Bombay HC: How Appellate court should exercise his discretion while deciding misc. civil appeal against the order of temporary injunction??

 The scope of jurisdiction available to this Court at this stage is well known. The temporary injunction is a discretionary relief granted to preserve the subject matter till end of civil suit & to satisfy the decree therein. Prima facie case, balance of convenience & possibility of the irreparable loss are the tests applied by trial court & this Court can interfere only if there is any perversity or jurisdictional error. If the trial court has after proper appreciation of records and contentions reached a plausible finding, this Court can not overrule it merely because some other view is also possible. In the case of Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd., MANU/SC/0595/1990 : 1990 (Supp) SCC 727, the Hon. Apex Court has considered the question of grant of interlocutory injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure in a case under Section 29(2) of the Act and Section 55 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and held as follows :-

Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated- "............. is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having bee prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the 'balance of convenience' lies.

The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear of a prima facie case. The Court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted. xxx xxx xxx xxx The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. {Para 8}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal From Order No. 838 of 2011

Decided On: 05.11.2012

Mangalam Group Vs. Nandkumar Bhalchandra Bhondve

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.P. Dharmadhikari, J.

Citation: 2013(1) ABR 331,MANU/MH/1819/2012

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Bombay HC: Unstamped Agreement Cannot Be Basis For Granting Temporary Injunction Even If Its Execution Is Accepted By Defendant

 The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case of Avinash Kumar Chauhan Vs. Vijay Krishna Mishra reported in MANU/SC/8502/2008 : 2009 AIR SCW 97, observed that where possession of property has been transferred under any instrument, in absence of payment of stamp duty, such instrument cannot be admitted even for collateral purpose or to corroborate oral evidence. There is total and absolute bar as to admission of unstamped instrument, unless there is compliance with requirements of provisos to Section 35. {Para 17}

18. In this background, if unstamped instrument is admitted even for collateral purpose, it would amount to receiving such document in evidence for a purpose which is prohibited under Section 35 of Stamp Act. The bar against admissibility of instrument which is chargeable with stamp duty and is not stamped is of course absolute whatever be the nature of purpose, be it for main or collateral purpose, unless requirements of proviso (A) to Section 35 are complied with.

19. The similar issue was considered by High Court of Karnataka in case of Smt. Dyavamma Alias Sanna Mukkamma Vs. Smt. Balamma and Others reported in MANU/KA/0842/2010 : ILR 2010 KAR 3280, that instruments which are not duly stamped are not only inadmissible in evidence, but the Court cannot act upon it, or consider the same for any relief like temporary injunction till such time both duty and penalty are paid. In case of Yellapu Uma Maheswari & Another Vs. Buddha Jagadheeswararao & Others reported in MANU/SC/1141/2015 : 2015:INSC:755 : (2015) 16 SCC 787, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that if party wanted to rely upon document for collateral purpose, it was upon for him to pay stamp duty together with penalty and get document impounded.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 13409 of 2023

Decided On: 29.07.2025

Salim Baig Vs. Sayyad Nawid

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.G. Chapalgaonkar, J.

Citation: 2025:BHC-AUG:19926, MANU/MH/4610/2025

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What are Order 43, Rule 1(r) of CPC 1908 provisions?

Order 43, Rule 1(r) of CPC 1908 allows an appeal from orders passed under Rules 1, 2, 2A, 4, or 10 of Order 39 of CPC. These orders specifically concern temporary injunctions, restraining breach of contract, and setting aside or modifying such injunctions. It acts as a crucial provision for immediate legal recourse against interim injunction orders. 

Key aspects of Order 43, Rule 1(r) include:

• Appeals from Injunctions: An appeal can be filed against orders granting, refusing, modifying, or discharging temporary injunctions.

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Madhya Pradesh HC: Whether District Judge in Miscellaneous civil appeal can entertain application for amendment of plaint?

The appeal before the learned District Judge was one under Order 43, Rule 1 (r), C. P. C. and not a regular appeal. Jurisdiction of the appellate Court while deciding appeal of such a character extends only to examine the validity of an order enumerated in Clause (r) of Order 43, Rule 1, C. P. C., which runs as under :

"An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of Section 104, namely :--

(r) an order under Rule 1, Rule 2, (Rule 2-A), Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order XXXIX."

Accordingly, the scope of such appeal is limited. It extends to adjudication of challenge to an order of grant or refusal of interim injunction as envisaged by Order 43, Rule 1 (r), C. P. C. As such, the learned District Judge has no seisin over the suit as such. He was seized of proceedings for issuance of a temporary injunction in the suit and not of the suit itself. This aspect of the law appears to have been overlooked by the learned District Judge.

As a logical corollary flowing from the aforesaid position of law, it has to be concluded that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for amendment of the plaint submitted before him by the plaintiff-applicant herein. If the applicant herein (plaintiff) chose to submit the application in the appeal preferred by the defendants before the learned District Judge, only courses which would have been adopted by the learned District Judge were (a) to direct the plaintiff to submit the amendment application before the trial Court; and (b) to forward it to the trial Court for decision in accordance with law after deciding the appeal on merits. However, he had no jurisdiction to decide the application for amendment of the plaint on its merits.

 In spite of this, the scope of the appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) is restricted as discussed above to examine the propriety and/or legality of order passed under the various rules of Order 39 referred therein. A distinction has to be made between the scope of regular appeal and a miscellaneous appeal under the aforesaid provision. While deciding the appeal of former character the appellate Court has, on the theory that appeal is continuation of suit, power to allow amendment in the pleadings, but in an appeal of the later type the appellate Court has jurisdiction only to adjudicate upon the correctness or otherwise of order refusing or granting an interim injunction. The position of trial Court in such a situation appears to be different, as the trial Court is in seisin of the suit as well as of application for issuance of a temporary injunction made in the suit. The powers exercisable by an appellate Court while hearing appeals preferred under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) cannot be regarded to extend to allowing amendment of the plaint, as he is not in seisin of the suit as such. 

In the present situation, the word 'proceeding' connotes merely an application for issuance of a temporary injunction and/or its reply. Accordingly, where the plaintiff-applicant moves an application for amendment of the application for issuance of temporary injunction, the appellate Court may be regarded to have jurisdiction to decide it.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

Civil Revn. No. 272 of 1979

Decided On: 25.02.1981

Dhundasingh Vs. Leeladhar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

H.G. Mishra, J.

Citation: 1982 AIR MP 14,1981 SCC ONLINE MP, MANU/MP/0005/1982

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Questions and answers on law (Part 88)

 

Q 1:- What is difference between Malfeasance,Misfeasance,and Nonfeasance ?

Ans:- https://www.lawweb.in/2019/07/what-is-difference-between.html

Q 2:- Whether appeal against status quo order is maintainable?

Ans:- An appeal against a status quo order is generally maintainable when the order is essentially one of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 or 2 CPC. In such a case, the remedy is an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC. However, the court will look to the real nature and source of the order; merely calling it a ‘status quo’ order is not decisive.”

Important distinction

If the status quo direction is actually an injunction restraining a party from changing possession, title position, construction, or nature of the property, it is treated as an appealable injunction order. But if the order is purely administrative, procedural, or not traceable to Order 39 Rules 1, 2, 4, or 10 CPC, appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) may not lie.

Judicial caution

Courts have also emphasized that a status quo order should not be passed casually, and it must satisfy the usual injunction tests such as prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. Therefore, maintainability of appeal depends on the substance of the order, not its label.

One-line answer

“An appeal against a status quo order is maintainable if the order is in substance a temporary injunction under Order 39 CPC, in which case appeal lies under Order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC.”

Q 3:- What is basic concept of Continuous offence with reference to Indian criminal law?

Ans:- https://www.lawweb.in/2024/06/what-is-basic-concept-of-continuous.html

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Supreme Court: No Temporary Injunction Can Be Granted In Appeal Against Rejection Of Plaint

 Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and

learned senior counsel for the respondent, we observe

that in a case where an appeal is filed by being

aggrieved by the rejection of a plaint in exercise of

powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the High Court ought

not to have granted an order of temporary injunction. We

say so for the reason that the plaint itself has been

rejected by the Commercial Court and the correctness or

otherwise of the said rejection is a matter at large

before the High Court. When the plaint itself has been

rejected, it cannot be said that the appeal filed against

such an order is a continuation of a suit. It may be that

in the commercial suit the respondent herein had the

benefit of an interim injunction, but once the plaint has

been rejected by the trial court i.e. the Commercial

Court, in the instant case, until it is revived /

restored, an order of temporary injunction cannot operate

against the defendant in the suit, who is the respondent

in the appeal filed against the rejection of the plaint.

In other words, it is necessary that there ought to be a

subsisting plaint in order to seek an order of temporary

injunction. {Para 5}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).7235/2025

IEEE MUMBAI SECTION WELFARE ASSOCIATION  Vs GLOBAL IEEE INSTITUTE FOR ENGINEERS 

Dated: May 27, 2025.

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Basic concepts: What is John Doe order?

 A John Doe order is a type of legal injunction that allows a plaintiff to take action against unknown or unidentified defendants. The term "John Doe" serves as a placeholder name for anonymous parties whose identities are not known at the time of filing the lawsuit.

Origins and Background

The concept of John Doe orders has its origins in England during the reign of King Edward III, when such orders were used to refer to unidentifiable defendants. The Oxford Dictionary defines "John Doe" as an "anonymous party". This legal mechanism was later adopted by U.S. and Canadian courts before making its way to India.

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Whether client lists maintained by the Plaintiff, can be deemed proprietary information or trade secrets, deserving legal protection?

  It is important to examine whether such client lists, even if they are maintained by the Plaintiff, can be deemed proprietary information or trade secrets, deserving legal protection. In this Court‟s view, a client list, by itself, is not automatically protected as confidential information simply by virtue of its existence. To be considered a trade secret or confidential information, the list must have economic or business value that requires safeguarding against competitors. {Para 26}

27. The mere existence of a client list does not confer proprietary rights over it in a way that would prevent former employees from using it, unless there is evidence that the list is compiled through proprietary methods, or that it holds specific commercial value that could harm the business if disclosed. It is also essential to distinguish between information that is generally known or accessible in the public domain and information that is truly confidential, which would merit the protection of an injunction.

28. In this context, while a company may claim that its client list is confidential, the Court must scrutinize whether such information is truly proprietary or whether it simply reflects business relationships that are already in the public domain. If the client details are publicly known or easily ascertainable by competitors, it would be unreasonable to grant an injunction based on a claim of confidentiality.

29. Therefore, the issue at hand is not merely whether the Defendant has knowledge of the Plaintiff‟s clients, but whether that knowledge rises to the level of confidential information or trade secrets that can be protected by legal measures such as an injunction. Without clear evidence that the client list holds economic value and that its use would harm the Plaintiff‟s business interests, the Plaintiff‟s request for an injunction based solely on the existence of a client list cannot be sustained.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 C.S. (OS) 1011/2024

 CIGMA EVENTS PRIVATE LIMITED  Vs DEEPAK GUPTA & ORS.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA

Dated: 24.12.2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Delhi HC: How far can an employer prevent its employees from using the information gained by employees during the course of employment?

 26. It is important to examine whether such client lists, even if they are maintained by the Plaintiff, can be deemed proprietary information or trade secrets, deserving legal protection. In this Court‟s view, a client list, by itself, is not automatically protected as confidential information simply by virtue of its existence. To be considered a trade secret or confidential information, the list must have economic or business value that requires safeguarding against competitors.

27. The mere existence of a client list does not confer proprietary rights over it in a way that would prevent former employees from using it, unless there is evidence that the list is compiled through proprietary methods, or that it holds specific commercial value that could harm the business if disclosed. It is also essential to distinguish between information that is generally known or accessible in the public domain and information that is truly confidential, which would merit the protection of an injunction.

28. In this context, while a company may claim that its client list is confidential, the Court must scrutinize whether such information is truly proprietary or whether it simply reflects business relationships that are already in the public domain. If the client details are publicly known or easily ascertainable by competitors, it would be unreasonable to grant an injunction based on a claim of confidentiality.

29. Therefore, the issue at hand is not merely whether the Defendant has knowledge of the Plaintiff‟s clients, but whether that knowledge rises to the level of confidential information or trade secrets that can be protected by legal measures such as an injunction. Without clear evidence that the client list holds economic value and that its use would harm the Plaintiff‟s business interests, the Plaintiff‟s request for an injunction based solely on the existence of a client list cannot be sustained.

30. A competitor, even when aware of which particular entity, individual, or person a business is currently engaged with, has the right to approach such individuals or persons to canvas their own business. It is ultimately the customer's discretion to decide which business or entity they choose to engage with. The mere creation of a database containing client or customer details, followed by a claim of confidentiality over it, does not bestow a monopoly over those customers. Furthermore, even if a person has gained knowledge about the Plaintiff's operational plans, they cannot be restrained from disclosing such plans to a competitor, provided that the information was retained in their mind. The competitor's decision-making cannotbe presumed to have been solely influenced by such disclosure.

31. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in American Express Bank Ltd. v. Priya Puri: 2006 SCC OnLine Del 638, had held that mere knowledge of the plaintiff‟s operational strategies or plans, when carried in an individual‟s mind, does not give rise to an actionable claim for injunctive relief. A competitor may be aware of these plans, but they cannot be automatically considered to have been influenced by them. The plaintiff is not entitled to restrain the competitor from acting based solely on this knowledge.

32. This Court is of the view that the plaintiff has failed to produce any document or evidence demonstrating that Defendant No. 2 was bound by any agreement that prohibited him from carrying on his own business, either during his tenure with the plaintiff company or post resignation from the directorship of the company. Therefore, the alleged use of client information or industry knowledge by the Defendant No. 2 cannot be restrained, as such knowledge does not constitute proprietary information or trade secrets of the plaintiff.

33. It is well-established that non-compete clauses during employment are enforceable; however, post-employment restrictions must be both reasonable and necessary to protect trade secrets or proprietary information. The defendant‟s use of general industry knowledge, gained during their employment with the plaintiff, cannot be prohibited unless it is shown that such knowledge constitutes confidential or proprietary information.

34. The plaintiff‟s contention that the Defendants used confidential

information, including the client details and vendor codes, which were allegedly generated using the Plaintiff‟s client database, is not

supported by any compelling evidence. As held by a Co-ordinate

Bench of this Court, in Manipal Business Solutions Private Limited

v. Aurigain Consultants Private Limited & Ors.: CS(OS) 190/2022, a

director or employee of a company will naturally become familiar

with the company‟s operations and clientele during their employment. This does not, however, grant them exclusive rights to the company‟s customer list or operational details.

35. The Plaintiff‟s claim that certain information is confidential and

proprietary cannot prima facie be termed as such, as much of this

information, including details about clients, business operations, and

event types, is widely available through public sources such as press

releases, social media posts, and public collaborations. As observed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Manipal Business Solutions Private Limited v. Aurigain Consultants Private Limited & Ors.: (Supra), confidential information must possess distinct commercial value. If information is already in the public domain, it cannot be classified as a trade secret deserving protection. The relevant extract from the judgment is as follows:

“ 37. According to Mr. Mehta, the same include customer

data, agent data, contract data, employee data, market data

and business plans.

38. I may at the outset state here that the plaintiff is not

claiming any copyright in the above information. It is only

claiming that the data is confidential. Even if such an

argument was to be raised, the question would be whether

the above information shall fall within the definition of

copyright as defined under Section 13(1) of the Copyright

Act. This Court in a series of judgments including the

judgment in the case of Navigators Logistics Ltd. (supra),

has in paragraphs 22 to 35, by referring to the judgment of

the Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. DB

Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1, held that to claim copyright, the

author must produce the material created with exercise of

his skill and judgment, which must not be so trivial that it

would be characterised as a purely mechanical exercise.

The Court was of the opinion that the plaintiff therein,

being a juristic person is incapable of being the author of

any literary work in which a copyright may exist, though it

may be the owner of copyright. As the plaintiff had failed to

disclose the identity of the author, it could not claim any

copyright in a list of customers/clients with their contact

numbers.

39. Even the plea of confidentiality taken by Mr. Mehta is

unsustainable, as merely stating that there exists some

confidential and secret information does not convince this

Court that such information is, in fact confidential, more so,

when the plaint and the pleadings do not disclose the nature

of the information / data of which confidentiality is

claimed. I find that no material / document connected with

the aforesaid data / information has been filed by the

plaintiff. In fact this aspect has been accepted by Mr. Mehta

during his submissions.

***

41. It has not been filed nor shown to the satisfaction of this

Court, as to what exactly is the confidential information,

how it is confidential, and how, if at all, the defendant

company has used such information to the detriment of the

plaintiff.

***

44. A reading of the above reproduced paragraphs would

reveal that not every customer/client list would qualify as

confidential information or trade secret unless the

confidentiality about it is of economic/business/commercial

value. It is held that in any employment, every employee

would get to know some information without any special

effort. All such persons cannot be said to be in knowledge

of trade secrets or confidential information and every

knowledge of such facts cannot be labeled as trade secret or

confidential information. If an employee on account of his

employment has gathered some business

knowledge/acumen or ways of dealing with clients, the

same would not be termed as confidential information,

disclosure of which would harm the plaintiff. Unless there

is some material on record to show that the defendant had

come to know of any confidential information / trade secret

concerning the plaintiff and its business, no injunction can

be granted, more so when such trade secret / confidential

information have not even been spelt out. The learned

Single Judge, referring to the decision in American Express

Bank (supra) has observed that a competitor even after

knowing which particular entity/an individual/person is

currently in business with, can approach such

individual/person to canvas about itself, and it is for the

customer to decide which business/entity to choose.

Creating a database of clients/customers and then claiming

confidentiality on it does not create a monopoly over such

customers. That apart, even if a person has amassed

knowledge with regard to the plaintiff‟s plan of operation,

he could not be injuncted from disclosing such plans to the

competitor, if he has carried such plans in his head and even

the competitor could not be said to be driven by such

disclosure alone. I agree with the aforesaid conclusion

arrived at by the Coordinate Bench of this Court.

57. I agree with the conclusion of the Court that a client list cannot be construed as confidential information to claim any right. The judgment relied upon has no applicability. ”

36. It is also established that every employee gains knowledge during the course of their employment, and not all such knowledge can be classified as a trade secret or confidential information. If an employee acquires business knowledge, such as ways of dealing with clients, through ordinary experience, it cannot be considered confidential information. Disclosure of such knowledge would not harm the plaintiff unless it is demonstrated that the defendant had access to specific trade secrets or proprietary information.

37. Therefore, the details of customers, while potentially known to employees of a business, cannot be deemed proprietary or protected trade secrets. Such information can easily be acquired by others through observation, independent canvassing, or minimal effort. It is unreasonable to treat such details as confidential when they are accessible with little effort and at minimal cost.

38. In light of the above, this Court finds that the injunction sought by the Plaintiff would curtail the Defendants' ability to seek future employment or business opportunities. Restricting an individual‟s freedom to seek better prospects, merely on the grounds that they possess information that is readily available or ascertainable, is an impermissible restraint on trade and employment. Such restrictions are contrary to public policy, as enshrined in Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

 C.S. (OS) 1011/2024

 CIGMA EVENTS PRIVATE LIMITED  Vs DEEPAK GUPTA & ORS.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA

Dated: 24.12.2024.

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Questions and answers on law (Part 70)

Q 1:-   Whether civil court can grant injunction even if issue of tenancy is referred to tenancy court?

Ans:- The question is not ultimately what the other reliefs are claimed in the suit. If the plaintiff is alleging that he is in possession and therefore he wants his possession to be protected by an appropriate order made under O. XXXIX R. 1 of the Code, then the Court, considering whether he is prima facie in possession and other such factors as the balance of convenience, can give interim relief by way of injunction restraining the drefendant from disturbing the plaintiffs possession. If other issues which can be decided only by the authorities under the Tenancy Act arise, then those issues may be referred to the appropriate tenancy authorities, but it cannot be said that unless those issues are answered by the proper tenancy authorities no interim relief can be given by the Civil Courts under O. XXXIX R. 1 of the Code.

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Whether the court can grant temporary injunction in suit for specific performance of contract if vendor pleads that agreement of sale was executed under coercion?

 In the instant case, the defendant has not

denied the execution of the agreement to sell dated

07.05.2022 but has contended that the agreement to sell

was entered into under coercion. However, the defendant

had kept the money received under the agreement of Rs.10

lakh in her account for more than 5 months. Thus, prima

facie agreement cannot be said to be under coercion as

there is no steps taken by the defendant to return the

amount, rather the defendant has kept money in her

account and effect thereto is to be examined before the trial

court and thus no interference is called for at this stage, in

the order passed by the trial Court. {Para 31}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 25 OF 2023

Smt. Manisha w/o. Balkrushna Kode, Vs Shri. Madanlal s/o. Uttamchand Desarda,

CORAM : ARUN R. PEDNEKER, J.

Pronounced on : 02.08.2023

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Under which circumstances can the court set aside temporary injunction order granted after hearing both parties?

The order which has been vacated by the Trial Court is an ad interim order and not a temporary order on injunction which had been adjudicated upon by the Trial Court after hearing the parties in its proper perspective. Order XXXIX Rule (4) reads as under:

"4. Order for injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside.-

Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside by the Court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order:

Provided that if in an application for temporary injunction or in an affidavit supporting such application a party has knowingly made a false or misleading statement in relation to a material particular and the injunction was granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall vacate the injunction unless, for reasons to be recorded, it considers that it is not necessary so to do in the interest of justice:

Provided further that where an order for injunction has been passed after giving a party an opportunity of being heard, the order shall not be discharged, varied or set aside on the application of that party except where such discharge, variation or setting side has been necessitated by a change in the circumstances, or unless the Court is satisfied that the order has caused undue hardship to that party."

16. A perusal of the above would go on to show that the order of injunction may be discharged or varied or set aside by the Court on an application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order. The proviso further provides that if in an application for temporary injunction or in any affidavit supporting such application, a party knowingly makes a false or misleading statement in relation to a material particular whereby the temporary injunction was obtained by way of false and misleading statement and the same was granted without notice to the opposite party, the Court shall vacate the injunction. Similarly, the second proviso further provides that the injunction order can be set aside in changed circumstances or in case of causing undue hardship to a party.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

CR-1857-2020, CR-1858-2020 and CR-1859-2020

Decided On: 03.09.2020

Ravinder and Ors.  Vs.  Gram Panchayat, Damla and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Gurmeet Singh Sandhawalia, J.

Citation: MANU/PH/0787/2020

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Whether Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act operates as bar to grant of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of CPC?

In view of the submissions advanced, the following points arise for consideration and determination;

i) Whether Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act operates as a bar to the grant of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC? {Para 14}

24. From the aforesaid, we are of the considered view that Section 52 of T.P. Act although provides protection to the parties from transfers pendent lite, in as much as it makes such transfers subservient to the decree that may be passed in the suit, but it does not come in the way of passing an order of temporary injunction restraining alienation of the suit property during the pendency of the suit on the applicant satisfying all the three ingredients of prima facie, balance of convenience and causing irreparable loss or injury in his favour.

25. The distinction between Section 52 of T.P. Act and Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, is that an order of temporary injunction is of preemptive nature restraining the act of alienation by party to the suit where there is such a danger, whereas Section 52 of T.P. Act comes into play after the alienation takes place during pendency of the suit. Section 52 of T.P. Act provides for the consequences of a transfer taking place pending litigation, i.e., that the pendent lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations of his vendor(s) that may be finally determined by the court. Section 52 of T.P. Act does not come in the way of applicability of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. In other words, notwithstanding Section 52 of T.P. Act making the transfers during pendency of the suit subject to the ultimate decree that may be passed in the suit, the court may, pass an order of temporary injunction, if all the requisite pre-conditions for such grant are satisfied. If an order is passed and transfer is restrained, the question of applicability of Section 52 of T.P. Act will not arise as then there will be no transfer pending litigation. On the other hand, if the party does not apply for temporary injunction or if the application is rejected and the suit property is transferred pending litigation, Section 52 of T.P. Act shall come into play and those transfers would abide by the ultimate result of the suit.

28. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of Section 52 of T.P. Act providing for the effect of transfers during pendency of the suit, the order of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 could not be passed. If such an argument is accepted, then the court cannot pass an order of temporary injunction to restrain alienation in spite of specific provision under Order 39 Rule 1(a) CPC, in any case, as in every case any alienation made pending litigation would abide by the doctrine of lis pendens embodied under Section 52 of T.P. Act. This will render the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC ineffective.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 43 and 45 of 2021

Decided On: 25.01.2022

K. Ravi Prasad Reddy and Ors.  Vs.  G. Giridhar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C. Praveen Kumar and Ravi Nath Tilhari, JJ.

Author: Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.

Citation: MANU/AP/0075/2022,

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What is the court's duty when the proceeding in which a stay granted to recover money is dismissed?

  Following the said decision, this Court in Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. and Others v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Others, (1997) 5 SCC 772 has held that an order of stay which is granted during the pendency of a writ petition/suit or other proceeding comes to an end with the dismissal of the substantive proceedings and it is the duty of the court in such cases to put the parties in the same position that they would have been in but for the interim order of the court. In that case, this Court rejected the contention that when the operation of the notification itself was stayed, no surcharge could be demanded upon the amount withheld. It was held thus:

“11. …. Holding otherwise would mean that even though the Electricity Board, who was the respondent in the writ petitions succeeded therein, yet deprived of the late payment surcharge which was due to it under the tariff rules/regulations. It would be a case where the Board suffers prejudice on account of the orders of the court and for no fault of its. It succeeds in the writ petition and yet loses. The consumer files the writ petition, obtains stay of operation of the notification revising the rates and fails in his attack upon the validity of the notification and yet he is relieved of the obligation to pay the late payment surcharge for the period of stay, which he is liable to pay according to the statutory terms and conditions of supply — which terms and conditions indeed form part of the contract of supply entered into by him with the Board. We do not think that any such unfair and inequitable proposition can be sustained in law.

xxx xxx xxx

It is equally well settled that an order of stay granted pending disposal of a writ petition/suit or other proceeding, comes to an end with the dismissal of the substantive proceeding and that it is the duty of the court in such a case to put the parties in the same position they would have been but for the interim orders of the court. Any other view would result in the act or order of the court prejudicing a party (Board in this case) for no fault of its and would also mean rewarding a writ petitioner in spite of his failure. We do not think that any such unjust consequence can be countenanced by the courts. As a matter of fact, the contention of the consumers herein, extended logically should mean that even the enhanced rates are also not payable for the period covered by the order of stay because the operation of the very notification revising/enhancing the tariff rates was stayed. Mercifully, no such argument was urged by the appellants. It is un-understandable how the enhanced rates can be said to be payable but not the late payment surcharge thereon, when both the enhancement and the late payment surcharge are provided by the same notification — the operation of which was stayed.”{Para 19}

20. In Rajasthan Housing Board and Others v. Krishna Kumari, (2005) 13 SCC 151 this Court observed that Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 provides for grant of temporary injunction at the risk and responsibility of the person who obtains it and, if ultimately case is decided against such person, he would be liable to pay interest on the arrears of any amount due which had been stayed by the injunction order. The legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that an act of the Court shall prejudice no man, becomes applicable in such a case.

21. In South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. V. State of M.P. and Others, (2003) 8 SCC 648 the writ petitioner therein had argued that interest accrued due to nonpayment of enhanced amount of royalty was protected by a judicial order of an interim nature and, therefore, merely because the writ was finally dismissed, the writ petitioner should not be held liable for payment of interest so long as money was withheld under the protective umbrella of the injunction order. This submission was rejected by this Court by holding as under:

“The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognized in Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 144 CPC speaks not only of a decree being varied, reversed, set aside or modified but also includes an order on a par with a decree. The scope of the provision is wide enough so as to include therein almost all the kinds of variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of a decree or order. The interim order passed by the court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favour of a party, stands reversed in the event of a final decision going against the party successful at the interim stage. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the successful party at the end would be justified with all expediency in demanding compensation and being placed in the same situation in which it would have been if the interim order would not have been passed against it. The successful party can demand (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost; and it is the duty of the court to do so unless it feels that in the facts and on the circumstances of the case, the restitution far from meeting the ends of justice, would rather defeat the same. Undoing the effect of an interim order by resorting to principles of restitution is an obligation of the party, who has gained by the interim order of the court, so as to wipe out the effect of the interim order passed which, in view of the reasoning adopted by the court at the stage of final decision, the court earlier would not or ought not to have passed. There is nothing wrong in an effort being made to restore the parties to the same position in which they would have been if the interim order would not have existed.”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2417 OF 2022 

 STATE OF U.P. THR. SECRETARY AND ORS. Vs PREM CHOPRA

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Bombay HC: The court should refuse to grant a temporary injunction to restrain demolition of construction if it is unauthorized

  It is true that in cases relating to orders for demolition of buildings, irreparable loss may occur if the structure is demolished even before trial, and an opportunity to establish by evidence that the structure was authorised and not illegal. In such cases, where prima facie case is made out, the balance of convenience automatically tilts in favour of plaintiff and a temporary injunction will be issued to preserve status quo. But where the plaintiffs do not make out a prima facie case for grant of an injunction and the documents produced clearly show that the structures are unauthorised, the court may not grant a temporary injunction merely on the ground of sympathy or hardship. To grant a temporary injunction, where the structure is clearly unauthorised and the final order passed by the Commissioner (of the Corporation) after considering the entire material directing demolition, is not shown to suffer from any infirmity, would be to encourage and perpetuate an illegality. {Para 31}

Bombay High Court

JUSTICE PRITHVIRAJ K. CHAVAN

Shantilal Chhogalalji Doshi & Anr. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & ANr.

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Which rules will prevail in case of conflict between rules framed under MRTP Act and building bye-laws?

  In case of any conflict between the rules and regulations as framed under the provisions of the M.R.T.P. Act or the Development Regulation and Scheme Regulations in one hand and the building bye-laws framed by the provisions of Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, it is quite clear that regulations made under the MRTP Act would prevail. {Para 28}

Bombay High Court

JUSTICE PRITHVIRAJ K. CHAVAN

Shantilal Chhogalalji Doshi & Anr. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & ANr.

APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 8 OF 2021

18th February 2021

Citation: 2021 NearLaw (BombayHC) Online 177

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Whether court can consider an unregistered family settlement at the time of deciding temporary injunction?

 Similarly, it is yet to be established whether the alleged family settlement Ex.P-1 is a genuine document or not. It may, however, be noted that in this document there is no mention of oral family settlement alleged to have been arrived at on 24.5.1979. From this document it is also clear that the alleged family arrangement was with regard to the partition of the immoveable properties and was reduced in writing so that it could be used in future at the time of need. Such a document is required to be registered compulsorily under Section 17(1) (b) of the Registration

Act, 1908. In this connection reference may be made to the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Tek Bahadur (supra). In this case the Supreme Court held that “it is only when the parties reduce the family arrangement in writing with the purpose of using that writing as proof of what they had arranged and, where the arrangement is brought about by the document as such, that the document would require registration, as it is then that it would be a document of title declaring for future what rights and in what properties the parties possess.” In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, I am prima facie of the view that the document Ex.P-1 required registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act as the said document was with regard to the partition of the immoveable properties and was reduced to writing with the purpose of using the same as proof of what the parties had decided in respect of those properties. Since the said document was not registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act, the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 cannot be permitted to rely on this document at this stage.

 HIGH COURT OF DELHI

IAS No. 7532/88, 8290/88, 211/89 3160/90 and 8916/92 in S.NO. 159/86

K.G. Mal Vs Sham Behari Mal 

Sat Pal, J

Decided on : 5th July, 1994

Citation: 1994 SCC OnLine Del 388 : (1994) 30 DRJ 242 : (1994) 55 DLT 137 : PLR (1994) 108 Del 3

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Whether court can grant an interim injunction based on unregistered agreement?

  It may be pointed out that no suit for specific performance of unregistered agreements dated 31.3.1965 and 16.10.1965 was filed nor have the respondents sought cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 31.3.1965 and 19.10.1965. This would lead to a situation where the respondents are not avoiding the transaction in the registered instrument but are seeking to use the unregistered agreements dated 31.3.1965 and 16.10.1965 to seek mandatory and permanent injunction as also possession. Such is impermissible and any interim order in furtherance thereof cannot be granted. It has been held by the Supreme Court in S. Saktivel (dead) by LRs. v. M. Venugopal Pillai and Ors., 2000 (7) SCC 104, that registered document cannot be rescinded, varied or altered by unregistered document. Therefore, no final relief can be granted on the basis of unregistered agreement in the teeth of the registered sale deed. Consequently, where a final relief cannot be granted, an interim relief to the same effect is also barred.{Para 5}

6. I need hardly go into other aspects of the matter raised by learned counsel, but suffice it to say that the injunction order under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC cannot be sustained in view of the registered sale deed not being canceled.

HIGH COURT OF DELHI

C.M. (M) 672 of 2002 & C.M. 1369 of 2003

Punjab National Bank  Vs Iqbal Ahmad 

R.S. Sodhi, J.

Decided on : November 7, 2003

Citation: 

2003 SCC OnLine Del 1060 : (2004) 72 DRJ 89 : (2003) 108 DLT 378

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What should the court consider if the plaintiff is seeking an injunction against the demolition of construction by Municipal Corporation?

  There is no dispute that the Municipal Corporation has issued a notice under section 55 of the M.R.T.P. Act A perusal of section 55(1) of the M.R.T.P. Act clearly indicates if it is found that any person has carried out any development of a temporary nature unauthorizedly as indicated in section 52 of the M.R.T.P. Act, the Corporation is empowered to order such person to remove or discontinue the use of the land unauthorizedly. The Municipal Corporation has to be satisfied that the authorized construction of a temporary nature is carried out as provided in section 52 of the M.R.T.P. Act. A perusal of section 55(2) of the M.R.T.P. Act clearly indicates that the decision of the planning authority on the question whether the development is a temporary in nature shall be final. In my view, the action taken by the Municipal Corporation under section 55 of the M.R.T.P. Act thus in the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of section 55 read with section 55(2) is final and conclusive.{Para 12}

13. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the documents referred to and relied upon by the appellant in support of the submission of the appellant that the suit structure was not of a temporary nature and that the appellant has been carrying on business in the suit structure since 1961-1962.

14. I have given an opportunity to the learned counsel appearing for the appellant to demonstrate before this Court from the documents produced before the learned trial Judge in support of his contention that the suit structure was not temporary structure and that the appellant has been carrying on business in the suit premises since 1961-1962. Pursuant to this opportunity granted by this Court, the learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention to some of the documents which were on record before the learned trial Court, which are dealt with in the later part of the order.

15. Insofar as the alleged Deed of Declaration relied by the appellant dated 11th May, 1949 is concerned, a perusal of the said alleged Deed of Declaration does not indicate any description of the alleged structure between the two buildings. If according to the appellant, the appellant was carrying on business since 1961-1962 in the suit premises, such structure would have been definitely assessed by the Municipal Corporation in last several decades till date. Admittedly the temporary structure of the subject matter of the suit is not assessed between 1961 till date.

16. In my view merely on the basis of the said alleged Deed of Declaration dated 11th May, 1949, this Court cannot accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant had been carrying on business in the said premises from 1961-1962.

17. Insofar as the notices issued by the Municipal Corporation under different provisions of the M.M.C. Act issued in the year 2005 and thereafter relied upon by the appellant is concerned, a perusal of such notices clearly indicates that the Municipal Corporation in the year 2005 had found that the appellant had stored some of the empty boxes in the open space between two buildings. The said empty boxes were without obtaining permission from the Municipal Corporation. The prosecution was launched against the appellant pursuant to such action initiated by the Municipal Corporation. All such documents which are relied upon by the appellant would clearly indicate that there was no shed found by the Municipal Corporation on its visit in the year 2005. The empty boxes were stored in the open space. It is thus clear beyond reasonable doubt that whatever structures are put up by the appellant were after the year 2005.

18. In my view, none of these documents which are relied by the appellant would indicate that the suit structure which is the subject matter of the notice was a pacca structure or is in existence since 1961-62.

19. It is not the case of the appellant that the appellant had obtained any permission from the Municipal Corporation for erection of such structure.

20. A perusal of the application, which was filed by the appellant for the purpose of obtaining the license under the provisions of the Shops and Establishment Act, which is annexed to the civil application filed by the intervenor clearly indicates that it was the case of the appellant himself that he started business in the premises some time in the year 2014.

21. Even copy of the passport, electricity bill and telephone bill, produced on record by the appellant would not indicate that the suit premises was a pacca structure or that the appellant was carrying on business in the premises since 1961-1962. If the appellant was carrying on any business in the premises since 1961-1962, the appellant would have in his possession several documents and/or permission from the Municipal Corporation or other authorities to indicate that such business was being carried on since 1961-1962. In my view the appeal is devoid of merits. 

Bombay High Court

Mohammed Ismail Gulam Shaikh vs Municipal Corporation Of Greater ... on 1 February, 2016

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Whether an order passed by the trial court to issue notice to the defendants and thereby declining to grant ex parte ad interim injunction is appealable?

  Reference must also be made to the recent decision of the Apex Court in A. Venkatasubiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan . In paragraph 19 of the judgment, the Apex Court observed:

"It cannot be contended that the power to pass interim ex parte orders of injunction does not emanates from the said Rule. In fact, the said rule is the repository of the power to grant temporary injunction with or without notice interim or temporary, or till further orders or till disposal of the suit. Hence, any order passed in exercise of the aforesaid powers under Rule 1 would be appealable as indicated in Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. The choice is for the party affected by the order either to move the appellate court or the same court which passed the ex parte order for any relief.

(Underlining supplied) These observations show that Rules 1 and 2 and not the Rule 3 of Order 39 are the repository of the power to grant injunction. The words "any order" used by the Apex Court are significant and thus an appeal would lie even against an order refusing to grant ad interim injunction. It is no doubt true that some observations in paragraph No. 19 of the very judgment do suggest that an appeal against an ex parte ad interim order of injunction would be maintainable if the court does not decide the application finally within 30 days and breaches the mandate of Rule 3A of Order 39. However, those observations must be read in the context and in any event do not limit the earlier observations contained in paragraph No. 11 extracted above.{Para 10}

Bombay High Court

Rajendraprasad R. Singh vs The Municipal Corpn. Of Gr. Bombay ... on 24 January, 2003

Citations: AIR 2003 Bom 392, 2004 (1) BomCR 300, 2003 (3) MhLj 757

Author: D Karnik

Bench: D Karnik

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