Madhya Pradesh HC: JJ Act Overrides NIA Act, Juvenile Booked Under UAPA To Be Tried By Children's Court not Special Judge, NIA Act

While discussing the juvenile issue, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon (supra) observed that there is no doubt that JJ Act is beneficial in nature and is socially oriented legislation and in case the provisions are not complied with, the object of its enactment would be frustrated. However, while resolving the conflict between the JJ Act, 2000 and TADA Act, 1987, it was observed that Section 1(4) of JJ Act, 2000 was added w.e.f. 22.08.2006 which gave overriding effect over other statutes. However, the other statutes in that case was TADA Act which was not in existence and was repealed much before coming into force of the amendment of 22.08.2006. Since the overriding effect was provided over other statutes and TADA Act stood repealed much before the same, it could not be said that JJ Act, 2000 will have an overriding effect upon the TADA Act. In the present case, both the NIA Act, 2008 and JJ Act, 2015 are in operation. The later in point of time is JJ Act which provides for clear cut non-obstante over any other law for the time being in force whereas Section 13 of the NIA Act provides for non-obstante clause giving an overriding effect only upon the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, this Court is of the view that the JJ Act, 2015 will have an overriding effect over the NIA Act, 2008. {Para 25}

26. On a mature consideration of the above discourse as well as the legal position, especially considering the effect of Section 1(4) of Act, 2015, it is hereby held that when the FIR is registered under a Scheduled Act prescribed under the NIA Act and a juvenile has been directed to be tried as an adult by the Children's Court, then the jurisdiction to try the case would vest in Children's Court and not in the Special Judge under the NIA Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (JABALPUR BENCH)

Misc. Criminal Case No. 1133/2025

Decided On: 19.05.2025

In Reference Vs. Memo No. 454/2024 Bhopal Dated 23/11/2024

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Dwivedi, J.

Citation:  MANU/MP/1475/2025.

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Supreme Court: What is the duty of Session judge while deciding bail application in National Investigation Agency Act?

 The High Court ought to have taken into account the totality of the material and evidence on record as it is and ought not to have discarded it as being inadmissible. The High Court clearly overlooked the settled legal position that, at the stage of considering the prayer for bail, it is not necessary to weigh the material, but only form opinion on the basis of the material before it on broad probabilities. The Court is expected to apply its mind to ascertain whether the accusations against the Accused are prima face true. Indeed, in the present case, we are not called upon to consider the prayer for cancellation of bail as such but to examine the correctness of the approach of the High Court in granting bail to the Accused despite the materials and evidence indicating that accusations made against him are prima facie true. {Para 35}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 578 of 2019.

Decided On: 02.04.2019

National Investigation Agency Vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Khanwilkar and Ajay Rastogi, JJ.

Author: A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0458/2019,(2019) 5 SCC 1.

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To what extent general provision of criminal law are applicable to prosecution under National Investigation Agency Act?

 What is held by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Farhan Sheikh‟s case (supra) is condensed in para (89) of the judgment which reads thus:

“89. Thus, so far as the constitution of NIA is concerned, it a complete code. However, the same cannot be said about the substantive offences, and the procedural laws which would be applicable for the purpose of investigation and conduct of trial of such offences. To the extent that Section 16 of the NIA Act prescribes powers of Special Courts, the same would prevail. However, in respect of matters not dealt with under the Act relating procedures, and the substantive offences, it is the provisions of the Code and the substantive laws enumerated in the schedule to the Act, which would be relevant. Even if, the Act is considered to be complete Code in so far as it provides the right of appeal, in the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are inclined to hold that the prescription of limitation in Section 21(5) of the NIA Act is directory and not mandatory and that the High Court is empowered to entertain and consider application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The said application is maintainable”.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT JAMMU

CrlA(D) No. 46/2022 ,CrlM No. 1474/2022

National Investigation Agency Through Its Chief Investigating Officer, Jammu Vs Mr. Vishal Sharma, DSGI.

CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAN LAL, JUDGE

Author: Sanjeev Kumar, J.

Pronounced on 13..12.2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Does S 21 of the NIA Act exclude the application of S 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act for determining the limitation period for filing an appeal under the NIA Act?

  The point that arises for determination is, whether NIA Act, in particular Section 21 whereof expressly excludes the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act for determining the period of limitation for filing an appeal under NIA Act. One view is that by providing for condonation of delay after the expiry of 30 days‟ period prescribed for filing appeal, but not beyond 90 days from the date of judgment, sentence or order appealed from, the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded. The other view is that exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 must be express and not by necessary implication. We are, however, inclined to go by the later view. This is because Section 21 of the NIA Act has no where specifically excluded the application of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) for determining the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeal under Section 21 of the Act. There is, of course, similar provision in first proviso to Section 21(5) which gives discretion to the High Court to entertain an entertain an appeal after expiry of period of limitation of 30 days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within a period of 30 days. However, second proviso to Section 21(5) of the Act ordains that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of period of 90 days. {Para 19}

20 Having regard to the object of the NIA Act and the right of the accused to fair trial, the word “shall” used in second proviso to Section 21(5) of the Act deserves to be read as “may”, else the right of appeal given to the accused against his conviction would become a causality if the doors of the Appellate Court are shut to him on the ground of limitation. The right to fair trial is a right vested in the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution. The right of appeal, wherever it is provided, is a matter of substance and essentially a remedial right. If this remedy is put in jeopardy by creating bar of limitation and leaving no discretion in the Court to condone the delay even in well deserving cases, it would render the remedy otiose. We, therefore, cannot put any construction or interpretation on a provision that has the effect of taking away the fair trial right of the accused. It is in this context, we must hold that right of the accused to avail the remedy of appeal is a substantive and concomitant right of fair trial. This is in this background, the Delhi High Court in the case of Farhan Sheikh vs. State (National Investigation Agency), 2019(7) AD (Delhi) 233, has taken the view that the word “shall” used in second proviso to Section 21(5) shall be read as “may” and that the second proviso is directory in nature. The Court further observed that the High Court shall have the discretion to condone the delay in appropriate cases even after expiry of period of 90 days. The Delhi High Court rightly did not agree to lift and apply decisions based on the interpretation of civil provisions, rendered in the context of civil and taxing statutes.

35 We have already held that the provisions of second proviso to sub-section 5 of Section 21 of the Act are directory in nature and, therefore, an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is maintainable.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT JAMMU

CrlA(D) No. 46/2022 ,CrlM No. 1474/2022

National Investigation Agency Through Its Chief Investigating Officer, Jammu Vs Mr. Vishal Sharma, DSGI.

CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAN LAL, JUDGE

Author: Sanjeev Kumar, J.

Pronounced on 13..12.2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether investigating officer can seek Production warrant U/S 267 of CRPC for recording statement of a witness during investigation?

 Section 267(1) of the Cr.P.C under which the appellant had moved an application before the trial Court reads as under: 

“267. Power to require attendance of prisoners. (1) Whenever, in the course of an inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, it appears to a Criminal Court,- (a) that a person confined or detained in a prison should be brought before the Court for answering to a charge of an offence, or for the purpose of any proceedings against him, or (b) that it is necessary for the ends of justice to examine such person as a witness, the Court may make an order requiring the officer in charge of the prison to produce such person before the Court for answering to the charge or for the purpose of such proceeding or, as the case may be, for giving evidence. (2)…………………………………………………………………..

(3)………………………………………………………………….

30 Form a plain reading of Section 267(1), it clearly transpires that a Criminal Court, in the course of an enquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure, can direct a person confined or detained in a prison to be produced before the Court for answering to a charge of an offence or for the purpose of any proceedings against him. The criminal Court is further empowered to direct the officer in-charge of the prison to produce any person who is required to be examined as a witness for the purpose of giving evidence.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT JAMMU

CrlA(D) No. 46/2022 ,CrlM No. 1474/2022

National Investigation Agency Through Its Chief Investigating Officer, Jammu Vs Mr. Vishal Sharma, DSGI.

CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAN LAL, JUDGE

Author: Sanjeev Kumar, J.

Pronounced on 13..12.2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether a criminal court can refuse to issue production warrant U/S 267 CrPC when no case is pending trial or enquiry before it?

 In view of what we have discussed herein above we answer the question referred to us as under:-

"The Police can seek permission to remove an accused from judicial custody to police custody for completion of investigation in another case and for this purpose production warrant under Section 267 CrPC. can be issued. The expression "other proceeding" used in Section 267(1) and "for the purpose of any proceedings" occurring in Section 267(1)(a) would include "investigation" as defined under Section 2(h) CrPC.{Para 31}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT JAMMU

CrlA(D) No. 46/2022 ,CrlM No. 1474/2022

National Investigation Agency Through Its Chief Investigating Officer, Jammu Vs Mr. Vishal Sharma, DSGI.

CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAN LAL, JUDGE

Author: Sanjeev Kumar, J.

Pronounced on 13..12.2022

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Supreme Court : The court can give Protected Witness's Statement With Identity Redacted to accused as per S 207 of CRPC

  Having said so, we also come to the order passed by the trial court on 11.09.2021 which has been cautiously worded. The order has not only permitted redaction of the address and particulars of the witnesses which could disclose their identities but has further observed as noted aforesaid that even other relevant paras in the statement which would disclose their occupation and identity could be redacted. Thus, a wide discretion has been given and that too for the Special Public Prosecutor to take a call. There could thus have hardly been a grievance raised by the prosecution in this regard. On query to the learned counsel for the respondent as to how this order can in any manner prejudice or have the propensity to disclose the identity of the witnesses or their families with the possibility of harm being caused to them, there has really been no answer. We believe that the order dated 11.09.2021 is both fair and reasonable for the prosecution and defence while protecting the witnesses and not depriving the defence of a fair trial with the disclosure of the redacted portion of the testimony under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C. {Para 27}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.237 OF 2022

WAHEED-UR-REHMAN PARRA  Vs UNION TERRITORY OF JAMMU & KASHMIR

Sanjay Kishan Kaul; M.M. Sundresh, JJ.

Author: SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

February 25, 2022

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Whether Magistrates Can Extend Time To Complete Investigation In UAPA Cases?

  Para 26 of the decision of this Court in Bikramjit Singh was to the following effect:

“26. Before the NIA Act was enacted, offences under the UAPA were of two kinds — those with a maximum imprisonment of over 7 years, and those with a maximum imprisonment of 7 years and under. Under the Code as applicable to offences against other laws, offences having a maximum sentence of 7 years and under are triable by the Magistrate’s courts, whereas offences having a maximum sentence of above 7 years are triable by Courts of Session. This scheme has been completely done away with by the NIA Act, 2008 as all Scheduled Offences i.e. all offences under the UAPA, whether investigated by the National Investigation Agency or by the investigating agencies of the State Government, are to be tried exclusively by Special Courts set up under that Act. In the absence of any designated court by notification issued by either the Central Government or the State Government, the fallback is upon the Court of Session alone. Thus, under the aforesaid scheme what becomes clear is that so far as all offences under the UAPA are concerned, the Magistrate’s jurisdiction to extend time under the first proviso in Section 43-D(2)(b) is non-existent, “the Court” being either a Sessions Court, in the absence of a notification specifying a Special Court,or the Special Court itself. The impugned judgment in arriving at the contrary conclusion is incorrect as it has missed Section 22(2) read with Section 13 of the NIA Act. Also, the impugned judgment has missed Section 16(1) of the NIA Act which states that a Special Court may take cognizance of any offence without the accused being committed to it for trial, inter alia, upon a police report of such facts.” { Para 11}

12. After considering various provisions of the relevant statues, it was concluded that “so far as all offences under the UAPA are concerned, the Magistrate’s jurisdiction to extend time under the first proviso in Section 43-D (2)(b) is nonexistent”.

13. Consequently, in so far as “Extension of time to complete investigation” is concerned, the Magistrate would not be competent to consider the request and the only competent authority to consider such request would be “the Court” as specified in the proviso in Section 43-D (2)(b) of the UAPA. In view of the law laid down by this Court, we accept the plea raised by the appellants and hold them entitled to the relief of default bail as prayed for.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE UDAY UMESH LALIT JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT JUSTICE BELA M. TRIVEDI

SADIQUE & ORS. Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.963 OF 2021

7th September 2021

Citation: 2021 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 424

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Supreme Court: All UAPA Offences Investigated By NIA Or State Police Are Exclusively Triable By Special Courts

“The Court”, when read with the extended definition contained in Section 2(1)(d) of the UAPA, now speaks of the Special Court constituted under Section 22 of the NIA Act. What becomes clear, therefore, from a reading of these provisions is that for all offences under the UAPA, the Special Court alone has exclusive jurisdiction to try such offences. This becomes even clearer on a reading of Section 16 of the NIA Act which makes it clear that the Special Court may take cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed to it for trial upon receipt of a complaint of facts or upon a police report of such facts. What is equally clear from a reading of Section 16(2) of the NIA Act is that even though offences may be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years, the Special Court alone is to try such offence – albeit in a summary way if it thinks it fit to do so. On a conspectus of the abovementioned provisions, Section 13 read with Section 22(2)(ii) of the NIA Act, in particular, the argument of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Punjab based on Section 10 of the said Act has no legs to stand on since the Special Court has exclusive jurisdiction over every Scheduled Offence investigated by the investigating agency of the State.

21.Before the NIA Act was enacted, offences under the UAPA were of two

kinds – those with a maximum imprisonment of over 7 years, and

those with a maximum imprisonment of 7 years and under. Under the

Code as applicable to offences against other laws, offences having a

maximum sentence of 7 years and under are triable by the

Magistrate’s Courts, whereas offences having a maximum sentence of

above 7 years are triable by Courts of Sessions. This Scheme has

been completely done away with by the 2008 Act as all scheduled

offences i.e. all offences under the UAPA, whether investigated by the

National Investigation Agency or by the investigating agencies of the

State Government, are to be tried exclusively by Special Courts set up

under that Act. In the absence of any designated Court by notification

issued by either the Central Government or the State Government, the

fall back is upon the Court of Sessions alone. Thus, under the

aforesaid Scheme what becomes clear is that so far as all offences

under the UAPA are concerned, the Magistrate’s jurisdiction to extend

time under the first proviso in Section 43-D(2)(b) is non-existent, “the

Court” being either a Sessions Court, in the absence of a notification

specifying a Special Court, or the Special Court itself.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 667 OF 2020

BIKRAMJIT SINGH  Vs THE STATE OF PUNJAB 

Author: R.F. Nariman, J.

Dated:October 12, 2020.

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What are the parameters for the grant of bail Under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act?

 In National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor

Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), this Court considered the

parameters for exercise of the power under Section 43

(5) D, held as follows:

“23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it

is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there

are reasonable grounds for believing that the

accusation against the accused is prima facie

true or otherwise. Our attention was invited to

the decisions of this Court, which has had an

occasion to deal with similar special provisions in

TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying those

decisions may have some bearing while

considering the prayer for bail in relation to the

offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably,

under the special enactments such as

TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is

required to record its opinion that there are

reasonable grounds for believing that the

accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence.

There is a degree of difference between the

satisfaction to be recorded by the Court that

there are reasonable grounds for believing that

the accused is “not guilty” of such offence and

the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes

of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable

grounds for believing that the accusation against

such person is “prima facie” true. By its very

nature, the expression “prima facie true” would

mean that the materials/evidence collated by the

investigating agency in reference to the

accusation against the accused concerned in the

first information report, must prevail until

contradicted and overcome or disproved by other

evidence, and on the face of it, shows the

complicity of such accused in the commission of

the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient

on its face to establish a given fact or the chain

of facts constituting the stated offence, unless

rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the

degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court

has to opine that the accusation is “prima

facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the

accused “not guilty” of such offence as required

under the other special enactments. In any case,

the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the

Court for opining that there are reasonable

grounds for believing that the accusation against

the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than

the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for

considering a discharge application or framing of

charges in relation to offences under the 1967

Act….”

11. While considering the grant of bail under Section 43

(5) D, it is the bounden duty of the Court to apply its

mind to examine the entire material on record for the

purpose of satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is

made out against the accused or not.

 Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal Nos . 314-315 of 2021

Sudesh Kedia Vs  Union of India 

Author: L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

Dated: April 09, 2021.

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Whether all UAPA Offences Investigated By NIA Or State Police Are Exclusively Triable By 'Special Courts?

 It will be seen that the aforesaid notification has been issued under

Section 22(1) of the NIA Act. What is important to note is that under

Section 22(2)(ii), reference to the Central Agency in Section 13(1) is to

be construed as a reference to the investigation agency of the State Government – namely, the State police in this case. Thereafter, what is

important to note is that notwithstanding anything contained in the

Code, the jurisdiction conferred on a Special Court shall, until a

Special Court is designated by the State Government, be exercised

only by the Court of Sessions of the Division in which such offence has

been committed vide sub-section (3) of Section 22; and by sub-section

(4) of Section 22, on and from the date on which the Special Court is

designated by the State Government, the trial of any offence

investigated by the State Government under the provisions of the NIA Act shall stand transferred to that Court on and from the date on which it is designated.

19.Section 13(1) of the NIA Act, which again begins with a non-obstante

clause which is notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, read

with Section 22(2)(ii), states that every scheduled offence that is

investigated by the investigation agency of the State Government is to

be tried exclusively by the Special Court within whose local jurisdiction

it was committed. 

“The Court”,  when read with the extended definition contained in Section 2(1)(d) of the UAPA, now speaks of the Special Court constituted under Section 22 of the NIA Act. What becomes clear, therefore, from a reading of these provisions is that for all offences under the UAPA, the Special Court alone has exclusive jurisdiction to try such offences. This becomes even clearer on a reading of Section 16 of the NIA Act which

makes it clear that the Special Court may take cognizance of an

offence without the accused being committed to it for trial upon receipt

of a complaint of facts or upon a police report of such facts. What is

equally clear from a reading of Section 16(2) of the NIA Act is that

even though offences may be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years, the Special Court alone is to try such offence –

albeit in a summary way if it thinks it fit to do so. On a conspectus of

the abovementioned provisions, Section 13 read with Section 22(2)(ii)

of the NIA Act, in particular, the argument of the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the State of Punjab based on Section 10 of the

said Act has no legs to stand on since the Special Court has exclusive

jurisdiction over every Scheduled Offence investigated by the

investigating agency of the State.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 667 OF 2020

BIKRAMJIT SINGH  Vs THE STATE OF PUNJAB 

Author: R.F. Nariman, J.

Dated: October 12, 2020.

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Whether Session Judge can remand accused to custody prosecuted under UAPA if the central government has not entrusted the investigation to the National Investigation Agency?

As we have noticed hereinabove, the NIA Act primarily is an Act to constitute the National Investigation Agency, and to provide for trial of cases entrusted to and investigated by the NIA in respect of scheduled offences, by a Special Court. In the present case, it is not even the petitioner's submission that the Central Government has entrusted the investigation of the case registered against the detenue Gulfisha Fatima under UAPA to the NIA. The UAPA does not state that all cases under the said act necessarily have to be investigated by the NIA.

35. It is clear that apart from NIA, the other police establishments are equally competent to investigate cases under the UAPA. This position is also clear from Section 6(7) of NIA Act, which clears doubts, if any, by declaring that till the NIA takes over the investigation of the case, it shall be the duty of the officer-in-charge of the police station where the case is registered, to continue to investigate.

36. The UAPA does not state that offences under the said Act can be tried only by a Special Court. Section 45 only lays down the restriction of grant of prior sanction by the Central Government, or the State Government, as the case may be. It does not state that only a Special Court constituted under the NIA Act would have jurisdiction to try offences under the UAPA. Just because UAPA is one of the enlisted enactments in the Schedule to the NIA Act, it does not follow that every offence under the UAPA has necessarily to be investigated by the NIA, and that the trial of such case necessarily has to proceed before the Special Court.

38. There is no dispute about the fact that Shri Dharmender Rana, ASJ-02, is a court of Sessions. He had been entrusted by the District and Sessions Judge, New Delhi District, New Delhi with the task of hearing and disposing of fresh bail applications and pending bail applications, and also authorised to deal with the entire remand work pertaining to, inter alia, UAPA. The learned District and Sessions Judge acted completely within the scope of the authority vested in him under Section 10(3) of the Code, to assign work to the Additional District and Session Judges serving in the New Delhi District, and this position has been squarely settled by the decision in Rambeer Shokeen (supra), which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

W.P. (Crl.) 824/2020

Decided On: 22.06.2020

 Aqil Hussain Vs.  State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vipin Sanghi and Rajnish Bhatnagar, JJ.

Citation: MANU/DE/1276/2020

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Important provisions of National Investigation Agency Act 2008 as amended in the year 2019

1. Short title, extent and application.—(1) This Act may be called the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008.

(2) It extends to the whole of India and it applies also—

(a) to citizens of India outside India;

(b) to persons in the service of the Government wherever they may be; 2[* * *]

2. The word “and” omitted by Act 16 of 2019, S. 2(i) (w.e.f. 2-8-2019).

(c) to persons on ships and aircrafts registered in India wherever they may be 3[and].

3. Ins. by Act 16 of 2019, S. 2(ii) (w.e.f. 2-8-2019).

4[(d) to persons who commit a Scheduled Offences beyond India against the Indian citizens or affecting the interest of India.]

4. Ins. by Act 16 of 2019, S. 2(iii) (w.e.f. 2-8-2019).

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