Showing posts with label session court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label session court. Show all posts

Tuesday, 7 July 2026

Supreme Court: Whether accused can file bail application before Session court after withdrawing it from High court?

Having carefully scrutinized the material available on record,

we are of the considered view that the High Court has passed the

impugned order, without application of its mind, by revoking the

bail granted to the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge-3,

Nagpur in Misc. Criminal Application No. 1847 of 2017, on the

ground that the application was not maintainable before the Trial Court as the appellant previously approached the High Court for bail and subsequently withdrew the bail application. It may be mentioned in this connection that there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or law laid down by this Court that once an accused has withdrawn his bail application before the High Court, he cannot file a subsequent bail application before the Sessions Court and that his subsequent bail application would lie before the High Court only. Thus, the impugned order of the High Court is not sustainable in the eyes of law and deserves to be set aside.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1221/2019

SHARAD Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. 

Dated: 8TH AUGUST, 2019.
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Sunday, 29 March 2026

RPwD Act, 2016: A Notification May Designate the Special Court, But Cannot by Itself Confer Direct Cognizance

 Author’s Note: The question is not whether offences under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 deserve prompt and effective prosecution; they certainly do. The real issue is narrower and jurisdictional: when a Court of Session is notified as a Special Court under Section 84, does that notification alone authorize the court to take direct cognizance or entertain remand at the threshold stage? The safer answer is in the negative unless the parent statute or otherwise applicable criminal procedure expressly permits it.

1. Statutory Background

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Delay, Denial, and Direct Cognizance: Why the Bombay High Court Quashed the Prosecution in C.B. Healthcare v. Union of India

 

The Bombay High Court’s decision in Ms. C.B. Healthcare and Ors. v. Union of India is a significant reminder that prosecutions under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 must satisfy not only public health objectives but also the statutory safeguards built into the Act and the Rules. In a judgment delivered on 24 March 2026, Justice N.J. Jamadar quashed the criminal prosecution against the manufacturer and its partners, holding that the cumulative procedural lapses had destroyed the accused’s valuable right to challenge the analyst’s report and had rendered the continuation of prosecution an abuse of the process of court.

Facts and procedural history

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Bombay HC : Sessions Court Cannot Take Cognisance Of Offences Under Drugs & Cosmetics Act Without Committal of case By Magistrate

 In regard to the action of the learned Special Judge of taking cognizance of the offence directly, there appears substance in the submission of Mr. Bhasin. {Para 40}

41. Section 32 of the Drugs Act, 1940 provides for cognizance of offences. Sub-Section (2) of Section 32 provides that, save as otherwise provided in that Act, no court inferior to that of a Court of Session shall try an offence punishable under Chapter IV. Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, contains an interdict against the Court of Sessions taking cognizance of any offence as Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code, except as otherwise expressly provided by that Code or by any other law for the time being force.

Evidently, though sub-Section (2) of Section 32 begins with an inbuilt saving clause in the form of expression, “save as otherwise provided in this Act” yet, there is no provision in the Drugs Act 1940 which expressly provides for the Court of Session taking the cognizance of the offence punishable under the said Act directly. Nor Section 32(2) contains the usual expression, “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973”, employed by the legislature where the Court of Session is empowered to take cognizance of the offences under the special enactments, without the case having been committed to it by a Magistrate.

42. What sub-Section (2) of Section 32 essentially provides is that, the trial of an offence under Chapter IV of the Drugs Act 1940 shall be before a Court not inferior to that of the Court of Session. The necessary corollary flowing from Section 4 of the Code, is that the rest of the provisions in the Code in regard to taking of the cognizance of the offence, inclusive of the interdict contained in Section 193 of the Code against the Court of Session taking cognizance of the offence directly, are clearly attracted.

43. Mr. Singh, the learned Special Counsel for the Respondent, attempted to wriggle out of the situation by canvassing a submission that the Administrator of the U.T. of Damand and Diu And Dadra and Nagar Haveli, has published Notification to designate the “Principal District Judge”, Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli at Silvassa as Special Court and empowered him to try the case under the Drugs Act, 1940 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for the area of UT of Daman And Diu And Dadra And Nagar Haveli. The said Notification, according to Mr. Singh, constitutes the saving envisaged by the expression, “save as otherwise provided” contained in sub-Section (2) of Section 32.

44. I find it difficult to accede to the aforesaid submission. I have perused the said Notification dated 17th June 2010. It is issued under Section 36AB(1) of the Drugs Act 1940 which came to be inserted by Act No. 26 of 2008, to provide for designation of one or more Special Courts for trial of offence relating to adulterated drugs or spurious drugs and punishable under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 13, sub-Section (3) of Section 22, clauses (a) and (c) of Section 27, Section 28, Section 28A, Section 28B and clause (b) of sub- Section (1) of Section 30 and other offences relating to adulterated drugs or spurious drugs.

45. In the case at hand, the complaint is lodged for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 27(d) of the Drugs Act, 1940. Secondly, the said Notification even if the submission on behalf of the Respondent is taken at par, would not empower the Court of Session to directly take the cognizance of the offence as there is no provision in the Drugs Act, 1940 which provides for taking of cognizance of offence by the Court of Session directly.

46. A useful reference in this context can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India V/s. Ashok Kumar sharma and Ors. (2021) 12 SCC 674, wherein the Supreme Court expounded the law, as under :

“49. Section 32 of the Act undoubtedly provides for taking

cognizance of the offence by the court only at the instance of the

four categories mentioned therein. They are: (a) Inspector under the Act; (b) Any Gazetted Officer empowered by the Central or the State Government; (c) Aggrieved person; and (d) Voluntary Association. It is clear that the Legislature has not included the Police Officer as a person who can move the court. Before the matter reaches the court, under Section 190 of the CrPC, ordinarily starting with the lodging of the first information report leading to the registration of the first information report, investigation is carried out culminating in a report under Section 173. The Police Report, in fact, is the Report submitted under Section 173 of the CrPC to the court. Under Section 190 of the CrPC, the court may take cognizance on the basis of the police report. Such a procedure is alien to Section 32 of the Act. In other words, it is not open to the Police Officer to submit a report under Section 173 of the CrPC in regard to an offence under Chapter IV of the Act under Section 32. In regard to offences contemplated under Section 32(3), the Police Officer may have power as per the concerned provisions. Being a special enactment, the manner of dealing with the offences under the Act, would be governed by the provisions of the Act. It is to be noted that Section 32 declares that no court inferior to the Court of Sessions shall try offence punishable under Chapter IV. We have noticed that under Section 193 of the CrPC, no Court of Sessions can take cognizance of any offence as a Court of Original Jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under the CrPC. This is, undoubtedly, subject to the law providing expressly that that Court of Sessions may take cognizance of any offence as the Court of Original Jurisdiction. There is no provision in the Act which expressly authorises the special court which is the Court of Sessions to take cognizance of the offence under Chapter IV. This means that the provisions of Chapters XV and XVI of the CrPC must be followed in regard to even offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act. Starting with Section 200 of the Act dealing with taking of cognizance by a Magistrate on a complaint, including examination of the witnesses produced by the complainant, the dismissal of an unworthy complaint under Section 203 and following the procedure under Section 202 in the case of postponement of issue of process are all steps to be followed. It is true that when the complaint under Section 32 is filed either by the Inspector or by the Authorised Gazetted Officer being public servants under Section 200, the Magistrate is exempted from examining the complainant and witnesses.”

(emphasis supplied)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.2777 OF 2024

M/s. C.B.Healthcare and Ors. Vs  Union of India 

CORAM: N.J.JAMADAR, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 24 MARCH 2026

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Saturday, 21 March 2026

MCOCA Charges Added After Bail? A Practical Roadmap for Sessions Judges

 When MCOCA is invoked mid‑stream in a case where the accused is already on bail, three issues arise together: jurisdiction, the fate of existing bail, and the correct form of the Sessions Court’s order. This article consolidates the law from Supreme Court and High Court decisions into a single, practitioner‑oriented guide.

Jurisdiction: Sessions Court Is Immediately Divested

Section 6 of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 provides that “every offence punishable under this Act shall be triable only by the Special Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed…” This “only by the Special Court” language, read with Section 5, creates exclusive jurisdiction in the notified MCOCA Special Court; no other criminal court can assume such jurisdiction.

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Whether Session Judge should grant Anticipatory bail to accused when Session triable offence is punishable with imprisonment for three years and police has issued notice to him U/S 35 of BNS?

Introduction

 When the police do not arrest an accused during investigation in a sessions-triable offence punishable up to three years, can the committal court or Sessions Court still insist on custody before bail? The answer lies in reading Section 232 BNSS through the liberty-centered lens of Satender Kumar Antil.

A man receives notice during investigation. He appears before the police, cooperates, and is never arrested. The investigation ends, the charge-sheet is filed, and yet when he appears before the committal court, he is told: since the offence is triable by the Court of Session, obtain bail from the Sessions Court first.
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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances, the high court or Session court should not release the accused on bail only on the ground that offence is triable by JMFC?

 At this stage, we may note that one of the grounds that weighed with the High Court was that the offences against Respondent No. 1 were triable by a Magistrate. However, the High Court overlooked the fact that the offences now alleged against Respondent No. 1 include offences Under Section 409 Indian Penal Code and Section 467 Indian Penal Code also. Significantly, the punishment for offences under these provisions can extend to imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term up to ten years. Similarly, some of the other offences for which Respondent No. 1 has been hauled up for entail a possible sentence of imprisonment over three years. {Para 12}


13. Under Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732, a Magistrate of First Class can pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, while a Chief Judicial Magistrate may pass a sentence of imprisonment, excepting imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years or a sentence of death or imprisonment for life. A Metropolitan Magistrate has the same powers as a Magistrate of First Class while a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is equivalent to a Chief Judicial Magistrate.


14. In that view of the matter, it would always be open to a Magistrate, if he is of the opinion that any of the offences in the case are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, to commit the case to a Court of Sessions Under Section 209 Code of Criminal Procedure or Section 323 Code of Criminal Procedure. It may be noted that Under Section 323 Code of Criminal Procedure, such power can be exercised by the Magistrate even during the course of the trial. Therefore, the assumption of the High Court that the case on hand is triable by a Magistrate is premature.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 957 of 2026 

Decided On: 17.02.2026

Rakesh Mittal Vs. Ajay Pal Gupta and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.

Author: P.V. Sanjay Kumar, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 161, MANU/SC/0164/2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances, Magistrate Can Commit the case to Sessions court during Course Of Trial even if it is not exclusively triable by Session Court?

At this stage, we may note that one of the grounds that weighed with the High Court was that the offences against Respondent No. 1 were triable by a Magistrate. However, the High Court overlooked the fact that the offences now alleged against Respondent No. 1 include offences Under Section 409 Indian Penal Code and Section 467 Indian Penal Code also. Significantly, the punishment for offences under these provisions can extend to imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term up to ten years. Similarly, some of the other offences for which Respondent No. 1 has been hauled up for entail a possible sentence of imprisonment over three years. {Para 12}


13. Under Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732, a Magistrate of First Class can pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, while a Chief Judicial Magistrate may pass a sentence of imprisonment, excepting imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years or a sentence of death or imprisonment for life. A Metropolitan Magistrate has the same powers as a Magistrate of First Class while a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is equivalent to a Chief Judicial Magistrate.


14. In that view of the matter, it would always be open to a Magistrate, if he is of the opinion that any of the offences in the case are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, to commit the case to a Court of Sessions Under Section 209 Code of Criminal Procedure or Section 323 Code of Criminal Procedure. It may be noted that Under Section 323 Code of Criminal Procedure, such power can be exercised by the Magistrate even during the course of the trial. Therefore, the assumption of the High Court that the case on hand is triable by a Magistrate is premature.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 957 of 2026 

Decided On: 17.02.2026

Rakesh Mittal Vs. Ajay Pal Gupta and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.

Author: P.V. Sanjay Kumar, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 161, MANU/SC/0164/2026
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Sunday, 28 December 2025

P & H HC: Even when the regular bail petition is pending before the High Court, the Sessions Court or Magistrate court are competent to grant default bail

Resultantly, a pendency of bail petition either in the High Court or the Sessions Court would not disentitle the Magistrate or even the Sessions Court, as the case may be, from their statutory powers under Section 187(2) BNSS, 2023 or Section 167(2) CrPC, 1973. On the contrary, if the Magistrate or the Sessions Court does not grant default bail, in such circumstances, then there might be a possibility of such Court(s) violating the fundamental right or contravening the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. {Para 16}


17. Given the above and in the light of the binding judicial precedents, the answer to the proposition is that even when the regular bail petition was pending before the High Court, the Sessions Court is competent to grant default bail, also known as compulsive bail or statutory bail, and similarly the Magistrate is competent to grant default bail even when the regular bail petition was pending before the Sessions Court or the High Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-21371-2025

Decided On: 05.08.2025

Gurmeet Singh Vs. State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anoop Chitkara, J.

Citation: 2025:PHHC:100608, MANU/PH/1919/2025

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Friday, 20 June 2025

Karnataka HC: Revision Petition Before Sessions Court Against Order Passed By Magistrate U/S 143A NI Act Maintainable U/S.397 CrPC

All these judgments considered the purport of an application under Section 143A of the Act and its closure and would hold that revision before the Court of Sessions under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. would be maintainable as an order on the application filed under Section 143A of the Act is not an interlocutory order but an intermediate order. Therefore, I answer the issue that has arisen for consideration holding that an order passed on an application filed under Section 143A of the Act, is not interlocutory order, but an intermediate order, as the application is filed, and the application is closed, under the said provision, determining the rights and liabilities of parties qua the application and revision petition before the Court of Sessions on the order passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 143A either allowing the application, or rejecting it, would be maintainable for the aggrieved party, be it the complainant or the accused to approach.{Para 11}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Criminal Petition No. 5944 of 2023

Decided On: 28.07.2023

Sanjay P.S. Vs. Abhishek M.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Maheshan Nagaprasanna, J.

Citation:  MANU/KA/1977/2023.

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Friday, 6 June 2025

Supreme Court Recognizes Complainant as Victim, Grants Unconditional Appeal Right in Cheque Bounce Acquittals


 Background

In a significant judgment delivered on April 8, 2025, the Supreme Court of India addressed a crucial legal question: Can a complainant in a cheque dishonour case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, appeal an acquittal order as a "victim" under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), without seeking special leave under Section 378(4) of the CrPC? This issue arose in the case of M/s. Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran & Others, where the appellant, a financial firm, sought to challenge the acquittal of borrowers who had defaulted on multiple loans and whose cheques were dishonoured due to insufficient funds.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

Factual Matrix

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Monday, 2 June 2025

Cognizance by Sessions Courts: Navigating the Legal Framework Under CrPC and Special Acts

 Understanding the jurisdictional boundaries and exceptions in criminal proceedings

Introduction

The power of Sessions Courts to take cognizance forms a critical aspect of India's criminal justice system. While the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 establishes clear procedural boundaries through Section 193, various provisions within the Code and special legislations create specific exceptions that empower Sessions Courts to exercise original jurisdiction. This article examines the intricate legal framework governing when and how Sessions Courts can take cognizance of criminal offences.

The Foundational Principle: Section 193 CrPC

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Sunday, 6 April 2025

Supreme court: Factors which the High court and Session court must consider while releasing accused on anticipatory bail

23. The principles which can be culled out, for the purposes of the instant case, can be stated as under:


(i) The complaint filed against the accused needs to be thoroughly examined, including the aspect whether the complainant has filed a false or frivolous complaint on earlier occasion. The court should also examine the fact whether there is any family dispute between the accused and the complainant and the complainant must be clearly told that if the complaint is found to be false or frivolous, then strict action will be taken against him in accordance with law. If the connivance between the complainant and the investigating officer is established then action be taken against the investigating officer in accordance with law.


(ii) The gravity of charge and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended. Before arrest, the arresting officer must record the valid reasons which have led to the arrest of the accused in the case diary. In exceptional cases, the reasons could be recorded immediately after the arrest, so that while dealing with the bail application, the remarks and observations of the arresting officer can also be properly evaluated by the court.


(iii) It is imperative for the courts to carefully and with meticulous precision evaluate the facts of the case. The discretion to grant bail must be exercised on the basis of the available material and the facts of the particular case. In cases where the court is of the considered view that the accused has joined the investigation and he is fully cooperating with the investigating agency and is not likely to abscond, in that event, custodial interrogation should be avoided. A great ignominy, humiliation and disgrace is attached to arrest. Arrest leads to many serious consequences not only for the accused but for the entire family and at times for the entire community. Most people do not make any distinction between arrest at a pre-conviction stage or post-conviction stage.


(iv) There is no justification for reading into Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure the limitations mentioned in Section 437 Code of Criminal Procedure. The plentitude of Section 438 must be given its full play. There is no requirement that the accused must make out a "special case" for the exercise of the power to grant anticipatory bail. This virtually, reduces the salutary power conferred by Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure to a dead letter.


A person seeking anticipatory bail is still a free man entitled to the presumption of innocence. He is willing to submit to restraints and conditions on his freedom, by the acceptance of conditions which the court may deem fit to impose, in consideration of the assurance that if arrested, he shall be enlarged on bail.

(v) The proper course of action on an application for anticipatory bail ought to be that after evaluating the averments and accusations available on the record if the court is inclined to grant anticipatory bail then an interim bail be granted and notice be issued to the Public Prosecutor. After hearing the Public Prosecutor the court may either reject the anticipatory bail application or confirm the initial order of granting bail. The court would certainly be entitled to impose conditions for the grant of anticipatory bail. The Public Prosecutor or the complainant would be at liberty to move the same court for cancellation or modifying the conditions of anticipatory bail at any time if liberty granted by the court is misused. The anticipatory bail granted by the court should ordinarily be continued till the trial of the case.


(vi) It is a settled legal position that the court which grants the bail also has the power to cancel it. The discretion of grant or cancellation of bail can be exercised either at the instance of the accused, the Public Prosecutor or the complainant, on finding new material or circumstances at any point of time.


(vii) In pursuance of the order of the Court of Session or the High Court, once the accused is released on anticipatory bail by the trial court, then it would be unreasonable to compel the accused to surrender before the trial court and again apply for regular bail.


(viii) Discretion vested in the court in all matters should be exercised with care and circumspection depending upon the facts and circumstances justifying its exercise. Similarly, the discretion vested with the court Under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure should also be exercised with caution and prudence. It is unnecessary to travel beyond it and subject the wide power and discretion conferred by the legislature to a rigorous code of self-imposed limitations.


(ix) No inflexible guidelines or straitjacket formula can be provided for grant or refusal of anticipatory bail because all circumstances and situations of future cannot be clearly visualised for the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail. In consonance with legislative intention, the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail should necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.


(x) We shall also reproduce para 112 of the judgment wherein the Court delineated the following factors and parameters that need to be taken into consideration while dealing with anticipatory bail:


(a) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made;


(b) The antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether the accused has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a court in respect of any cognizable offence;


(c) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice;


(d) The possibility of the accused's likelihood to repeat similar or other offences;


(e) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her;


(f) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail particularly in cases of large magnitude affecting a very large number of people;


(g) The courts must evaluate the entire available material against the accused very carefully. The court must also clearly comprehend the exact role of the accused in the case. The cases in which the accused is implicated with the help of Sections 34 and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 the court should consider with even greater care and caution, because over implication in the cases is a matter of common knowledge and concern;


(h) While considering the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors, namely, no prejudice should be caused to free, fair and full investigation, and there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the accused;


(i) The Court should consider reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant;


(j) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused in entitled to an order of bail.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1134-1135 of 2015.

Decided On: 01.09.2015

Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Sikri and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.

Author: A.K. Sikri, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0949/2015,AIR 2015 SC 3090,( 2016 ) 1 SCC 152.

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Supreme Court: Procedure the High court or Session Court must follow while entertaining Anticipatory bail application

We may remind the High Court of what this Court observed

in the case of Srikant Upadhyay & Ors. v. State of Bihar &

Anr., reported in 2024 INSC 202. We quote the relevant

observations as under:

“… A bare perusal of Section 438(1), Cr.PC, would

reveal that taking into consideration the factors

enumerated thereunder the Court may either reject

the application forthwith or issue an interim order

for the grant of anticipatory bail. The proviso

thereunder would reveal that if the High Court or,

the Court of Sessions, as the case may be, did not

pass an interim order under this Section or has

rejected the application for grant of anticipatory

bail, it shall be open to an officer in-charge of a

police station to arrest the person concerned

without warrant, on the basis of the accusation

apprehended in such application. In view of the

proviso under Section 438(1), Cr.PC, it cannot be

contended that if, at the stage of taking up the

matter for consideration, the Court is not rejecting

the application, it is bound to pass an interim

order for the grant of anticipatory bail. In short,

nothing prevents the court from adjourning such an

application without passing an interim order. This

question was considered in detail by a Single Bench

of the High Court of Bombay, in the decision in

Shrenik Jayantilal Jain and Anr. v. State of

Maharashtra through EOW Unit II, Mumbai 2014 SCC

Online Bom 549 and answered as above and we are in

agreement with the view that in such cases, there

will be no statutory inhibition for arrest. Hence,

the appellants cannot be heard to contend that the

application for anticipatory bail filed in November,

2022 could not have been adjourned without passing

interim order.…

We have already held that the power to grant

anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power. Though

in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a

rule, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be

said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot

be the rule and the question of its grant should be

left to the cautious and judicious discretion by the

Court depending on the facts and circumstances of

each case. While called upon to exercise the said

power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious

as the grant of interim protection or protection to

the accused in serious cases may lead to miscarriage

of justice and may hamper the investigation to a

great extent as it may sometimes lead to tampering

or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be

understood to have held that the Court shall not

pass an interim protection pending consideration of

such application as the Section is destined to

safeguard the freedom of an individual against

unwarranted arrest and we say that such orders shall

be passed in eminently fit cases. At any rate, when

warrant of arrest or proclamation is issued, the

applicant is not entitled to invoke the

extraordinary power. Certainly, this will not

deprive the power of the Court to grant pre-arrest

bail in extreme, exceptional cases in the interest

of justice. …”{Para 16}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.5456 OF 2024

DEEPAK AGGARWAL  Vs  BALWAN SINGH & ANR.

Dated: 18th December, 2024.

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Monday, 10 February 2025

Supreme Court: Sessions or Pocso Courts Must Order Victim Compensation or interim compensation In Cases Of Sexual Offences Against Minors And Women

 In the circumstances, we direct that a Sessions Court, which adjudicates a case concerning the bodily injuries such as sexual assault etc. particularly on minor children and women shall order for victim compensation to be paid having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and based on the evidence on record, while passing the judgment either convicting or acquitting the Accused. Secondly, the said direction must be implemented by the District Legal Services Authority or State Legal Services Authority, as the case may be, in letter and spirit and in the quickest manner and to ensure that the victim is paid the compensation at the earliest. {Para 16}

17. There can also be a direction for payment of interim compensation which could be made by the Sessions Court depending upon the facts of each case.

19. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the second Respondent shall also be entitled to be considered for compensation Under Rule 7 of the POCSO Rules, 2012 and now Under Rule 9 of the POCSO Rules, 2020.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 4495 of 2024.

Decided On: 04.11.2024

Saibaj Noormohammad Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1363/2024.

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Sunday, 26 January 2025

Supreme Court: High court or Session court should not give ad-interim relief in the nature of final relief while issuing notice in application for Anticipatory bail

The High Court has issued notice to the State and has passed an ad-interim order which reads thus"- "In the meantime, the petitioner is directed to join the investigation. In the event of arrest, he shall be on ad interim bail to the satisfaction of the arresting/investigating officer subject to the conditions as provided under Section 482(2) of the BNNS, 2023." {Para 11}


12. We take notice of the fact that in all other connected matters the High Court has said that till the anticipatory bail applications are decided the accused persons shall not be arrested.


13. What weighed with us in issuing notice and staying the operation of the impugned order referred to above was the nature of the ad interim relief the High Court thought fit to grant. 

14. Ordinarily, when the High Court takes up anticipatory bail application for hearing it has three options. Either it may reject it on the very first day or it may issue notice to the State but would not grant any ad-interim protection or in a given case may issue notice and may even deem fit to grant appropriate protection. The aforesaid is of course the discretion of the Court concerned having regard to the merits of the matter. However, what we disapprove in the present case is the nature of the ad-interim relief granted. The same is practically in the nature of granting the final relief.


15. There is no point in asking the accused to go before the investigating officer pending the final disposal of the anticipatory bail application before the High Court and further saying that in the event of arrest he shall be released on ad-interim bail. Such ad-interim reliefs have their own legal implications.


16. We may remind the High Court of what this Court observed in the case of Srikant Upadhyay & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr., reported in 2024 INSC 202. We quote the relevant observations as under: "... A bare perusal of Section 438(1), Cr.PC, would reveal that taking into consideration the factors enumerated thereunder the Court may either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail. The proviso thereunder would reveal that if the High Court or, the Court of Sessions, as the case may be, did not pass an interim order under this Section or has rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer in-charge of a police station to arrest the person concerned without warrant, on the basis of the accusation apprehended in such application. In view of the proviso under Section 438(1), Cr.PC, it cannot be contended that if, at the stage of taking up the matter for consideration, the Court is not rejecting the application, it is bound to pass an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail. In short, nothing prevents the court from adjourning such an application without passing an interim order. This question was considered in detail by a Single Bench of the High Court of Bombay, in the decision in Shrenik Jayantilal Jain and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra through EOW Unit II, Mumbai 2014 SCC Online Bom 549 and answered as above and we are in agreement with the view that in such cases, there will be no statutory inhibition for arrest. Hence, the appellants cannot be heard to contend that the application for anticipatory bail filed in November, 2022 could not have been adjourned without passing interim order....


We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion by the Court depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass an interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases. At any rate, when warrant of arrest or proclamation is issued, the applicant is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary power. Certainly, this will not deprive the power of the Court to grant pre-arrest bail in extreme, exceptional cases in the interest of justice. ..." (Emphasis supplied)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 5456 of 2024

Date of Order: 18.12.2024

Deepak Aggarwal Vs. Balwan Singh & Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/146578/2024.

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Saturday, 25 January 2025

Supreme Court: Sessions Court Must Order Victim Compensation In Cases Of Bodily Injury To Women And Children

On a reading of the order and judgment of the Trial

Court, which has convicted the appellant herein for the

offence, inter alia, under Section 376-D of the IPC except

imposing the fine of Rs.12,500/- (Rs.10,000/- + Rs.2,500/-),

we find that no direction for payment of victim compensation

to the second respondent/victim has been ordered. Such a lapse

on the part of Sessions Court would only delay payment of any

compensation under Section 357-A of the CrPC.

In the circumstances, we direct that a Sessions Court,

which adjudicates a case concerning the bodily injuries such

as sexual assault etc. particularly on minor children and

women shall order for victim compensation to be paid having

regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and based

on the evidence on record, while passing the judgment either

convicting or acquitting the accused. Secondly, the said

direction must be implemented by the District Legal Services

Authority or State Legal Services Authority, as the case may

be, in letter and spirit and in the quickest manner and to

ensure that the victim is paid the compensation at the

earliest.

There can also be a direction for payment of interim

compensation which could be made by the Sessions Court

depending upon the facts of each case.

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 13890/2024)

SAIBAJ NOORMOHAMMAD SHAIKH Vs  STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR

Dated: NOVEMBER 04, 2024.
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Friday, 4 October 2024

Bombay HC: The Magistrate and Sessions courts must apply their mind before taking cognizance of offence against an accused

 The orders are not required to be passed without application of mind and mechanically even by a Sessions Judge. Thereafter, in the present matter on 04.04.2019 there is order by learned District Judge-4/Additional Sessions Judge for issuance of process against the accused. It is to be noted that Section 14 of the Atrocities Act came to be amended with effect from 26.01.2016 and it made provision for power to take cognizance of the offence directly to the Special Court. Meaning thereby, there was no necessity of committal of the case by Judicial Magistrate First Class. In other words, the Investigating Officer was supposed to file the charge sheet directly before the Special Court established under the Atrocities Act and thereupon such Court was empowered to take cognizance directly of the offences under the Atrocities Act. Here, in this case, no such procedure has been adopted. In fact, we deprecate use of stamp for the orders of taking cognizance. Because taking of cognizance of an offence, involves the process of application of mind and it should be specifically mentioned for which offences the cognizance has been taken. There might be such circumstances that some of the offences are not made out though the Investigating Officer mentions it in charge sheet. Here, there is no such detailed order, but we take that the cognizance has been taken in respect of offence under Section 295-A, 153-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(v) of the Atrocities Act. Learned District Judge-4 (it ought to have been ‘Special Judge, under the S.C. & S.T. Act’) had not even considered the point of sanction under Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the time of taking cognizance. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

901 CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.2375 OF 2019

Dnyaneshwar Rohidas Wakale, Vs   The State of Maharashtra

CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI &

S.G. CHAPALGAONKAR, JJ.

DATE : 19th SEPTEMBER, 2024

Citation: 2024:BHC-AUG:22690-DB

ORDER : (PER : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI, J.).

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Saturday, 28 September 2024

Kerala HC: Accused prosecuted before Sessions or Special court can file discharge application within sixty days from the date of supply of copies of documents.

 But the crucial aspect is lack of clarity or legislative vacuum with regard to the starting point of sixty days to file discharge petition as per Section 250(1) of BNSS, in sessions cases where no committal is possible. In this connection, it is apropos to refer Section 262(2) of BNSS, deals with discharge of an accused in warrant trial cases which is pari materia to Section 239 of Cr.P.C. Section 262(1) is a new provision equivalent to Section 250(1) of BNSS. As per Section 262(1) of BNSS, the accused in a warrant trial case may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of supply of copies of documents under Section 230.

Be it so, in sessions cases where committal doesn't arise,

because of the original jurisdiction conferred upon the Special

Courts referred herein above, the principle in Section 262(1) of

BNSS can be followed till the legislature makes the starting

point in such cases with clarity and certainty, by appropriate

amendment to Section 250(1) of BNSS. Thus in such cases, the

starting point of sixty days can be counted from the date of

supply of copies of documents. {Para 10}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL.REV.PET NO. 879 OF 2024

SAJITH Vs  STATE OF KERALA

 Coram:  MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN

Citation: 2024:KER:67663

Dated: 3rd day of September, 2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here. 

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Kerala HC: The Sessions or Special Court Has Discretion U/ S. 250 of BNSS to Consider Discharge application of accused Even After Prescribed Limit Of 60 Days

It is discernible that in Section 250 of BNSS, Sub-section (1) provides that the accused may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of commitment of the case under Section 232.

Sub-section (1) of Section 250 of BNSS is a new provision

which prescribes a period of sixty days to prefer an application

by the accused for discharge from the date of committal of the

case. In fact, no such time limit fixed in Section 227 of Cr.P.C.

But it is noticed that there is lack of clarity or legislative

vacuum in the matter of starting point of sixty days in Section

250(1) of BNSS. It is true that in cases where the procedure of

committal is necessary, the statutory wordings in Section

250(1) of BNSS regarding the starting point of sixty days, is so

clear. But, now a days many Special Courts, viz., Special Court

under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, Special Court under the Protection of Children

from Sexual Offences Act, etc., proceedings are going before

the Special Court during the crime stage itself where committal

doesn't arise. In relation to such cases, the starting point to

count sixty days period to file discharge petition as provided in

Section 250(1) of BNSS lacks clarity or the same is a legislative

vacuum. In this context, it is relevant to refer Section 330 of

BNSS, a pari materia provision to Section 294 of Cr.P.C. Section

330(1) provides that where any document is filed before any

Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of

every such document shall be included in a list and the

prosecution or the accused or the advocate for the prosecution

or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the

genuineness of each such document soon after supply of such

documents and in no case later than thirty days after such

supply. First proviso to Section 330(1) stipulates that the Court

may, in its discretion, relax the time limit with reasons to be

recorded in writing. The notable distinction is that in Section

330(1) of BNSS, the time limit is preceded by the word 'shall'

and in Section 250(1) of BNSS, the time limit is preceded by the

word 'may'. Thus, it is perceivable that when the legislature

uses the word 'shall', the same is mandatory and when the

word 'may' is used, the same is discretionary. The First proviso

to Section 330(1) of BNSS has been engrafted by the legislature

and the time limit of thirty days is preceded by the word 'shall'

makes the provision mandatory. Thus proviso to relax time

also was incorporated. In Section 250(1) of BNSS, the

legislature used the word 'may' which gives discretion to the

court to relax the time limit and therefore, no proviso to relax

the time limit was engrafted by the legislature. Therefore, even

after expiry of sixty days, a petition for discharge can be

considered by the court since the time limit is not mandatory

and is only directory. If so, the intent of the legislature to avoid

filing of discharge petition even at a belated stage in the strict

sense could not be achieved. {Para 9}

10. But the crucial aspect is lack of clarity or legislative vacuum with regard to the starting point of sixty days to file discharge petition as per Section 250(1) of BNSS, in sessions cases where no committal is possible. In this connection, it is apropos to refer Section 262(2) of BNSS, deals with discharge of an accused in warrant trial cases which is pari materia to Section 239 of Cr.P.C. Section 262(1) is a new provision equivalent to Section 250(1) of BNSS. As per Section 262(1) of BNSS, the accused in a warrant trial case may prefer an application for discharge within a period of sixty days from the date of supply of copies of documents under Section 230.

Be it so, in sessions cases where committal doesn't arise,

because of the original jurisdiction conferred upon the Special

Courts referred herein above, the principle in Section 262(1) of

BNSS can be followed till the legislature makes the starting

point in such cases with clarity and certainty, by appropriate

amendment to Section 250(1) of BNSS. Thus in such cases, the

starting point of sixty days can be counted from the date of

supply of copies of documents.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL.REV.PET NO. 879 OF 2024

SAJITH Vs  STATE OF KERALA

 Coram:  MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN

Citation: 2024:KER:67663

Dated: 3rd day of September, 2024

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