Whether amendment of plaint adding new cause of action can be allowed?

The law on the subject was summed up by this Court in Ashok v. Gourammabai, MANU/MH/1028/1993 : 1994 Mh.L.J. 286 in the following words :

"The position that emerges from the above decisions of the Supreme Court is that an amendment should always be allowed if it is necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions and controversies between the parties and if it can be made without injustice to the other party. There is no injustice if the other side can be compensated by costs. The only exception is where the amendment would take away from a defendant a legal right which accrued to him by lapse of time. Even amendments modifying the original cause of action or adding another may be allowed if the entire subject-matter of the suit is not altered. Introduction of a new cause is no ground for refusing to allow amendment so long as the defendant has the opportunity of meeting the new case by amendment of the written statement and by leading evidence in respect of his defence. Avoidance of multiplicity of suits is also one of the relevant considerations."

All these decisions clearly go to show that amendment of pleadings should be liberally allowed except in cases where vested rights of any of the parties are affected.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 859 of 1991 in Interlocutory Notice No. 595 of 1991 in L.E. and C. Suit No. 51/68 of 1979

Decided On: 11.02.1994

 Annoo Shetty Vs. Aishabai Hamid Khan

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Whether eviction of tenant on ground of non payment of rent and bonafide need constitute distinct cause of action?

Is the requirement of personal use and occupation by the landlord under sub-section (3)(a)(i) a distinct and separate cause of action from that of non-payment of rent under sub-sec (2)(i) for the eviction of the tenant as prescribed by S. 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949--has come to the, fore as the spinal question in this reference to the Full Bench.

It is, however, well settled that a cause of action means every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support the right to a judgment in his favour. In other words it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the tenant. Negatively it does not comprise evidence necessary to prove the bundle of facts and equally has no relation. whatsoever to the defence, which may be set up by the defendant nor doss it defend on the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. 

In my opinion. therefore, the cause of action in a petition for eviction does not consist in merely obtaining an order for eviction but the cause of action consists in obtaining an order of eviction on one or the other grounds specified in the statute.

But the landlord cannot be competed to raise in a Petition all the statutory grounds that entitle him to obtain eviction. I am of the view that if it is the legal right of the landlord to obtain eviction on the grounds afforded to him by the statute, he is free to claim it on any of them and is not obliged to press all of them in one petition nor can he be debarred from claiming eviction or pressing the grounds that mal be available to him in a subsequent petition, provided be satisfies the ingredients of the ground, e.g., if a landlord claims eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent he may not even be aware of existence d the subletting and if be comes to know about it later, he cannot be debarred from claiming eviction on the ground of subletting which he may succeed in establishing irrespective of the fact when the subletting had occurred-"

On this acid test as well, since the evidence to establish the two is clearly distinct and different, a fortiori the two causes of action are thus equally distinct and separate. They cannot possibly be termed as merely grounds for a single cause of action.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

Civil Revn. No. 1852 of 1977

Decided On: 25.11.1983

Harnam Singh Vs. Surjit Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J., Prem Chand Jain and Satya Parkash Goyal, JJ.

Citation: 1984(1) RCR (Rent) 247

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Whether court should grant injunction if proceeding is pending before collector for partition?

 Before this Court, learned counsel for the appellants submits that even as per the findings of the learned lower appellate Court, the appellants, i.e. defendants in the suit, were found to have constructed a house on the land which was partitioned in the 1980s. However, the suit of the plaintiffs (respondents herein) has been decreed only on the ground that the partition proceedings were still in issue before the appellate authority, i.e. the Collector (SDM) and as such, further construction upon the suit property may create a hindrance in such partition. Learned counsel further submits that the suit could not have been decreed in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs, in view of the fact that they are admittedly co-sharers. A perusal of the judgment of the learned lower appellate Court (learned District Judge, Narnaul), shows that he has not upset the findings of the learned Civil Judge, to the effect that construction is existent on the spot and in fact, he has specifically recorded that even as per the plaintiffs' own admission, construction has been made by the defendantsappellants, as already noticed. All that has been eventually held by that Court, while setting aside the decree of the learned Civil Judge, is that further construction be not made by the appellantsdefendants, till the pendency of the partition proceedings. Such proceedings, as already noticed, are stated to be pending (in appeal) before the Collector, and on specific query, learned counsel for the appellants submits that there is no stay on the order of the Assistant Collector, by which the mode of partition has been determined. In view of the above, even the contention of learned counsel that an injunction cannot lie against a co-sharer, does not hold good, as partition proceedings at least at the first stage, have been finalized as submitted before this Court. Such partition has not been stayed by the appellate revenue authority, as already noticed. Consequently, if in terms of the partition, specific portions of land have been given to respective co-sharers and any of the parties is aggrieved of such mode of partition, obviously their remedy lies before the competent authority, in such partition proceeding. As regards the reasoning given for the injunction granted by the learned lower appellate Court, restraining the appellant from making further construction, during the pendency of partition proceedings, I see no error in that reasoning, it being based on the judgments cited by that Court, in an attempt to try and avoid multiplicity of litigation. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH 

 RSA No. 6280 of 2015 (O&M) 

 Date of Decision: 26.04.2016

 Ramanand and others  Vs. Dharampal 

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMOL RATTAN SINGH 

Citation:AIR 2017(NOC)449 P&H

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When court should grant injunction in suit for specific performance of contract?

We have seen that already the suit property was sold twice. If we permit the suit property
to be transferred further by not granting injunction, there would be every possibility of
multiplication of proceedings. That apart, nature and character of the suit property should not be
allowed to be altered during the pendency of the suit.
As such, we hold that the learned court below did not commit any illegality in passing the
impugned order of injunction in the facts of the present case.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
 Justice Jyotirmay Bhattacharya
AND
 Justice Ishan Chandra Das
 F.M.A.T. 685 of 2016
 (CAN 7943 of 2016)

Sujan Maity  V  Sri Raj Kumar Koley & Ors.


Judgement on: 17th January, 2017.
Citation: AIR 2017 Cal 63

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What is distinction between Doctrine of Lis Pendens and Order of Temporary Injunction ?

Thus, it is apparent that, both, "the Principle of Lis Pendens" and "the order of temporary injunction", have not only different objects but the breaches thereof have also different consequences. The transaction made in breach of injunction order is apparently and patently illegal and binds no party, even the purchaser. Whereas, transaction effected during lis pendens does not attract the taint of illegality. It remains legal, valid and binding on the parties, subject to the outcome of the litigation. It also does not entail the consequences of penalty or contempt, as there is no order passed by the Court in Doctrine of Lis Pendens.

 As a result, from the perspective of litigating parties also, the "Doctrine of Lis Pendens" and "Order of Temporary Injunction" have different effects. The apprehension of action under Section 2A Rule 11 of CPC of attachment of property and the punishment of contempt of courts act as deterrent to the party against whom order of injunction is running.

This deterrent has the further effect of avoiding multiplicity of transactions and procedings. The Doctrine of Lis Pendens does / cannot create such deterrent effect as it does not entail drastic consequence of attachment of property, detention in civil prison, suit being dismissed or defence being struck off, as the case may be, or punishment for contempt of court.

110. Alienation of property lis pendens is merely in the nature of a gamble, which party may willingly enter into without any apprehension of above-said consequences as such party has always the chance of winning the case and thereby retaining the property. The only consequence the party may face, is of loosing that property and nothing more. In that respect also, the transaction will always remain binding  between transferor and purchaser. Therefore, alienee can very much receive purchase-price from transferor as such transaction does not suffer from any taint of illegality. As against it, the order of temporary injunction can and does avoid multiplicity and complications by deterring the party at the threshold itself from entering into transactions, which effect Doctrine of Lis Pendens does not have.

Bombay High Court

Shri Prakash Gobindram Ahuja vs Shri Ganesh Pandharinath Dhonde ... on 4 October, 2016

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