In Maheshwar Tigga Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2020) 10
SCC 108 the question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was
whether the prosecutrix had consented to the physical relationship
under any misconception of fact with regard to promise of marriage
or whether her consent was based on fraudulent misrepresentation of
marriage. The Apex Court has held that under Section 90 of IPC a consent given under a misconception of fact is no consent in the eye of the law. But the misconception of fact has to be in proximity of time to the occurrence and cannot be spread over a period of four years. The Apex Court has observed as under :-
“15. In Uday vs. State of Karnataka, (2003 4 SCC 46,
the Appellant and the prosecutrix resided in the same
neighbourhood. As they belonged to different castes,
a matrimonial relationship could not fructify even
while physical relations continued between them on
the understanding and assurance of marriage. This
Court observed as follows:
“21. It therefore appears that the consensus
of judicial opinion is in favour of the view
that the consent given by the prosecutrix to
sexual intercourse with a person with whom
she is deeply in love on a promise that he
would marry her on a later date, cannot be
said to be given under a misconception of
fact. A false promise is not a fact within the
meaning of the Code. We are inclined to
agree with this view, but we must add that
there is no straitjacket formula for
determining whether consent given by the
prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary,
or whether it is given under a misconception
of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid
down by the courts provide at best guidance
to the judicial mind while considering a
question of consent, but the court must, in
each case, consider the evidence before it
and the surrounding circumstances, before
reaching a conclusion, because each case has
its own peculiar facts which may have a
bearing on the question whether the consent
was voluntary, or was given under a
misconception of fact. It must also weigh the
evidence keeping in view the fact that the
burden is on the prosecution to prove each
and every ingredient of the offence, absence
of consent being one of them.” ”
“20. We have no hesitation in concluding that the
consent of the prosecutrix was but a conscious and
deliberated choice, as distinct from an involuntary
action or denial and which opportunity was available
to her, because of her deep-seated love for the
appellant leading her to willingly permit him liberties
with her body, which according to normal human
behaviour are permitted only to a person with whom
one is deeply in love. The observations in this regard
in Uday are considered relevant :-
“25…It usually happens in such cases, when two
young persons are madly in love, that they
promise to each other several times that come
what may, they will get married. As stated by
the prosecutrix the appellant also made such a
promise on more than one occasion. In such
circumstances the promise loses all significance,
particularly when they are overcome with
emotions and passion and find themselves in
situations and circumstances where they, in a
weak moment, succumb to the temptation of
having sexual relationship. This is what appears
to have happened in this case as well, and the
prosecutrix willingly consented to having sexual
intercourse with the appellant with whom she
was deeply in love, not because he promised to
marry her, but because she also desired it. In
these circumstances it would be very difficult to
impute to the appellant knowledge that the
prosecutrix had consented in consequence of a
misconception of fact arising from his promise.
In any event, it was not possible for the
appellant to know what was in the mind of the
prosecutrix when she consented, because there
were more reasons than one for her to
consent.”” {Para 8}
9. In the instant case, the evidence on record indicates that
the prosecutrix and the accused were known to each other. They had
indulged in sexual relationship for a period of over three years. The
evidence of PW1-prosecutrix does not indicate that she had sexual relationship with the accused under misconception of fact, with regard to the promise of marriage or that her consent was based on fraudulent misrepresentation of marriage. There is no evidence on record to indicate that since the inception accused did not intend to marry her. In the absence of evidence to prove that the prosecutrix had consented for physical relationship on a misconception of fact, as stipulated under Section 90 of IPC, the mere refusal to marry would not constitute offence under Section 417 of the IPC.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.119 OF 1999
Kashinath Narayan Gharat Vs The State of Maharashtra
CORAM : SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.
DATED: 9th DECEMBER, 2021.
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