As has been discussed above, Section 2(wa), in its definition of “victim”, uses
the phrase “means x and includes y”. While Chattar Singh reasoned that “includes
y” extends the ordinary meaning of the “[means] X”, to cover things that would not
otherwise be covered by an everyday meaning of “X”, it interpreted the two parts of
the definition to include non-overlapping and mutually exclusive categories:
“injury” being limited to the most direct and proximate sufferer of physical harm,
and “legal heirs” covering the heirs entitled to succeed in personal law. A broader
meaning of the word “victim”, encompassing sufferers of emotional harm, would
have necessitated an overlap between the two categories, since it is possible that a
legal heir would also be a “victim”, in the sense of having suffered a proximate
mental injury as a result of the crime. This Court,therefore, does not agree with the
decision in Chattar Singh that a Class II heir can be excluded by a Class I heir, as a
Class II heir may well have suffered “injury” that is emotional/mental, thus bringing
him/her within the definition of “victim” itself. To permit such a victim to be
excluded by a Class I heir would amount to letting those “included” within the
definition, exclude those falling within the ordinary and natural meaning of the word
defined. The Court therefore cannot agree with the analysis in Chattar Singh that
treats the hierarchy of “legal heirs” in personal law as solely determinative of who
may qualify as a “victim” simpliciter, in the absence of which, a victim by inclusion.
Subject to this, we are in agreement with the submissions of the learned Amicus, and
with the judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, that the meaning of “legal
heirs” refers to all heirs designated as such by the relevant personal law, irrespective
of whether or not they are excluded by the lines of succession at any given time.
53. To summarize, the conclusions from the above discussion are:
(i) “victim” in Section 2(wa), by virtue of being defined as “a person who
has suffered any loss or injury” must include a person who has suffered
„harm caused to the mind‟, given that Section 2(y) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure incorporates the definition of “injury” in Section 44 of the IPC
into the Code.
(ii) The “means X and includes Y” clause in Section 2 (wa) cannot be
interpreted so as to result in the included meaning Y excluding the actual
meaning X of the term being defined; thus “legal heirs” who are included
within the definition of the term „victim‟ cannot exclude those who
actually fall within the definition of „victim‟ by virtue of emotional harm
suffered, such as the father or siblings of a deceased victim or other
categories of persons (based on proximity) noted previously .
(iii) The laws of inheritance, which decide one‟s “legal heirs”, are not intended
to be solely determinative of the entitlement to exercise the rights of the
victim, in the criminal trial/appeal, on his/her death, application of
Heydon‟s mischief rule, given that the object of the 2008 Amendment Act
was to ensure the involvement of the victim, who has a presumably
personal interest in the fair and efficient prosecution of the trial/appeal.
Resultantly, it is impermissible for an appellate court to shut out an appeal
by a “legal heir” based only on her/his not being an immediate heir, or
being lower down in hierarchy vis-à-vis entitlement to the crime victim‟s
estate.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment pronounced on: 28.05.2015
CRL.A.1415/2012
RAM PHAL .
V
STATE & ORS.
CORAM:
MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
MS. JUSTICE GITA MITTAL
MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT
Dated;MAY 28, 2015