Madhya Pradesh HC: Whether the owner of vehicle can take the defence that minor child drove the vehicle without his knowledge?

The contention of the owner that the vehicle was driven by his minor brother without his consent or knowledge cannot be accepted as the owner of a vehicle must take adequate care to ensure that only a duly licensed and competent person drives the vehicle.

8. It is often said that responsibility is the silent shadow that follows every act of freedom. In the case of the young, whose impulses race faster than their understanding, that shadow must be guided by the hands of their elders. Thus, upon the elder rests the solemn duty to restrain the minor from venturing into paths not yet meant for their age particularly, the act of driving a vehicle, which demands both maturity and lawful permission. The elder must serve as both guardian and guide, ensuring that the thrill of youth does not overrun the boundaries of safety and law. The minor's safety, and the safety of others, depends upon the vigilance of the elder who understands that care is the truest expression of responsibility.

9. In the present case, both the owner and the driver are real brother. It is inconceivable that the owner was unaware of his brother's use of the vehicle. Even assuming otherwise, the duty to keep the vehicle safe and not accessible to an unlicensed person lies squarely on the owner. Hence, the owner cannot escape liability by merely stating lack of consent.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (JABALPUR BENCH)

Misc. Appeal No. 376 of 2007

Decided On: 10.11.2025

Branch Manager United India Insu. Comp. Vs. Maneesh Kumar Singrore and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Himanshu Joshi, J.

Citation: 2025:MPHC-JBP:57157,MANU/MP/3600/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Madhya Pradesh HC: Negligently Allowing Minor To Drive Without Valid License Is Breach Of Insurance Policy

 In the present case, both the owner and the driver are real brother. It is inconceivable that the owner was unaware of his brother's use of the vehicle. Even assuming otherwise, the duty to keep the vehicle safe and not accessible to an unlicensed person lies squarely on the owner. Hence, the owner cannot escape liability by merely stating lack of consent. {Para 9}

10. Therefore, it is held that there was a fundamental breach of the policy condition by the owner in permitting or negligently allowing a minor to drive the vehicle.

11. The Insurance Company has raised a valid defence that the vehicle was being driven by a person who was not duly licensed. The breach being fundamental and directly contributing to the cause of the accident, the insurer is entitled to be exonerated from liability to indemnify the claimants.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (JABALPUR BENCH)

Misc. Appeal No. 376 of 2007

Decided On: 10.11.2025

Branch Manager United India Insu. Comp. Vs. Maneesh Kumar Singrore and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Himanshu Joshi, J.

Citation: 2025:MPHC-JBP:57157,MANU/MP/3600/2025

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Madhya Pradesh HC: Step father is not liable to maintain his step children

As per the said section, it reveals that the legislative stress is on his wife, his legitimate or illegitimate child or his father or mother. When the stress is on the word 'his', it obviously means that it would include only the person who procreates, begets or brings forth offspring. It will not include a child of another father or mother of another person.

10. In the present case, non-applicant No. 2 is the daughter of 1st marriage of non-applicant No. 1 and not of the applicant, therefore, the Family Court has erred in awarding the maintenance to non-applicant No. 2.

11. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Annu Bala (supra) in para 4 and 5 has held as under:-

"4. Perusal of the relevant provisions referred to above reveal that legislative stress is on his wife, his legitimate or illegitimate child or his father or mother. When the stress is on the word 'his', it obviously means that it would include only the person who procreates, begets or brings forth offspring. It will not include a child of another father or mother of another person. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (JABALPUR BENCH)

Criminal Revision No. 704/2015

Decided On: 05.07.2018

Pradeep Jain Vs. Manjulata Jain Modi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vandana Kasrekar, J.

Citation:MANU/MP/0248/2018.

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Madhya Pradesh HC: Whether District Judge in Miscellaneous civil appeal can entertain application for amendment of plaint?

The appeal before the learned District Judge was one under Order 43, Rule 1 (r), C. P. C. and not a regular appeal. Jurisdiction of the appellate Court while deciding appeal of such a character extends only to examine the validity of an order enumerated in Clause (r) of Order 43, Rule 1, C. P. C., which runs as under :

"An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of Section 104, namely :--

(r) an order under Rule 1, Rule 2, (Rule 2-A), Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order XXXIX."

Accordingly, the scope of such appeal is limited. It extends to adjudication of challenge to an order of grant or refusal of interim injunction as envisaged by Order 43, Rule 1 (r), C. P. C. As such, the learned District Judge has no seisin over the suit as such. He was seized of proceedings for issuance of a temporary injunction in the suit and not of the suit itself. This aspect of the law appears to have been overlooked by the learned District Judge.

As a logical corollary flowing from the aforesaid position of law, it has to be concluded that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for amendment of the plaint submitted before him by the plaintiff-applicant herein. If the applicant herein (plaintiff) chose to submit the application in the appeal preferred by the defendants before the learned District Judge, only courses which would have been adopted by the learned District Judge were (a) to direct the plaintiff to submit the amendment application before the trial Court; and (b) to forward it to the trial Court for decision in accordance with law after deciding the appeal on merits. However, he had no jurisdiction to decide the application for amendment of the plaint on its merits.

 In spite of this, the scope of the appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) is restricted as discussed above to examine the propriety and/or legality of order passed under the various rules of Order 39 referred therein. A distinction has to be made between the scope of regular appeal and a miscellaneous appeal under the aforesaid provision. While deciding the appeal of former character the appellate Court has, on the theory that appeal is continuation of suit, power to allow amendment in the pleadings, but in an appeal of the later type the appellate Court has jurisdiction only to adjudicate upon the correctness or otherwise of order refusing or granting an interim injunction. The position of trial Court in such a situation appears to be different, as the trial Court is in seisin of the suit as well as of application for issuance of a temporary injunction made in the suit. The powers exercisable by an appellate Court while hearing appeals preferred under Order 43, Rule 1 (r) cannot be regarded to extend to allowing amendment of the plaint, as he is not in seisin of the suit as such. 

In the present situation, the word 'proceeding' connotes merely an application for issuance of a temporary injunction and/or its reply. Accordingly, where the plaintiff-applicant moves an application for amendment of the application for issuance of temporary injunction, the appellate Court may be regarded to have jurisdiction to decide it.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

Civil Revn. No. 272 of 1979

Decided On: 25.02.1981

Dhundasingh Vs. Leeladhar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

H.G. Mishra, J.

Citation: 1982 AIR MP 14,1981 SCC ONLINE MP, MANU/MP/0005/1982

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Madhya Pradesh HC: Whether Session court can permit witness to directly produce additional documents during sessions trial at time of recording evidence?

 It is also apparent from the aforesaid provision that it is for the prosecutor only to state by what evidence he/she proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. In such circumstances also, a witness cannot be allowed to bring any new document on record during his testimony. {Para 14}

15. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that it is only the prosecution, who can file an application to produce additional documents, which were gathered prior to or subsequent to the investigation, but such a practice, where a witness produces the document and the prosecution supports such application, cannot be allowed as the same would compromise the sanctity of the trial as envisages under Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In such circumstances, while relying upon the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of R.S.Pai (supra), in case of Sarla Shrivastava (supra)by this court, as also the Bombay High Court in the case of Bhagyashree Prashant Wasankar (supra), the present application is hereby allowed as the application under Section 242 of Cr.P.C. was filed by the witness, which is not envisaged under law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

Misc. Criminal Case No. 46527 of 2023

Sunil Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Subodh Abhyankar, J.

 Decided On: 21.09.2024.

Citation: 2024:MPHC-IND:29173, MANU/MP/3679/2024.

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Madhya Pradesh HC: Under which police papers are not binding on Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for deciding claim petition?

 Thus, it is clear that the claim cases cannot be decided solely only on the basis of documents forming part of police record. The claim cases are to be decided on the basis of material evidence, which is led before the Claims Tribunal. Furthermore, the documents collected during the investigation and the opinion formed by the Investigating Officer is not binding on the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. {Para 6}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (JABALPUR BENCH)

Misc. Petition No. 5892 of 2024

Decided On: 25.10.2024

IFFCO Tokyo General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mamta Bai Lodhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia, J.

Citation: 2024:MPHC-JBP:54034,MANU/MP/3933/2024.

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Digital Privacy vs Fair Trial: High Court's Game-Changing Verdict on WhatsApp Evidence in Family Disputes

 Landmark Ruling Expands Digital Evidence Admissibility in Matrimonial Cases

In a groundbreaking judgment that could reshape how digital evidence is treated in family disputes, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has ruled that WhatsApp chats obtained through surveillance—even without consent—can be admitted as evidence in family court proceedings if they assist in resolving matrimonial disputes.

Case Background: Digital Surveillance in Marriage

The case of Smt. Anjali Sharma vs. Raman Upadhyay (M.P. No. 3395/2023)Decided On: 16.06.2025, involved a marriage that took place on December 1, 2016, with a daughter born in October 2017. Th dispute arose when the husband filed for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, alleging cruelty and adultery.

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Madhya Pradesh HC: Illegally obtained Whatsapp chat is admissible in family court proceeding as per S 14 of Family courts Act

The husband has filed a suit for dissolution of marriage under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on the ground of cruelty. He has also pleaded adultery on the part of wife. In order to prove adultery, in paragraphs 8 & 9 of the plaint, specific pleadings have been made with regard to WhatsApp chat of the wife with a third person. The husband has pleaded that by way of a special application installed in the wife's phone, the WhatsApp chatting of her phone are automatically forwarded to his phone, which shows that the wife is having extramarital affair with a third person.

5. When the suit was at the stage of husband's evidence, he sought to exhibit the WhatsApp chats, to which the wife raised an objection. The learned Family Court has rejected the wife's objection and has allowed the husband to exhibit the WhatsApp chats. Being aggrieved by this order of the Family Court, the instant misc. petition has been filed by wife.

24. The Bombay High Court also dealt with the similar aspect in the case of Deepali Santosh Lokhande v. Santosh Vasantrao reported in MANU/MH/3502/2017 and held as under:

"9. A cumulative reading of section 14 and section 20 of the Family Courts Act, takes within its ambit the restricted applications of the provisions of the Evidence Act qua the documentary evidence which includes electronic evidence, whether or not the same is relevant or admissible, if in the opinion of the Family Court such evidence would assist the Family Court to deal effectively with the matrimonial dispute. Considering the above object and the intention of the legislature, in providing for a departure, from the normal rules of evidence under the Evidence Act, in my opinion, there was no embargo for the learned Judge of the Family Court to accept and exhibit the documents as sought by the petitioner-wife. Ultimately, it is the absolute power and authority of the Family Court either to accept or disregard a particular evidence in finally adjudicating the matrimonial dispute. However, to say that a party would be precluded from placing such documents on record and or such documents can be refused to be exhibited unless they are proved, in my opinion, goes contrary to the object of section 14 of the Family Courts Act."

35. In view of the discussion made above, this court is of the opinion that the Legislature, being fully aware of the principals of admissibility of evidence, has enacted Section 14 in order to expand that principle in so far as disputes relating to marriage and family affairs are concerned. The Family Court is thereby freed of restrictions of the strict law of evidence. The only test under Section 14 for a Family Court to receive the evidence, whether collected legitimately or otherwise, is based upon its subjective satisfaction that the evidence would assist it to deal effectually with the dispute.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (GWALIOR BENCH)

Misc. Petition No. 3395 Of 2023

Decided On: 16.06.2025

Anjali  Vs. Raman 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashish Shroti, J.

Citation:  MANU/MP/1611/2025

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Madhya Pradesh HC: JJ Act Overrides NIA Act, Juvenile Booked Under UAPA To Be Tried By Children's Court not Special Judge, NIA Act

While discussing the juvenile issue, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon (supra) observed that there is no doubt that JJ Act is beneficial in nature and is socially oriented legislation and in case the provisions are not complied with, the object of its enactment would be frustrated. However, while resolving the conflict between the JJ Act, 2000 and TADA Act, 1987, it was observed that Section 1(4) of JJ Act, 2000 was added w.e.f. 22.08.2006 which gave overriding effect over other statutes. However, the other statutes in that case was TADA Act which was not in existence and was repealed much before coming into force of the amendment of 22.08.2006. Since the overriding effect was provided over other statutes and TADA Act stood repealed much before the same, it could not be said that JJ Act, 2000 will have an overriding effect upon the TADA Act. In the present case, both the NIA Act, 2008 and JJ Act, 2015 are in operation. The later in point of time is JJ Act which provides for clear cut non-obstante over any other law for the time being in force whereas Section 13 of the NIA Act provides for non-obstante clause giving an overriding effect only upon the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, this Court is of the view that the JJ Act, 2015 will have an overriding effect over the NIA Act, 2008. {Para 25}

26. On a mature consideration of the above discourse as well as the legal position, especially considering the effect of Section 1(4) of Act, 2015, it is hereby held that when the FIR is registered under a Scheduled Act prescribed under the NIA Act and a juvenile has been directed to be tried as an adult by the Children's Court, then the jurisdiction to try the case would vest in Children's Court and not in the Special Judge under the NIA Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (JABALPUR BENCH)

Misc. Criminal Case No. 1133/2025

Decided On: 19.05.2025

In Reference Vs. Memo No. 454/2024 Bhopal Dated 23/11/2024

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Dwivedi, J.

Citation:  MANU/MP/1475/2025.

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Madhya Pradesh: Under which circumstance motor accident claim appeal is liable to be dismissed on account of non joinder of necessary parties?

Being not satisfied with the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal, the two legal representatives Hemlata and Manisha filed the present appeal joining initially in the array of respondents the third legal representative Smt. Mangala Ben, mother of the deceased as the respondent No. 4. But subsequently on 27-9-1978, the appellants have without good reason decided to delete the name of the third legal representative Mangala Ben from the array of respondents and deleted her name from the array of respondents. But deletion of her name has brought about a serious defect in the appeal inasmuch as all the necessary parties are not joined in the memo of appeal. The appeal, is, therefore, not properly constituted and only on this ground, the appeal must fail. {Para 6}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

Decided On: 23.04.1986

Hemlata Devi and Ors. Vs. Gurudayal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Varma and G.G. Sohani, JJ.

Author: R.K. Varma, J.

Citation: MANU/MP/0225/1986, (1986)2ACC129.

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Madhya Pradesh HC: Electricity Department cannot recover the dues assessed in the name of electricity theft until adjudicated by the Special Court

After hearing learned counsel for the rival parties and going through the provisions of Sections 135 and 154 of the Act, 2003, this Court finds that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, every offence punishable under Section 135 of the Act, 2003 shall be triable by the Special Court. As per Sub Section 5 of Section 154 of the Act, the Special Court is even empowered to determine the civil liability against the consumer or a person in terms of money for theft of energy. Thus, when the

Special Court is very well empowered to determine the civil liability apart from taking any penal action against the person who has committed theft of energy, the authorities could not have usurped such powers and could not had determined the liability and could not have raised a demand of Rs.1,93,561/- vide Annexure P/1 dated 23.07.2022.The aforesaid analogy finds support from the matter of Sangita wd/o Suresh Chandra Gupta and Another Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2009(1) MPLJ 366.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT GWALIOR

WRIT PETITION No. 11729 of 2023

NAVEEN KUMAR JAIN Vs  MADHYA PRADESH.

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE

Dated: 24 th OF FEBRUARY, 2025.

Citation: 2025:MPHC-GWL:3898.

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Under which circumstances the court can release accused on bail relying on metadata of photo submitted by him by taking the plea of alibi?

 It is the submission of learned counsel for the applicant that applicant is suffering in confinement on false pretext. Counsel for the applicant referred the letter dated 28.02.2020 written by Station House Officer, Police Station Nai Saraye, District Ashoknagar addressed to Trial Court and report of Cyber Forensic Lab, Bhopal containing digital forensic examination report dated 12.12.2019 and subsequent report filed by the Cyber Forensic Lab, Bhopal indicates that photograph submitted by the applicant was in support of his innocence on the basis of plea of alibi. From perusal of Metadata of photograph, it is prima facie clear that the present applicant was present at Bakaspur Village Khajuri, Tahsil Badarwas, District Ashoknagar on 02.04.2019 at about 1.34 pm and time of incident is around 1.30 pm - 2.00 pm on the same day at Village Ranga, Tahsil Nai Saraye, District Ashoknagar. The distance of place of incident is around 60 kms.- 70 kms. from the place where applicant was present at 1.34 pm. Such distance can only be covered by the applicant in not less than one hour at least. Therefore, Metadata of photo and report indicate that he was present at that time at a place 60 kms.-70 kms. away from the place of incident and no tampering has been made in photograph.

According to applicant, benefit of doubt so far as grant of bail is concerned be given to him because it is the case of over implication. Applicant has been arrayed as accused on false pretext. He does not bear any criminal record. Confinement amounts to pretrial detention. 

This is the case mainly in respect of digital forensic evidence and Metadata of any photograph is a big tool in the hands of forensic experts to reach to the truth about the exact nature of incident. Trial Courts are expected to scrutinize the said scientific tool with care and deep study so that forensic examination of evidence can be done to its higher standards. Metadata can be very useful especially in cases where plea of alibi is taken by the parties or accused in particular. Photo, Metadata details and report of Digital Forensic Expert should carry due certification as per Evidence Act and other relevant provisions.

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Surendra vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 16 June, 2020.

M Cr. C No. 15796/2020

Author: Anand Pathak

Bench: Anand Pathak

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Madhya Pradesh HC: Revisional power can be exercised only when there exists a manifest illegality in the order or there is a grave miscarriage of justice

Now, the scope of revisional jurisdiction is also required to be ruminated. On this aspect, In Kaptan Singh v. State of M.P., (1997) 6 SCC 185 : AIR 1997 SC 2485, (1997) CCR 109 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered a large number of its earlier judgments, and held that revisional power can be exercised only when “there exists a manifest illegality in the order or there is a grave miscarriage of justice”.{Para 13}

14. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:

“In Its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.

15. In State of A.P. v. Rajagopala Rao, (2000) 10 SCC 338, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:

“The High Court in exercise of its revisional power has upset the concurrent findings of the Courts below without in any way considering the evidence on the record and without indicating as to in what manner the courts below had erred in coming to the conclusion which they had arrived at. The judgment of the High Court contains no reasons whatsoever which would indicate as to why the revision filed by the respondent was allowed. In a sense, it is a non-speaking judgment.”

16. In upshot of the aforesaid prepositions, this Court while using its revisional jurisdiction, has to examine that whether there is a manifest illegality in the judgment of the learned Courts below or there is miscarriage of justice.

 In the High Court of Madhya Pradesh{ Indore Bench}

(Before Prem Narayan Singh, J.)

Rekha Soni  Vs Gopal and Others 

Criminal Revision No. 1274 of 2020

Decided on October 17, 2023, 

Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine MP 3772.

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Whether wife is barred from claiming maintenance Under Domestic violence Act if her application for maintenance U/S 125 of CRPC is rejected by court?

 The law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajnesh Vs. Neha & Another, MANU/SC/0833/2020 : 2021 (2) SCC 324, , it is crystal clear that Hon'ble the Apex Court has in very categorical terms, ordered that maintenance application decided under one statute would not foreclose the claim for maintenance under a different statute. Hon'ble Apex Court has also gone to the extent that even in a case if maintenance is awarded under one of the statutes that by itself would not preclude the claimant from raising another claim application under a different statute claiming maintenance.{Para 18}

19. In light of the aforesaid legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that if, in proceeding under Section 125 of Cr.P.C., the application of wife seeking maintenance is rejected by the Family Court, such wife would not be precluded from claiming maintenance or other monetary remedy under the provisions of the D.V. Act. The reasons assigned by the learned Family Court in rejecting the application under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. have no relevancy to the cases pending before the Courts dealing with the D.V. Act. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

Criminal Revision No. 527 of 2022

Decided On: 02.11.2023

Bhupendra Singh Rajawat and Ors. Vs. Ranjeeta Rajawat

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Prem Narayan Singh, J.

Citation: MANU/MP/3163/2023.

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Whether burden of proof is on the muslim husband to prove that he has given divorce to his wife and how he should prove it?

Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and after perusing the entire record, this Court is of the opinion that in pursuance of definition of divorced woman, it is bounden duty of the husband to prove in Court by adducing cogent and reliable evidence that he had divorced his wife in accordance with Muslim law especially when the wife is not accepting the divorce and denies the factum of giving divorce to her by her husband. Section 2(a) of (The) Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is defined as under:--

"2, Definition.-- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires--

(a) "Divorced woman" means a Muslim woman who married according to Muslim Law, and has been divorced by or has obtained divorce from her husband in accordance with Muslim Law."

In the present case applicant/wife filed an application under Section 125, Cr.PC for grant of maintenance. In reply to this application, non-applicant/husband submitted in Paragraph 2 that in August, 1997, he had given divorce to the applicant/wife according to Muslim Law. Thereafter, he has filed written application on 1-5-1998, in which he has mentioned that he has pronounced oral divorce to his wife and also given divorce in writing before the Trial Court and has no relations with her.  Learned Revisional Court has failed to consider whether the divorce was given in accordance with the Muslim Law. It is pertinent to note that non-applicant/husband neither examined himself in Court as a witness nor given any opportunity to cross-examine to the applicant/wife. He has not examined any other witness in his favour in Court for establishing his case by adducing evidence. As a matter of fact, in the entire case, there is no evidence led by the husband to prove his case. A mere pleading as mentioned in paragraph 2 of his reply or filing an application about pronouncement or declaration of divorce, would not sufficient to establish that non-applicant/husband has given divorce to the applicant/wife in accordance with the Muslim Law as embodied in Section 2(1)(a) of the Muslim Woman Act.

The fact is also very important and noticeable that the wife/applicant served legal notice dated 2-12-1997, Exh. P-1, its acknowledgment is Exh. P-2 by which she demanded maintenance @ Rs. 2,000/- per month. This notice was duly received by the non-applicant/husband and also admitted the receipt of notice in Paragraph 8 of the reply submitted on 2-9-1998. When the non-applicant husband received notice on 2-12-1997, why he had not given intimation of divorce and reply to this notice informing that the applicant/wife was already divorced in the month of August, 97 and as such now she is not entitled for any maintenance except in accordance with the Provisions of Muslim Women Act.

Learned Lower Revisional Court has failed to consider that the non-applicant/husband has failed to establish that applicant/wife has been given divorce by him in accordance with Muslim Law. For this purpose, non-applicant/husband neither examined him in Court nor adduced any evidence. In absence of this, it cannot be said that the applicant/wife acquired status of divorced woman and, therefore, her application under Section 125, Cr.PC was maintainable only from the period of filing the application till the date of giving divorce and for iddat period.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

Criminal Revision No. 341/2001

Decided On: 19.07.2002

Khatunbai  Vs. Gani Khan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.L. Kochar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MP/0316/2002.

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When the court should not reject plaint in suit for specific performance of contract on the ground of limitation?

 Whereas the decision of the Supreme Court in the of Urvashiben

and another vs. Krishnakant Manuprasad Trivedi (supra) is fully

applicable to the case in hand, in which it has been held :-

“12. It is fairly well settled that, so far as the issue of limitation is concerned, it is a mixed question of fact and law. It is true that limitation can be the ground for rejection of plaint in exercise of powers under O.VII R.11(d) of the CPC. Equally, it is well settled that for the purpose of deciding application filed under O.VII R.11 only averments stated in the plaint alone can be looked into, merits and demerits of the matter and the allegations by the parties cannot be gone into. Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes the limitation of three years, for suits for specific performance.

The said Article reads as under :

Suits for Specific Performance 3 Years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice

that performance is refused

13. From a reading of the aforesaid Article, it is clear that when the date is fixed for performance, limitation is three years from such date. If no such date is fixed, the period of three years is to be computed from the date when the plaintiff, has notice of

refusal. When rejection of plaint is sought in an application filed under O.VII R.11, same is to be considered from the facts of each case, looking at the averments made in the plaint, for the purpose of adjudicating such application. As averred in the plaint, it is the case of the plaintiff that even after payment of the entire consideration

amount registration of the document was not made and prolonged on some grounds and ultimately when he had visited the site on 25.05.2017 he had come to know that the same land was sold to third parties and appellants have refused performance of contract. In such event, it is a matter for trial to record correctness or otherwise of

such allegation made in the plaint. In the suits for specific performance falling in the second limb of the Article, period of three years is to be counted from the date when it had come to the notice of the plaintiff that performance is refused by the defendants.

For the purpose of cause of action and limitation when it is pleaded that when he had visited the site on 25.05.2017 he had come to know that the sale was made in favour of third parties and the appellants have refused to execute the Sale Deed in which event same is a case for adjudication after trial but not a case for rejection of plaint under O.VII R.11(d) of CPC.”

7. In the present case, no date or period has been fixed for

performance of the agreement or for execution of sale deed and the plaintiff has come with the case that he was put in possession on the date of agreement of sale and during life time, the vendor Narayandas and after his death the defendant 1 assured the plaintiff to execute the sale deed but first time on 08.11.2021 by way of reply to the notice, he has denied from the agreement. Further, the plaintiff claiming himself to be in possession of the disputed land, has also prayed relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from making interference in possession of the plaintiff.

8. As such, in view of the aforesaid facts and legal position, at thepresent stage of suit, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC and the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT JABALPUR

CIVIL REVISION No. 281 of 2022

BHERU CHANDANI  Vs SHIVKUMAR GUPTA 

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DWARKA DHISH BANSAL

ON THE 3rd OF FEBRUARY, 2023

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Can the Session court take cognizance of the offence as per S 32(2) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act even though the said case is not committed to it?

 In 'The Act of 1940', no where expressly or by necessary implication provides that either the Special Court can take cognizance without the case being committed to it by the competent Magistrate, nor any such provisions is there in 'The Act of 1940' that the Magistrate or for that matter, Chief Judicial Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take cognizance and to pass a committal order. {Para 10}

11. Section 193 of 'The Code', which deals with cognizance of offence by Court of Sessions and is relevant for the present discussions runs as under:

193. Cognizance of offences by Courts of Session.--Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under this Code."

12. Section 193 (Supra) provides, in no uncertain terms, that a Court of Sessions will not take cognizance of an offence as a Court of original jurisdiction, unless the case has been committed to it, except otherwise expressly provided in that regard.

13. Hon'ble the Apex Court, while considering Section 14 of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (as it stood prior to amendment of 2015), in the context of taking cognizance by the Special Court constituted under that Act had an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of Section 193 of 'The Code' Relevant observations made in this regard, which are apposite here and cover the controversy at hand, run as under:

"Section 14 of the Act says that "for the purpose of providing for speedy trial, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for each district a Court of Sessions to be a Special Court to try the offences under this Act". So it is for trial of the offences under the Act that a particular Court of Session in each district is sought to be specified as a Special Court. Though the word "trial" is not defined either in the Code or in the Act it is clearly distinguishable from inquiry. The word "inquiry" is defined in Section 2(g) of the Code as. "every inquiry, other than trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or court". So the trial is distinct from inquiry and inquiry must always be a forerunner to the trial. The Act contemplates only the trial to be conducted by the Special Court. The added reason for specifying a Court of Session as Special Court is to ensure speed for such trial. "Special Court" is defined in the Act as "a Court of Session specified as a Special Court in Section 14", [vide S. 2(1)(d)] Thus the Court of Session is specified to conduct a trial and no other court can conduct the trial of offences under the Act. Why the Parliament provided that only a Court of Session can be specified as a Special Court? Evidently the legislature wanted the Special Court to be Court of Session. Hence the particular Court of Session, even after being specified as a Special Court, would continue to be essentially a Court of Session and designation of it as a Special Court would not denude it of its character or even powers as a Court of Session. The trial in such a court can be conducted only in the manner provided in Chapter XVIII of the Code which contains a fasciculus of provisions for 'Trial before a Court of Session'."

"Section 193 of the Code has to be understood in the aforesaid backdrop. The section imposes an interdict on all Courts of Session against taking cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction. It can take cognizance only if "the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate", as provided in the Code, Two segments have been indicated in Section 193 as exceptions to the aforesaid interdict. One is, when the Code itself has provided differently in express language regarding taking of cognizance, and the second is when any other law has provided differently in express language regarding taking cognizance of offences under such law. The word "expressly" which is employed in Section 193 denoting to those exceptions is indicative of the legislative mandate that a Court of Session can depart from the interdict contained in the section only if it is provided differently in clear and unambiguous terms. In other words, unless it is positively and specifically provided differently no Court of Session can take cognizance of any offence directly, without the case being committed to it by a Magistrate."

14. Here it is noticeable that Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 specifically provides that special Judge under the Act can take cognizance of offence(s) without the accused being committed to him for trial.

15. Likewise, under the SC/ST (PA) Act, 1989 (prior to amendment by Amending Act of 2015), a case triable by Special Court constituted under Section 14 of this Act was required to be committed to the Special Court as held by the Apex Court in Gangula Ashok's case (MANU/SC/0047/2000 : AIR 2000 SC 740) (supra). After the amendment of 2015, a provision has been added in Section 14 of SC/ST (PA) Act, 1989, conferring power on the Special Court to take cognizance of the case without the same being committed to it for trial. A provision identical to one in Sec. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 or Sec. 14 of the SC/ST (PA) Act, 1989 is not there in 'The Act of 1940', therefore, Special Court, constituted under this Act, which is a Sessions Court, cannot take cognizance without the accused being committed to it for trial.

16. In view of Section 193 of 'The Code' as interpreted by Hon'ble the Apex Court in Gangula Ashok's case (MANU/SC/0047/2000 : AIR 2000 SC 740) (supra), the cases (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner have no application in the present case. The special Court constituted under 'The Act of 1940' cannot take direct cognizance, because no enabling provision is there in 'The Act of 1940' in that regard, hence, no fault can be found with the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, committing the case to the special Court. Therefore, the impugned order of for that matter the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate does not suffer from any illegality. In view of the aforesaid, this petition having no force deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)

M. Cri. C. No. 11940 of 2016

Decided On: 10.01.2017

 Kalptaru Medicose  Vs.  Food and Drug Administration

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ved Prakash Sharma, J.

Citation: MANU/MP/0133/2017,2017(1)Drugs cases (DC)204

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Whether Magistrate should commit cases under Drugs and Cosmetics Act after amendment of said Act effective from 10-8-2009?

  In this case, on 10.8.2009, the sample was taken by the respondent,

who is a Drug Inspector of the State and on 22.3.2005 the case was instituted against the petitioners herein. They appeared on 29.8.2007 and the amendment to Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 came into effect from 10.8.2009 according to which the offences under the said Act would only be tried by a Court, not inferior to that of a Court of Sessions. However, in ignorance of the said amendment, the learned Court of J.M.F.C. framed charges on 8.12.2009 for offences U/s.18(a)(i) read with Section 17 and 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetic Act, 1940. In this case, the question involved is not the retrospective application of the amendment, but the continuation of the case before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class after the amendment came into force at which point of time, even the charges were not framed by the Court of the Ld. JMFC. The framing of the charge by the Court of learned J.M.F.C. on 8.12.2009 itself was rendered illegal on account of the amendment having come into force on 10.8.2009 itself. Therefore, all the proceedings before the Ld. JMFC after 10.8.2009, on which date even the charges were not framed by the Court of learned J.M.F.C., were rendered bad in the eyes of law.

Under the circumstances, the impugned order cannot be faulted, as all proceedings from the stage of framing charges onwards had no sanction under the law. Therefore, this petition is disposed of by sustaining the impugned order of committal of the case to the Court of Sessions but as the evidence taken before the Court of learned J.M.F.C. was done much after the amendment came into force and the charges were framed after the coming into force of the amendment, all proceedings before the Court below commencing from the framing of charges are struck down and the trial will commence denovo before the learned Court of Sessions from the stage of framing charges after giving an opportunity to both the petitioners and the prosecution to address the Court on the issue of framing charges.

Madhya Pradesh High Court

M/S Jayram Pharmaceauticals Pvt. ... vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 20 July, 2017

                            MCRC-7419-2017
   

         The present petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this

Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. by the petitioners being aggrieved by the

impugned order dated 17.1.2017 (Annex.A/3) passed by the learned Judicial

Magistrate First Class, Bhopal in R.T. No.2307/2005 whereby he is stated to

have erroneously committed the case to the learned Court of Sessions on the

basis of a retrospective application of the amendment to Section 32 of the

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, which was done 12 years after the institution

of the case and also after recording the evidence of all the material

prosecution witnesses who are 4 in number.

         Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment

passed by this Court in Dwarka Prasad Vs. State of M.P., decided on

30.3.2016 in M.Cr.C. No.11246/2014 by which this Court has held in para 24

that the trial of the case may be said to be in advanced stage where a material

witness/ witnesses have been examined on behalf of the prosecution. This

Court further held that it is not so much the number of the witnesses examined

by the prosecution, but the nature of the evidence given by such

witness/witnesses which would have to be seen. It also held that in a given

case where witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution may not have

deposed to the essential part of the prosecution case or where such evidence

may be formal in character, the case may not be said to be at the advanced

stage of trial. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied heavily upon this

judgment. This judgment was passed while examining the amendment in the

Cr.P.C. whereby offences U/s.467, 468 inter-alia, which were earlier triable by
 the Court of Magistrate, were made triable after the amendment by the Court

of Sessions. In the case examined in Dwarka Prasad (supra), the Court was

concerned with the stage at which the case was after the amendment came

into force. However, in the instant case, on factual aspects, there is a

difference.

         In this case, on 10.8.2009, the sample was taken by the respondent,

who is a Drug Inspector of the State and on 22.3.2005 the case was instituted against the petitioners herein. They appeared on 29.8.2007 and the amendment to Section 32 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 came into effect from 10.8.2009 according to which the offences under the said Act would only be tried by a Court, not inferior to that of a Court of Sessions. However, in ignorance of the said amendment, the learned Court of J.M.F.C. framed charges on 8.12.2009 for offences U/s.18(a)(i) read with Section 17 and 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetic Act, 1940. In this case, the question involved is not the retrospective application of the amendment, but the continuation of the case before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class after the amendment came into force at which point of time, even the charges were not framed by the Court of the Ld. JMFC. The framing of the charge by the Court of learned J.M.F.C. on 8.12.2009 itself was rendered illegal on account of the amendment having come into force on 10.8.2009 itself. Therefore, all the proceedings before the Ld. JMFC after 10.8.2009, on which date even the charges were not framed by the Court of learned J.M.F.C., were rendered bad in the eyes of law.

Under the circumstances, the impugned order cannot be faulted, as all proceedings from the stage of framing charges onwards had no sanction under the law. Therefore, this petition is disposed of by sustaining the impugned order of committal of the case to the Court of Sessions but as the evidence taken before the Court of learned J.M.F.C. was done much after the amendment came into force and the charges were framed after the coming into force of the amendment, all proceedings before the Court below commencing from the framing of charges are struck down and the trial will commence denovo before the learned Court of Sessions from the stage of framing charges after giving an opportunity to both the petitioners and the prosecution to address the Court on the issue of framing charges.

With these directions, the petition is disposed of. C.C. as per rules.

(ATUL SREEDHARAN) JUDGE a

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Supreme Court Guidelines for recording evidence of victim woman of sexual offences

  The legislature has, at places, moulded criminal procedure to enable victims of sexual crimes to seek justice. This has been done in recognition of the gravity of sexual crimes and the need to handle such cases in an appropriately sensitive manner. For instance, Section 327 CrPC provides for in camera trials to be conducted with respect to offences punishable under Sections 376, 376A, 376B, 376C or 376D of the Indian Penal Code 1860. {Para 33}

34. This Court, too, has had its role to play in ensuring that justice does not remain inaccessible. In State of Maharashtra v. Bandu @ Daulat,10 this Court directed that special centres be set up in each state in order to facilitate depositions by vulnerable witnesses, including victims of sexual offences. In Smruti Tukaram Badade v. State of Maharashtra,11 a two-judge bench of this Court (of which one of us, Dr. DY Chandrachud, J. was a part) supplemented the directions issued in Bandu @ Daulat (supra) with respect to setting up such special centres.

35. It is the duty and responsibility of trial courts to deal with the aggrieved persons before them in an appropriate manner, by:

a. Allowing proceedings to be conducted in camera, where appropriate, either under Section 327 CrPC or when the case otherwise involves the aggrieved person (or other witness) testifying as to their experience of sexual harassment / violence;

b. Allowing the installation of a screen to ensure that the aggrieved woman does not have to see the accused while testifying or in the alternative, directing the accused to leave the room while the aggrieved woman’s testimony is being recorded;

c. Ensuring that the counsel for the accused conducts the cross-examination of the aggrieved woman in a respectful fashion and without asking inappropriate questions, especially regarding the sexual history of the aggrieved woman. Cross-examination may also be conducted such that the counsel for the accused submits her questions to the court, who then poses them to the aggrieved woman;

d. Completing cross-examination in one sitting, as far as possible.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No 1184 of 2022 

XYZ Versus State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Coram: DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD; J., J.B. PARDIWALA; J. 

Author: Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.

Dated: August 05, 2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Supreme Court: Hold In-Camera Trial In All Sexual Harassment Cases, Apart From Rape Cases

  The legislature has, at places, moulded criminal procedure to enable victims of sexual crimes to seek justice. This has been done in recognition of the gravity of sexual crimes and the need to handle such cases in an appropriately sensitive manner. For instance, Section 327 CrPC provides for in camera trials to be conducted with respect to offences punishable under Sections 376, 376A, 376B, 376C or 376D of the Indian Penal Code 1860.

34. This Court, too, has had its role to play in ensuring that justice does not remain inaccessible. In State of Maharashtra v. Bandu @ Daulat,10 this Court directed that special centres be set up in each state in order to facilitate depositions by vulnerable witnesses, including victims of sexual offences. In Smruti Tukaram Badade v. State of Maharashtra,11 a two-judge bench of this Court (of which one of us, Dr. DY Chandrachud, J. was a part) supplemented the directions issued in Bandu @ Daulat (supra) with respect to setting up such special centres.

35. It is the duty and responsibility of trial courts to deal with the aggrieved persons before them in an appropriate manner, by:

a. Allowing proceedings to be conducted in camera, where appropriate, either under Section 327 CrPC or when the case otherwise involves the aggrieved person (or other witness) testifying as to their experience of sexual harassment / violence;

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No 1184 of 2022 

XYZ Versus State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Coram: DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD; J., J.B. PARDIWALA; J. 

Author: Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.

Dated: August 05, 2022.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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