Showing posts with label misconception of fact. Show all posts
Showing posts with label misconception of fact. Show all posts

Saturday, 25 December 2021

Whether the court can convict the accused for an offence of cheating if there is no prosecution evidence that the lady maintained sexual relations under a false promise of marriage?

 In Maheshwar Tigga Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2020) 10

SCC 108 the question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was

whether the prosecutrix had consented to the physical relationship

under any misconception of fact with regard to promise of marriage

or whether her consent was based on fraudulent misrepresentation of

marriage. The Apex Court has held that under Section 90 of IPC a consent given under a misconception of fact is no consent in the eye of the law. But the misconception of fact has to be in proximity of time to the occurrence and cannot be spread over a period of four years. The Apex Court has observed as under :-

“15. In Uday vs. State of Karnataka, (2003 4 SCC 46,

the Appellant and the prosecutrix resided in the same

neighbourhood. As they belonged to different castes,

a matrimonial relationship could not fructify even

while physical relations continued between them on

the understanding and assurance of marriage. This

Court observed as follows:

“21. It therefore appears that the consensus

of judicial opinion is in favour of the view

that the consent given by the prosecutrix to

sexual intercourse with a person with whom

she is deeply in love on a promise that he

would marry her on a later date, cannot be

said to be given under a misconception of

fact. A false promise is not a fact within the

meaning of the Code. We are inclined to

agree with this view, but we must add that

there is no straitjacket formula for

determining whether consent given by the

prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary,

or whether it is given under a misconception

of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid

down by the courts provide at best guidance

to the judicial mind while considering a

question of consent, but the court must, in

each case, consider the evidence before it

and the surrounding circumstances, before

reaching a conclusion, because each case has

its own peculiar facts which may have a

bearing on the question whether the consent

was voluntary, or was given under a

misconception of fact. It must also weigh the

evidence keeping in view the fact that the

burden is on the prosecution to prove each

and every ingredient of the offence, absence

of consent being one of them.” ”

“20. We have no hesitation in concluding that the

consent of the prosecutrix was but a conscious and

deliberated choice, as distinct from an involuntary

action or denial and which opportunity was available

to her, because of her deep-seated love for the

appellant leading her to willingly permit him liberties

with her body, which according to normal human

behaviour are permitted only to a person with whom

one is deeply in love. The observations in this regard

in Uday are considered relevant :-

“25…It usually happens in such cases, when two

young persons are madly in love, that they

promise to each other several times that come

what may, they will get married. As stated by

the prosecutrix the appellant also made such a

promise on more than one occasion. In such

circumstances the promise loses all significance,

particularly when they are overcome with

emotions and passion and find themselves in

situations and circumstances where they, in a

weak moment, succumb to the temptation of

having sexual relationship. This is what appears

to have happened in this case as well, and the

prosecutrix willingly consented to having sexual

intercourse with the appellant with whom she

was deeply in love, not because he promised to

marry her, but because she also desired it. In

these circumstances it would be very difficult to

impute to the appellant knowledge that the

prosecutrix had consented in consequence of a

misconception of fact arising from his promise.

In any event, it was not possible for the

appellant to know what was in the mind of the

prosecutrix when she consented, because there

were more reasons than one for her to

consent.”” {Para 8}

9. In the instant case, the evidence on record indicates that

the prosecutrix and the accused were known to each other. They had

indulged in sexual relationship for a period of over three years. The

evidence of PW1-prosecutrix does not indicate that she had sexual relationship with the accused under misconception of fact, with regard to the promise of marriage or that her consent was based on fraudulent misrepresentation of marriage. There is no evidence on record to indicate that since the inception accused did not intend to marry her. In the absence of evidence to prove that the prosecutrix had consented for physical relationship on a misconception of fact, as stipulated under Section 90 of IPC, the mere refusal to marry would not constitute offence under Section 417 of the IPC.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.119 OF 1999

Kashinath Narayan Gharat  Vs The State of Maharashtra 

CORAM : SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.

DATED: 9th DECEMBER, 2021.

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Sunday, 5 March 2017

Whether justice can be denied to litigant if his action is due to wrong legal advice of Advocate?

  Having considered the nature and contents of the various applications filed by the petitioner through her learned Advocate Sri Sachin Mukherjee, we have no hesitation in concluding that the petitioner was wrongly advised by him, particularly in filing the application for drawing up of another preliminary decree by setting aside the ex parte decree earlier passed and in not prosecuting the application earlier filed under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C. It is elementary knowledge that so long as a decree, either preliminary or final, legally subsists, it can not be replaced or substituted by another decree. It necessarily follows that if and when the ex parte preliminary decree in the instant suit was set aside by allowing the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code then only another preliminary decree could have been passed. Therefore, filing of the application by the petitioner expressing her intention not to proceed with Misc. Case No. 15 of 1979, as she had filed an application for substitution of the preliminary decree, was wholly misconceived and must be attributed to wrong advice of her learned Advocate. In making this observation we have drawn inspiration from the sworn testimony of the learned Advocate himself who admitted that the steps taken by him were not proper and that the applications were filed out of his own bona fide mistake. On facts therefore we are fully satisfied that the petitioner has been badly let down by the wrong advice given to her by her former Advocate and placed in an unenviable position.From the impugned order we find that the learned Judge appreciated the predicament of the petitioner, but rejected the application solely on the ground that the phrase "sufficient reason" in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code did not include misconception o:
fact and/or law of the Advocate and inherent power could not be used to correct the erroneous view of the learned Advocate. We are, however, unable to agree with the learned Judge.
As has been already noticed, the principal ground which was canvassed for setting aside the above orders was that whatever steps she had taken earlier in connection with the suit was under wrong advice of her Advocate; and as we have already noticed, the testimony of the learned Advocate also supports that view. By filing the application, therefore, the petitioner prayed for justice which was denied to her owing to patently wrong steps taken by her under legal advice. In such a situation the Court would be failing in its duty if it does not invoke its inherent powers to come to her rescue. Every Court functions for the purpose of doing justice according to law and therefore shall be deemed to possess, as a necessary corollary thereto, all such powers as may be necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of its such functioning.
Citation : AIR 1989 Cal 106
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Decided On: 05.04.1988
 In Re: Mahamaya Banerjee
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.K. Mukherjee and Sudhanshu Shekhar Ganguly, JJ.
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