Showing posts with label joint tenancy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label joint tenancy. Show all posts

Sunday, 27 November 2022

Privy Council: The principle of joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law except in the case of the joint property of an undivided Hindu family

 With reference to this decision Lord Watson observed:

There are two substantial reasons why it ought not to be followed as an authority. In the first place it appears to their Lordships that the learned Judges of the High Court of Madras were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing. The principle of joint tenancy appears to be unknown to Hindu law, except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided family. In the second place the learned Judges misapprehended the law of England, because it is clear, according to that law, that a conveyance, or an agreement to convey his or her personal interest by one of the joint tenants, operates as severance.

12. In their Lordships' opinion this is a clear ruling that the principle of joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law except in the case of the joint property of an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law which under that law passes by survivorship. There could therefore be no question of these grants creating a joint tenancy as opposed to a tenancy in common, even if according to English law the terms of these instruments admitted of such a construction.

13. As to the question whether these grants were made to these two brothers severally or as members of a joint family that depends on the intention of the donor as expressed in the grants. Prima facie a gift to a member of a joint Hindu family is his separate property and will only become joint family property when it descends to his sons, unless he himself has made it joint family property by throwing it into the common stock. There is nothing in the terms of these maintenance grants to these two brothers to suggest that the Government intended to make a grant to a joint family.

 BEFORE THE PRIVY COUNCIL

Decided On: 12.01.1933

Bahu Rani and Ors. Vs. Rajendra Baksh Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Thankerton, John Wallis and Lancelot Sanderson, JJ.

Author: John Wallis, J.

Citation: MANU/PR/0002/1933

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Sunday, 19 July 2020

Supreme Court: Legal heirs of deceased tenant inherit tenancy as joint tenants

We are of the view that in the light of H.C. Pandey (supra), the situation is very clear that when original tenant dies, the legal heirs inherit the tenancy as joint tenants and occupation of one of the tenant is occupation of all the joint tenants. It is not necessary for landlord to implead all legal heirs of the deceased tenant, whether they are occupying the property or not. It is sufficient for the landlord to implead either of those persons who are occupying the property, as party. There may be a case where landlord is not aware of all the legal heirs of deceased tenant and impleading only those heirs who are in occupation of the property is sufficient for the purpose of filing of eviction petition. An eviction petition against one of the joint tenant is sufficient against all the joint tenants and all joint tenants are bound by the order of the Rent Controller as joint tenancy is one tenancy and is not a tenancy split into different legal heirs. Thus, the plea of the tenants on this count must fail.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3996 of 2018 

Decided On: 19.04.2018

 Suresh Kumar Kohli   Vs.  Rakesh Jain and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.K. Agrawal and Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.

 Citation: 2018 (6) SCC 708,MANU/SC/0432/2018
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Sunday, 24 March 2019

Whether on death of original tenant,his legal heirs acquires joint tenancy?

 The submission that after the death of original tenants, the petitioners/other defendants became tenants and the tenancy is joint is not correct considering the scheme and purpose of the Bombay Rent Act. Under the Bombay Rent Act, it is only one person who can be recognised as tenant. Defendant No. 1 is accordingly recognised as tenant though it is observed about the joint tenancy Once it is clear that only one person can be recognised as tenant after the death of original tenant, the claim of such joint tenancy is impermissible. 
The submission based upon the authority in the case of (H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul) MANU/SC/0209/1989 : [1989]2SCR769 , is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case as under the Bombay Rent Act only one heir or one person is recognised as tenant for all the purposes after the death of the original tenant. All occupants are brothers of the tenant who are not treated as joint tenants.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 221 of 2007 with C.A. No. 2607 of 2008

Decided On: 03.12.2008

 Suresh  Vs.  Bhikaji Bhagwat Redkar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Anoop V. Mohta, J.

Citation: 2009 (2)MHLJ 917
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Thursday, 20 September 2018

Whether one legal heir of tenant can claim tenancy without making other legal heirs party to suit?

At this stage Mr. Ghaisas, the learned Advocate appearing for respondent No. 3 appeared in Court and sought leave to make submissions in the matter. On leave being granted, he submitted that in the case in hand there was no dispute that the rent receipts were issued in favour of the respondent No. 2 alone and therefore there was no need of filing the suit against the petitioner or Joining the petitioner as party to the said Civil Suit No. 170 of 1970. The learned Advocate for the respondent No. 3 however was unable to point out any provisions in law which besides contending about exclusive tenancy rights in favour of the person in whose name the receipts are issued pursuant to the death of the original tenant. Merely because the person in whose name receipts are issued happened to be one of the legal heirs of the original tenant, the right of other heirs are not wipped off. In fact, the law in this regard is well established as already stated above i.e. upon death of the original tenant, tenancy rights are inherited by all the legal heirs. At the cost of repetition it can be stated that the Trial Court has found that the petitioner was residing with the original tenant and he is one of the legal representatives of the original tenant. Applying the test laid down by the Apex Court in the decision referred above, the petitioner was clearly a necessary and proper parly to the suit and in the absence thereof, the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 170 of 1970 cannot be held to be binding upon the petitioner.
Bombay High Court
Ramesh Shankar Kale vs Madhav Bhimshankar Wadnere & Ors. on 7 July, 2000
Equivalent citations: (2001) 2 BOMLR 945

Bench: R Khandeparkar
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Saturday, 14 October 2017

Whether concept of joint family property is applicable to muslim law?

This Court again in Kasambhai Sheikh v. Abdulla Kasambhai Sheikh (2004)
13 SCC 385 has held that succession in Mohammedan Law is in specific shares as
tenants in common.
52. It was observed in Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar AIR 1969 All. 526 that a
joint tenancy connotes unity of title, possession, interest and commencement of
title; in tenancy in common there may be unity of possession and commencement
of title but the other two features as to unity of title and interest are missing.
53. In Mansab Ali Khan v. Mt. Nabiunnisa & Ors. AIR 1934 All 702, a suit was
filed by the plaintiffs who had acquired rights in 12/24 sihams in the property in
dispute. They claimed possession over the share of the whole property on the
ground that one of the defendant-respondents, Mt. Nabiunnissa, had sold certain
property to the defendant-respondents Nos.2 and 3. There was an agreement that
Mt. Nabiunnisa should remain in possession on the condition that she became
liable to pay all the debts due from the deceased. Though the agreement was not
proved, the trial court found that certain debts were paid by Mt. Nabiunnisa. It was
held that one of the heirs of a deceased Mohamedan was perfectly entitled to
alienate his share of the property without getting it partitioned provided he had
paid the proportionate share of debt on assessment of property.
54. Muhammadan Law does not recognize the right of any one of the
shareholders being tenants-in-common, for acting on behalf of co-heirs as laid
down in Abdul Majeeth Khan Sahib v. C .Krishnamachariar AIR 1918 Mad 1049
(FB). It has been laid down that one heir has no authority in law to deal with the
share of his co-heirs. Relevant portion is extracted hereunder :
“This is absolutely clear authority in proof of the position that one heir
has no authority, in law, to deal with the shares of his co-heirs. In face
of it, it is not necessary to refer to other original text-books. It is
stated, however, in Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi I.L.R. 26 Mad.
734 that, "if the creditor of the deceased can seek his relief against one
of several co-heirs in a case where all the effects of the deceased are
in the hands of that heir, it can make no difference whether the heir
meets the demand by a bona fide voluntary sale, or the property is
brought to sale in execution of a decree obtained against him." To the
same effect is a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Hasan Ali v.
Medhi Husain I.L.R. 1 All. 533. The statement in Pathummabi v. Vittil
Ummachabi I.L.R. (supra) was purely by way of obiter dictum and
with all respect to the learned Judges, they failed to bear in mind that,
the provision of the Muhammadan Law, that a decree against one heir
in possession of all the effects of the deceased, is binding on all if
obtained after contest, is part of the processual law of that system and
is not based on the ground that a single heir, if he happens to be in
possession of the estate of the deceased, represents the rest of the heirs
for the purposes of administration generally. The ground on which a
decree against one of the heirs, in such circumstances, is treated as res
judicata is, as stated in the books, that the decree in such cases is, in
law, against the deceased and not against the particular heir who is
made defendant in the suit.
xxx xxx xxx
So far as voluntary alienations are concerned, which alone form the
subject-matter of reference, the Muhammadan Law is clear that one of
the heirs of a deceased person is not competent to bind the other heirs
by his acts,
Spencer, J. -- I agree with the judgment of Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim
just now pronounced.
Srinivasa Aiyangar, J.-- I agree. In the absence of any right in one of
the heirs to represent the co-heirs, one of several co-heirs can only
deal with his or her interest in the ancestor's property inherited by
them. My learned brother has shown that there is nothing in the
Muhammadan Law giving such a right to one of the co-heirs who may
happen to be in actual possession of the whole of the ancestor's estate;
such possession, it must be remembered, is presumably on behalf of
all the co-heirs. He is not constituted the representative of the
deceased and cannot administer his property even for the limited
purpose of paying off his debts. In Khiarajmal v. Daim L.R., 32 Ind.
App., 23, Lord Davey referring to a sale by one of the heirs of a
Muhammadan for discharging the debt due by the ancestor said
"prima facie his conveyance would pass only his share", See. p.37.
Representation in a suit may conceivably stand on a different footing
for as stated by their Lordships in the same judgment at page 35, "The
Indian Courts have exercised a wide discretion in allowing the estate
of a deceased debtor to be represented by one member of the family,
and in refusing to disturb judicial sales on the mere ground that some
members of the family, who were minors, were not made parties to the
proceedings, if it appears that there was a debt justly due from the
deceased, and no prejudice is shown to the absent minors. But these
are usually cases where the person named as defendant is de facto
manager of a Hindu family property, or has the assets out of which the
decree is to be satisfied under his control;" and they applied this
principle in that very case to the estate of Nabibaksh. However, that is
not the question here.”
55. In Mohammad Afzal Khan, Haji v. Abdul Rahman, Malik & Ors. AIR 1932
PC 235, the Privy Council has held that in case one of two or more co-sharers had
mortgaged an undivided share, the mortgagee takes the security subject to rights of
other co-sharers, and the partition if effected, the mortgaged properties are allotted
to the other co-sharers, they take those properties in the absence of fraud, free from
the mortgage and the mortgagee can proceed only against the properties allotted to
the mortgagor in substitution of his undivided share. The principle that emanates
from the aforesaid decision is that co-sharer can bind his property and cannot
create charge on the property of other co-sharers. The Privy Council had relied
upon the decision in the case of Byjnath Lall v. Ramoodeen Chowdry (1874) L R 1
Ind. App. 106, the relevant portion of Mohammad Afzal Khan, Haji (supra) is
extracted hereunder:
“As regards the first point, their Lordships are of opinion that where
one of two or more co-sharers mortgages his undivided share in some
of the properties held jointly by them, the mortgagee takes the security
subject to the right of the other co-sharers to enforce a partition and
thereby to convert what was an undivided share of the whole into a
defined portion held in severalty. If the mortgage, therefore, is
followed by a partition and the mortgaged properties are allotted to
the other co-sharers, they take those properties, in the absence of
fraud, free from the mortgage, and the mortgagee can proceed only
against the properties allotted to the mortgagor in substitution of his
undivided share. This was the view taken by the Board in Byjnath
Lall v. Ramoodeen Chowdry (1874) LR 1 Ind. App. 106. In that case
the partition was made by the Collector under Regulation XIX of
1814 (Bengal), and the mortgagee was seeking to enforce his remedy
not against the properties mortgaged to him, but against the properties
which had been allotted to the mortgagor in lieu of his undivided
share; but the Board held that not only he had a right to do so, but that
it was in the circumstances of the case his sole right, and that he could
not successfully have sought to charge any other parcel of the estate in
the hands of any of the former co-sharers. Their Lordships think that
the principle enunciated in that case applies equally to a partition by
arbitration such as the one in the present case. Their Lordships are
therefore of opinion that the appellant is not entitled to enforce his
charge against the properties allotted to the first and second
respondents. The third respondent (the mortgagor) has not appeared
before their Lordships, and their Lordships express no opinion as to
any other rights which the appellant may have in respect of his
mortgage.”
56. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that in Mohammedan law the
doctrine of partial partition is not applicable because the heirs are
tenants-in-common. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of this Court in
Syed Shah Ghulam Ghouse Mohiuddin v. Syed Shah Ahmed Mohiuddin Kamisul
(supra). In S.M.A. Samad & Ors. v. Shahid Hussain & Ors. AIR 1963 Patna 375,
the Patna High Court referring to the various decisions indicated that it would be
inexpedient to allow suits for partition of a portion of the properties, because it
would lead to a multiplicity of suits. It is merely a rule of procedural law.
Mohammedans are never joint in estate but only tenants-in-common. It has been
observed that the rule with respect to the partial partition is not so rigid, it can be
allowed in certain circumstances. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Abdul Karim & Ors. v. Hafij Mohammad &
Ors. (1989) MP LJ 178, in which it had been held that suit for partial partition was
maintainable. Reference has also been made to the case of A.J. Pinto & Anr. v. Smt.
Sahebbi Kom Muktum Saheb (Dead) by LRs & Ors. (1972) 4 SCC 238, wherein
this Court has left open the question whether partial partition is possible under
Muslim Law and no opinion was expressed. The aforesaid decision as to the
partial partition had been cited to emphasize that when Muslims inherit in specific
share, their share is determined. However, the question of partial partition is not
involved in the instant case, as such, we need not go into the aforesaid question as
to the permissibility of the partial partition, as the suit in the instant case was filed
for partition of the entire matruka property.
57. A Full Bench decision of the High Court of Sind in Vazir alias Dino & Anr.
v. Dwarkamal & Ors. AIR 1922 Sind 41 has also been referred to, wherein
referring to the case of Mangaldas v. Abdul Razak (1916) 16 Bombay L.R. 224, it
has been observed that the notions of joint family, joint family property and joint
family business are utterly unknown to Mohammedan Law.
58. A decision in Jan Mahomed v. Dattu Jaffer (1913) 38 Bombay 449 has also
been referred to and it has been held that Mohammedans under their own law are
never joint in estate whether they live together or whether they do not. On death of
a Muslim his heirs at once become vested with the shares to which the Islamic Law
entitles them. They have not to wait until the property is divided by metes and
bounds. It has also been observed that sometime an error is caused by application
of Hindu law to the case of Mohammedan law. It has also been further observed
that a Mohammedan heir is not a co-parcener. He has not merely a right to a
defined and immediate share in each portion of the estate but if any portion of the
estate is in any case marked off and divided from the rest of the estate, he has a
right to an immediate share in that portion.

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4731-4732 OF 2010
T. Ravi & Anr. Vs. B. Chinna Narasimha & Ors. etc.
Dated: 21 MARCH 2017
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Saturday, 25 March 2017

What is distinction between joint tenancy and tenants-in-common?

 The Hindu Succession Act by Section 19 clearly provides that each of the co-heirs takes per capita and takes as a tenant-in-common and not at all as a joint tenant or a joint owner. In the case of joint owners or co-owners or joint landlords on the death of one of them, the other co-owners or joint owners or joint landlords take the land by survivorship. That is not so in the case of tenants-in-common. On the death of any tenants-in-common the share of such a tenant-in-common goes not by survivorship, but to his or her own successors and the incidents of the joint tenancy and tenancy in common are distinct and separate. A distinction has been brought about between the joint tenants and the tenants-in-common in the definition of these two terms in the book 'Law Terms and Phrases' by Aiyer. "Tenancy-in-common" is where two or more persons have undivided possession but distinct estate in any subject of property, in equal or unequal shares, and either by the same or by different titles. On the death of a tenant-in-common the share goes to his representative, and not, as in a joint tenancy, to the survivors. Then a distinction has been brought about between a 'tenancy in common and joint tenancy' thus:
"The joint owners may be tenants-in-common or joint tenants (or coparceners), in the case of tenant-in-common they own the property in ascertained or defined shares, but the property has not been divided into shares. In the case of joint tenancy the joint owners own the property in coparcenary and their shares have not been ascertained and cannot be ascertained except perhaps at the tune of partition. In a tenancy-in-common a joint owner's share is inherited on his death by his personal heirs, whereas in a joint tenancy on the death of a joint owner the property belongs to the surviving joint owners. In a tenancy-in-common each joint owner owns or has a right in his share, in a joint tenancy all the joint owners together own the property, a joint owner having no ascertained share cannot be said to own a particular share in it."
Bombay High Court
Umabai Trimbakrao Talukdar And ... vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors. on 26 March, 1971
Equivalent citations: AIR 1971 Bom 293
Bench: D.B.Padhye
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