Cheating and criminal breach of trust differ mainly in the stage of dishonest intention: in cheating, the dishonest intention exists from the very beginning and the property is obtained by deception, while in criminal breach of trust, the property is initially received lawfully through entrustment and is dishonestly misappropriated later.
Print PageSunday, 19 April 2026
Wednesday, 24 December 2025
The Illusion of Guilt: Why Receiving Money from a Cheater Doesn’t Make You a Cheat Under Section 420 IPC
Introduction
A common misconception in
criminal law is that anyone who receives money in connection with a cheating
transaction can be implicated as an accused under Section 420 of the Indian
Penal Code. However, recent judicial pronouncements clarify a crucial distinction:
receiving part of illegally obtained funds does not automatically transform
a victim into an offender. This article examines the essential ingredients
of Section 420 IPC and demonstrates how courts distinguish between perpetrators
and victims even where financial connections exist.
The Essential Ingredients of Section 420 IPC
Print PageThursday, 7 September 2023
Whether Use Of Deceased Brother's SIM Card amounts to An Offence of Criminal breach of trust and cheating?
Merely because the sim-card of real brother was used by the sister i.e. the present petitioner, that by itself will not constitute or amount to commission of the offence. The fact remains that to infer misuse of sim-card by the petitioner, there is no iota of evidence to infer such act. It is an admitted fact that the sim-card is duly received by the complainant from the petitioner before the date of lodging of the complaint. {Para 7}
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1871 OF 2022
Heena Afrin Huzaifa Shaikh Vs The State of Maharashtra & Anr.
CORAM : NITIN W. SAMBRE & R. N. LADDHA, JJ.
DATE : 17th AUGUST, 2023
Print PageTuesday, 4 April 2023
Whether Advocate can be held guilty for cheating before Lok adalat through Whatsapp Video Call?
The applicant is thus alleged of being a part of the entire episode of impersonating Mrs.Gidwani in the consent terms which were filed in S.C. Suit No. 3032/2019.Tilak Prima facie, it can be seen that the applicant filed his vakalatnama and represented the so-called Ms.Pushpa Gidwani for the first time on 9/3/2020, and he was having her mobile number and as per the direction of the Panel Members of the Lok Adalat on 12/12/2020 he made a phone call on the said number and one lady appeared at the other end, who had introduced herself as Pushpa Gidwani and she was known to the applicant as the defendant in the Suit. The applicant claim innocence by stating that as a lawyer, he was not expected to go into the detail Identification as once the client approached and introduced herself to be so and so, there is no reason to disbelieve and even the vakalatnama which was signed by her was given to him which he filed in the Court. {Para 6}
7 There is no reason to disbelieve the applicant, as a lawyer was satisfied that the vakalatnama given to him and chose to represent the defendant in the Suit and even signed the consent terms. However, the learned APP state that the applicant has refused to divert the phone number of Gidwani to whom he had made a video call. Mr.Nikam state that the applicant shall render his co-operation to the Investigating Officer.In the above circumstances, the custodial interrogation of the applicant is not necessary and he deserve protection by way of interim order.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION NO. 2174 of 2022
Date of Order: 18.08.2022
Rakesh Shrinath Dubey Vs. The State Of Maharashtra
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Bharati Dangre, J.
Citation: MANU/MHOR/121450/2022,2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 16.
Print PageSaturday, 25 December 2021
Whether the court can convict the accused for an offence of cheating if there is no prosecution evidence that the lady maintained sexual relations under a false promise of marriage?
In Maheshwar Tigga Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2020) 10
SCC 108 the question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was
whether the prosecutrix had consented to the physical relationship
under any misconception of fact with regard to promise of marriage
or whether her consent was based on fraudulent misrepresentation of
marriage. The Apex Court has held that under Section 90 of IPC a consent given under a misconception of fact is no consent in the eye of the law. But the misconception of fact has to be in proximity of time to the occurrence and cannot be spread over a period of four years. The Apex Court has observed as under :-
“15. In Uday vs. State of Karnataka, (2003 4 SCC 46,
the Appellant and the prosecutrix resided in the same
neighbourhood. As they belonged to different castes,
a matrimonial relationship could not fructify even
while physical relations continued between them on
the understanding and assurance of marriage. This
Court observed as follows:
“21. It therefore appears that the consensus
of judicial opinion is in favour of the view
that the consent given by the prosecutrix to
sexual intercourse with a person with whom
she is deeply in love on a promise that he
would marry her on a later date, cannot be
said to be given under a misconception of
fact. A false promise is not a fact within the
meaning of the Code. We are inclined to
agree with this view, but we must add that
there is no straitjacket formula for
determining whether consent given by the
prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary,
or whether it is given under a misconception
of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid
down by the courts provide at best guidance
to the judicial mind while considering a
question of consent, but the court must, in
each case, consider the evidence before it
and the surrounding circumstances, before
reaching a conclusion, because each case has
its own peculiar facts which may have a
bearing on the question whether the consent
was voluntary, or was given under a
misconception of fact. It must also weigh the
evidence keeping in view the fact that the
burden is on the prosecution to prove each
and every ingredient of the offence, absence
of consent being one of them.” ”
“20. We have no hesitation in concluding that the
consent of the prosecutrix was but a conscious and
deliberated choice, as distinct from an involuntary
action or denial and which opportunity was available
to her, because of her deep-seated love for the
appellant leading her to willingly permit him liberties
with her body, which according to normal human
behaviour are permitted only to a person with whom
one is deeply in love. The observations in this regard
in Uday are considered relevant :-
“25…It usually happens in such cases, when two
young persons are madly in love, that they
promise to each other several times that come
what may, they will get married. As stated by
the prosecutrix the appellant also made such a
promise on more than one occasion. In such
circumstances the promise loses all significance,
particularly when they are overcome with
emotions and passion and find themselves in
situations and circumstances where they, in a
weak moment, succumb to the temptation of
having sexual relationship. This is what appears
to have happened in this case as well, and the
prosecutrix willingly consented to having sexual
intercourse with the appellant with whom she
was deeply in love, not because he promised to
marry her, but because she also desired it. In
these circumstances it would be very difficult to
impute to the appellant knowledge that the
prosecutrix had consented in consequence of a
misconception of fact arising from his promise.
In any event, it was not possible for the
appellant to know what was in the mind of the
prosecutrix when she consented, because there
were more reasons than one for her to
consent.”” {Para 8}
9. In the instant case, the evidence on record indicates that
the prosecutrix and the accused were known to each other. They had
indulged in sexual relationship for a period of over three years. The
evidence of PW1-prosecutrix does not indicate that she had sexual relationship with the accused under misconception of fact, with regard to the promise of marriage or that her consent was based on fraudulent misrepresentation of marriage. There is no evidence on record to indicate that since the inception accused did not intend to marry her. In the absence of evidence to prove that the prosecutrix had consented for physical relationship on a misconception of fact, as stipulated under Section 90 of IPC, the mere refusal to marry would not constitute offence under Section 417 of the IPC.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.119 OF 1999
Kashinath Narayan Gharat Vs The State of Maharashtra
CORAM : SMT. ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, J.
DATED: 9th DECEMBER, 2021.
Print PageSunday, 7 March 2021
Whether the offence of cheating is made out if the prosecution fails to prove that accused has caused intentional deception by misrepresentation?
Before dealing with the submissions, qua the application of Section 417 of IPC to the facts of the case, let me advert to the evidence of the prosecutrix. In her testimony, she testified that she was living on construction site and be-friended with the accused, whereafter they fell in love with each other. Her evidence in no uncertain terms, let-out, that she presumed, appellant was not married and believing that he would marry her, she indulged into sexual relationship with him. Her evidence reads as under: {Para 11}
12. Thus, the evidence of the prosecutrix does not suggests that the appellant made false promise to marry her, soon after they be-friended. What appears from her evidence is, that prosecutrix consented for sexual relations, initially, for more than one time but when she learnt that he was married, she filed the report with police whereupon crime came to be registered.
13. Thus, on plain reading of the prosecutrix's evidence, it cannot be said that the appellant lured the prosecutrix to engage in sexual relations with him on false promise of marrying her.
14. In the context of the facts of the case and the evidence on record, question that falls for my consideration is whether conviction of the accused under Section 417 of the IPC is sustainable.
Herein there was no ‘promise to marry’ nor intentional deception by misrepresentation or deceitfulness practised before establishing physical relationship with prosecutrix. In fact her evidence suggests that she presumed that he was not married and further assumed that he would marry her. Therefore, absence of ‘dishonest concealment of fact’, which is essential ingredient of offence, within the meaning of explanation, appended to Section 415 of IPC, conviction under Section 417 of IPC is not sustainable.
In the High Court of Bombay
(Before Sandeep K. Shinde, J.)
Jagdish Raghunath Mankar Vs State of Maharashtra
Criminal Appeal No. 354 of 1998
Decided on February 24, 2021
Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 269
Print PageFriday, 25 October 2019
Whether prosecution for cheating can be quashed if civil suit and prosecution for dishonour of cheque is pending?
Sunday, 28 July 2019
Whether court can reject application for compounding of offence in offence of cheating?
Saturday, 13 April 2019
Whether failure to pay Mobile postpaid user charges amounts to offence of cheating U/S 420 of IPC?
Sunday, 3 March 2019
Whether Advocate can prosecute litigant for cheating if they fail to pay his fees?
Sunday, 26 August 2018
Notes on criminal misappropriation of property,criminal breach of trust and cheating
Saturday, 2 September 2017
When prosecution for cheating is liable to be quashed?
the face value are true, in our view, the basic essential
ingredients of dishonest misappropriation and cheating
are missing. Criminal proceedings are not a short cut
for other remedies. Since no case of criminal breach of
trust or dishonest intention of inducement is made out
and the essential ingredients of Sections 405/420
Indian Penal Code are missing, the prosecution of the
Appellants Under Sections 406/120B Indian Penal
Code, is liable to be quashed.”
12. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and
perusing the record of the case as well as precedent laws cited at
Bar, this Court is of the opinion that the sum and substance of the
FIR was that at the time of agreement with the respondent No.2,
the property in question was already promised to be transferred to
one Chhoga Ram vide agreement dated 25.07.2012. It is an
admitted position which is also reflected in the case diary that
Chhoga Ram has during investigation deposed before the
investigating authority and stated that though he had entered into
an agreement on 25.07.2012 but after a compromise, he has
abandoned the agreement and vide compromise between the
parties on 25.04.2013, he has agreed to the proposition of the
petitioner that the agreement in question shall no more have any
impact upon the title of the petitioner. Thus, very basis of the FIR
is not found to be correct in the investigation and the investigating
authority has categorically pointed out that Chhoga Ram was not
having any claim over the property in question after 25.04.2013
whereas the agreement between the petitioner and respondent
No.2 had happened only on 08.09.2013 and at the very inception,
the petitioner was neither deceiving the respondent No.2 nor
inducing him by any of his act which would amount to an offence
as defined under Section 415 IPC.
13. Since, the offence under Section 415 IPC itself was not
made out, there is no question of offence under Section 420 IPC
being made out, as the basic ingredients of the alleged offence is
cheating and dishonest inducement, at the inception, for delivery
of property. Thus, even in the constrained jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. after seeing the precedent laws and observing
the facts, on the face of it, this Court finds that no offence is made
out.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Misc(Pet.) No. 3723 / 2016
Jugal Kishore V The State of Rajasthan
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
Order
24/08/2017
Monday, 1 May 2017
When accused can be held guilty for cheating and forgery?
the petitioner happened to be a suspended employee of the
Punjab National Bank and the factum of his having
approached PW-1 for purchase of electronics goods on
11.09.1998 and having presented forged demand draft to
him in lieu of the payment of said electronics goods has been
duly proved on record by the prosecution.
Dr. B.A. Vaid, handwriting expert, entered the
witness box as PW-6 and he deposed on the basis of material
on record which included the admitted handwriting of the
petitioner/accused as well as his handwriting which were
obtained during the course of investigation that these
handwritings and those found on the forged demand draft
were of one and the same person i.e. accused/petitioner.
19. In my considered view, from the material which
was produced on record by the prosecution, all the
incriminating factors were pointing towards the guilt of the
accused.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 39 of 2010
Date of decision: 26.08.2016
Sunil Bhaseen V State of Himachal Pradesh
Coram :
Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge.
Citation: 2017 CRLJ322
Sunday, 30 April 2017
When offence of cheating is made out against sanyasi?
A.P. and others reported in (1999) 5 Supreme Court Cases
740, it is held as follows:-25
“8. If somebody offers his prayers to God for
healing the sick, there cannot normally be any
element of fraud. But if he represents to another
that he has divine powers and either directly or
indirectly makes that other person believe that
he has such divine powers, it is inducement
referred to in Section 415 IPC. Anybody who
responds to such inducement pursuant to it and
gives the inducer money or any other article and
does not get the desired result is a victim of the
fraudulent representation. The Court can in such
a situation presume that the offence of cheating
falling within the ambit of Section 420 IPC has
been committed. It is for the accused, in such a
situation to rebut the presumption.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
BLAPL NO. 7367 of 2015
Surendranath Mishra V State of Odisha
P R E S E N T:-
MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO
Date of order: 25.05.2016
Citation: 2017 CRLJ30
Friday, 14 April 2017
Whether offence of cheating is made out if cheque is issued after closure of bank Account?
Saturday, 23 April 2016
Whether failure to follow rules and regulation amounts to offence of cheating or criminal breach of trust?
He will now proceed to consider the final report submitted by the Police (C.I.D.). I should, however, like to observe for the benefit of the learned Magistrate that he will bear in mind that mere failure to follow rules and regulations is neither cheating nor breach of trust. He will also bear in mind while applying himself to the case diary with all thoroughness whether there is any material to show that the Railways have suffered. In order to constitute offence of cheating causation of damage or harm to a person in body, mind, reputation or property is essential. The learned Magistrate will direct his attention to this aspect of the matter. Loss to the Railways cannot be presumed merely from the fact of irregular booking. The learned Magistrate will consider the effect of issuing of despatch advice and forwarding notes by Tisco at the time of despatch of goods. The learned Magistrate will also bear in mind that mere failure to pay does not amount to cheating for, mere breach of contract is not cheating. The attention of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate is particularly drawn to the cases of Harkrishna Mahatab v. Emperor MANU/BH/0295/1929 : AIR1930Pat209 , Major Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor MANU/WB/0123/1933 : AIR1933Cal800 and the State of Kerala v. A. Prasad Pillai and Anr. MANU/SC/0263/1972 : 1972CriLJ1243 . To my mind that Railway as an organisation profited rather than lost by the unusual procedure adopted in relation to Tisco. The learned. Magistrate will also consider whether the whole case diary reveals any material indicating that any public servant had enriched himself either by bribery or by breach or by breach of faith. After going through the case diary thoroughly the learned Magistrate will decide dehors the recommendation of Superintendent of Railway Police, respondent No. 7 and C.I.D. whether any offence had been committed and if so which accused should be put on trial.
Wednesday, 3 February 2016
What is Distinction between offence of cheating and breach of contract?
the averments in the complaint make out a case to constitute an
offence of cheating. The essential ingredients to attract Section
420 IPC are: (i) cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver
property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or
anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being
converted into a valuable security and (iii) mens rea of the
accused at the time of making the inducement. The making of a
false representation is one of the essential ingredients to
constitute the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC. In order
to bring a case for the offence of cheating, it is not merely
sufficient to prove that a false representation had been made, but,
it is further necessary to prove that the representation was false
to the knowledge of the accused and was made in order to deceive
the complainant.
Distinction between mere breach of contract and the
cheating would depend upon the intention of the accused at the
time of alleged inducement. If it is established that the intention
of the accused was dishonest at the very time when he made a
promise and entered into a transaction with the complainant to
part with his property or money, then the liability is criminal and
the accused is guilty of the offence of cheating. On the other
hand, if all that is established that a representation made by the
accused has subsequently not been kept, criminal liability cannot
be foisted on the accused and the only right which the
complainant acquires is the remedy for breach of contract in a
civil court. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal
prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention
is shown at the beginning of the transaction. In S.W. Palanitkar &
Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2002) 1 SCC 241, this Court held as
under:
“21 ……In order to constitute an offence of cheating, the
intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when
the inducement was made. It is necessary to show that a
person had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of
making the promise, to say that he committed an act of
cheating. A mere failure to keep up promise subsequently
cannot be presumed as an act leading to cheating.”
The above view in Palanitkar’s case was referred to and followed in
Rashmi Jain vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2014) 13 SCC 553.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2128 OF 2011
INTERNATIONAL ADVANCED RESEARCH
CENTRE FOR POWDER METALLURGY
AND NEW MATERIALS (ARCI) & ORS.
V
NIMRA CERGLASS TECHNICS (P) LTD.
& ANR.
Citation;2015ALLMR(Cri)4101,2015(4)Crimes86(SC),
R. BANUMATHI, J.
Saturday, 26 December 2015
Whether sale of truck by accused before repayment of loan amounts to offence U/S 420 of IPC?
S.C. Agrawal, J.
Equivalent Citation: 1982WLN(UC)195
Tuesday, 22 December 2015
When sanction for prosecution is not required for prosecution of public servant?
fabrication of records or misappropriation cannot be said to be
in discharge of their official duty. Their official duty is not to
fabricate records or permit evasion of payment of duty and
cause loss to the Revenue. Unfortunately, the High Court
missed these crucial aspects. The learned Magistrate has
correctly taken the view that if at all the said view of sanction is
to be considered, it could be done at the stage of trial only.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 129 OF 2013
Inspector of Police and another … Appellant (s)
Versus
Battenapatla Venkata Ratnam and another ... Respondent (s)
Citation; 2015 (4) crimes 267 SC






