

the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section,

if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it

would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case

fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.

(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person

falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable

homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is

punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however,

it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the

second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part

of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’

whereas the second part would apply when there is no such

intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.

(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury

was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in

the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the

requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are

fulfilled and the offence would be murder.

(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes

of cases: (i) when the case falls under one or the other of

the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the

exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not

of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the

expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to

cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is

generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and

the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the

IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that

death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause

death or an injury likely to cause death.

To put it more succinctly, the difference between

the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the

first part, the crime of murder is first established and the

accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to

Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the

crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for

the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence

punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC,

the accused need not bring his case within one of the

exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.

(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished

from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even

or greater than its not happening, we may say that the

thing will 'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the

court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and

then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by

the act he was likely to cause death.

(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299

of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always

to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge

under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of

unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide

amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder

would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case

is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the

IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are

pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on

record, the prosecution must still be required under the law

to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section

300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the

prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any

one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely,

1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out

and the case may be one of culpable homicide not

amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the

IPC.

(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens

rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the

assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the

deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct

evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn

from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must

necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used,

part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force

used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the

circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.

(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a

culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury

or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to

cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if

death has actually been caused and intention to cause such

injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts

resulting in the injury or injuries.

(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in

the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle,

can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to

cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in

the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the

required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which

has to be determined on the facts of each case.

(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the

intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily

injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the

ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he

inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the

victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of

Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.

(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had

guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a

single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient

in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact

that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight

or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury

was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a

simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty

knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304

Part II of the IPC.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2043 OF 2023

ANBAZHAGAN Vs THE STATE 

Author: J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :

Dated: JULY 20, 2023.

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Whether accused can be held guilty for the offence of murder if he had no intention to cause death?

In this backdrop, the short question which falls for consideration is whether the Appellant's act of causing death of Smt. Anita and Khushal Singh tantamounts to offence of 'murder' as held by the trial court and the High Court or any lesser offence as urged by Shri Siddharth Luthra, learned senior Counsel for the Appellant. Sections 299 as well as 300, Indian Penal Code provide for situations in which death is caused by an act with the intention of causing death or such bodily injury which the offender knows is likely to cause death. Both Sections 299 and 300 deal with instances in which death is caused by an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of the person to whom injury is inflicted. These provisions also deal with cases where there is no intention of either causing death or a bodily injury which is ordinarily sufficient to cause death. The absence of intention to cause death or bodily injury which is in the ordinary course of nature likely to cause death is, therefore, not conclusive. What is required to be seen is whether the act is one where the offender must be deemed to have had the knowledge that he was likely, by such act, to cause death.

 The Appellant is, thus, guilty of an act, the likely consequences of which including causing fatal injuries to the persons being in a close circuit, are attributable to him. The offence committed by the Appellant, thus, would amount to 'culpable homicide' within the meaning of Section 299, though punishable Under Section 304 Part 2 of the Indian Penal Code.

17. Incidents of celebratory firing are regretfully rising, for they are seen as a status symbol. A gun licensed for self-protection or safety and security of crops and cattle cannot be fired in celebratory events, it being a potential cause of fatal accidents. Such like misuse of fire arms convert a happy event to a pall of gloom. Appellant cannot escape the consequences of carrying the gun with live cartridges with the knowledge that firing at a marriage ceremony with people present there was imminently dangerous and was likely to cause death.

 Everybody, who carries a gun with live cartridges and even others know that firing a gun and that too in the presence of several people is an act, is likely to cause death, as indeed it did. Guns must be carried with a sense of responsibility and caution and are not meant to be used in such places like marriage ceremonies.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 407 of 2020 

Decided On: 18.03.2020

 Bhagwan Singh  Vs. State of Uttarakhand

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.A. Bobde, C.J.I., B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ.

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Calcutta HC: Knowledge of commission of dacoity is necessary to attract penal liability for harbouring dacoits U/S. 216-A IPC

There is no evidence on
record that the appellant was aware that they were planning to commit
dacoity in the convent. Raucous and unbridled behaviour of the accused
persons during marriage or their expensive habits without anything more
would not create an irresistible inference in the mind of a reasonable man of
ordinary prudence that they were planning to commit dacoity in the
convent.
It is apposite to note that in Emperor the Court held penal liability
would not be attracted if a person harbours dacoits in general and it must
be proved that he had harboured such dacoits who intended to commit a
‘particular dacoity’. Knowledge of the appellant with regard to dacoity
conducted at the convent does not appear to be proved beyond doubt as
evidence of P.W. 11 is too vague to be convincing and the other evidence on
record do not inspire confidence to come to such conclusion.
In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion, that the
prosecution case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and the
appellant is entitled to get an order of acquittal.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Joymalya Bagchi
And
The Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur
C.R.A. 693 of 2017
With
CRAN 1241 of 2018

Gopal Sarkar  Vs. State of West Bengal

Judgment on : 20.12.2019
Joymalya Bagchi, J. :

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Whether suit for specific performance of contract can be filed after limitation if transfer of property was not communicated to plaintiff?

 It is contended by learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 that the suit was barred as the advance possession was given by the State Government in the year 1983 to the Town Improvement Trust but in the case, there is no evidence to prove the fact that the aforesaid so called transfer of possession, which was taken on the paper, was taken place in the knowledge of the appellant/plaintiff in absence of it this cannot be said that the suit of the appellant/plaintiff is time barred, therefore, learned trial Court has not committed any error holding that the suit is within time.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (JABALPUR BENCH)

First Appeal No. 646/2013

Decided On: 01.08.2019

 Adarsh Balak Mandir Vs. Chairman, Nagar Palika Parishad, Harda and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jagdish Prasad Gupta, J.

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Whether it is mandatory to report about occurrence of offence under POCSO Act after investigating facts?

The entire case set up against the Appellants is on the basis that when the victim was brought to the hospital her age was recorded as 18 years. On that basis Appellants could have gathered that at the time of conception she was less than 18 years and was, thus, a minor and, therefore, the Appellants should have taken due care in finding as to how the victim became pregnant. Fastening the criminal liability on the basis of the aforesaid allegation is too far-fetched. The provisions of Section 19(1), reproduced above, put a legal obligation on a person to inform the relevant authorities, inter alia, when he/she has knowledge that an offence under the Act had been committed. The expression used is "knowledge" which means that some information received by such a person gives him/her knowledge about the commission of the crime. There is no obligation on this person to investigate and gather knowledge. If at all, the Appellants were not careful enough to find the cause of pregnancy as the victim was only 18 years of age at the time of delivery. But that would not be translated into criminality.

10. The term "knowledge" has been interpreted by this Court in A.S. Krishnan and Ors. v. State of Kerala MANU/SC/0233/2004 : (2004) 11 SCC 576 to mean an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. Further, a person can be supposed to know only where there is a direct appeal to his senses. We have gone through the medical records of the victim which were referred by Mr. Basant R., Senior Advocate for the Appellants. The medical records, which are relied upon by the prosecution, only show that the victim was admitted in the hospital at 9.15 am and she immediately went into labour and at 9.25 am she gave birth to a baby. Therefore, Appellant No. 1 attended to the victim for the first time between 9.15 am and 9.25 am on 7th February, 2017. The medical records of the victim state that she was 18 years' old as on 7th February, 2017. Appellant No. 1 did not know that the victim was a minor when she had sexual intercourse.

11. Appellant No. 2 had not even examined the victim and was not in contact with the victim. As per the medical records relied upon by the prosecution, the baby was attended to by Appellant No. 2 at 5.30 pm on 7th February, 2017. He advised that the baby be given to the mother. Therefore, Appellant No. 2 had no occasion to examine/treat the victim.

12. Appellant No. 3 had not come in contact with the victim or the baby at all. Being the administrator of the hospital it was not possible for her to be aware of the details of each patient. Considering that the victim was brought to the said hospital for the first time on 7th February, 2017, it would not be possible for Appellant No. 3 to be aware of the circumstances surrounding the admission of the victim.

13. The knowledge requirement foisted on the Appellants cannot be that they ought to have deduced from circumstances that an offence has been committed.

14. Accordingly, we are of the view that there is no evidence to implicate the Appellants. Evidence should be such which should at least indicate grave suspicion. Mere likelihood of suspicion cannot be the reason to charge a person for an offence. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 961 of 2018 

Decided On: 01.08.2018

 Tessy Jose  Vs.  State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 18 SCC 292

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Whether person accused of offence under SC &SC (Atrocities) Act can be granted anticipatory bail?

 In the present FIR, absolutely there are no averments to

the effect that appellants-applicants are belonging from higher

caste or atleast that they are not a member of Scheduled Castes

or Scheduled Tribes. There are also no whisper in the FIR/

complaint that appellants had an knowledge that complainant

was from Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes community. It is

true that there are allegations that appellants hurled abuses to

the complainant on caste by saying “Bhil”. But, bare uttering

word “Bhil” would not sufficient to draw inference that appellants

had an knowledge or they were aware about the caste of

complainant, and therefore, they abused the complainant in the

name of her caste to insult or humiliate her within public view.

The possibility of uttering word “Bhil” during the course of hot

exchange of words may be to increase gravity of abuses and

make it more filthily. All these circumstances being prime and

basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(w)(i)(ii) of the Act of 1989 and

the absence of the same will have an serious impact as to the

allegations to constitute offence under Act of 1989.

11. In the matter-in-hand, as referred above, averments

in regard to appellants that they are not the member of

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes community or they are

belonging from higher caste, are totally absent in the alleged FIR.

In contrast, it reveals that appellant No. 1 is from Scheduled

Caste category. He produce the relevant document of his caste

on record. Therefore, the provisions of Act of 1989 do not attract

against appellant No.1-Avinash Chandra in the present matter.

Moreover, recitals of the FIR are silent to point out that the

appellants had an knowledge or aware about the caste of

complainant as she belongs to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled

Tribes community. The abuses by uttering words “Bhil” may be

towards act of abusing the complainant more filthily. Therefore,it

cannot be said that allegations nurtured on behalf of complainant

are sufficient to constitute the offence under the Act of 1989. In

the result, statutory bar under Section 18 of the Act of 1989,

would not set in operation to the facts and circumstances of the

present case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 276 OF 2019

 Avinash Prabhakar Chandra,  Vs  The State of Maharashtra,

CORAM : K.K. SONAWANE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 30th APRIL, 2019.

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Whether it is permissible for complainant to fill up details of cheque beyond knowledge of accused?

In other words it would be certainly unlawful if a complainant is allowed to fill up details of cheque beyond the knowledge of the accused such that filling up date and the amount in a blank cheque.

19. In this regard it would be useful to look into the decision of this Court reported in 2011 ACD 1326 (MADRAS) P. Krishnasamy v. Deltaknit Wearable's, wherein it was held that to presume under section 139 of the N.I Act due execution of Negotiable Instrument is to be proved. Due execution means not signing a cheque but mean to give a cheque in complete form towards a legally enforceable liability.

20. It would also be useful to look into a decision of Kerala High Court 2011 ACD 1136 relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2003) 8 SCC 745 : AIR 2004 SC 175 and (1996) 4 SCC 596 : AIR 1996 SC 2184 holding that the procedural approach as though mere production of cheque proves all the relevant facts which prosecution must establish in a prosecution is an incorrect approach.

21. Thus firstly the complainant must allege and prove the due execution of the cheque by accused and the allegations must be established by way of evidence. In the case on hand as stated above, the complainant had utterly failed to satisfy the Court that there was due execution of cheque. The figure denoting amount found to be written in different inks and the handwriting in as much as the digits and words also differs. The different ink, pen and manipulation of the amount would show that the complainant had failed to demonstrate due execution of the cheque. Therefore, I do not find any error or illegality over the impugned order of acquittal made by the lower appellate Court.

In the High Court of Madras

(Before M.V Muralidaran, J.)

E. Dhanuskodi  v.  D. Sreedhar 

Criminal Appeal No. 814 of 2011

Decided on November 8, 2018,

Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 5124

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Whether person refusing to accept registered letter is deemed to have knowledge of its contents?

 Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic-'Meaning of service by post' and says that where any Central Act or Regulation authorises or requires any document to be served by post, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting it by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The section thus arises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgement due is received from the addressee or not. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the contents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more. Similar presumption is raised under Illustration (f) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the Court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in a particular case, that is to say, when a letter is sent by post by pre-paying and properly addressing it the same has been received by the addressee . Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise. In the instant case, additionally, there was positive evidence of the postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually tendered by him to the appellant on November 10, 1966 but the appellant refused to accept. In other words, there was due service effected upon the appellant by refusal. In such circumstances, we are clearly of the view, that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice which he refused to accept. It is impossible to accept the contention that when factually there was refusal to accept the notice on the part of the appellant he could not be visited with the knowledge of the contents of the registered notice because, in our view, the presumption raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean service of everything that is contained in the notice. It is impossible to countenance the suggestion that before knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate person the contents should be read over to him by the postman or someone else. Such things do not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed envelope. It would, therefore, be reasonable to hold that when service is effected by refusal of a postal communication the addressee must be imputed, with the knowledge of the contents thereof and in our view, this follows upon the presumptions that are raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1402 of 1979

Decided On: 20.02.1981

 Harcharan Singh  Vs. Shivrani and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.D. Tulzapurkar, D.A. Desai and A.N. Sen, JJ.

Citation: (1981) 2 SCC 535

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How to ascertain limitation for cancellation of document executed due to force or fraud?

 In law, once documents are alleged by the appellant/plaintiff to be forged and fabricated documents, such a plea would ordinarily include challenge to the documents on the ground that the contents of the documents are not known to the appellant/plaintiff. Once the contents of the documents are not known, then the period of limitation can only start against the appellant/plaintiff to question the documents when the contents of the documents are known to her. This is clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the judgment in the case of Prem Singh and Others v. Birbal and Others (2006) 5 SCC 353 that a voidable document is a document which is sought to be cancelled under Article 59 of the Limitation Act whereas a void document need not be cancelled. It has also been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa and Others (1996) 7 SCC 767 that the starting point of limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act is the knowledge of the alleged fraud. The relevant paragraph of this judgment is para 6 and this para 6 reads as under:-
“6. The question, therefore, is as to whether Article 59 or Article 113 of the Schedule to the Act is applicable to the facts in this case. Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 had provided inter alia for suits to set aside decree obtained by fraud. There was no specific article to set aside a decree on any other ground. In such a case, the residuary Article 120 in Schedule III was attracted. The present Article 59 of the Schedule to the Act will govern any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground. Therefore, Article 59 would be applicable to any suit to set aside a decree either on fraud or any other ground. It is true that Article 59 would be applicable if a person affected is a party to a decree or an instrument or a contract. There is no dispute that Article 59 would apply to set aside the instrument, decree or contract between the inter se parties. The question is whether in case of person claiming title through the party to the decree or instrument or having knowledge of the instrument or decree or contract and seeking to avoid the decree by a specific declaration, whether Article 59 gets attracted? As stated earlier, Article 59 is a general provision. In a suit to set aside or cancel an instrument, a contract or a decree on the ground of fraud, Article 59 is attracted. The starting point of limitation is the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud. When the plaintiff seeks to establish his title to the property which cannot

be established without avoiding the decree or an instrument that stands as an insurmountable obstacle in his way which otherwise binds him, though not a party, the plaintiff necessarily has to seek a declaration and have that decree, instrument or contract cancelled or set aside or rescinded. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 regulates suits for cancellation of an instrument which lays down that any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable and who has a reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, can sue to have it adjudged void or voidable and the court may in its discretion so adjudge it and order it to be delivered or cancelled. It would thus be clear that the word „person‟ in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act is wide enough to encompass a person seeking derivative title from his seller. It would, therefore, be clear that if he seeks avoidance of the instrument, decree or contract and seeks a declaration to have the decrees set aside or cancelled he is necessarily bound to lay the suit within three years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the decree set aside, first became known to him.”
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
RFA No. 332/2018
Dated: 11th October, 2018 

ANITA RANI MANGLA  Vs BHAGWAT DAYAL 

 CORAM:  MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA 

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What is scope of intention or knowldge for proving offence under SC &ST Atrocities Act?

Prior to the Amendment Act 1 of 2016, the words used in Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act are "...... on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe".

6. Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act has now been amended by virtue of Amendment Act 1 of 2016. By way of this amendment, the words "....... on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe" have been substituted with the words "........ knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe". Therefore, if subsequent to 26.01.2016 (i.e. the day on which the amendment came into effect), an offence under Indian Penal Code which is punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more, is committed upon a victim who belongs to SC/ST community and the Accused person has knowledge that such victim belongs to SC/ST community, then the charge of Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act is attracted. Thus, after the amendment, mere knowledge of the Accused that the person upon whom the offence is committed belongs to SC/ST community suffices to bring home the charge Under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act.

7. In the present case, unamended Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act is applicable as the occurrence was on the night of 8/9.12.1995. From the unamended provisions of Section 3(2) (v) of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, it is clear that the statute laid stress on the intention of the Accused in committing such offence in order to belittle the person as he/she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1182 of 2015

Decided On: 08.12.2017

 Asharfi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ranjan Gogoi and R. Banumathi, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 1 SCC 742

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How a party can prove that he has not violated injunction order?

 It is, however, to be borne in mind that where a person who is not a party to the suit is proceeded against in order to punish him it is essential that he should be made a party to the proceeding for violation and it should be brought home by sufficient and unimpeachable evidence that he had been guilty of abetting violation of injunction. A party proceeded against for violation of injunction can prove his innocence in the following manner, i.e. by proving that (a) the order was not within knowledge, or (b) the order was ambiguous and was reasonably capable of more than one interpretation or (c) that in fact he did not intend to disobey the order, but conducted himself in accordance with his interpretation of the order. The question whether a party has understood an order in a particular manner, and has conducted himself in accordance with such a construction is primarily one of fact. The party setting up such a plea has to prove it.

Citation : AIR 1994 Ori 173

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA

Misc. Appeal No. 170 of 1990

Decided On: 04.01.1994

 Prafulla Kumar Mohapatra
Vs.
Jaya Krushna Mohapatra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.

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Whether a person can be held guilty for breach of injunction order even if he was not party to suit?

The respondent set up a case that the owner of the disputed premises is Smt. Savita Singh and the respondent No. 3 has denied to be present at the site during the period when the outlets in question were closed by filling earth. The architect who was working at the instance of respondent No. 3 had filed his affidavit and stated that he had filled the strip of land with earth at the instance of respondent No. 3. The respondent No. 3 stated that he had been away from Dehradun at the relevant time and also said that the petitioner has no right of easement. Now, after the judgment of the civil court decreeing the petitioners' suit for injunction accepting the easementary right, it is no more open to the respondent to plead otherwise and deny that there is no easementary right of flowing rain and flood water through the disputed outlets. The technical plea raised is that owner of the premises is Smt. Savita Singh and the respondent is not the owner and he has no concern with the same. The judgment of the learned Civil Judge shows that he mainly proceeded on placing reliance on 1962 ALJ 201 (supra) and has not noticed the relevant amendments made in the Code otherwise he would have invoked the inherent jurisdiction under O. 39, R. 2A. The question whether an agent of the defendant can be proceeded against in a proceeding under 0. 39, R. 2A of the Code as amended by 1976 Act, the Patna High Court in MANU/BH/0067/1983 Ram Pd. Singh v. Subodh Pd. Singh has held that a person is liable to be proceeded against under O. 39, R. 2A of the Code even if he was not presently party to the suit provided he is shown to be the agent or servant of the defendant and to have violated the orders of the Court in spite of knowledge that there was such an order. The respondent No. 3 is the husband of the owner of the premises. The architect stated on affidavit that the apertures were closed at the instance of the respondent No. 3. It is wholly immaterial whether the respondent was personally present at the time of actual closing of the outlets or not and whether he was a party in the suit or not.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19415 of 1988

Decided On: 13.07.1992

 K.L. Virmani  Vs.  IIIrd Additional Dist. Judge, and others

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
N.L. Ganguly, J.
 Citation : AIR 1992 All 326

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Whether Mere knowledge that modesty of a woman is likely to be outraged is sufficient to attract S 354 IPC ?

 In order to constitute the offence under Section 354 of

the IPC, mere knowledge that the modesty of a woman is likely

to be outraged is sufficient without any deliberate intention of

having such outrage alone for its object. There is no abstract

conception of modesty that can apply to all cases. A careful

approach has to be adopted by the court while dealing with a

case alleging outrage of modesty. The essential ingredients of

the offence under Section 354 IPC are as under:

(i) that the person assaulted must be a woman;

(ii) that the accused must have used criminal force on

 her; and

(iii) that the criminal force must have been used on the

 woman intending thereby to outrage her modesty.

23) This Court, in Vidyadharan vs. State of Kerala (2004)

1 SCC 215, held as under

“10. Intention is not the sole criterion of the offence

punishable under Section 354 IPC, and it can be committed

by a person assaulting or using criminal force to any woman,

if he knows that by such act the modesty of the woman is

likely to be affected. Knowledge and intention are essentially

things of the mind and cannot be demonstrated like physical

objects. The existence of intention or knowledge has to be

culled out from various circumstances in which and upon

whom the alleged offence is alleged to have been committed.

A victim of molestation and indignation is in the same

position as an injured witness and her testimony should

receive the same weight …..”

24) It is undoubtedly correct that if intention or knowledge is

one of the ingredients of any offence, it has got to be proved

like other ingredients for convicting a person. But, it is also

equally true that those ingredients being state of mind may

not be proved by direct evidence and may have to be inferred

from the attending circumstances of a given case. The

sequence of events which we have detailed earlier indicates

that the appellant-accused had the requisite culpable

intention.

25) This Court, in Tarkeshwar Sahu vs. State of Bihar,

(2006) 8 SCC 560, held as under:-

“39. So far as the offence under Section 354 IPC is concerned,

intention to outrage the modesty of a woman or knowledge that

the act of the accused would result in outraging her modesty is

the gravamen of the offence.

40. The essence of a woman’s modesty is her sex. The culpable

intention of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction

of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always

decisive. Modesty is an attribute associated with female human

beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female owing

to her sex.”

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2126 OF 2010

S.P.S. Rathore V C.B.I. & Anr.

Dated:SEPTEMBER 23, 2016.
Citation:AIR 2016 SC 4486,2017 CRLJ 537

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When directors of company can escape liability for dishonour of cheque?

It primarily falls on the drawer company and is
extended to officers of the Company. The normal rule in the
cases involving criminal liability is against vicarious liability,
that is, no one is to be held criminally liable for an act of
another. This normal rule is, however, subject to exception on
account of specific provision being made in statutes extending
liability to others. Section 141 of the Act is an instance of
specific provision which in case an offence under Section 138 is
committed by a Company, extends criminal liability for
dishonour of cheque to officers of the Company. Section 141
contains conditions which have to be satisfied before the
liability can be extended to officers of a company. Since the

provision creates criminal liability, the conditions have to be
strictly complied with. The conditions are intended to ensure
that a person who is sought to be made vicariously liable for an
offence of which the principal accused is the Company, had a
role to play in relation to the incriminating act and further that
such a person should know what is attributed to him to make
him liable. In other words, persons who had nothing to do with
the matter need not be roped in. A company being a juristic
person, all its deeds and functions are result of acts of others.
Therefore, officers of a Company who are responsible for acts
done in the name of the Company are sought to be made
personally liable for acts which result in criminal action being
taken against the Company. It makes every person who, at the
time the offence was committed, was incharge of, and was
responsible to the Company for the conduct of business of the
Company, as well as the Company, liable for the offence. The
proviso to the sub-section contains an escape route for persons
who are able to 'prove' that the offence was committed without
their knowledge or that they had exercised all due diligence to
prevent commission of the offence.
12. The position of a Managing Director or a Joint
Managing Director in a company may be different. These
persons, as the designation of their office suggests, are in
charge of a company and are responsible for the conduct of the
business of the company. In order to escape liability such
persons may have to bring their case within the proviso to

Section 141(1), that is, they will have to prove that when the
offence was committed they had no knowledge of the offence
or that they exercised all due diligence to prevent the
commission of the offence.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
 Crl. Misc. No. M-21674 of 2013 (O&M)
 Date of decision : 17.11.2015
Kishan Lal More and another

versus
M/s. Bibby Financial Services India Pvt. Ltd. & another

CORAM:- HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANITA CHAUDHRY
Citation:2016 CRLJ(NOC)213 P&H

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What is difference between 'intention' and 'knowledge' in Murder trial?

The ‘intention’
and ‘knowledge’ of the accused are subjective and invisible states
of mind and their existence has to be gathered from the
circumstances, such as the weapon used, the ferocity of attack,
multiplicity of injuries and all other surrounding circumstances.
The framers of the Code designedly used the words ‘intention’ and
‘knowledge’ and it is accepted that the knowledge of the
consequences which may result in doing an act is not the same
thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue.
Firstly, when an act is done by a person, it is presumed that he
must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences
would or could follow. But that knowledge is bare awareness and
not the same thing as intention that such consequences should
ensue. As compared to ‘knowledge’, ‘intention’ requires something
more than the mere foresight of the consequences, namely the
purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 46 OF 2016

NANKAUNOO V STATE OF U.P.

Citation;(2016) 3 SCC 317
R. BANUMATHI, J.

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