Supreme Court: Whether the court should consider gravity of offence alongwith triple test before releasing any accused on regular bail?

Thus from cumulative perusal of the judgments cited on either side including the one rendered by the Constitution Bench of this Court, it could be deduced that the basic jurisprudence relating to bail remains the same inasmuch as the grant of bail is the Rule and refusal is the exception so as to ensure that the Accused has the opportunity of securing fair trial. However, while considering the same the gravity of the offence is an aspect which is required to be kept in view by the Court. The gravity for the said purpose will have to be gathered from the facts and circumstances arising in each case. Keeping in view the consequences that would befall on the society in cases of financial irregularities, it has been held that even economic offences would fall under the category of "grave offence" and in such circumstance while considering the application for bail in such matters, the Court will have to deal with the same, being sensitive to the nature of allegation made against the Accused. One of the circumstances to consider the gravity of the offence is also the term of sentence that is prescribed for the offence the Accused is alleged to have committed. Such consideration with regard to the gravity of offence is a factor which is in addition to the triple test or the tripod test that would be normally applied. In that regard what is also to be kept in perspective is that even if the allegation is one of grave economic offence, it is not a Rule that bail should be denied in every case since there is no such bar created in the relevant enactment passed by the legislature nor does the bail jurisprudence provides so. Therefore, the underlining conclusion is that irrespective of the nature and gravity of charge, the precedent of another case alone will not be the basis for either grant or refusal of bail though it may have a bearing on principle. But ultimately the consideration will have to be on case to case basis on the facts involved therein and securing the presence of the Accused to stand trial. {Para 21}

22. In the above circumstance it would be clear that even after concluding the triple test in favour of the Appellant the learned Judge of the High Court was certainly justified in adverting to the issue relating to the gravity of the offence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1831/2019 

Decided On: 04.12.2019

P. Chidambaram Vs. Directorate of Enforcement

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Banumathi, A.S. Bopanna and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.

Author: A.S. Bopanna, J.

Citation: 2019 INSC 1317, MANU/SC/1670/2019

Print Page

Supreme Court: Provisions of CRPC does not contemplate either granting of a bail on the basis of an assurance of a compromise or cancellation of a bail for violation of the terms of such compromise

  Mr. Kharat, relied on the case of Biman Chatterjee (supra) to submit that now fulfillment of the terms of compromise cannot be basis of granting or cancelling the bail. He places reliance on the paragraph No. 7 of the said decision. Case in Biman Chatterjee (supra) was a proposed settlement between a couple having matrimonial discord. Bail granted to the Accused in the said crime was cancelled on the ground that the Accused was not adhering to the settlement terms. It is in this context that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph-7 has made the observations as under:

7. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in cancelling the bail on the ground that the Appellant had violated the terms of the compromise. Though in the original order granting bail there is a reference to an agreement of the parties to have a talk of compromise through the media of well wishers, there is no submission made to the court that there will be a compromise or that the Appellant would take back his wife. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the courts below could not have cancelled the bail solely on the ground that the Appellant had failed to keep up his promise made to the court. Here we hasten to observe first of all from the material on record, we do not find that there was any compromise arrived at between the parties at all, hence, question of fulfilling the terms of such compromise does not arise. That apart non-fulfilment of the terms of the compromise cannot be the basis of granting or cancelling a bail. The grant of bail under the Code of Criminal Procedure is governed by the provision of Chapter XXXIII of the Code and the provision therein does not contemplate either granting of a bail on the basis of an assurance of a compromise or cancellation of a bail for violation of the terms of such compromise. What the court has to bear in mind while granting bail is what is provided for in Section 437 of the said Code. In our opinion, having granted the bail under the said provision of law, it is not open to the trial court or the High Court to cancel the same on a ground alien to the grounds mentioned for cancellation of bail in the said provision of law. {Para 20}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3219/2025

Decided On: 28.07.2025

Gajanan Dattatray Gore Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1004/2025,2025 INSC 913.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

J & K HC: Whether a person accused of the offence of rape can be released on bail subsequently on the ground of change of circumstances if the main prosecution witnesses who are examined do not support the prosecution's case?

It is pertinent to mention here that after the dismissal of second bail application of the petitioner, statements of four more prosecution witnesses have been recorded. Therefore, there is a change in circumstances since the dismissal of second bail application of the petitioner. {Para 6}

7) The petitioner has sought bail on the grounds that from the statements recorded during trial of the case, the prosecution version against him is not proved. It has been further contended that only on the ground that the petitioner is involved in a heinous offence his bail application cannot be rejected, particularly when, prima facie, the offence for which he has been charged is not made out against him. It has been contended that the statement of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence and this aspect of the matter has not been dealt with by the trial court while rejecting the bail applications of the petitioner. It has been further contended that the petitioner has been in custody for the last about two years and all the material prosecution witnesses have already been examined and, therefore, there is no apprehension of the petitioner tampering with the prosecution witnesses.

13) After having gone through the statements of the prosecution witnesses, particularly statement of the prosecutrix, her mother and grandfather, there appears to be prima facie merit in the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. Although at the stage of considering the plea of bail, a meticulous analysis of the evidence led by the prosecution is to be avoided, yet, for the limited purpose of deciding this bail application, it does appear that the sexual intercourse alleged to have been committed by the petitioner upon the prosecutrix, who was major at the relevant time, appears to be consensual in nature. Therefore, a case for grant of bail in favour of the petitioner is made out. The learned trial court, while rejecting earlier bail applications of the petitioner, has not considered the evidence led by the prosecution even for the limited purpose of deciding the bail applications and has mechanically rejected the applications on the ground that the petitioner is involved in a heinous offence.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT SRINAGAR

Bail App No.91/2025

BASHARAT AHMAD BHAT  Vs.  UT OF J&K 

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE

Pronounced on:19.12.2025.

Print Page

Delhi HC: Whether accused is entitled to get default bail if chargesheet is filed without obtaining Sanction U/S 39 of Arms Act

 The maximum period of 180 days which is being granted to the investigating agency to complete the investigation in the case wherein the prosecution is for the offence under UAPA is not something in the form of a package that everything has to be completed including obtaining of sanction within this period of 180 days. As observed above, the investigating agency has nothing to do with sanction. Sanction is altogether a different process. Sanction is accorded, based on the materials collected by the investigating agency which forms the part of the final report under Section 173CrPC. The investigating agency gets full 180 days to complete the investigation. To say that obtaining of sanction and placing the same along with the charge-sheet should be done within the period of 180 days is something which is not only contrary to the provisions of law discussed above, but is inconceivable." {Para 53}

37. In view of the above judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court, the filing of the chargesheet against the Applicant in the present case, without sanction under Section 39 of the Arms Act, does not render the said chargesheet incomplete under Section 193(3) of the BNSS. Consequently, the case of the Applicant that it is entitled to default bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS, is without any merit as obtaining sanction is not contemplated under the said provision.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Bail Appln. 1713/2025

Decided On: 25.06.2025

Suraj Kanojia Vs. State Govt of Nct of Delhi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Tejas Karia, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/4621/2025.

Print Page

Supreme Court: The court must grant bail solely on law and the merits of each case — not on extraneous undertakings, assurances, or financial conditions.

 Be that as it may, now we have made ourselves very clear that there shall not be a single order that the High Courts and the Trial Courts shall pass for grant of regular bail or anticipatory bail on the basis of any Accused or his/her family members giving an undertaking to deposit a particular amount. The plea shall be decided strictly on merits in accordance with law. If the case is made out on merits the court may exercise its discretion and if no case is made out on merits the court shall reject the plea for regular bail or anticipatory bail as the case may be. However, in any circumstances the High Courts or trial courts shall not pass a conditional order of regular bail or anticipatory bail. {Para 24}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3219/2025

Decided On: 28.07.2025

Gajanan Dattatray Gore Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1004/2025,2025 INSC 913.

Print Page

Supreme court: S.161 CrPC Statement Of Accused Implicating Co-Accused Cannot Be Considered At Stage Of Regular Or Anticipatory Bail

53. From the above exposition of law, the following emerges:

(i) A person who is Accused of an offence or named in the first information report, can be examined by the police and his statement may be recorded Under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as held in Nandini Satpathy (supra).

(ii) A statement of an Accused Under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, would ordinarily be of two kinds, it may be inculpatory in nature or may be exculpatory in nature.

(iii) An inculpatory statement again may be in the form of an admission or a confession. If such statement admits either a gravely incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, respectively, as held in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), then it amounts to confession.

(iv) Where such police statement of an Accused is confessional statement, the rigour of Section(s) 25 and 26 respectively will apply with all its vigour. A confessional statement of an Accused will only be admissible if it is not hit by Section(s) 24 or 25 respectively and is in tune with the provisions of Section(s) 26, 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act respectively. In other words, a police statement of an Accused which is in the form of a confession is per se inadmissible and no reliance whatsoever can be placed on such statements either at the stage of bail or during trial. Since such confessional statements are rendered inadmissible by virtue of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, the provision of Section 30 would be of no avail, and no reliance can be placed on such confessional statement of an Accused to implicate another co-Accused.

(v) A confessional statement of one Accused implicating another co- Accused may be taken into consideration by the court against such co- Accused in terms of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, only at the stage of trial, where (1) the confession itself was relevant and admissible in terms of the Evidence Act; (2) was duly proved against the maker; (3) such confessional statement incriminates the maker along with the co- Accused and; (4) both the Accused persons in question are in a joint trial for the same offence.

(vi) Furthermore, because such confessional statements are not "evidence" in terms of Section 3 of the Evidence Act as held in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), such a confession as held in Kashmira Singh (supra) can only be pressed into consideration by the court as a Rule of prudence, to lend assurance to the other evidence against such co-Accused, provided that aforesaid ingredients or conditions of Section 30 read with Section(s) 24 to 29 of the Evidence Act, are fulfilled.

(vii) Where the police statement of an Accused is in the form of an admission, such inculpatory statement even if it implicates another co-Accused cannot be taken into consideration against such co-Accused in terms of Section(s) 17 read with 21 of the Evidence Act, as doing so would militate against the general principle, that an admission may be given as evidence against the maker alone. The exceptions to the aforesaid general principle carved out under the Evidence Act, do not permit the usage of such admission against a co-Accused in any scenario whatsoever.

(viii) Where the police statement of the Accused is an exculpatory statement i.e., it is neither a confession nor an admission, the statement being one Under Section 161, would immediately attract the bar Under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the same may be used only for the very limited purpose provided in the Proviso for the purpose of contradiction or re- examination of such Accused person alone, as held in Mahabir Mandal (supra). Even if such exculpatory statement of one Accused, implicates another co-Accused, the same cannot be taken into consideration against such co-Accused, as there can be no credibility attached to an exculpatory statement of an Accused implicating another co-Accused, more particularly because it is neither required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the co-Accused, the same cannot be tested by cross- examination and the exculpatory nature of such statement militates against the foundational principle that permits taking into consideration a statement of one Accused person against another co-Accused as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), i.e., 'when a person admits guilt to its fullest extent either to a certain incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, and in doing so exposes himself and in the process other co-Accused persons to the pain and penalties provided for the guilt, there exists a sincerity and semblance of sanction for the truthfulness of such statement'.

(ix) Although a handful of decisions of this Court such as Indresh Kumar (supra) and Salim Khan (supra) have held that statements Under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ought to be looked into by the courts at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail for the purpose of ascertaining whether a prima-facie case has been made out against the Accused and the nature and gravity of the allegations, yet the aforesaid Rule only applies insofar as such statements Under Section 161 were made by witnesses and not Accused persons. A statement of an Accused Under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stands on a completely different footing from a police statement of a witness. As already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, if the police statement of an Accused is inculpatory in nature, its more in the form of a confession or admission rather than a statement, and the relevant provisions of Section(s) 17 to 30 of the Evidence Act, will apply with all its vigour. Where such statement of the Accused is exculpatory in nature, the same can be looked into by the courts only for the limited purpose of either culling out the stance of the Accused person qua the allegations or for contradicting the Accused, if the Accused chooses to be examined as a witness in terms of Section 315 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, such exculpatory statement insofar as it implicates another Accused person cannot be looked into by the courts, as such statements by their nature cannot be tested by cross-examination if such Accused person declines to be a witness in the trial in terms of Section 315 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and because such exculpatory statement has no credibility as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra).

(x) Before the court looks into the police statement of any person Under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the purpose of anticipatory or regular bail, the court must first ascertain whether such person is actually a witness or an Accused person, or likely to be an Accused person in respect of the offence(s) alleged. This is because, there may be situations where a person while giving his statement Under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may not be an Accused, but later arrayed as one. In such a scenario the courts must be mindful of the fact that because the investigation is still ongoing, it is more likely for a person who was originally a witness to happen to be later arrayed as an Accused person. If the court was to blindly place reliance on statement of such a person merely because he is not named in the first information report, without first seeing whether such person is likely to be arrayed as an Accused or not, it would lead to an absurd situation where the statement of such a person may be relied upon up until such person is arrayed as an Accused. We also caution the courts, where it emerges from the material on record, that such a person is likely to be arrayed as an Accused, the courts should refrain from expressing any such opinion so that the investigation is not prejudiced in any manner.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos. 7532 of 2025, 7533/2025 and 7534/2025

Decided On: 16.05.2025

P. Krishna Mohan Reddy Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

 Citation: 2025 INSC 725,MANU/SC/0737/2025

Print Page

Whether initial grant of anticipatory bail for lesser offence entitle accused to insist for regular bail?

The mere initial grant of anticipatory bail for lesser offence, did not entitle the respondent to insist for regular bail even if he was subsequently found to be involved in the case of murder. Neither Section 437(5) nor Section 439(1) of the Code was attracted. There was no question of cancellation of bail earlier granted to the accused for an offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 406 IPC. The Magistrate committed a irregularity by holding that "I do not agree with the submission made by the Ld.Prosecutor in as much as if we go by his submissions then the accused would be liable for arrest every time the charge is altered or enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not the spirit of law". With the change of the nature of the offence, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime. Instead of referring to the grounds which entitled the respondent- accused the grant of bail, the Magistrate adopted a wrong approach to confer him the benefit of liberty on allegedly finding that no grounds were made out for cancellation of bail.

Supreme Court of India

Prahlad Singh Bhati vs N.C.T., Delhi & Anr on 23 March, 2001

Author: Sethi

Bench: K Thomas, R Sethi.

Print Page