Bombay HC: Forgery of court record at the time of filing of land acquisition proceeding, person who were not practicing advocate at relevant time are not liable for prosecution

Criminal Procedure - Forged Documents - Filing of - Section 215(1)(b) of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Present petition filed by advocates challenging the Reference Court's order directing the District Collector to lodge an FIR and the Assistant Superintendent of Court to file complaints against claimants and advocates for offences related to forged documents in land acquisition references - Whether the Reference Court's directions were vitiated due to lack of opportunity of hearing for the advocates, and whether the directions would result in multiple proceedings for the same offence - Held, the Reference Court formed its opinion based on evidence presented during the trial, not as a finding of guilt, and therefore, there was no statutory requirement to provide an opportunity of hearing before directing a complaint; principles of natural justice are generally not applicable at the stage of reporting a criminal offence as it would frustrate proceedings and defeat justice - The court clarified that the directions to the Assistant Superintendent of Court relate to offences committed on the record of the Court, while the directions to the Collector relate to offences committed outside the Court prior to the presentation of references, and therefore, there would not be multiple proceedings for the same offence - The court found that petitioner nos. 1 and 3 were not practicing advocates when the land acquisition references were originally submitted and could not be held responsible for the presentation of forged documents - Petition partly allowed for petitioner nos. 1 and 3; impugned directions quashed to the extent they apply to them; petition dismissed for petitioner no. 2.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1156 of 2026

Decided On: 06.05.2026

Akshay Ravindra Bornare and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.G. Chapalgaonkar, J.

 Citation: 2026:BHC-AUG:21518, MANU/MH/4467/2026

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Bombay HC: A preliminary inquiry and opportunity of hearing are not mandatory before a court directs filing a complaint U/S 379 of BNSS

Criminal Procedure - Forgery - Complaint against advocate - Section 379 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Present petition filed by advocate challenging directions of Reference Court to lodge FIR and file complaints against him and claimants for offences related to forged documents used in land acquisition reference proceedings - Whether the Reference Court's directions to lodge an FIR and file complaints against the petitioner and claimants are valid, and whether a preliminary inquiry and opportunity of hearing are mandatory before making such directions - Held, the Reference Court, based on evidence presented during the land acquisition reference proceedings, formed an opinion that the petitioner and claimants had knowledge of the forgery of documents and used them to mislead the court - Section 379 of BNSS (formerly Section 340 Cr.P.C.) does not mandate a complaint in every case, but only if it is "expedient in the interest of justice," and allows for a preliminary inquiry to determine this - A preliminary inquiry and opportunity of hearing are not mandatory before a court directs filing a complaint, as the inquiry is not to determine guilt or innocence - The person against whom a complaint is made has a legal right to be heard by the Magistrate during subsequent proceedings - Principles of natural justice are generally not applicable at the stage of reporting a criminal offence, as this would frustrate proceedings - The Reference Court's opinion was based on an in-depth inquiry during the trial, and is not a finding of guilt against the petitioner - The directions to the Assistant Superintendent of Court to file complaints for offences committed on court record and the directions to the Collector to lodge FIR/police reports for offences committed outside the court are distinct and valid - Petition dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 1660 of 2026

Decided On: 06.05.2026

Kishor Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.G. Chapalgaonkar, J.

 Citation: 2026:BHC-AUG:21520,MANU/MH/4470/2026

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Excellent Video explaining how India's Supreme Court Shields Advocate-Client Privilege from Investigative Overreach

  

This video is produced and presented for educational and informational purposes only. The content is based on the Supreme Court of India judgment,

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 2 of 2025, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 632 of 2025 and Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9334 of 2025

In Re: Summoning Advocates Who Give Legal Opinion or Represent Parties During Investigation of Cases and Related Issues.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai, C.J.I., K. Vinod Chandran and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.

Author: K. Vinod Chandran, J.

Decided On: 31.10.2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 1275, MANU/SC/1470/2025.

https://www.lawweb.in/2025/11/guardians-of-confidentiality-how-indias.html

The judgment discussed pertains to the client's legal privilege under Sections 132 to 134 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) and related Supreme Court directions as cited in the source. This content is aimed at legal professionals, students, and scholars seeking insight into client-advocate confidentiality in Indian law.

Disclaimer

The video and accompanying materials do not constitute legal advice or opinion and should not be relied upon as a substitute for professional legal counsel. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, the creators and host disclaim any liability for errors or omissions.

Viewers are encouraged to refer to the original Supreme Court judgment and consult qualified legal experts for specific cases or issues. Use of this video is at the viewer's discretion, and the creators assume no responsibility for outcomes based on this information.

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How the Supreme Court's Landmark Decision Protects Your Right to Confidential Legal Advice?

 

How the Supreme Court's Landmark Decision Protects Your Right to Confidential Legal Advice

The Supreme Court of India has delivered a landmark judgment that will transform how investigating agencies interact with lawyers. In a historic decision  In Re : Summoning Advocates Who Give Legal Opinion or Represent Parties During Investigation of Cases and Related Issues (2025 INSC 1275), the Court categorically ruled that investigating officers cannot directly summon advocates who are representing accused persons in criminal cases, unless the situation falls under strict exceptions and meets rigorous procedural requirements.

If you are a criminal defendant, understand this: The investigating agency cannot simply drag your lawyer into the police station to extract information about your case. Your lawyer's confidential communications with you remain sacrosanct under the law.

The Case That Changed Everything

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Guardians of Confidentiality: How India's Supreme Court Shields Advocate-Client Privilege from Investigative Overreach

The Way Forward:

67. On a broad conspectus of the Client-Advocate privilege as codified in Section 132 to 134 of the BSA; though we are not persuaded to lay down any guidelines, which we believe are sufficiently available on an interpretation of the provisions itself, which also restrains us from constituting a committee of legal professionals, we issue the following directions; to ensure that the privilege is not impinged upon by valiant investigators or overzealous parties to a litigation, purely on the basis of the interpretation of the evidentiary Rules codified:

1. Section 132 is a privilege conferred on the client, obliging an Advocate not to disclose any professional communications, made in confidence, which privilege, in the absence of the client can be invoked by the Advocate on behalf of the client.

1.1 The Investigating Officers in a criminal case or a Station House Officer conducting a preliminary inquiry in a cognizable offence shall not issue a summons to an Advocate who represents the Accused to know the details of the case, unless it is covered under any of the exceptions Under Section 132.

1.2 When a summons is so issued to an Advocate, under any of the exceptions, it shall explicitly specify the facts on which the exception is sought to be relied upon, which shall also be with the consent of the superior Officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police who shall record his satisfaction as to the exception in writing, before the summons is issued.

1.3 A summons so issued shall be subject to judicial review at the instance of the Advocate or the client Under Section 528 of the BNSS.

1.4 The Advocate on whom there is an obligation of non-disclosure as per Section 132 of the BSA shall be one who is engaged in a litigation or in a non-litigious or a pre-litigation matter.

2. Production of documents in the possession of the Advocate or the client will not be covered under the privilege conferred by Section 132, either in a civil case or a criminal case.

2.1 In a criminal case, the production of a document directed by a Court or an Officer shall be complied with by production before the Court Under Section 94 of the BNSS; being regulated also by Section 165 of the BSA.

2.2 In a civil case, the production of a document shall be regulated by Section 165 of BSA and Order XVI Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

2.3 On production of such document, it shall be upon the Court to decide on any objection filed with respect to the order to produce, and the admissibility of the document, after hearing the Advocate and the party whom the Advocate represents.

3. The production of a digital device Under Section 94 of the BNSS if directed by an Investigating Officer, the direction shall only be to produce it before the Jurisdictional Court.

3.1 On production of the digital device by the Advocate before the Court; the Court shall issue notice to the party with respect to whom the details are sought to be discovered from the digital device and hear the party and the Advocate on any objection regarding the production of the digital device, discovery from it and the admissibility of that discovered.

3.2 If the objections are overruled by the Court, then the digital device shall be opened only in the presence of the party and the Advocate, who will be enabled due assistance of a person with expertise in digital technology, of their choice.

3.3 While examining the digital device, care shall be taken by the Court not to impair the confidentiality with respect to the other clients of the Advocate and the discovery shall be confined to that sought by the Investigating Officer, if it is found to be permissible and admissible.

4. In-house counsel will not be entitled to the privilege Under Section 132 since they are not Advocates practicing in Courts as spoken of in the BSA.

4.1 The In-house counsel, however, would be entitled to the protection Under Section 134 insofar as any communication made to the legal advisor of his employer, which however, cannot be claimed for the communications between the employer and the In-house counsel.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 2 of 2025, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 632 of 2025 and Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9334 of 2025

In Re: Summoning Advocates Who Give Legal Opinion or Represent Parties During Investigation of Cases and Related Issues.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai, C.J.I., K. Vinod Chandran and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.

Author: K. Vinod Chandran, J.

Decided On: 31.10.2025

Citation: 2025 INSC 1275, MANU/SC/1470/2025.

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Supreme Court: What will be proper order there is disobedience of interim injunction order and thereafter main suit is dismissed?

A question of maintainability of the application Under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was raised. With reference to Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan MANU/SC/0564/1998 : 1998:INSC:334 : (1998) 7 SCC 59, it was held that even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside, the disobedience thereof is not erased. {Para 3}.

12. But the position Under Rule 2-A of Order 39 is different. Even if the injunction order was subsequently set aside, the disobedience does not get erased. It may be a different matter that the rigour of such disobedience may be toned down if the order is subsequently set aside.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 13999 of 2024.

Decided On: 05.03.2025

Lavanya C. and Ors. Vs. Vittal Gurudas Pai since deseased by L.Rs. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pankaj Mithal and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0318/2025.

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Bombay HC: Advocate Casting Aspersions On Woman's Character Upon Instructions From Client Is Discharging His Duty, Not Insulting Her Modesty

 Reliance is placed upon the decision in the case of Navin Parekh vs. Madhubala Shridhar Sharma & Ors. MANU/MH/0883/1992 : 1992 Mh.L.J. 1409, in the backdrop that the lawyer had forwarded certain letters on behalf of his client where it was alleged that he had acted in highly unprofessional and unethical manner and he was sought to be prosecuted for alleged defamation, since the words used in the letter were per se defamatory. It is in these facts, it was held that where a party on the basis of sufficient material arrives at a conclusion and states its case and the contemplated course of action in the legal correspondence, it would be wholly inappropriate to allege that an offence of defamation is committed. Justice M.F.Saldanha held that, "in the case of an Advocate where express malice is absent, a Court having due regard to public policy would be extremely cautious of depriving him of the protection of Exception 9 to Section 499 Indian Penal Code. The Trial Magistrates would be well advised to be doubly cautious while entertaining complaints against legal practitioners because the law does confer on them certain privileges which are necessary for the conduct of their professional duties. It is, therefore, only in that class of cases where those privileges have been virtually abused alone, the process should be issued. The obligation of making out a case that the accused, who is an advocate had not acted in good faith and that he had acted maliciously is, therefore, a condition precedent and in absence of this necessary ingredient, the prosecution cannot be sustained." {Para 21}

24. In any case, since we find that there was no intention on part of the Petitioner to insult her modesty, as he was only discharging his duty of defending his clients in the remand proceedings and even if he had cast aspersions upon her character, since they were based on the instructions received from his clients, which has reference in the complaint made on-line and its receipt in the police station is not denied, we deem it appropriate to extend the privilege of an Advocate to the present Petitioner and moreso, what we find is, the statement is not unconnected to the case, as it is the case of his client that by using the pressure tactics, they were being coerced to pay the money.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 3858 of 2024

Decided On: 09.12.2024

Ratnadeep Ram Patil Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre and Manjusha Ajay Deshpande, JJ.

Author: Bharati H. Dangre, J.

 Citation: 2024:BHC-AS:48668-DB, MANU/MH/7471/2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Bombay HC: Offence of outraging modesty of a lady depends on intention or knowledge of accused and feeling of woman

From bare reading of the Section, which is identically worded as Section 509 of IPC, the essential ingredients noted are as below :-

i. Intention to insult the modesty of a woman;

ii. The insult must be caused by :

a. uttering any words, or making any sound

b. or gesture.

c. or exhibiting any object

intending that such word or sound shall be heard or that the gesture or object shall be seen by such woman, or

iii. Intruding upon the privacy of such a woman.

The aforesaid provision comprise of three pivotal components for establishing an offence; firstly, the presence of an intention to insult the modesty of a woman; secondly, the manner in which this insult is perpetrated and thirdly, though independently, an intrusion on her privacy, where it is not restricted to utterance or gesture, as it is not qualified by any prescribed manner.

15. In Major Singh (supra), while answering the question whether the Respondent who caused injury to the private parts of a female child of seven and half months is guilty under Section 354 of the Penal Code, an offence of outraging the modesty of a woman, which involves assault or use of criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, Chief Justice A.K. Sarkar, opined that the offence does not depend on the reaction of the woman subjected to the assault or use of criminal force, as the Section contemplate that the act has to be done "intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty" and this intention or knowledge is the ingredient of the offence and not the woman's feeling.

In no uncertain terms, the necessary ingredients of the said offence were carved out in the following words :-

"It would follow that if the intention or knowledge was not proved, proof of the fact that the woman felt that her modesty had been outraged would not satisfy the necessary ingredient of the offence. Likewise, if the intention or knowledge was proved, the fact that the woman did not feel that her modesty had been outraged would be irrelevant, for the necessary ingredient would then have been proved. The sense of modesty in all women is of course not the same; it varies from woman to woman. In many cases, the woman's sense of modesty would not be known to others. If the test of the offence was the reaction of the woman, then it would have to be proved that the offender knew the standard of the modesty of the woman concerned, as otherwise, it could not be proved that he had intended to outrage "her" modesty...."

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 3858 of 2024

Decided On: 09.12.2024

Ratnadeep Ram Patil Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre and Manjusha Ajay Deshpande, JJ.

Author: Bharati H. Dangre, J.

 Citation: 2024:BHC-AS:48668-DB, MANU/MH/7471/2024.

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Delhi High court: No time should be permitted to be wasted on interim applications and the advocate should consent for the suitable order if they know the probable outcome of such application

 It is also found that whenever applications are filed, the opposite party/counsel, out of habit, while appearing on advance notice, seek time for filing reply. Most of such interim applications need no reply. Moreover, the law on various aspects which come up for consideration in such interim applications, is by and large settled and any counsel worth his salt knows the outcome of such applications. In such situations, no time should be permitted to be wasted on such applications and if the counsel knows that the application, even after reply and arguments would be allowed, should consent thereto. Else, the Commercial Courts Act, insofar as aimed at expediting disposal, will remain a piece of legislation only on paper.

 In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.)

Vifor (International) Ltd. Vs  Suven Life Sciences Ltd.

CS(COMM) 1680/2016

Decided on March 11, 2019

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7514

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What is duty of Advocate in proceeding before motor accident claim tribunal?

 If the relevant chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is perused, the object seems to be to rehabilitate the victims of the motor accidents and/or their legal representatives. A claim petition under the said Act is in that sense not an adversarial litigation like a litigation where the rival parties fight in respect of a right over a property. At this stage, it will be necessary to make a reference to a recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar and another, MANU/SC/1018/2010 : 2011(2) Mh. L.J. (SC) 569 : 2011(1) SCC 343. In paragraph No. 11 of the said decision, the Apex Court has held that the Tribunal under the said Act does not function as a neutral umpire as in a civil suit, but as an active explorer and seeker of truth who is required to hold an enquiry into the claim for determining the just compensation. The Apex Court has held that the Tribunal has an active role to play in ascertaining the true and correct position so that just compensation can be awarded. A judicial notice will have to be taken that in our country generally we have very bad road conditions. The street lighting is poor. There are no road dividers on major roads. In mofussil areas, the means of transport are limited. We do not have any kind of traffic discipline. The cumulative effect of all these factors is that there are large number of road accidents. Therefore, in a sense, the victims of motor accidents are the victims of the system and therefore, it is the duty of the Advocates representing the parties before the Tribunal to assist the Court in the mission of finding the truth and arriving at just compensation. If the claims are inflated or fabricated, the duty of the Advocates is to assist the Court to arrive at the truth. In genuine claims, the approach of insurers and their Advocates has to be fair and humane. In the facts of the present case, the respondent No. 3 should have adopted a fair approach and could have always avoided inhuman approach which was reflected from the questions put in the cross-examination of the appellant and Dr. Joshi. Less said the better about the written arguments.  {Para 19}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

F.A. No. 717 of 1999

Decided On: 08.08.2011

Dattatraya Laxman Shinde Vs. Nana Raghunath Hire and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citations: 2012 AAC 334 (BOM), 2011 (107) AIC (SOC) 32 (BOM), 2011 (6) ABR (NOC) 564 (BOM.), (2012) 3 ACC 554, (2011) 5 MAH LJ 854, (2011) 4 TAC 367, (2011) 6 ALLMR 646 (BOM), (2013) 1 ACJ 474, (2011) 6 BOM CR 553

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Whether it is mandatory to file fresh Vakalatnama alongwith Memo of appeal if same Advocate is representing the appellant in appeal?

 It is, thus, now well-settled that any detect in signing the memorandum of appeal or any detect in the authority of the person signing the memorandum of appeal, or the omission to file the vakalatnama executed by the appellant, along with the appeal, will not invalidate the memorandum of appeal, if such omission or defect is not deliberate and the signing of the Appeal memorandum or the presentation thereof before the appellate court was with the knowledge and authority of the appellant. Such omission or defect being one relatable to procedure, it can subsequently be corrected. It is the duty of the Office to verify whether the memorandum of appeal was signed by the appellant or his authorized agent or pleader holding appropriate vakalatnama. If the Office does not point out such detect and the appeal is accepted and proceeded with, it cannot be rejected at the hearing of the appeal merely by reason of such detect, without giving an opportunity to the appellant to rectify it. The requirement that the appeal should be signed by the appellant or his pleader (duly authorized by a Vakalatnama executed by the appellant) is, no doubt, mandatory. But it does not mean that non-compliance should result in automatic rejection of the appeal without an opportunity to the appellant to rectify the defect. If and when the defect is noticed or pointed out, the court should, either on an application by the appellant or suo motu, permit the appellant to rectify the detect by either signing the memorandum of appeal or by furnishing the vakalatnama. It should also be kept in view that if the pleader signing the memorandum of appeal has appeared for the party in the trial court, then he need not present a fresh Vakalatnama along with the memorandum of appeal, as the Vakalatnama in his favour filed in the trial court will be sufficient authority to sign and present the memorandum of appeal having regard to Rule 4(2) of Order 3 CPC, read with Explanation [c] thereto. In such an event, a mere memo referring to the authority given to him in the trial court may be sufficient. However, filing a fresh Vakalatnama with the memo of appeal will always be convenient to facilitate the processing of the appeal by the office. {Para 15}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6701 of 2005.

Decided On: 10.11.2005

Uday Shankar Triyar Vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ruma Pal, A.R. Lakshmanan and R.V. Raveendran, JJ.

Author: R.V. Raveendran, J.

Citation: 2006 (1) ARC 1 (SC), MANU/SC/2173/2005

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Can rights of the accused be waived by his Advocate?

  In India, the rights of the accused cannot be waived by the advocate without the express and informed consent of the accused. The accused person is the primary holder of their legal rights, and these rights are considered fundamental and inalienable. The advocate's role is to provide legal advice and representation, but they must act in accordance with the instructions and decisions of their client, the accused.

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Under which circumstances the court can convict the accused based on the suggestion given by his Advocate to prosecution witnesses?

 Thus, from the above it is evident that the suggestion made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross-examination if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner would definitely bind the accused and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client. 

{Para 38}

39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except the concession on the point of law. As a legal proposition we cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner.

40. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the initial burden to establish the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt rests on the prosecution. It is also an elementary principle of law that the prosecution has to prove its case on its own legs and cannot derive advantage or benefit from the weakness of the defence. We are not suggesting for a moment that if prosecution is unable to prove its case on its own legs then the Court can still convict an accused on the strength of the evidence in the form of reply to the suggestions made by the defence counsel to a witness. Take for instance, in the present case we have reached to the conclusion that the evidence of the three eyewitnesses inspires confidence and there is nothing in their evidence on the basis of which it could be said that they are unreliable witnesses. Having reached to such a conclusion, in our opinion, to fortify our view we can definitely look into the suggestions made by the defence counsel to the eyewitnesses, the reply to those establishing the presence of the accused persons as well as the eyewitnesses in the night hours. To put it in other words, suggestions by itself are not sufficient to hold the accused guilty if they are incriminating in any manner or are in the form of admission in the absence of any other reliable evidence on record. It is true that a suggestion has no evidentiary value but this proposition of law would not hold good at all times and in a given case during the course of cross-examination the defence counsel may put such a suggestion the answer to which may directly go against the accused and this is exactly what has happened in the present case.

41. The principle of law that in a criminal case, a lawyer has no implied authority to make admissions against his client during the progress of the trial would hold good only in cases where dispensation of proof by the prosecution is not permissible in law. For example, it is obligatory on the part of the prosecution to prove the post mortem report by examining the doctor. The accused cannot admit the contents of the post mortem report thereby absolving the prosecution from its duty to prove the contents of the same in accordance with law by examining the doctor. This is so because if the evidence per se is inadmissible in law then a defence counsel has no authority to make it admissible with his consent.

42. Therefore, we are of the opinion that suggestions made to the witness by the defence counsel and the reply to such suggestions would definitely form part of the evidence and can be relied upon by the Court along with other evidence on record to determine the guilt of the accused.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1910 OF 2010

BALU SUDAM KHALDE AND ANOTHER Vs

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Author: J.B. PARDIWALA, J.:

MARCH 29, 2023.

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Whether Advocate can be held guilty for cheating before Lok adalat through Whatsapp Video Call?

 The applicant is thus alleged of being a part of the entire episode of impersonating Mrs.Gidwani in the consent terms which were filed in S.C. Suit No. 3032/2019.Tilak Prima facie, it can be seen that the applicant filed his vakalatnama and represented the so-called Ms.Pushpa Gidwani for the first time on 9/3/2020, and he was having her mobile number and as per the direction of the Panel Members of the Lok Adalat on 12/12/2020 he made a phone call on the said number and one lady appeared at the other end, who had introduced herself as Pushpa Gidwani and she was known to the applicant as the defendant in the Suit. The applicant claim innocence by stating that as a lawyer, he was not expected to go into the detail Identification as once the client approached and introduced herself to be so and so, there is no reason to disbelieve and even the vakalatnama which was signed by her was given to him which he filed in the Court. {Para 6}

7 There is no reason to disbelieve the applicant, as a lawyer was satisfied that the vakalatnama given to him and chose to represent the defendant in the Suit and even signed the consent terms. However, the learned APP state that the applicant has refused to divert the phone number of Gidwani to whom he had made a video call. Mr.Nikam state that the applicant shall render his co-operation to the Investigating Officer.In the above circumstances, the custodial interrogation of the applicant is not necessary and he deserve protection by way of interim order.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION NO. 2174 of 2022

Date of Order: 18.08.2022

Rakesh Shrinath Dubey  Vs. The State Of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati Dangre, J.

Citation: MANU/MHOR/121450/2022,2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 16.

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Can the court accept a compromise petition if the party has not given authority to his advocate to compromise the case through a special Vakalatnama?

 The third question that arises for our consideration in context with the legality and validity of the settlement is whether the learned advocate appearing for the cross-objector i.e., Defendant No. 2 could have signed the compromise petition without an express consent. It is an imperative duty of the Court to ascertain the genuineness and lawfulness of the compromise deed. Indisputably, in the case on hand, the First Appellate Court had neither recorded the statements of the parties in the Court nor had made any inquiry into the terms of the settlement. It is in such circumstances that the High Court in its impugned order has observed that the Compromise Petition was signed by the advocate without any express authority or without special vakalatnama executed in favour of the advocate. In fact, the authority was expressly curtailed in the compromise deed. {Para 100}

103. Almost six decades back, the Madras High Court speaking through Justice Ramaswami (as His Lordship then was) in the case of Govindammal v. Marimuthu Maistry and Ors. reported in MANU/TN/0103/1959 : AIR 1959 Mad 7 had sounded the note of caution observing as under:

5.... The decisions appear to be fairly clear that even in cases where there is no express authorization to enter into a compromise, under the inherent authority impliedly given to the Vakil he has power to enter into the compromise on behalf of his client. But in the present state of the clientele world and the position in which the Bar now finds itself and in the face of divided judicial authority and absence of statutory backing prudence dictates that unless express power is given in the vakalatnama itself to enter into compromise, in accordance with the general practice obtaining a special vakalatnama should be filed or the specific consent of the party to enter into the compromise should be obtained. If an endorsement is made on the plaint etc., it would be better to get the signature or the thumb impression of the party affixed thereto, making it evident that the party is aware of what is being done by the Vakil on his or her behalf.

104. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the High Court committed no error in holding that the settlement between the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was unlawful.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors.  Vs.  Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Citation: MANU/SC/0326/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether the court should accept compromise petition if it is not signed by a party or his Advocate?

  The learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent took a stand that the High Court was justified in taking the view that the suit had been simply withdrawn by the Plaintiff-Appellant Under Rule 1 of Order 23 and it had not been compromised in terms of Rule 3 of the said Order 23; as such there was no occasion for the Appellant to file an application for recall of the said order and for restoration of the suit in question for being heard on merit. From the copy of the petition which was filed on February 27, 1991 it appears that the terms and conditions of settlement and agreement had been mentioned saying that both parties had entered into a compromise because of which the Plaintiff-Appellant had thereafter no connection with the disputed land and Defendant-Respondent shall be deemed to be in possession and the owner of the said disputed land. The prayer made in the said petition also says that the compromise may be ordered to be accepted. On basis of that petition, as already mentioned above, the court passed an order saying that the compromise had been accepted. In the order it has been mentioned that the suit of the Plaintiff be "dismissed as per compromise deed Ex. C". In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is difficult to hold that by order dated February 27, 1991 the Court allowed the suit to be withdrawn in terms of Rule 1 of Order 23. The order on face of it purported to dismiss the suit of the Plaintiff on basis of the terms and conditions mentioned in the petition of compromise. As such, the validity of that order has to be judged treating it to be an order deemed to have been passed in purported exercise of the power conferred on the Court by Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code. The learned Subordinate Judge should not have accepted the said petition of compromise even if he had no knowledge of the fraud alleged to have been practised on the Appellant by his counsel, because admittedly the petition of compromise had not been signed either by the Respondent or his counsel. This fact should have been discovered by the Court. In the case of Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel [MANU/SC/0032/1987 : (1988) 1 SCC 270 : AIR 1988 SC 400] it has been said: (SCC p. 276, para 10)

Under Rule 3 as it now stands, when a claim in suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties and there must be a completed agreement between them. To constitute an adjustment, the agreement or compromise must itself be capable of being embodied in a decree. When the parties enter into a compromise during the hearing of a suit or appeal, there is no reason why the requirement that the compromise should be reduced in writing in the form of an instrument signed by the parties should be dispensed with. The court must therefore insist upon the parties to reduce the terms into writing.

The requirement of the petition of compromise being signed by the parties concerned has been considered also in the case of Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India [MANU/SC/0485/1991 : (1992) 1 SCC 31 : AIR 1991 SC 2234]. It appears the attention of learned Judges was not drawn to the aforesaid case of this Court in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel [MANU/SC/0032/1987 : (1988) 1 SCC 270 : AIR 1988 SC 400]. {Para 10}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2913-2915 of 2018

Prasanta Kumar Sahoo and Ors.  Vs.  Charulata Sahu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Decided On: 29.03.2023

Citation: MANU/SC/0326/2023.

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Whether the court can dismiss the bail application if Advocate for accused remains absent?

 Prisoners have no remedy against absentee counsels and little

control over the adverse situation that follows. In these

circumstances the prisoner becomes a victim of “undeserved

want” within the meaning of Section 12 (e) of the Legal Services

Authorities Act, 1987 who is entitled to legal aid. Refusal of

legal aid to this class of prisoners would entail denial of justice.

{Para 18}

19. In this wake, dismissal of a bail application for non

prosecution on account of absence of counsel is impermissible,

as it is contrary to the rights of prisoners to legal aid under the

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 and violative of

fundamental rights of the prisoners guaranteed under Article 21

of the Constitution of India.

20. Personal liberty is the fount of all rights. Protection of liberty

is the crown of the court process. While deciding bails the courts

have to be cognizant of the entitlement of prisoners to legal aid,

and also alert to their right of hearing. In the event of non

appearance of a prisoner’s counsel the court may appoint an

amicus curiae to represent the prisoner and proceed with the

hearing of the bail.

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Case :- CRIMINAL MISC. BAIL APPLICATION No. - 18536

of 2020

Applicant :- Maneesh Pathak

Opposite Party :- State of U.P.

Author: Hon'ble Ajay Bhanot,J.

Order Date :- 28.2.2023

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Bombay HC: Advocates Appointed By Legal Aid Or Court Exempt From Filing Certified Copies Of Judgement In Appeal

 The learned counsel Mr. Pawan Mali has strenuously preparedthe Appeal Memo along with the Application for condonation of delay.It appears that the office has not permitted him to file the Appeal and

Application, mentioning.doc rather has not accepted his papers on the ground that he has not furnished the certified copy of the impugned judgment. In fact the learned counsel was never given a certified copy of the said judgment by the Legal Aid Services Authority. {Para 3}

4. In view of this, the learned counsel Mr. Pawan Mali is exempted

from filing of the certified copy of the judgment and order in Sessions Case No.41 of 2016. Office to accept the papers and register the same as in other proceedings.

5. These directions would be applicable to all Advocates who are

appointed either by the Court or by the Legal Aid Services Authority.

Non-filing of the certified copy of the judgment shall not be an

impediment to accept the papers and register the Appeals by the

office.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2022

Babi Krushna Pawar  Vs The State of Maharashtra .

CORAM: SMT. SADHANA S. JADHAV &

MILIND N. JADHAV,J.

DATE MARCH 30, 2022.

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Can say given by defendant's Advocate on the reverse side of the plaint be treated as a written statement of the defendant?

  The respondent Corporation's advocate appears to

have filed say under his own signature on reverse side of

page Nos. 3 and 4 of the plaint. This novel way of filing of

written statement cannot be said to be pleadings of the party

because they are neither signed by the representative of the

Corporation nor there is verification of the same. Though

the suit is contested, there is no written statement as

required by the law. {Para 3}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

SECOND APPEAL NO. 427 OF 2005

Ashabai Murlidhar Karpe Vs The Municipal Corporation of Aurangabad, 

CORAM : P.R. BORKAR,J.

DATED : 30.06.2009

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Whether the trial court can suspend sentence of convict in his absence when application to that effect is filed by his Advocate?

 It is difficult for me to concur with the view taken by the Kerala High Court that in the cases arising from the Negotiable Instruments Act, upon   conviction, the accused automatically enjoys the benefit of Section 389(3)   of the Cr.P.C. Of course, an application can be filed under Section 389(3)   of the Code and the Court may pass an appropriate order in accordance   with law. The question is about the personal presence of the accused for   the purpose of passing an appropriate order upon the application under   Section 389(3) of the Code. {Para 35}

36 I am of the view that in the absence of the convict accused, the learned   advocate  appearing  for  him  cannot  prefer  an  application  under  Section   389(3)  of the Code for suspension of the sentence  to enable  the convict   accused to prefer an appeal before the Sessions Court. When an order is   passed under Section 389(3) of the Code for suspension of the sentence by   the   trial   Court   to   enable   the   accused   to   prefer   an   appeal   before   the   Sessions   Court,   then   the   accused   has   to   furnish   bail   with   necessary   sureties. He has to execute the bail bonds. The order under Section 389(3)   of the Code will come into force only when the accused furnishes the bail   bonds. In such circumstances, in his absence, the learned advocate cannot   be   permitted   to   file   such   an   application.   There   is   one   more   reason   in   taking this view. If it is permissible for the learned advocate defending the   accused   to   file   an   application   under   Section   389(3)   of   the   Code   for   suspension of the sentence in the absence of the accused being personally   present before the learned Magistrate, then the same would render Section   418(2) of the Code otiose or redundant. If the convicted person is released   on bail under Section 389(3) of the Code and such person has to furnish   the   bail,   how   this   process   will   be   undertaken   in   the   absence   of   the   convicted  accused.  I am of the  view that the  learned  Magistrate  rightly   observed  in the  order  that  the  application  under  Section  389(3)  of the   Code was not maintainable since the convicted accused was not personally   present   before   the   Court.   Thus,   the   fourth   question   is   answered   accordingly. 

Gujarat High Court

Ishwarbhai Hirabhai Chunara vs State Of Gujarat & on 22 February, 2017

                   R/SCR.A/9112/2016     

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