Whether complaint U/S 498A of IPC can be filed by father of aggrieved woman?

Section 498A provides for an offence when husband or the relative of the husband, subject her to cruelty. There is nothing in Section 498A, which may indicate that when a woman is subjected to cruelty, a complaint has to be filed necessarily by the women so subjected. A perusal of Section 498A, as extracted above, indicates that the provision does not contemplate that complaint for offence under Section 498A should be filed only by women, who is subjected to cruelty by husband or his relative. We, thus, are of the view that complaint filed by respondent No.2, the father of Vanshika cannot be said to be not maintainable on this ground. We, thus, reject the submission of the counsel for the appellant that complaint filed by respondent No.2 was not maintainable.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.594 of 2019

RASHMI CHOPRA  Vs  THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 

Coram: ASHOK BHUSHAN J.

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Whether departmental enquiry can be initiated against judicial officer in absence of complaint on affidavit?

In the context of the challenge raised in the above Petitions, the issue that
arises is as regards the power of the Disciplinary Authority in the instant case
being the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, the Hon'ble Judges of this Court to
institute the disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner. There can be no

dispute about the fact that the Maharashtra Civil Services Rules are applicable.
A useful reference could be made to Rule 8(1) and (2) of the said Rules which
are relevant for the purpose of the present Petition:
8. Procedure for imposing major penalties:(
1)
No order imposing any of the major penalties
shall be made except after an inquiry held, as far
as may be, in the manner provided in this rule
and Rule 9, or where such inquiry is held under
the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of
1850) in the manner provided in that Act.
(2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the
opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into
the truth of any imputation of misconduct or
misbehaviour against a Government servant, it
may itself inquire into, or appoint under this rule
or under the provisions of the Public Servants
(Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, an
authority to inquire into the truth thereof.
Provided that, where there is a complaint of
sexual harassment within the meaning of Rule 22A
of Maharashtra Civil Services (Conduct) Rules
1979, the Complaints Committee established in
each Department or Office for inquiring into such
complaints, shall be deemed to be the inquiring
authority appointed by the disciplinary authority
for the purpose of these rules and the Complaints
Committee shall hold, if separate procedure has
not been prescribed for the Complaints
Committee for holding the inquiry into the
complaints for sexual harassments, the inquiry as
for as practicable in accordance with the
procedure laid down in these rules.
ExplanationWhere
a disciplinary authority
itself holds an inquiry under this rule, any
reference to an inquiring authority in this rule
shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be
construed as reference to the disciplinary
authority.

A reading of the said Rule 8(2) therefore discloses that the
discretion is of the Disciplinary Authority if it is of the opinion that there are
grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or
misbehaviour against a Government servant. Hence the said Rule (2) can be
said to confer a wide discretion in the Disciplinary Authority in the matter of
inquiring into the truth of any misconduct or misbehaviour against the
Government servant.
12 Now coming to the guide lines which have been formulated by the
Hon'ble The Chief Justice of India which are comprised in the letter dated 3102014
they read thus:A.
The complaint making allegations against
members of the Subordinate Judiciary in the
States should not be entertained and no action
should be taken thereon, unless it is accompanies
by a duly sworn Affidavit and verifiable material
to substantiate the allegations made therein.
B. If action on such complaint meeting the
above requirement is deemed necessary,
authenticity of complaint should be duly
ascertained and further steps thereon should be
taken only after satisfaction of the competent
authority designated by the Chief Justice of the
High Court.
C. If the above requirements are not complied
with, the complaint should be filed/lodged
without taking any steps thereon.

The said guidelines were modified and communicated vide letter
dated 1632017
issued by the Hon'ble The Chief Justice Of India. The
modification carried out which is relevant for the purposes of the present
Petition is in clause (A). The modified clause (A) reads thus:
A. The complaint making allegations against
members of the Subordinate Judiciary in the
States should not be entertained and no action
should be taken thereon, unless it is accompanied
by a duly sworn Affidavit and/or verifiable
material to substantiate the allegations made
therein.
(emphasis supplied)
13 Hence by modification the requirement is that a complaint should
be accompanied by duly sworn affidavit and/or verifiable material to
substantiate the allegations made therein. Hence a complaint can be
entertained in two contingencies one is when a complaint is accompanied by a
duly sworn affidavit and second is when the complaint contains verifiable
material. It is in the light of the said modification that the instant case would
have to be considered. The said modification being in the matter of the
procedure which is required to be followed prior to holding a Departmental
Enquiry, the same would obviously relate back to the date of issuance of the
show cause notice, even if the notice is prior to the issuance of the
modification.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.643 OF 2017

Asif Badremunir Tahasildar Vs. State of Maharashtra 

CORAM :R. M. SAVANT, &
SARANG V KOTWAL, JJ

PRONOUNCED ON : 4th MAY, 2018
Citation: 2018(6) MHLJ 850
JUDGMENT (PER R.M.SAVANT J.)

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Whether prima facie case can be made out against accused on basis of material other than complaint?

Looking into the allegations made in the complaint, so far as assault on the deceased is concerned, there is an averment that the petitioner assaulted the deceased on her right cheek/neck. It is no doubt true that in the complaint, there is no mention that the petitioner assaulted the deceased with a stone. But complaint is not an encyclopedia. Looking to the statement of eyewitness Smt. Sumithra W/o Sanadi, she has clearly stated in her statement that the present petitioner assaulted the deceased with a stone, then she fell down unconscious.

8. I have also perused the medical opinion given by the doctor regarding the cause of death. Considering these materials placed on record, I am of the opinion that prosecution has placed prima facie material so far as the involvement of the present petitioner in committing the alleged offence. Therefore, it is not a fit case to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner.

In the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru

(Before Budihal R.B., J.)

Balaraj S/o Hurdayaraj Chinnappa,v. The State, 

Criminal Petition No. 5331 of 2017

Decided on October 9, 2017

Citation: 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 2451

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Whether complaint under DV Act is maintainable in absence of specific instance of domestic violence against petitioner?

The precise object of the Act of 2005 is to protect
a woman against domestic violence and in appropriate
cases, she is also entitled to claim right of residence.
The right of residence can be claimed by wife in the
property owned by her husband or joint property in
which husband has a share and not otherwise. A bare
reading of the complaint makes it abundantly clear that
it does not disclose any specific instance of domestic
violence against the petitioners as contemplated under
Section 3 of the Act of 2005 except certain omnibus
allegations against the petitioners. Moreover, there is
no semblance of proof furnished by the respondentcomplainant
that her deceased husband was owning a
residential house or had a share in the joint family
property. In such a situation, a casual reference of the
name of the family members i.e. petitioners in the
complaint without there being any allegation of their
active involvement in the matter is sufficient to
conclude that complaint is in fact designed to harass
petitioners against the legislative intent. In absence of
any concrete proof about domestic relationship with the
petitioners i.e. the petitioners and respondent had been
living in a shared household and she has been
subjected to domestic violence, the maintainability of
the complaint itself is under serious clouds. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JODHPUR

 CRIMINAL MISC. (PET.) (CRLMP) NO.1524 of 2011
 Sudama Dutt Sharma

V
The State of Rajasthan.

Date of Order :: 08.11.2016

HON'BLE MR. P.K. LOHRA, J.

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Whether contemnor can take defence that complaints were pending against complainant Judge?

So far as the allegations made by the appellant with
regard to the complaints made by him against the
complainant judge, after having held that the appellant had
appeared before the Court and had made contemptuous
statements, we are of the opinion that those averments
regarding the complaints are irrelevant. The averments
regarding the complaints cannot be a defence for the
appellant. Even if we assume those averments about the
complaints to be correct, then also, the appellant cannot
use such contemptuous language in the Court against thepresiding Judge.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 63 OF 2006
Mahipal Singh Rana, Advocate V State of Uttar Pradesh
Dated:July 05, 2016.
Citation:2016 CRLJ 3734

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When complaint for dishonour of cheque will not be treated as premature?

 No cognizance on a complaint which was pre-mature:

Before meeting the 2nd contention as to the validity of cognizance on a pre-mature complaint, it would be apposite to quote paragraphs- 35 & 36 in the judgment of Yogendra Pratap Singh vs. Savitri Pandey, 2014 (10) SCC 713, on which heavy reliance is placed by learned counsel for the applicant.

35. Can an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act be said to have been committed when the period provided in Clause (c) of the proviso has not expired? Section 2 (d) of the Code defines 'complaint'. According to this definition, complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to taking his action against a person who has committed an offence. Commission of an offence is a sine qua non for filing a complaint and for taking cognizance of such offence. A bare reading of the provision contained in Clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that no complaint can be filed for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act unless the period of 15 days has elapsed. Any complaint before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint at all in the eye of law. It is not the question of prematurity of the complaint where it is filed before expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on him, it is no complaint at all under law. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the NI Act, inter alia, creates a legal bar on the Court from taking cognizance of an offence Under Section 138 except upon a written complaint. Since a complaint filed Under Section 138 of the NI Act before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no complaint in the eye of law, obviously, no cognizance of an offence can be taken on the basis of such complaint. Merely because at the time of taking cognizance by the Court, the period of 15 days has expired from the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/accused, the Court is not clothed with the jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence Under Section 138 on a complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque.

36. A complaint filed before expiry of 15 days from the date on which notice has been served on drawer/accused cannot be said to disclose the cause of action in terms of Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 and upon such complaint which does not disclose the cause of action the Court is not competent to take cognizance. A conjoint reading of Section 138, which defines as to when and under what circumstances an offence can be said to have been committed, withSection 142 (b) of the NI Act, that reiterates the position of the point of time when the cause of action has arisen, leaves no manner of doubt that no offence can be said to have been committed unless and until the period of 15 days, as prescribed Under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, has, in fact, elapsed. Therefore, a Court is barred in law from taking cognizance of such complaint. It is not open to the Court to take cognizance of such a complaint merely because on the date of consideration or taking cognizance thereof a period of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused has elapsed. We have no doubt that all the five essential features of Section 138 of the NI Act, as noted in the judgment of this Court in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 954 : (2000) 2 SCC 745] and which we have approved, must be satisfied for a complaint to be filed Under Section 138. If the period prescribed in Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138has not expired, there is no commission of an offence nor accrual of cause of action for filing of complaint Under Section 138 of the NI Act.

To appreciate the observations made in paragraphs-35 & 36 in Yogendra Pratap Singh (supra), it would be pertinent to consider the context in which the said observations were made. One of the issues involved before the Apex Court, was to the following effect:

1.1 (i) Can cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 be taken on the basis of a complaint filed before the expiry of the period of 15 days stipulated in the notice required to be served upon the drawer of the cheque in terms of Section 138(c) of the Act aforementioned? And,

9. The Apex Court was examining as to whether cognizance of an offence under Section 138 of the Act could be taken, even though the 15 day period indicated in the statutory notice had not expired. Against the said backdrop, the Apex Court after examining the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act which inter alia includes issuance of a statutory notice within a month from the date of the reported dishonour of the cheque and a period of 15 days having expired from the date of the receipt of the notice, a complaint under Section 138 of the Act could be filed upto the period of one month and in that context, the Apex Court held that where 15 days statutory period had not expired, the complaint filed before the expiry of 15 days period, would not be maintainable.

10. Once this is the legal position as regards the maintainability of a complaint filed before the expiry of the 15 day period indicated in the notice, observations made in paragraphs- 35 & 36 in Yogendra Pratap Singh (supra) will have to be read with the issue which was under consideration before the Apex Court. Thus, the bar of cognizance which is referred in paragraphs - 35 & 36 would relate to those cases only where a pre-mature complaint is filed on admitted materials at the stage of summoning, else if the contention of the applicant is accepted, it would not only defeat the purpose and object of the enactment but would run counter to the judgment of the Apex Court in the cases of C.C. Alavi Haji (supra) and Ajeet Seeds (supra), where consistent view has been taken that for the purpose of summoning, what is to be seen is only the mode and manner of the issuance of the notice and not its service. In Yogendra Pratap Singh (supra), the complaint was filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice, as per the complaint allegations. Thus, the complaint itself was not maintainable on the admitted allegations made in the complaint.

11. Learned counsel for the applicant placed heavy reliance on the judgment of Salaskar (supra) to contend that 30 days time ordinarily must be held to be sufficient for service of notice and if that be so, a complaint filed on 12.8.2009 on the basis of notice dated 18.7.2009, was not maintainable. The Court finds that in Vinay Patni vs. State of U.P. and others, 2013(80) ACC 1, this Court held that the period of 30 days taken to effect service in Salaskar (supra) is only the outer limit in a case of presumed service for judging whether the complaint is barred by limitation or not, because in Salaskar (supra), a legal notice dated 17.1.2001 was sent by speed post, whereas the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, was filed on 20.4.2001. Thus, the Apex Court held that the notice dated 17.1.2001 must be deemed to have been served at best within 30 days from the date of issuance thereof, i.e., upto 16.2.2001, whereas it ought to have been filed by 2.4.2001, but the same was filed on 20.4.2001. The decision in the case of Salaskar (supra) would not come to the rescue of the applicant.

Thus on the facts of the present case, a complaint filed on 12.8.2009 on the basis of registered notice dated 18.7.2009, cannot be said to be pre-mature.

Allahabad High Court

Smt. Mohini Verma vs State Of U.P. & Others on 30 September, 2015

Bench: Pankaj Naqvi

Citation:2016 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL459 ALLAH

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When complaint U/S 156 of CRPC can directly be made to magistrate without giving FIR to police?

 In view of our above discussion, we record our answers to the questions of law posed before us, as follow:-

Question No. (i) Whether in absence of a complaint to the police, a complaint can be made directly before a Magistrate ?

Answer Normally a person should invoke the provisions of Section 154 of the Code before he takes recourse to the power of the Magistrate competent to take cognizance under Section 190of the Code, under Section 156(3). Atleast an intimation to the police of commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154(1) would be a condition precedent for invocation of powers of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code. We would hasten to add here that this dictum of law is not free from exception.

There can be cases where non-compliance to the provisions of Section 154(3) would not divest the Magistrate of his jurisdiction in terms of Section 156(3). There could be cases where the police fail to act instantly and the facts of the case show that there is possibility of the evidence of commission of the offence being destroyed and/or tampered with or an applicant could approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code directly by way of an exception as the Legislature has vested wide discretion in the Magistrate.

Equivalent Citation: 2010(112)BOMLR427, 2010CriLJ2723, 2010(1)MhLj421, 2010(3)RCR(Criminal)261

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Criminal Writ Petition Nos. 270, 1445 of 2009,
Decided On: 10.12.2009

Mr. Panchabhai Popotbhai Butani, Vs. The State of Maharashtra 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Swatanter Kumar, C.J., A.M. Khanwilkar and R.S. Dalvi, JJ.

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Whether Officials accused of sexual harassment are entitled to get copy of complaint under RTI?

 Accused government officials are entitled to get a copy of the complaint against them even if the allegations pertain to sexual harassment, the Central Information Commission has held.

While pulling up Delhi University for withholding records related to a complaint filed by PG students at GB Pant Hospital in Delhi against Dr Arun Lata Agarwal on the grounds that allegations pertained to sexual harassment, CIC said it could not “locate” any such allegation against her.

“In spite of repeated deep scrutiny, the Commission could not locate any point of allegation related to sexual harassment,” Information Commissioner Sridhar Acharyulu said.

Acharyulu said the Central Public Information Officer should have seen the rules and FAQs circulated by the Department of Personnel and Training to understand that officers accused of sexual harassment were entitled to have a copy of the sexual harassment complaint against them.

“...the CPIO cannot deny the disclosure of the complaint related information or papers to the accused officer. It was not correct for CPIO to raise this kind of contention,” Acharyulu said.

The case related to allegations of harassment levelled against Aruna Agarwal and her husband Sanjay Agarwal by nine PG students after which she was sent back to the Centre by Delhi Government.

Through the RTI application, Aruna Agarwal had sought the information related to the complaint and the inquiry from the University which refused claiming disclosure may hamper physical security of complainants and that it is held in fiduciary capacity.

During the hearing before CIC, the CPIO representing the University claimed that students had filed complaints against the Agarwal couple alleging sexual harassment and as per the law details about complaint and related information could not be given to the two doctors.

After perusal of communication between National Commission of Women and the University, the Commissioner said the students were complaining against Sanjay Agarwal alleging that he caused mental harassment, created vicious working atmosphere and continued humiliating behaviour.

Acharyulu noted that M S Bhatia, HOD of Psychiatry, referred to representation consisting allegation of ‘sexual harassment’ against Sanjay Agarwal and sought immediate action to suspend him.

“Most of the allegations (levelled by PG students) are about harassment by husband and wife together. The allegations made in 23 points do not consist any specific sexual harassment allegation against either Sanjay (husband) or Aruna Agarwal (wife) individually.

“Every allegation was made against both jointly. The complaints did not reveal any allegation that both of them together caused any ‘sexual harassment’,” Acharyulu said.

He said CPIO was not correct in alleging that complaints by nine students (both male and female) against husband and wife were of sexual harassment.

“Even if it is assumed that the complaint of PG students against supervising couple of is of sexual harassment, the CPIO cannot deny the disclosure of the complaint related information or papers to the accused officer,” he said as he directed disclosure of complaint.

He said when the complaint of nine students cannot be considered as complaint of sexual harassment, the contention of the CPIO that it cannot be disclosed will totally fail.

“The Commission considers, after due study of the sealed file which includes recommendations of NCW, that the complaint is not in nature of sexual harassment and that is why it was not referred to the Committee against sexual harassment. No committee was constituted to inquire into this charge,” he said.
   CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION

Prof. M. Sridhar Acharyulu (Madabhushi Sridhar)
Information Commissioner
CIC/RM/A/2014/000313­SA

A.L. Agarwal Vs. Delhi University

Decision: 9.12.2015

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Whether complaints under Domestic Violence Act can be quashed invoking Section 482 CrPC?

 In view of the aforesaid observations and
discussion, the following conclusions:
(i) The provisions of the Act provide for remedial
measures for civil rights of women but the machinery
provided is through criminal court.
(ii) Initiation of proceedings under Section 12 or 18 or
19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 31 of the Act would begin
only when the Magistrate has passed any judicial order
including of issuance of notice for hearing.
(iii) Any person affected by any proceedings under the
Act, prior to initiation of proceedings under Section 12 of
the Act may prefer Special Criminal Application under
Article 226 of the Constitution if as per him, the
proceedings are beyond the scope and ambit of the Act
or without any authority in law. But this Court, while
entertaining the petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution may decline entertainment of the petition by

way of self-imposed restriction in exercise of the judicial
powers or may decline entertainment of the petition in
exercise of its sound judicial discretion.
(iv) Once proceedings are initiated under Section 12 or
18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 31 either
independently or jointly on account of any judicial order
passed by the learned Magistrate including issuance of
notice, such proceedings shall be governed by the Code
of Criminal Procedure coupled with the power of the
Court under Section 28(2) to lay down its own procedure
for disposal of an application under Section 12 or under
sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act.
(v) Once the applicability of the Code of Criminal
Procedure has started on account of any judicial order
passed by the learned Magistrate including issuance of
notice either under Section 12 or 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or
22 or 23 or 31 of the Act independently or jointly,
remedial measures to the aggrieved person as provided
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be said
as available. But the higher forum under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, may be the Court of Session or the

High Court, may decline entertainment of such
proceedings considering the facts and circumstances of
the case and as per the settled principles of law and in
accordance with law.
(vi) The aforesaid remedial measures provided under
the Code of Criminal Procedure would also include the
powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Code, but
the Court may, in a given case, decline entertainment of
the petition when there is express remedy provided
under the Code of Criminal Procedure or no case is made
out to prevent the abuse of process of any Court, or no
case is made out to secure the ends of justice.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CRIMINAL REFERENCE NO. 6 of 2015
IN
SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 5313 of 2015


SUO MOTU. Vs  USHABEN KISHORBHAI MISTRY

CORAM: THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR.
JAYANT PATEL and MR.JUSTICE N.V.ANJARIA

 Date : 27/11/2015

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Whether complaint under Domestic violence Act is permissible even if parties are residing separately prior to coming in to force of this Act?

 In Saraswathy v. Babu MANU/SC/1193/2013 : (2014) 3 SCC 712, in the similar circumstances where the wife was driven out of the matrimonial home about fourteen years before, complaint was filed under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and this Court has laid down the law on the point as under:

"24. We are of the view that the act of the Respondent husband squarely comes within the ambit of Section 3 of the D.V.A., 2005, which defines "domestic violence" in wide terms. The High Court made an apparent error in holding that the conduct of the parties prior to the coming into force of the D.V.A., 2005 cannot be taken into consideration while passing an order. This is a case where the Respondent husband has not complied with the order and direction passed by the trial court and the appellate court.... The Appellant wife having being harassed since 2000 is entitled for protection order and residence order Under Sections 18 and 19 of the D.V.A., 2005 along with the maintenance as allowed by the trial court Under Section 20(1)(d) of the D.V.A., 2005...."

13. In view of the above position of law and considering that the wife has clearly stated that her maternal uncle is no more ready to allow her to stay in his house, we are of the opinion that the High Court has erred in law in quashing the proceedings filed by the wife under the Act of 2005. Therefore, this appeal deserves to be allowed
 Citation: 2015 (3) KHC 636, 2015(3)RCR(Civil)774, 2015(3)RCR(Criminal)652, 2015(6)SCALE219,AIR 2015 SC2605

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Crl.A. No. 1556 of 2010

Decided On: 06.05.2015

 Shalini Vs.  Kishor and Ors.

Coram:Dipak Misra and Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.

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Whether filing of complaint by wife under Domestic violence Act amounts to cruelty?

 So far as filing of the case under the Domestic   Violence Act   is
concerned, the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that because of the
ill­treatment and acts of incidents out of anger at the hands of in­laws, she was
subjected to strangulation which forced her to file the  complaint.  Except this
solitary criminal complaint, she has not filed any other complaint.   It is required
to be noted that the said case is still pending. The competent court has not found

that it is a false complaint.  In our view, filing of the complaint itself can never be
considered as an act of  cruelty unless it is found  by positive evidence that it was
a false complaint.  The said complaint has not yet been decided and is still
pending.   When the said case is pending before the competent court, the learned
trial Judge should not have given so much weightage about the factum of filing
of such complaint and trying to find out as to whether the allegations in the said
complaint   are   correct   or   not.   If   ultimately   the   said   complaint   is   dismissed,
naturally one can presume that the wife is guilty of filing false cases and making
reckless allegations against the husband. When the Act permits the   wife to
approach the Court under the provisions of Domestic Violence Act and if that
remedy is   availed of, such act should not be   treated as an act of cruelty,
otherwise  in no case a lady can file any complaint,  if the filing of complaint is to
be treated as an act of cruelty.  Simply because the wife in her cross­examination
admitted   that   she   did   not   want   to   live   an   animal   life   and   that   she   is   not
interested in marital life, one cannot jump to a conclusion that the wife is at
wrong.  A wife is also entitled to have her own freedom after marriage.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.120 OF 2009
with
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 174 OF 2009
Mrs. Deeplakshmi Sachin Zingade 
V
Sachin Rameshrao Zingade,  

 CORAM:  P.B. MAJMUDAR  &
                  R.V. MORE, JJ.
       
         Dated:     24th September,2009
Citation; 2010(1) MHLJ 10 Bom

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When employee is not empowered to file complaint for dishonour of cheque on behalf of Company?

In this case it is not in dispute that the complaint was filed by one Shri V. Shankar Prasad claiming to be General Power of Attorney of the complainant company. Subsequently PW-1 Shri Ravinder Singh gave the evidence on behalf of the Company under the General Power of Attorney given by the complainant Company. The complaint was not signed either by Managing Director or Director of the Company. It is also not in dispute that PW-1 is only the employee of the Company. As per Resolution of the Company i.e. Ex.P3 under first part Managing Director and Director are authorized to file suits and criminal complaints against the debtors for recovery of money and for prosecution. Under third part of the said Resolution they were authorized to appoint or nominate any other person to appear on their behalf in the Court and engage lawyer etc. But nothing on the record suggest that an employee is empowered to file the complaint on behalf of the Company. This apart, Managing Director and Director are authorized persons of the Company to file the complaint by signing and by giving evidence. At best the said persons can nominate any person to represent themselves or the Company before the Court. In the present case one Shri Shankar Prasad employee of the Company signed the complaint and the Deputy General Manager of the Company i.e. PW-1 gave evidence as if he knows everything though he does not know anything. There is nothing on the record to suggest that he was authorized by the Managing Director or any Director. Therefore, Magistrate by judgment dated 30th October, 2001 rightly acquitted the appellant. 

Supreme Court of India

A.C. Narayanan vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 28 January, 2015

Bench: Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, S.A. Bobde

Citation; AIR 2015 SC 1198

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Whether Magistrate can work as post office and transmit every complaint for registration of FIR?

Allowing aggrieved people to hold police machinery to ransom would affect the morale and functioning of the machinery, said the Bombay High Court recently while quashing an FIR filed against three police officers.The court said that the magistrate court, which ordered for the FIR, could not act as a “post office” and transmit everyapplication for investigation.

“Allowing the aggrieved or disgruntled persons to hold the police machinery at ransom by unjustifiable vexatious persecution will affect the morale and effective functioning of the police machinery. This in turn will have serious and far-reaching adverse impact on the interest of the society,” the court said while offering the relief.

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Supreme court : Complaints to Magistrates for police investigation S156(3) are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by Complainant

 In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this
country where Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. applications are to
be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant
who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the
Magistrate.
That apart, in an appropriate case, the
learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the
truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations.
This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible.
We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications
are being filed in a routine manner without taking any
responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons.
That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming
when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders
under a statutory provision which can be challenged
under the framework of said Act or under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take
undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is
determined to settle the scores.
We have already
indicated that there has to be prior applications under
Section 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under
Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt
out in the application and necessary documents to that
effect shall be filed.
The warrant for giving a direction
that an the application under Section 156(3) be supported
by an affidavit so that the person making the application
should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no
false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is
found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in
accordance with law.
This will deter him to casually
invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section
156(3).
That apart, we have already stated that the
veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned
Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations
of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of
cases
pertaining
to
fiscal
sphere,
matrimonial
dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical
negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where
there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal
prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being
filed.
That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be
aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.781 OF 2012

Mrs. Priyanka Srivastava Vs  State of U.P. 

Dated;March 19, 2015.
Citation;  AIR2015SC1758,2015CriLJ2396, 2015(2)Crimes179(SC), 2015(2)Crimes209(SC),(2015)6SCC287,

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Wife suspecting that husband is having an extramarital affair whether amounts to cruelty?

The Bombay High Court has ruled that regularly coming home late without informing the wife amounts to cruelty.

“Such type of conduct on the part of the husband… amounts to cruelty to the wife,” observed a division Bench comprising Justice P.B. Majmudar and Justice R.V. More.

It is expected that the husband “at least inform the wife on telephone” so that she won’t wait for him, the high court added while delivering the judgment on Thursday.

Pune-based Deeplakshmi had filed a petition challenging the Pune family court’s May 29 order, which had dissolved her marriage acting on her husband Sachin Zingade’s petition. 

Zingade had accused his wife of picking up quarrels with him, suspecting him of having an extramarital affair and insulting his parents and friends whenever they visited his home.

The family court had accepted his contention on the point of suspicion and termed it as cruelty.

The high court, however, clarified that the spouses are entitled to point out their legitimate grievances against each
other.

“If the circumstances so warrant, the wife may have some suspicion about the act and behaviour of her husband,” observed the high court.

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