Showing posts with label intermediate order. Show all posts
Showing posts with label intermediate order. Show all posts

Friday, 20 June 2025

Bombay HC: When substantive rights of accused are violated, said order will be intermediate order and criminal revision is maintainable against said order

 Here in this case, the learned Magistrate applied that provision of law which was not at all applicable to the case in hand before him, therefore, definitely it had affected the right of the accused. Consequently it cannot be said that, the order which was passed by the learned Magistrate was purely "interlocutory order" as contemplated under Section 397 (2) of Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was justified in setting aside the said order by exercising his power under Section 397 (1) of Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no merit in the present writ petition much less to invoke the constitutional powers of this Court under Article 226 and 227, hence the writ petition is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged. {Para 11}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 1848 of 2019

Decided On: 11.12.2019

Hitendra Vs. Shankar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vibha Kankanwadi, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/3561/2019.

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Monday, 13 May 2024

Whether the appellate or revisional court should reverse any finding on account of any irregularity in sanction for prosecution if accused has not raised objection in that respect in the trial court?

 Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the PC Act is also important in this context inasmuch as the time lapse in challenging an error, omission or irregularity in the sanction resulting in a failure of justice is of considerable significance. Unless the challenge is made at the initial stages of a trial and within a reasonable period of time, the court would not be obliged to consider the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction for prosecution. Therefore, it is not as if the Accused can, after an unreasonable delay, raise an issue about the sanction; but if that Accused does so, the court may not decide that issue both at the appellate stage as well as for the purposes of stay of the proceedings. {Para 66}


67. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.K. Sehgal   MANU/SC/0650/1999 : (1999) 8 SCC 501 it was held that for determining whether the absence of or any error, omission or irregularity in the grant of sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice, the court has a duty to consider whether the Accused had raised any objection on that score at the trial stage. Even if it had been raised at the trial and early enough, it would not be sufficient to conclude that there was a failure of justice. Whether in fact and in law there was a failure of justice would differ from case to case but it was made clear that if such an objection was not raised in the trial, it certainly cannot be raised in appeal or in revision. It was explained that a trial involves judicial scrutiny of the entire material before the Special Judge. Therefore, if on a judicial scrutiny of the evidence on record the Special Judge comes to a conclusion that there was sufficient reason to convict the Accused person, the absence or error or omission or irregularity would actually become a surplusage. The necessity of a sanction is only as a filter to safeguard public servants from frivolous or mala fide or vindictive prosecution. However, after judicial scrutiny is complete and a conviction is made out through the filtration process, the issue of a sanction really would become inconsequential. It was held in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Report as under:


A court of appeal or revision is debarred from reversing a finding (or even an order of conviction and sentence) on account of any error or irregularity in the sanction for the prosecution, unless failure of justice had been occasioned on account of such error or irregularity. For determining whether want of valid sanction had in fact occasioned failure of justice the aforesaid Sub-section (2) enjoins on the court a duty to consider whether the Accused had raised any objection on that score at the trial stage. Even if he had raised any such objection at the early stage it is hardly sufficient to conclude that there was failure of justice. It has to be determined on the facts of each case. But an Accused who did not raise it at the trial stage cannot possibly sustain such a plea made for the first time in the appellate court......


In a case where the Accused failed to raise the question of valid sanction the trial would normally proceed to its logical end by making a judicial scrutiny of the entire materials. If that case ends in conviction there is no question of failure of justice on the mere premise that no valid sanction was accorded for prosecuting the public servant because the very purpose of providing such a filtering check is to safeguard public servants from frivolous or mala fide or vindictive prosecution on the allegation that they have committed offence in the discharge of their official duties. But once the judicial filtering process is over on completion of the trial the purpose of providing for the initial sanction would bog down to a surplusage. This could be the reason for providing a bridle upon the appellate and revisional forums as envisaged in Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1137 of 2017

Decided On: 13.07.2017

Girish Kumar Suneja Vs. C.B.I.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Madan B. Lokur, Kurian Joseph and A.K. Sikri, JJ.

Author: Madan B. Lokur, J.

Citation: AIR 2017 SC 3620,MANU/SC/0829/2017.

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Friday, 10 September 2021

Supreme Court: Against which orders court can entertain criminal revision?

 There are three categories of orders that a court can pass—final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction—that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order.{Para 16}

21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind—an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue.

24. The second reason why Amar Nath [Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585] is important is that it invokes the principle, in the context of criminal law, that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Therefore, when Section 397(2) CrPC prohibits interference in respect of interlocutory orders, Section 482 CrPC cannot be availed of to achieve the same objective. In other words, since Section 397(2) CrPC prohibits interference with interlocutory orders, it would not be permissible to resort to Section 482 CrPC to set aside an interlocutory order. This is what this Court held : (SCC p. 140, para 3)

“3. While we fully agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that where a revision to the High Court against the order of the Subordinate Judge is expressly barred under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code the inherent powers contained in Section 482 would not be available to defeat the bar contained in Section 397(2). Section 482 of the 1973 Code contains the inherent powers of the Court and does not confer any new powers but preserves the powers which the High Court already possessed. A harmonious construction of Sections 397 and 482 would lead to the irresistible conclusion that where a particular order is expressly barred under Section 397(2) and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to such a case the provisions of Section 482 would not apply. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject-matter. Where there is an express provision, barring a particular remedy, the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers.”

Supreme Court of India
Girish Kumar Suneja vs Cbi on 13 July, 2017
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