Allahabad HC has deprecated filing of multiple non-compulsive litigation for maintenance by wife when she is unable to maintain herself

On the one hand, the petitioner claims that she is unable to maintain herself and she cannot afford to purchase even the basic necessities for survival and on the other hand, she is multiplying non-compulsive litigation against her husband. The petitioner had filed an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and a complaint under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act claiming maintenance. Although she had a legal right to institute numerous proceedings claiming maintenance under various statutory provisions but when she claims to be unable to maintain herself and afford even the basic necessities for survival, it does not appear to be proper to multiply non-compulsive litigation. Further, non filing of the suit for restitution of conjugal rights or divorce indicates that the petitioner is interested only in claiming maintenance from her husband before various fora and not in settling her disputes either way by restitution of her matrimonial status or by dissolution of her marriage. {Para 9}

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

LUCKNOW

MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 4292 of 2026

Shashi Gupta Vs State Of U.P. 

Coram: HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Citation: 2026 AHC LKO 55690.

Dated: August 11, 2026

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Bombay HC: Senior citizen can not use senior citizens Act to evict daughter in law from residence granted to her as per domestic violence Act

Senior Citizens - Eviction of daughter-in-law - Legality of - Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (Act of 2007) - Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (D.V. Act) - Present petition filed to challenge orders of Sub Divisional Officer and Appellate Authority, which rejected petitioner's application for eviction of his daughter-in-law from "Writ House" - Whether proceedings under Act of 2007 can be used to circumvent a subsisting residence protection order granted under D.V. Act - Held, petitioner's attempt to evict daughter-in-law and minor granddaughters via summary procedure under Act of 2007 was a mala fide effort to bypass judicial protection orders already upheld by High Court - Court observed that petitioner, who owns multiple properties, fabricated a narrative of homelessness to justify eviction - Court held that provisions of Act of 2007 cannot be weaponized to defeat a woman's right to residence in a shared household under D.V. Act - Harmonious construction of both statutes is required, and Act of 2007 cannot be used as a "proxy" to facilitate marital disputes or harass protected parties - Impugned orders of lower authorities were found to be legally sound and justified - Petition dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 50,000/-.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 11433 of 2023

Decided On: 13.08.2026

Devba Pauladsing Girase Vs. Kavita Himmatsing Girase and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ajit B. Kadethankar, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/5559/2026

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Narrower Than It Looks: Why DV Act territorial Jurisdiction Is Tighter Than Section 125 CrPC"

 

A recurring battleground in matrimonial litigation is the courtroom itself — quite literally, which court has the power to hear the case. A recent appellate order arising out of a Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA) proceeding throws sharp light on why the territorial jurisdiction clause under the DV Act is drafted narrower than its cousin provision for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). Litigants, and even trial courts, often assume the two provisions operate identically. They do not, and the difference can determine whether an application survives a preliminary objection or collapses at the threshold.

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Supreme Court direct that in a subsequent maintenance proceeding, the applicant shall disclose the previous maintenance proceeding, and the orders passed therein

 Directions on overlapping jurisdictions

It is well settled that a wife can make a claim for maintenance under different statutes. For instance, there is no bar to seek maintenance both under the D.V. Act and Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., or under H.M.A. It would, however, be inequitable to direct the husband to pay maintenance under each of the proceedings, independent of the relief granted in a previous proceeding. If maintenance is awarded to the wife in a previously instituted proceeding, she is under a legal obligation to disclose the same in a subsequent proceeding for maintenance, which may be filed under another enactment. While deciding the quantum of maintenance in the subsequent proceeding, the civil court/family court shall take into account the maintenance awarded in any previously instituted proceeding, and determine the maintenance payable to the claimant.

To overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings, we direct that in a subsequent maintenance proceeding, the applicant shall disclose the previous maintenance proceeding, and the orders passed therein, so that the Court would take into consideration the maintenance already awarded in the previous proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount. If the order passed in the previous proceeding requires any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the concerned court in the previous proceeding.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 730 OF 2020

RAJNESH  Vs  NEHA & Anr

Dated: November 4, 2020.

Citation: MANU/SC/0833/2020 : (2021) 2 SCC 324

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Karnataka HC: Financially Independent Wife Earning More Than Husband Can't Claim Maintenance Merely Because She Is A Woman

 Only because a woman more particularly a wife files

a petition invoking the provisions of Domestic Violence Act or

the provisions of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act or the

provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, where

the right to claim maintenance is recognized, the Courts cannot

straight away pass an order awarding some amount towards

maintenance payable by the husband. When the wife is

financially sound and in case where the income of the wife is

more than that of the husband and where no other liabilities are

found on part of the wife, like looking after the children, Courts

should not be inclined to pass an order granting maintenance on

the ground that women are required to be maintained by men

or wife is required to be maintained by her husband. It should

be borne in mind that only when it is shown that the wife has no

financial sources to maintain herself according to the standards

of her husband, then only Courts are required to award

maintenance either interim or final. {Para 9}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

WP No. 2327 of 2026

DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026

SRI RAVI S @ JEEVAN S., Vs SMT. SAHANA DEVI A.,

CORAM: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA

Citation: NC: 2026:KHC:30140

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THE SILENT APPEAL: Why a Judge Cannot Enhance Maintenance When the Wife Doesn’t Fight Back

 

A Domestic Violence Law Deep Dive for Judicial Officers and Legal Practitioners

Introduction: The Paradox of Appellate Justice

Imagine this: A wife receives ₹4,000 per month maintenance. She’s satisfied. But her husband appeals, saying it’s too much. The question that haunts appellate judges across India is this: Can I increase the wife’s maintenance while hearing the husband’s appeal to reduce it—even though she hasn’t asked me to?

The answer lies in one of appellate law’s most profound yet overlooked principles: You cannot appeal for someone else.

This article explains why—and why this principle matters more than you think for the future of domestic violence jurisprudence in India.

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When Property Disputes Wear a Domestic Violence Mask: How Clever Pleading is Weaponizing the DV Act Against Judicial Integrity

A Critical Analysis on Scope Enlargement, Abuse of Process, and Judicial Safeguards

INTRODUCTION: THE NEW FRONTIER OF LEGALMISADVENTURE

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) was enacted with a noble purpose: to provide swift, summary remedies to women suffering from domestic violence within the family sphere. However, like every powerful legal instrument, it has begun to attract misuse—not necessarily by desperate women, but by clever advocates and litigants who have discovered that a property dispute, when dressed up as “economic abuse,” can slip past judicial scrutiny and transform a civil court matter into a criminal court proceeding with alarming efficiency.

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Supreme Court: DV Act Alteration, Modification Or Revocation Of Order Owing To A Change in Circumstances Could Only Be For A Period Ex Post Facto

 Learned counsel for the appellant rightly contended that

the said order has in fact merged with the Appellate Court’s

order in the appeal filed by the respondent which was

dismissed on the ground of delay and there being no further

challenge to the said order. In fact, the order dated

23.02.2015 has attained finality. Therefore, there cannot be

a setting aside of the order dated 23.02.2015 for the period

prior to such an application for revocation being made.

Unless there is a change in the circumstance requiring

alteration, modification or revocation of the earlier order

owing to a change occurring subsequent to the order being

passed, the application is not maintainable. Thus, the

exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of Section 25 of

the Act cannot be for setting aside of an earlier order merely

because the respondent seeks setting aside of that order,

particularly when the said order has attained finality by its

merger with an appellate order as in the instant case unless a

case for its revocation is made out. Secondly, the prayers

sought for by the respondent herein are for refund of the

entire amount of maintenance that was paid prior to the

application under sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act

being filed and the order dated 23.02.2015 passed in

Criminal Miscellaneous No.6/2014 being in fact revoked. The

revocation of an order, inter alia, under Section 12 of the Act

sought by a party cannot relate to a period prior to such an

order being passed. We find that in the instant case the

second prayer was not at all maintainable inasmuch as we

have already observed that any alteration, modification or

revocation of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act

owing to a change in circumstances could only be for a period

ex post facto, i.e., post the period of an order being made in a

petition under Section 12 of the Act and not to a period prior

thereto. Thus, such an application for alteration, modification

or revocation filed under sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the

Act cannot relate to any period prior to the order being

passed, inter alia, under Section 12 of the Act. {Para 17}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

S VIJIKUMARI  Vs  MOWNESHWARACHARI 

Author: NAGARATHNA, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 732.

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Supreme Court: Void divorce Decree requires a Formal Declaration by a Competent Court; it can not be challenged in collateral proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act

Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup and Ors.   MANU/SC/0238/2009 : (2009) 6 SCC 194.

From the above, it is evident that even if a decree is void ab initio, declaration to that effect has to be obtained by the person aggrieved from the competent court. More so, such a declaration cannot be obtained in collateral proceedings.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1635 of 2011.

Decided On: 23.08.2011

Inderjit Singh Grewal Vs. State of Punjab and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P. Sathasivam and B.S. Chauhan, JJ.

Author: B.S. Chauhan, J.

Citation: (2011) 12 SCC 588,MANU/SC/0988/2011.

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Punjab & Haryana HC: Can the applicant take recourse to the Domestic Violence Act proceedings to enforce her property rights?

 It needs to be clarified here that resort to Domestic Violence Act can not be done to enforce property rights as for enforcement of property right the parties are supposed to approach the Civil Court. Resort to Domestic Violence Act can only be done where there is urgent requirement of the wife of maintenance or residence because of domestic violence and she has been rendered home less or has lost source of maintenance. In this case the husband had pleaded that he was giving monthly maintenance and the wife had refused to accept the same. The Magistrate shall consider all these aspect and consider the domestic incident report and contents of the application and then proceed with the case in accordance with law. {Para 23}

 In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh

(Before Anita Chaudhry, J.)

Crl. Misc. No. M-24058 of 2014

Om Parkash Syngal and others Vs Shimla Garg .

Citation: 2015 SCC OnLine P&H 16071 : 2016 Cri LJ 3111 : (2016) 3 RCR (Cri) 310 : (2016) 3 RCR (Civil) 225 : (2016) 1 HLR 362

Decided on December 1, 2015.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Punjab & Haryana HC: What remedies are available if violence is committed against an aggrieved woman by any relative of her husband, if not residing with her in a shared household?

 Domestic relationship continues so long as the parties live under the same roof and enjoy living together in a shared household. However, where the living together has been given up and a separate household is established and belongings are removed, domestic relationship comes to an end and a relationship of being relatives of each other survives. This is very normal in families that a person whether, a male or a female attains self sufficiency completes the education or otherwise or take up a job outside and lives in some other city or country, he or she cannot be said to have domestic relationship with the persons whom they have left behind. His relationship of that of a brother and sister, father and son, father and daughter, father and daughter-in-law etc. survives but the domestic relationship of living in a joint household would not survive & comes to an end. {Para 17}

18. The purpose of the Act is to give remedy to the aggrieved persons against domestic violence. The domestic violence can take place only when one is living in shared household with the respondents. The acts of abuses, emotional, economic or physical if committed when one is living in the same shared household constitutes domestic violence. However, such acts of violence can be committed even otherwise when one is living separate. When such acts of violence take place when one is living separate, these may be punishable under different provisions of IPC or other penal laws, but, they cannot be covered under Domestic Violence Act. One has to make distinction between violence committed on a person living separate in a separate household and the violence committed on a person living in the shared household.

 In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh

(Before Anita Chaudhry, J.)

Crl. Misc. No. M-24058 of 2014

Om Parkash Syngal and others Vs Shimla Garg .

Citation: 2015 SCC OnLine P&H 16071 : 2016 Cri LJ 3111 : (2016) 3 RCR (Cri) 310 : (2016) 3 RCR (Civil) 225 : (2016) 1 HLR 362

Decided on December 1, 2015.

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Punjab and Haryana HC: Domestic violence Act proceeding against persons not residing in shared household is not maintainable

Respondent has filed the complaint under the Act. Admittedly, petitioners are not residing in the matrimonial home of the respondent. {Para 4}

6. A combined reading of the above definitions reveals that an 'aggrieved person' is a woman, who is in a domestic relationship with the respondent and has been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. 'Domestic relationship' would mean a relationship between two persons, who live or have at any point of time lived together in a shared household. 'Shared household' means a household where the person aggrieved lives at any stage in a domestic relationship either singly or along with respondent. The respondent has, thus, never resided with the petitioners in the household along with her husband to constitute an offence under the Act against the petitioners.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

Criminal Misc. No. M-22385 of 2011 (O&M)

Decided On: 11.10.2012

Girish and Ors. Vs. Poonam

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sabina, J.

Citation:  MANU/PH/2999/2012.

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Supreme Court: Whether applicant in domestic violence Act proceeding can add any person as party to the petition if they are not residing with her in shared household?

The High Court has rightly found in effect that the ingredients of domestic violence are wholly absent in this case. The Petitioner and the Respondents are not persons living together in a shared household. There is a vague allegation that the Respondents are family members. There is not a whisper of the Respondents with the Petitioner. They appear to be neighbours.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition (Criminal)... Diary No. 34053/2019

Date of Order: 04.10.2019

Kamlesh Devi Vs. Jaipal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Indira Banerjee and M.R. Shah, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SCOR/36609/2019.

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Supreme Court : Impleading distant relatives and strangers in domestic violence proceeding is impermissible

 In the petition filed by Respondent No. 2, apart from arraying her husband and her parents-in-law as parties to the proceedings, has included all and sundry, as Respondents. To say the least, she has even alleged certain actions said to have been done by the tenant whose name is not even known to her. {Para 3}

4. In a matter of this nature, we are of the opinion that the High Court at least should have directed that the petition filed by Respondent No. 2 be confined to her husband as also her parents-in-law and should not have allowed the impleadment of Respondent Nos. 4 to 12.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 43 of 2013 (SLP (Crl.) No. 8522 of 2010)

Decided On: 07.01.2013

Ashish Dixit and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

H.L. Dattu and C.K. Prasad, JJ.

Citation: (2013) AIR SC 1077,MANU/SC/0156/2013.

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When Vagueness Breeds Litigation: The Imperative for Judicial Clarity in Educational Expense Orders Under the PWDV Act

 Abstract

Recent judicial developments have highlighted a critical gap in domestic violence jurisprudence: the enforcement challenges arising from vague court orders regarding educational expenses. This article examines a landmark appellate decision that established stringent documentation requirements and specificity standards for educational expense claims under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDV Act), 2005. The judgment reinforces the principle that judicial orders must be "clear, specific and enforceable" to prevent abuse of process and unnecessary litigation.

Introduction

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From Vague Orders to Concrete Justice: How Courts Should Decide Educational Expenses of child under the Domestic Violence Act?

 

Introduction

The question of educational expenses for children in maintenance proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act (DV Act) has become a vital issue for Indian families, advocates, and judges. Vague or non-specific court orders can make enforcement difficult and breed unnecessary litigation. Recent judgments from the Supreme Court and Bombay High Court have clarified the path for quantifying and awarding such expenses, stressing the necessity of documentary proof and judicial reasoning.

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Kerala HC: Appellate courts U/S 29 of Domestic Violence Act have the power to pass interim protective orders

 It is true that, as per Section 28 of the DV Act, all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, ‘the Cr. P.C.’ hereinafter). Even though Section 29 of the DV Act not specifically mentioned in Section 28, appeal provided under Section 29 of the DV Act is against orders passed under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the DV Act. If so, the provisions of the Cr. P.C. is not excluded in an appeal filed under Section 29 of the DV Act, even though the provisions of the DV Act not given specific powers to the appellate court to grant interim orders. When a statute gives power to an appellate court to decide a matter in issue after reappreciating the evidence to set aside, vary or confirm the order, the appellate court should have the power to regulate the proceedings of the appeal till its disposal. If so, the appellate court if held to be lacking power to pass interim orders, the plight of the party who succeeds in the appeal will be in trouble. If so, it is difficult to lay down a ratio that the appellate court dealing with the appeal under Section 29 of the Act, has no power to pass an interim order, since the said power is not conferred by the DV Act. On the contrary, the appellate court can pass interim orders to regulate and to proceed with the appeal to do complete justice in between the parties, during the pendency of appeal, by resroting to the provisions of the Cr. P.C. or by resorting to its incidental or ancillary power embodied in the appellate jurisdiction following the principle embodied in the maxim ‘ubi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest’ (Where anything is conceded, there is conceded also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist.). Therefore, negativing the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is held that, an appellate court dealing with an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, is empowered to grant interim order/interim orders during pendency of an appeal to regulate the proceedings till disposal of the appeal on merits and to do justice between the parties. {Para 10}

 In the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam

(Before A. Badharudeen, J.)

Farsana P.S. and Another  Vs Razveen Raffique 

CRL.MC No. 6782 of 2024

Decided on October 14, 2024

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6055

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Custody Law Crossroads: Why DV Act Can’t Replace Guardianship Proceedings

 Imagine a mother seeking to take her child abroad for over two years for studies or work—but doing so without the father’s consent and through a petition under the Domestic Violence Act (D.V. Act). Sounds like a tricky situation? The recent court ruling has made it clear why such cases can’t be decided lightly or through interim orders.

What Is Section 21 of the Domestic Violence Act?

Section 21 is all about temporary custody—a quick, protective measure given by a Magistrate to keep a child safe during ongoing domestic violence proceedings. It’s designed to step in fast, not to decide complex long-term custody battles.

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Study guide on Domestic Violence Act

 Key Definitions You Must Know

Aggrieved Person: Any woman who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and alleges domestic violence.

Respondent: Any adult male person who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person.

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J & K HC: Magistrate issuing notice in Domestic violence Act is interlocutory order and Revision is not maintainable against said order

 An order issuing notice on an application does not decide the rights of the parties, therefore, such an order is interlocutory in nature. Such orders are passed by a Court to manage the proceedings without finally determining the rights of the parties. An interlocutory order is used to address procedural matters and it does not decide the rights of the parties conclusively. Therefore, such an order is not amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the superior court. In fact sub section (2) of Section 438 of BNSS creates a statutory bar for exercising revisional powers in relation to any interlocutory order. Thus the revisional court has rightly refused to entertain the revision petition filed by the petitioners. {Para 7}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT SRINAGAR

CRM (M) No. 261/2025

Decided On: 21.05.2025

Aamina and Ors. Vs. Aamir Ahmad Mir and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Dhar, J.

Citation:  MANU/JK/0358/2025.

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