Delhi HC: Person selected as judge will not be denied his appointment on ground of specific medical unfitness

Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, we are inclined to allow the petition. It is evident that the petitioner - who underwent renal transplant in the year 2015, has remained stable and normal for the last five years. The petitioner has also placed on record the certificate issued by his treating doctor, namely Dr. Ashwini Gupta, Senior Nephrologist, Department of Nephrology, Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, which certifies that the petitioner had undergone kidney transplant on 11.05.2015 and since then, he has been on regular follow-up with him and is maintaining normal renal function. It is also certified that he can perform normal duties and he has been advised medicines during his lifetime. Even the medical certificates issued by Dr. RML Hospital and AAAG Hospital have not stated that the petitioner is medically 'unfit' on account of him not being able to discharge the duties of a Judicial Officer due to his medical condition. It is clear to us that Clause 17 of Appendix III of the CSE Rules, which, inter alia, provides that all candidates having transplanted organs should be declared 'unfit' except corneal transplant, is an archaic rule, which cannot stand in the wake of medical advancements which have taken place over the decades and since the said rule was framed in the year 1964. The same is extremely widely worded and proceeds on the assumption that persons who undergo any organ transplant (except corneal transplant) cannot lead a stable, fruitful and healthy normal life. This assumption can no longer be justified in the light of the medical advancements made over the decades. As rightly observed by the Bombay High Court in Ranjit Kumar Rajak (supra), right to life and liberty of a person cannot be denied or depleted only on account of his medical condition, when such medical condition is not such as to interfere with his normal functioning on the post for which he has offered his candidature, and he has been found to be otherwise competent for selection.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

W.P. (C) 13807/2019 and C.M. No. 55473/2019

Decided On: 02.03.2020

Udbhav Kumar Jain Vs. High Court of Delhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vipin Sanghi and Sanjeev Narula, JJ.

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Supreme Court: Upright and straightforward judicial officers should not subjected to unmerited onslaught

 We are also not oblivious to the fact that mere suspicion cannot

constitute ‘misconduct’. Any ‘probability’ of misconduct needs to be

supported with oral or documentary material, even though the

standard of proof would obviously not be at par with that in a criminal

trial. While applying these yardsticks, the High Court is expected to

consider the existence of differing standards and approaches amongst

different judges. There are innumerable instances of judicial officers

who are liberal in granting bail, awarding compensation under MACT

or for acquired land, backwages to workmen or mandatory

compensation in other cases of tortious liabilities. Such relieforiented

judicial approaches cannot by themselves be grounds to cast

aspersions on the honesty and integrity of an officer.

22. Furthermore, one cannot overlook the reality of ours being a

country wherein countless complainants are readily available without

hesitation to tarnish the image of the judiciary, often for mere pennies

or even cheap momentary popularity. Sometimes a few disgruntled

members of the Bar also join hands with them, and officers of the

subordinate judiciary are usually the easiest target. It is, therefore, the

duty of High Courts to extend their protective umbrella and ensure

that upright and straightforward judicial officers are not subjected to

unmerited onslaught.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2077 OF 2020

Sadhna Chaudhary Vs State of U.P. 

Dated: 06.03.2020

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Supreme Court: In-service candidates should not be appointed against quota reserved for practising Advocate

In these matters, it is in dispute as to whether the
incumbents who have joined the services as Civil Judge can stake
their claims for the posts meant for direct recruitment from the
Bar reserved for practicing advocates for appointment as District

Judges. Since there is a quota in the direct recruitment of Bar
Members, in order to attract talent from the Bar out of practicing
advocates. 
It is settled proposition of law that final relief cannot be
granted by way of interim measure. When direct recruitment has to
be from Bar, we cannot continue to grant interim order of final
nature leaving the situation virtually irreversible, an incumbent
from Bar has to be deprived of the post given to in-service
candidate which is reserved for Bar, question of seniority would
also arise and in case relief is not finally granted several other
complications would arise. In any case such ad-hoc arrangements by
appointing such incumbents is not at all warranted that too in
higher judiciary unless and until the case is decided in favour of
in-service candidates.
We make it clear that we are not disturbing the appointments
which have been made so far by virtue of such interim orders.
However, no new appointments be made from now onwards of in-service
candidates against quota reserved for Bar. In case even if
in-service candidate has been selected in the examination held
earlier as against the Bar quota no further appointment to be made
of such candidates.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 14156/2015


DHEERAJ MOR  Vs HONBLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI 

Date : 10-05-2019
CORAM :
 MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
 MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA

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Whether a person can be denied judicial service on ground of moral turpitude?

Undoubtedly,
judicial service is very different from other services and the yardstick of
suitability that may apply to other services, may not be the same for a
judicial service. But there cannot be any mechanical or rhetorical
incantation of moral turpitude, to deny appointment in judicial service
simplicitor. Much will depend on the facts of a case. Every individual
deserves an opportunity to improve, learn from the past and move
ahead in life by selfimprovement.
To make past conduct, irrespective of
all considerations, an albatross around the neck of the candidate, may
not always constitute justice. Much will, however depend on the fact
situation of a case.
7. That the expression “moral turpitude” is not capable of precise
definition was considered in Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana and
another, (1996) 4 SCC 17, opining:
“12. “Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used
in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct
which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having
any connection showing depravity….”
8. The appellant by dint of hard academic labour was successful at
the competitive examination held on 16.08.2009 and after viva voce was

selected and recommended for appointment by the Maharashtra Public
Service Commission on 14.10.2009. In his attestation form, he had
duly disclosed his prosecution and acquittal. Mere disclosure in an
appropriate case may not be sufficient to hold for suitability in
employment. Nonetheless the nature of allegations and the conduct in
the facts of a case would certainly be a relevant factor. While others so
recommended came to be appointed, the selection of the appellant was
annulled on 04.06.2010 in view of the character verification report of
the police.
9. It is an undisputed fact that one Shri Sudhir Gulabrao Barde, who
had been acquitted on 24.11.2009 in Case No.3022 of 2007 under
Sections 294, 504, 34, IPC, has been appointed. We are not convinced,
that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the appellant
could be discriminated and denied appointment arbitrarily when both
the appointments were in judicial service, by the same selection
procedure, of persons who faced criminal prosecutions and were
acquitted. The distinction sought to be drawn by the respondents, that
the former was not involved in a case of moral turpitude does not leave
us convinced. In Joginder Singh (supra), it was observed as follows:
6
“25. Further, apart from a small dent in the name of
this criminal case in which he has been honourably
acquitted, there is no other material on record to
indicate that the antecedents or the conduct of the
Appellant was not up to the mark to appoint him to
the post….”
10. In the present proceedings, on 23.03.2018, this Court had called
for a confidential report of the character verification as also the
antecedents of the appellant as on this date. The report received reveals
that except for the criminal case under reference in which he has been
acquitted, the appellant has a clean record and there is no adverse
material against him to deny him the fruits of his academic labour in a
competitive selection for the post of a judicial officer. In our opinion, no
reasonable person on the basis of the materials placed before us can
come to the conclusion that the antecedents and character of the
appellant are such that he is unfit to be appointed as a judicial officer.
An alleged single misadventure or misdemeanour of the present nature,
if it can be considered to be so, cannot be sufficient to deny
appointment to the appellant when he has on all other aspects and
parameters been found to be fit for appointment. The Law is well settled
in this regard in Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and others, (2016) 8
7
SCC 471. If empanelment creates no right to appointment, equally
there can be no arbitrary denial of appointment after empanelment.
NONREPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 10571 OF 2018
(arising out of SLP(C) No.6599 of 2018)

MOHAMMED IMRAN Vs  STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

NAVIN SINHA, J.
Dated:October 12, 2018.

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What are guiding principles for deciding objections to answer key or question of Judicial service exam?

Before dealing with the objections and the reasons in support thereof
it would be useful to note the guiding principles on which objections to the
answer key or the question itself need to be tested.
8. In the decision reported as (1983) 4 SCC 309 Kanpur University Vs.
Sameer Gupta, laying down the scope of judicial review pertaining to an
answer key, the Supreme Court had observed as under:-
“We agree that the key answer should be assumed to be correct
unless it is proved to be wrong and that it should not be held to
be wrong by an inferential process of reasoning or by a process
of rationalization. It must be clearly demonstrated to be wrong,
that is to say, it must be such as no reasonable body of men
well-versed in the particular subject would regard as correct.
The contention of the University is falsified in this case by a
large number of acknowledged text books, which are commonly
read by students in U.P. Those text-books leave no room for
doubt that the answer given by the students is correct and the
key answer is incorrect.
17. ….Certain books are prescribed for the Intermediate
Board Examination and such knowledge of the subjects as the
students have is derived from what is contained in those text-
books. Those text-books support the case of the students fully.
If this were a case of doubt, we would have unquestionably
preferred the key answer. But if the matter is beyond the realm
of doubt, it would be unfair to penalize the students for not
giving an answer which accords with the key answer, that is to
say, with an answer which is demonstrated to be wrong.”

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 Judgment Delivered On : September 30, 2016
 W.P.(C) 8629/2016
ANIL KUMAR 
v
REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF DELHI ..... 
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI

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Whether person in govt/judicial service should resign to participate in District judge selection process?

“The challenge in the present writ  application  is  to  the  communication,
dated 16th of February, 2016, whereby representation of the  petitioners  to
appear in interview for the post of District Judge Entry Level (Direct  from
Bar) Examination, 2015, was  rejected  and  a  condition  was  imposed  that
petitioners  will  have  to  tender  their  rejection,   first,   from   the
Subordinate Judicial Service of the State of  Bihar  and  only,  thereafter,

they could appear in the interview.
  For   the   above-mentioned   reasons,   the   Appeal   is   allowed.
Consequently, the Writ Petition  (CWJC  No.  3504  of  2016)  filed  by  the
appellants also stands allowed  directing  the  respondents  to  permit  the
appellants to participate in the selection process  without  insisting  upon
their resigning from their current employment.  If the appellants are  found
suitable, it is open to the appellants to resign  their  current  employment
and opt for the post of District Judge, if they so choose.
REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7358  OF 2016
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 17466 of 2016)


Vijay Kumar Mishra and Another                             … Appellants

                                    Versus

High Court of Judicature at Patna and Others              … Respondents

   Dated:August 9, 2016                    
Chelameswar, J.
Citation:(2016) 9 SCC313,2017(2) MHLJ 9 SC

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Petition seeking appointment to judicial services with 70% blindness is rejected

Madras High Court: While deciding the present issue that whether the petitioner who has been declared to be partially blind with the percentage of disability at 70% was eligible to be appointed as a Civil Judge (Junior Division), the Division Bench of V. Ramasubramanian and T. Mathivanan, JJ., dismissed the petition with regard to the nature of duties of a Judge. The Court further stated that the Government, in consultation with the Court, had proposed to restrict the applicability of the benefit of reservation only to those, whose disability ranges from 40-50%.

The Tamil Nadu government by way of G.O.Ms.No.53 dated 11.04.2005 had identified the post of Civil Judge wherein reservation under the provisions of Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 can be made. In subsequent Notifications (2012 and 2014), in accordance with the Proviso to Section 33 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, the benefit of reservation for the physically challenged could be availed by those blind and deaf candidates, whose percentage of disability is 40-50%. The petitioner had applied for the said post and secured the requisite qualifying marks in the examination and the viva-voce, but his name was not forwarded by the Service Commission due to some confusion regarding the entitlement of the petitioner. S.V. Narayan appearing for the petitioner put forth that the right conferred by the 1995 Act is absolute and the Executive cannot make any exception violating the spirit of the Act.

The Court took up an in-depth analysis of the law and the circulars in question. It was observed that in 2010 an appointment of a completely blind candidate led to certain complications after which the administration in consultation with this Court proposed an amendment to the Recruitment Rules and bringing in the impugned Notification No.49858/Cts-I/2014-4 dated 08.08.2014. The Court further observed that the petitioner only challenged the Government Letter dated 08.08.2014, but did not challenge Paragraph 4.F of the impugned Notification, therefore the petitioner cannot achieve the desired outcome. It was further observed that Sections 32 and 33 of the 1995 Act itself gives the benefit of reservation to persons who suffer upto 40% of disability. Thus the impugned Notification does not amend the fundamental feature of reservation under the Sections and does not nullify the legislation in any manner.

Madras High Court

V.Surendra Mohan vs State Of Tamilnadu on 13 April, 2015

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