Whether petition U/S 482 of CRPC is maintainable under Domestic violence Act?

In Manish Tandon (supra), challenge before the High Court was to an ex-parte order granting interim maintenance to the wife under Section 23(2) of the Act. Bypassing the remedy of Section 29 of the Act, a Petition was filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Court held as under:-

"I totally and absolutely disagree with the aforesaid contention of Mr. Sharma. The word 'order' used in Section 29 connotes all types of orders passed by the Magistrates under the 2005 Act including orders granting interim maintenance under Sub Section (1) of Section 23 as well as ex-parte interim maintenance granted under Sub-Section (2) of Section 23. Since the word 'order' has not been qualified by any suffix or prefix in Section 29, the clear legislative intent is that each and every type of order, irrespective of its description and nature, passed by a Magistrate has been made appealable to the court of Session Judge under Section 29. The remedy of filing an appeal under Section 29, therefore, being an attentive and equally efficacious remedy, this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was not at all maintainable. It was not open to the Petitioner to have bypassed the appeal forum by straightway approaching this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that on the ground of availability of an alternative and efficacious remedy of appeal under Section 29 (supra), this petition is not maintainable in this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C."

33. It was vehemently argued by Ms. Rajkotia that since the matter relates to custody of minor girls, remedy of appeal is not efficacious. I am afraid that this Court cannot accept this argument for more than one reason. Legislature in its wisdom has provided for Appeal under Section 29 of the Act against all 'orders' and has not made any exception to orders relating to custody. Secondly, it is not shown why the Petitioner cannot resort to the remedy of an Appeal and why the Appellate Court is incapable of or incompetent to exercise its jurisdiction to deal with an impugned order of temporary custody, both in law and facts. As held in Manish Tandon (supra), the word 'Order' used in Section 29 of the Act connotes all types of Orders passed by the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate irrespective of whether they relate to maintenance, custody, etc.

34. For all the aforesaid reasons, the present petition cannot be entertained. It is open to the Petitioner to avail the remedy of Appeal available to her in law, if so advised.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Crl. M.C. 1554/2020 and Crl. M.A. 8821/2020

Decided On: 20.07.2020

Sirisha Dinavahi Bansal  Vs.  Rajiv Bansal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jyoti Singh, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1388/2020

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Whether son is liable to pay medical expenses to his mother under domestic violence Act?

In this case there is no dispute that petitioner No. 1 Ganesh was liable to pay maintenance and he would also be liable to incur medical expenses as mentioned in Section 20(1)(b) of the Domestic Violence Act. However, so far as petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned, under Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, as grandsons they would have been liable to pay maintenance under Section 22(1) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, provided their father had not been alive. When the father of petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 is alive and is capable of paying maintenance, Section 22(1) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, will not be applicable and under Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, petitioner No. 1 would be liable to pay maintenance to his mother i.e. respondent No. 2. As per Section 20 (b) of the Domestic Violence Act, the maintenance includes even medical attendance and treatment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 892 of 2009

Decided On: 10.02.2010

 Ganesh and Ors. Vs.  The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.R. Borkar, J.

Citation:  2010   (112)   BOMLR   1082

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Whether proceeding under domestic violence Act can be initiated against relatives of dead person?

 It is thus, obvious that the Applicant /Respondent No.1
was   under   obligation   to  prima   facie  demonstrate   that   she   had
relationship with the deceased in the nature of marriage.  If that was
lacking in the application, learned Magistrate could not have issued
notices to the petitioners.  In my considered opinion the Respondent
No.1 has failed to show from her application that she had relationship
with the deceased in the nature of marriage.  I have therefore, came to
the conclusion that no case was made out for issuing notices to the
Petitioners.  
19. There is another aspect which needs to be considered in
the present petitions.   The word, ''respondent'' has been defined in
section 2(q) of the Act as under :
“(q) “respondent” means any adult male person who

is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the
aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved
person has sought any relief under this Act:”
20. In the present case deceased Rajesh Khanna was the adult
male person with whom Respondent No.1 claimed to have  domestic
relationship.     The   petitions   under   section   12   of   the   Act   are   filed
against the Petitioners in the Court of Magistrate by virtue of proviso
to section 2 (q) of the Act which runs as under :­
“Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living
in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may
also   file   a   complaint   against   a   relative   of   the
husband or the male partner.”
21. No   doubt   the   present   Petitioners   are   relatives   of   the
deceased Rajesh Khanna. The question which arises for determination
is as to whether the present proceedings could have been filed against
them by taking advantage of the above stated proviso to section 2 (q)
of the Act.  It is admitted position that the Petitioners had never been
staying in the shared household  with the respondent no. 1.   The
Petitioner   No.1   Dimple   Jatin   Khanna   has   been   admittedly   staying
away from the bungalow 'Ashirwad' since last many years.  Petitioner
No.2 Twinkle Khanna is married and she is staying with her husband
petitioner no. 3 in her matrimonial house at Gandhi Gram Road, Juhu,

Mumbai.   As such, briefly stated, the Petitioners had never shared
common household with the Respondent No.1.  Grievance, if any, of
Respondent   No.1   could   have   been   against   the   deceased   Rajesh
Khanna.     Had   the   deceased   been   alive   at   the   time   of   filing   of
complaint and had the Petitioners living together with the deceased,
probably, there could have been a cause for Respondent No.1 to file a
complaint under section 12 of the Act against the petitioners.   The
proceedings of present nature could not have been filed against the
Petitioners  only  because they are  relatives  of  the  deceased Rajesh
Khanna.
22. In my opinion, this is a fit case where this Court shall
exercise powers under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.4196 OF 2012

Dimple Rajesh Khanna @ Mrs.
Dimple Khanna V Anita Advani 

CORAM:­M.L. TAHALIYANI, J.

Dated : 9th APRIL, 2015.

Citation:2016 ALLMR(CRI)3748 bom

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Whether complaints under Domestic Violence Act can be quashed invoking Section 482 CrPC?

 In view of the aforesaid observations and
discussion, the following conclusions:
(i) The provisions of the Act provide for remedial
measures for civil rights of women but the machinery
provided is through criminal court.
(ii) Initiation of proceedings under Section 12 or 18 or
19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 31 of the Act would begin
only when the Magistrate has passed any judicial order
including of issuance of notice for hearing.
(iii) Any person affected by any proceedings under the
Act, prior to initiation of proceedings under Section 12 of
the Act may prefer Special Criminal Application under
Article 226 of the Constitution if as per him, the
proceedings are beyond the scope and ambit of the Act
or without any authority in law. But this Court, while
entertaining the petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution may decline entertainment of the petition by

way of self-imposed restriction in exercise of the judicial
powers or may decline entertainment of the petition in
exercise of its sound judicial discretion.
(iv) Once proceedings are initiated under Section 12 or
18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 31 either
independently or jointly on account of any judicial order
passed by the learned Magistrate including issuance of
notice, such proceedings shall be governed by the Code
of Criminal Procedure coupled with the power of the
Court under Section 28(2) to lay down its own procedure
for disposal of an application under Section 12 or under
sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act.
(v) Once the applicability of the Code of Criminal
Procedure has started on account of any judicial order
passed by the learned Magistrate including issuance of
notice either under Section 12 or 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or
22 or 23 or 31 of the Act independently or jointly,
remedial measures to the aggrieved person as provided
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be said
as available. But the higher forum under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, may be the Court of Session or the

High Court, may decline entertainment of such
proceedings considering the facts and circumstances of
the case and as per the settled principles of law and in
accordance with law.
(vi) The aforesaid remedial measures provided under
the Code of Criminal Procedure would also include the
powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Code, but
the Court may, in a given case, decline entertainment of
the petition when there is express remedy provided
under the Code of Criminal Procedure or no case is made
out to prevent the abuse of process of any Court, or no
case is made out to secure the ends of justice.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CRIMINAL REFERENCE NO. 6 of 2015
IN
SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5313 of 2015


SUO MOTU. Vs  USHABEN KISHORBHAI MISTRY

CORAM: THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR.
JAYANT PATEL and MR.JUSTICE N.V.ANJARIA

 Date : 27/11/2015

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