Supreme Court: Non-filing of a copy of the chargesheet cannot become a ground for default bail if chargesheet is filed within stipulated time

 In the above backdrop, we are of the considered view that the present Appellant is not entitled to the relief of default bail. Undoubtedly, it is borne from the record that the chargesheet/police report stood filed within the prescribed statutory time before the magistrate on 02.09.2025. The contents thereof, being in compliance with Section 193(3) BNSS. Consequently, on 02.09.2025, the right to default bail became extinguished and the Appellant ought to have applied for regular bail. Moreover, it is also a matter of record that cognizance has also been taken on the chargesheet filed by the investigating agency. This order has not been challenged to date, thereby implying that the contents of the charge-sheet are in accordance with law. {Para 26}

27. Consequently, in our view, the Courts below have rightly held that the non-filing of a copy of the chargesheet cannot become a ground for default bail and the submission of the Appellant cannot be accepted.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 3094 of 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 4333 of 2026)

Decided On: 01.07.2026

Shaurya Sunil Kumar Singh Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 666, MANU/SC/0658/2026

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Constitutional Bail Jurisprudence under BNSS and Special Statutes

1. Contextual Foundations: Article 21 and the Architecture of Liberty

In the Indian criminal justice system, bail is the primary instrument through which the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 is made real at the trial‑court level. The Supreme Court, beginning with State of Rajasthan v. Balchand and Gudikanti Narasimhulu, has consistently affirmed that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception”, subject only to clearly articulated risks such as absconding, witness intimidation, or repeated offending.

For a District Judge, the adjudication of bail is therefore not a matter of discretion in the loose sense, but a structured constitutional function: to balance individual liberty and the presumption of innocence against the State’s obligation to maintain public order and ensure a fair trial. The trial court becomes the first and most important “custodian of the sword of justice”, ensuring that pre‑trial detention remains a protective measure, not a pre‑emptive punishment.

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Supreme Court Clarifies: Default Bail Pleas Can Be Decided Independently of Ritu Chhabaria case

The Supreme Court on Friday clarified that its interim order which directed that any application filed before any court seeking default bail on the basis of Ritu Chhabaria v. Union of India And Ors. should be deferred, shall not preclude any trial courts or High Courts from considering applications for grant of default bail independent of and without relying on the judgement in Ritu Chhabaria. In Ritu Chhabaria, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court had held that a chargesheet filed on the basis of an incomplete investigation, though filed within time, will not defeat the right of an accused to seek default bail. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal Crl. No. 5724/2023, 

Date of Order: 12.05.2023

Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Manpreet Singh Talwar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I., Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/68550/2023.

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FSL Report Filed Later, But No Default Bail: Bombay High Court Clarifies

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8(c), 21(c), 29, 36A(4) — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 167(2), 173(2), 173(5), 173(8), 439 — Default bail — Chargesheet filed within statutory period — CA/FSL report filed subsequently — Whether chargesheet is incomplete — Held, No — A police report containing particulars required under Section 173(2) CrPC, if filed within prescribed period, is not rendered incomplete merely because Chemical Analyser/FSL report was not filed along with it — Non-filing of FSL report with chargesheet does not by itself confer indefeasible right to default bail — Earlier view taking contrary position held not to reflect correct law in light of Division Bench ruling in Manas Krishna T.K. v. State — Compliance with Sections 42, 50 and 52A NDPS Act prima facie found — Commercial quantity of Mephedrone recovered — Rigours of Section 37 attracted — Bail applications rejected.​

​One-line proposition

A timely chargesheet in an NDPS case is not incomplete merely because the CA/FSL report is filed later; hence, default bail is not available on that ground alone.​

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Application (BA) Nos. 285/2024, 1141/2023 and 1179/2023

Decided On: 03.07.2024

Wasim Akram Vs. State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Urmila S. Joshi-Phalke, J

 Citation: 2024:BHC-NAG:6940,MANU/MH/5086/2024

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No Default Bail Merely Because FSL Report Came Later: Bombay High Court Explains the Law in NDPS Case

 A recent judgment of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, clearly explains an issue that frequently arises in NDPS prosecutions: if the chargesheet is filed within time, but the CA/FSL report is filed later, does the accused get default bail? The Court answered this in the negative and held that mere non-filing of the FSL report along with the chargesheet does not automatically make the chargesheet incomplete.

This ruling is important because many NDPS bail applications are founded on the argument that without the Chemical Analyser or Forensic Science Laboratory report, the investigation remains incomplete. The judgment explains why that argument does not always succeed, especially where the police report otherwise satisfies the legal requirements of Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

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Can Accused Get Default Bail under NDPS Act If FSL Report Isn't Submitted With Chargesheet Within Prescribed Time? Supreme Court Refers To Larger Bench

In view of there being diversity of views of different Benches of this Court even on the question of granting interim bail, we are of the opinion that a larger Bench may decide the question as to whether failure on the part of the prosecution to include the FSL report pertaining to the seized contraband article(s) along with the chargesheet, within the time specified in Section 167(2) of the Code read with Section 36A of the NDPS Act, would entitle the accused to default bail or not.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Petition (s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 15293/2023 and IA No. 245374/2023

Date of Order: 19.03.2024

Hanif Ansari Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Aniruddha Bose and P.V. Sanjay Kumar, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/53980/2024

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Guidelines of Supreme Court in the case Uday Mohanlal Acharya for releasing accused on default bail U/S 167 of CRPC

 In Uday Mohanlal Acharya's case (supra) the Court culled out six guidelines, which are as follows:

1. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 167, a Magistrate before whom an Accused is produced while the police is investigating into the offence can authorise detention of the Accused in such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days on the whole.

2. Under the proviso to the aforesaid Sub-section (2) of Section 167, the Magistrate may authorise detention of the Accused otherwise than in the custody of police for a total period not exceeding 90 days where the investigation relates to offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence.

3. On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the Accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the Accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate.

4. When an application for bail is filed by an Accused for enforcement of his indefeasible right alleged to have been accrued in his favour on account of default on the part of the investigating agency in completion of the investigation within the specified period, the Magistrate/court must dispose of it forthwith, on being satisfied that in fact the Accused has been in custody for the period of 90 days or 60 days, as specified and no charge-sheet has been filed by the investigating agency. Such prompt action on the part of the Magistrate/court will not enable the prosecution to frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandate of an Accused being released on bail on account of the default on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation within the period stipulated.

5. If the Accused is unable to furnish the bail as directed by the Magistrate, then on a conjoint reading of Explanation I and the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 167, the continued custody of the Accused even beyond the specified period in para (a) will not be unauthorised, and therefore, if during that period the investigation is complete and the charge-sheet is filed then the so-called indefeasible right of the Accused would stand extinguished.

6. The expression "if not already availed of" used by this Court in Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, MANU/SC/0554/1994 : (1994) 5 SCC 410, must be understood to mean when the Accused files an application and is prepared to offer bail on being directed. In other words, on expiry of the period specified in para (a) of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 167 if the Accused files an application for bail and offers also to furnish the bail on being directed, then it has to be held that the Accused has availed of his indefeasible right even though the court has not considered the said application and has not indicated the terms and conditions of bail, and the Accused has not furnished the same.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Appeal (crl.) 394 of 2001

Decided On: 29.03.2001

Uday Mohanlal Acharya vs. State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.B. Pattanaik, U.C. Banerjee and B.N. Agrawal, JJ.

Citation: (2001) 5 SCC 453.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Delhi HC: Whether accused is entitled to get default bail if chargesheet is filed without obtaining Sanction U/S 39 of Arms Act

 The maximum period of 180 days which is being granted to the investigating agency to complete the investigation in the case wherein the prosecution is for the offence under UAPA is not something in the form of a package that everything has to be completed including obtaining of sanction within this period of 180 days. As observed above, the investigating agency has nothing to do with sanction. Sanction is altogether a different process. Sanction is accorded, based on the materials collected by the investigating agency which forms the part of the final report under Section 173CrPC. The investigating agency gets full 180 days to complete the investigation. To say that obtaining of sanction and placing the same along with the charge-sheet should be done within the period of 180 days is something which is not only contrary to the provisions of law discussed above, but is inconceivable." {Para 53}

37. In view of the above judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court, the filing of the chargesheet against the Applicant in the present case, without sanction under Section 39 of the Arms Act, does not render the said chargesheet incomplete under Section 193(3) of the BNSS. Consequently, the case of the Applicant that it is entitled to default bail under Section 187(3) of the BNSS, is without any merit as obtaining sanction is not contemplated under the said provision.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Bail Appln. 1713/2025

Decided On: 25.06.2025

Suraj Kanojia Vs. State Govt of Nct of Delhi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Tejas Karia, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/4621/2025.

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Delhi HC : Whether the court can reject default bail application of accused if further investigation is going on?

 So far as the submission that provision of 'further investigation' as contained in Section 193(9) is camouflage to defeat the right of the accused person to seek 'default bail' under Section 187(3) of BNSS 2023, we may only observe that the provision contained in Section 193(9) and those of Section 187(3), operate in different fields and further that Section 193(9) does not in any manner acts as a camouflage to such right. 

{Para 14}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

W.P. (Crl) 3101/2024

Decided On: 27.08.2025

Yash Mishra Vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

D.K. Upadhyaya, C.J. and Tushar Rao Gedela, J.

Author: D.K. Upadhyaya, C.J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/7613/2025.

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P & H HC: Even when the regular bail petition is pending before the High Court, the Sessions Court or Magistrate court are competent to grant default bail

Resultantly, a pendency of bail petition either in the High Court or the Sessions Court would not disentitle the Magistrate or even the Sessions Court, as the case may be, from their statutory powers under Section 187(2) BNSS, 2023 or Section 167(2) CrPC, 1973. On the contrary, if the Magistrate or the Sessions Court does not grant default bail, in such circumstances, then there might be a possibility of such Court(s) violating the fundamental right or contravening the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. {Para 16}

17. Given the above and in the light of the binding judicial precedents, the answer to the proposition is that even when the regular bail petition was pending before the High Court, the Sessions Court is competent to grant default bail, also known as compulsive bail or statutory bail, and similarly the Magistrate is competent to grant default bail even when the regular bail petition was pending before the Sessions Court or the High Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

CRM-M-21371-2025

Decided On: 05.08.2025

Gurmeet Singh Vs. State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anoop Chitkara, J.

Citation: 2025:PHHC:100608, MANU/PH/1919/2025

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Kerala HC: Period Of Release On Interim Bail Not To Be Computed As 'Detention Period' For Granting Statutory Bail U/ S.187 BNSS

  In the present case, the petitioner remained in detention at

the first instance from 18.02.2025 till 24.05.2025 (96 days), and at

the second instance from 09.09.2025 to 22.10.2025 (44 days). In

view of the declaration of law by the Supreme Court, the broken

periods could be taken together to appreciate the claim of statutory

bail. The question now arises is: “Could the period during which the petitioner remained in interim bail be counted for calculating the requisite period for statutory bail?”. {Para 9}

12. The learned Amicus Curiae has taken me to the various

decisions and the relevant statutory provisions. The learned

Amicus Curiae relaying on Amir Hassan Mir v. UT of J & K and

others, (Manu/JK/0206/2022), submitted that the petitioner could not be treated to be in detention or custody for the period he was released on temporary bail. The learned Amicus Curiae submitted that only the actual  custody undergone by the accused will be counted for computing the period for default bail. The learned Amicus Curiae, on going through the facts of the case, submitted that the petitioner has remained in detention only for 140 days. Therefore, he is not entitled to statutory bail.

13. What matters for statutory bail is detention, as provided in

the statutory provisions, whether it is in one spell or in two spells.

An accused person is entitled to be released on statutory bail by

adding the truncated periods of detention suffered by him. I have

no doubt in concluding that the period during which the accused

person was released on temporary/interim bail should not be

computed for the purpose of reckoning the period for statutory bail, as only the actual period of detention undergone by the accused need be counted for. Therefore, the necessary conclusion is that the petitioner is not entitled to statutory bail.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

BAIL APPL. NO. 11634 OF 2025

FISAL PJ,  Vs  STATE OF KERALA

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. BABU

Citation: 2025:KER:79121

Dated this the 23rd day of October, 2025

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Delhi HC: Chargesheet Filed under S.187(3) BNSS Without Obtaining Sanction To Prosecute Under Arms Act Not Incomplete, No Default Bail

 Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Judgebir Singh v. NIA, MANU/SC/0501/2023 : 2023:INSC:472 : (2023) 17 SCC 48 referred to the judgment in Suresh Kumar (supra) and held that a chargesheet filed without sanction cannot be treated as an incomplete chargesheet and does not entitle an accused to a default bail as contemplated under Section 167(2) of the CrPC [now Section 187(3) of the BNSS]. 

"45. We find no merit in the principal argument canvassed on behalf of the appellants that a charge-sheet filed without sanction is an incomplete charge-sheet which could be termed as not in consonance with sub- section (5) of Section 173CrPC. It was conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that the charge-sheet was filed well within the statutory time period i.e. 180 days, however, the court concerned could not have taken cognizance of such charge-sheet in the absence of the orders of sanction not being a part of such charge-sheet. Whether the sanction is required or not under a statute, is a question that has to be considered at the time of taking cognizance of the offence and not during inquiry or investigation. There is a marked distinction in the stage of investigation and prosecution. The prosecution starts when the cognizance of offence is taken. It is also to be kept in mind that cognizance is taken of the offence and not of the offender. It cannot be said that obtaining sanction from the competent authorities or the authorities concerned is part of investigation. Sanction is required only to enable the court to take cognizance of the offence. The court may take cognizance of the offence after the sanction order was produced before the court, but the moment, the final report is filed along with the documents that may be relied on by the prosecution, then the investigation will be deemed to have been completed. Taking cognizance is entirely different from completing the investigation. To complete the investigation and file a final report is a duty of the investigating agency, but taking cognizance of the offence is the power of the court. The court in a given case, may not take cognizance of the offence for a particular period of time even after filing of the final report. In such circumstance, the accused concerned cannot claim their indefeasible right under Section 167(2)CrPC for being released on default bail. What is contemplated under Section 167(2)CrPC is that the Magistrate or Designated Court (as the case may be) has no powers to order detention of the accused beyond the period of 180 days or 90 days or 60 days as the case may be. If the investigation is concluded within the prescribed period, no right accrues to the accused concerned to be released on bail under the proviso to Section 167(2)CrPC. {Para 36}

46. Once a final report has been filed with all the documents on which the prosecution proposes to rely, the investigation shall be deemed to have been completed. After completing investigation and submitting a final report to the court, the investigating officer can send a copy of the final report along with the evidence collected and other materials to the sanctioning authority to enable the sanctioning authority to apply his mind to accord sanction. According sanction is the duty of the sanctioning authority who is not connected with the investigation at all. In case the sanctioning authority takes some time to accord sanction, that does not vitiate the final report filed by the investigating agency before the court. Section 173CrPC does not speak about the sanction order at all. Section 167CrPC also speaks only about investigation and not about cognizance by the Magistrate. Therefore, once a final report has been filed, that is the proof of completion of investigation and if final report is filed within the period of 180 days or 90 days or 60 days from the initial date of remand of accused concerned, he cannot claim that a right has accrued to him to be released on bail for want of filing of sanction order.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Bail Appln. 1713/2025

Decided On: 25.06.2025

Suraj Kanojia Vs. State Govt of Nct of Delhi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Tejas Karia, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/4621/2025.

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Bombay HC: Right to seek default bail in MCOCA case will arise next day after sanction to prosecute is refused by competent authority

 The issue can be examined from a different angle. If we assume for the sake of argument that the effect of the order refusing sanction to prosecute the accused as amounting to not disclosing of any offence under the MCOC Act, the further consequence thereof would, at the most, be that the custody extension order will cease to have any effect at the end of the day on which sanction is refused and till that day, the extension order would have to be held as valid. Even from this view point, the petitioners are not entitled to be released on default bail as the essential condition required for accrual of indefeasible right under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. to the petitioners is not fulfilled. This can be seen from the facts available on record, which show that charge-sheet has been filed on 22/08/2022 and on the same day, the application under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. was moved by the petitioners. Of course, it is the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the application of the petitioners was filed about 30 minutes before the charge-sheet was filed and, therefore, their application was first in point of time and as such there was an accrual of right of default bail to the petitioners. The argument, in our view, is really not relevant for deciding the controversy involved in the petition. The reason being that, the day on which sanction was refused by the authority, would have to be considered to be the day on which the extended period of custody expired and, therefore, the right to seek default bail would arise on the immediate next day. It also means that when sanction is refused, as for example on Monday, this day of Monday would be the last day on which extended period of custody would come to an end, though in normal circumstances it would have expired later, and therefore, the Investigating Officer would have to take care that he files the final report on that day or otherwise he risks the grant of default bail to the accused. This is because of the fact that the provisions made under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. speak not in terms of hours, minutes and seconds, but only in terms of number of days completed. For the purpose of ascertaining as to when the period of authorized custody comes to an end, it is only the number of completed days, which is relevant and not the time at which the event having the effect of rendering the custody as unauthorized took place. {Para 21}

22. If we examine the issue from the above alternative, which we have proposed only by way of assumption and for the sake of argument, still the petitioners cannot be said to be fulfilling the essential requirement of Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. in order to avail of right of default bail. The application under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. was filed by them on 22/08/2022 and that was the day when the sanction to prosecute the petitioners was refused. It was thus the day which became the last day of their authorized custody, which was otherwise extended up to 23/08/2022. Therefore, the right to avail of default bail in terms of Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. really arose in their favour only from 23/08/2022.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 817 of 2022

Decided On: 23.12.2022

Naresh and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Shukre and M.W. Chandwani, JJ.

Author: M.W. Chandwani, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/4539/2022.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Bombay HC: Refusal Of Sanction To Prosecute under MCOCA Does Not Invalidate Extension Of Judicial Custody Given By Special Court

A question remains, whether or not refusal of sanction by the A.D.G.P. under the provisions of the MCOC Act by itself will invalidate the grant of extension of period up to 180 days and would automatically reduce the judicial custody remand to it's original period of 90 days, especially when the extension had been granted under a judicial order, not challenged by the petitioners. It is to be noted the investigation for an offence and cognizance of the offence under the provisions of MOCC Act are governed by Section 23 of the MCOC Act, which are reproduced here. {Para 6}

"23. Cognizance of, and investigation into, an offence-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code,-Section 167

(a) no information about the commission of an offence of organised crime under this Act, shall be recorded by a police officer without the prior approval of the police officer not below the rank of the Deputy Inspector General of Police;

(b) no investigation of an offence under the provisions of this Act shall be carried out by a police officer below the rank of the Deputy Superintendent of Police.

(2) No. Special Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act without the previous sanction of the police officer not below the rank of Additional Director General of Police."

17. It is worthy to note here that the power to extend the period to complete the investigation up to 180 days is exercised under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. by invocation of provisions made under Section 21 of the MCOC Act and whereas power to grant or refuse sanction to prosecute has it's source in Section 23 of the MCOC Act. Former power is exercised by the Court and latter power by a Police Officer. Objects of both kinds of powers are different. Custody extension is done for, inter alia, ensuring effective and speedy investigation, without any hindrance, while sanction is necessary to enable the Special Court to take cognizance of an offence under the MCOC Act, which is disclosed by the charge-sheet. In other words, former power exists for facilitating the investigation, while the latter power is to facilitate trial of the accused. Thus, both these powers operate in different fields. After considering the magnitude of the investigation required in a particular case, the Special Judge enables in depth investigation by extending custody period, and whereas, there is an embargo created by Section 23(2) of the MCOC Act on the cognizance taking by the Special Court without previous sanction of the A.D.G.P. The purpose of incorporating such embargo is to provide double filter before roping in anybody under the stringent provisions of law.

18. Thus, extending further time of 90 days for completing the investigation by the Special Judge is one thing and giving sanction by the A.D.G.P. is a different thing. Once, the Special Court after giving reasons has extended the period of investigation up to 180 days, the refusal of sanction will not take away the extended period of 90 days granted by the Special Court or even curtail the extended period granted by the Special Court. The detention here was authorized by a legal order of the Court under Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOC Act, after considering the material then available with police and with reasoned order and it was never challenged and, therefore, it became a final order. The detention of the petitioners after 90 days thus can not be said to be unauthorized detention.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 817 of 2022

Decided On: 23.12.2022

Naresh and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Shukre and M.W. Chandwani, JJ.

Author: M.W. Chandwani, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/4539/2022

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Supreme Court: Right of the accused for default bail cannot be taken away by way of filing incomplete chargesheet and conducting the investigation in a piece-meal manner.

 32. In view of the above mentioned discussions, the issues framed by us stand answered as under:

I. Without completing the investigation of a case, a chargesheet or prosecution complaint cannot be filed by an investigating agency only to deprive an arrested Accused of his right to default bail Under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

II. Such a chargesheet, if filed by an investigating authority without first completing the investigation, would not extinguish the right to default bail Under Section 167(2) Code of Criminal Procedure.

III. The trial court, in such cases, cannot continue to remand an arrested person beyond the maximum stipulated time without offering the arrested person default bail.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 60 of 2023

Decided On: 26.04.2023

Ritu Chhabaria Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Krishna Murari and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ.

Author: Krishna Murari, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0459/2023.

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Landmark Supreme Court Judgments of the year 2024 On Bail (Part 2)

 1) Supreme Court: Senthil Balaji judgment- Requirement Of Expeditious Trial Must Be Read Into Special Statutes Imposing Stringent Bail Provisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 4011 of 2024.

Decided On: 26.09.2024

V. Senthil Balaji Vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Augustine George Masih, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1065/2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

https://www.lawweb.in/2024/09/supreme-court-v-senthil-balaji-judgment.html

2) Supreme Court: Anticipatory Bail Can't Be Denied On Mere Assertion Of State That Custodial Interrogation Of Accused Is Required

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Important Supreme court and Bombay HC Judgments on NDPS Act(Part 2)

1) Whether the bar of Section 37 of the NDPS Act will be applicable if there is total non compliance of mandatory provisions under Sections 42 and 50 of the NDPS Act?

In Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja's case (Supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the requirement of Section 50 of the NDPS Act are mandatory and, therefore, the provisions of Section 50 must be strictly complied with. It is imperative on the part of police officer to apprise the person intended to be searched of his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to be searched only before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. It is further held that it is equally mandatory on the part of the authorized officer to make the suspect aware of the existence of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, if so required by him and this requires a strict compliance. It is further held that the suspect person may or may not choose to exercise the right provided to him under Section 50 of the NDPS Act but so far as the officer is concerned, an obligation is cast upon him under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to apprise the suspect of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate.

Bombay High Court

Sholadoye Samuel Joy vs The State Of Maharashtra  on 20 January, 2022

Hon'ble Shri Justice Virendrasingh Gyansingh Bisht

https://www.lawweb.in/2022/08/whether-court-should-release-accused-on.html

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Bombay HC: The court must release accused prosecuted for an offence under NDPS Act if there is non compliance of S 36A of NDPS Act

Section 36A which is in pari-materia to various

Sections in the special statutes like Section 21(2)(b) of MCOC

Act and Section 20(4)((b)(d) of the (The) Terrorist and

Distuptive Activities (Prevention) ACT, 1987 and Section 49(2)

(b) of the The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA).

On reading of the said proviso appended to sub-section 4 of

Section 36A of NDPS Act, it can be clearly discerned that the

Special Court may extend the period of 180 days upto one year,

on the report of the Public Prosecutor, informing the Court about the progress of the investigation and the specific reason for

detention of the accused beyond the period of 180 days. {Para 11}

12 In the present case, as it can be seen that the Public

Prosecutor never submitted the report, but the Investigating

Officer directly preferred an application before the Court and

though the Public Prosecutor was present on the date of hearing

when the case was taken on Board, the application before the

Court was the one filed by the Investigating Officer.

It is settled position of law that when law requires a

particular thing to be done in a particular manner, then it shall be done only in that manner and in no other way.

13 The legislature intentionally contemplated submission

of the report by the Public Prosecutor and it also indicated what it should comprise of. The legislature did not purposely leave it to an Investigating Officer to make the application for seeking

extension of time. The legislature expect the investigation to be

completed with utmost promptitude but where it becomes

necessary to extend the period for completion of investigation,

the Investigating Agency, after inviting the attention of the Public Prosecutor to the said reasons, shall put up a report before the Court, apprising it about the progress of investigation and by furnishing reasons for further custody.

In case of Rajnikant Jivanlal & Ors.Vs. Intelligence

Officer, NCB, 1989 (3) SCC 532, the duty cast on the Public

Prosecutor was specifically highlighted in the background of the

power conferred on him, to submit the report before the

concerned Court when extension of custody is sought for.

14 The intention of the legislature, clearly surfacing

through the provision, to the effect that the report shall be

submitted by the Public Prosecutor before the Court, after proper application of mind. It is the provision designed to assist the designated Court to independently decide whether or not the

extension shall be granted. It is a serious business, as the further

incarceration of the accused in custody would be dependent upon

the Court being satisfied for the justification offered by the public Prosecutor who seek extension of the custody since the

investigation is not completed by the Investigating Officer within

the stipulated period.

15 It has been time and again reiterated that the Public

Prosecutor is neither the Post office of the Investigating Agency

nor he is forwarding agency, but he is charged with a statutory

duty and he must apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of the Court and his report must disclose on the face of it, that he

had applied his mind to the twin conditions i.e. there is progress in investigation and there are reasons for detaining the accused

beyond the period prescribed.

An important duty is cast on the Public Prosecutor to

prepare his own independent report to assist the Special Court to

decide whether the time period of custody of the

applicant/accused needs to be extended beyond 90 days or 180

days. The public prosecutor shall be convinced on the

submission of the Investigating Agency that there is a progress in

the investigation and for the reasons offered in the report, it could not be completed.

Here, in contrast, it can be seen that in the present

case, the report placed before the learned Magistrate is by the

Investigating Officer himself, which is in clear breach of the

mandate of law envisaged in the proviso appended to sub-section

(4) of Section 36A.

16 The applicant preferred an application for being

released on bail when the charge-sheet was not filed in 180 days

and on the defective application which could not have been

entertained. The Special Judge kept it pending though an

indefeasible right had accrued to the applicant on failure to file

the charge-sheet within 180 days. He availed of this right by

preferring an application, but the learned Court rejected it on a

flimsy ground.

17 Very recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of M.

Ravindran vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue

Intelligence, 2021 (2) SCC 485, has once again reiterated the

concept of default bail which has been recognized as an integral

part of the right of the person to personal liberty under Article 21

of the Constitution of India. It has been held that once the

accused files an application for bail under the proviso to Section

167(2) of Cr.P.C, he is deemed to have ‘availed of’ or enforced

his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of the stipulated time limit for investigation.

In the Law Report, Their Lordships of the Apex

Court has crystallized the position on the following words :

“Once the accused files an application for bail under the Proviso

to Section 167(2) he is deemed to have ‘availed of’ or enforced

his right to be released on default bail, accruing after

expiry of the stipulated time limit for investigation. Thus, if

the accused applies for bail under Section 167(2), CrPC read

with Section 36A (4), NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or

the extended period, as the case may be, the Court must release

him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after

getting necessary information from the public prosecutor,

as mentioned supra. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution

from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the

accused on bail in case of default by the investigative agency.

18.2 The right to be released on default bail continues to

remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail,

notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or

subsequent filing of the chargesheet or a report seeking

extension of time by the prosecution before the Court; or

filing of the chargesheet during the interregnum when

challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending

before a higher Court.

18 In the wake of the aforesaid position of law, clearly

emnating from the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble

Apex court, the applicant deserve his release on bail under

Section 167(2) read with Section 36A of the Narcotic Drugs &

Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

BAIL APPLICATION NO. 4215 of 2021

Shlok Rakesh Todankar  Vs  The State of Maharashtra 

CORAM: BHARATI DANGRE, J.

DATED : 6th SEPTEMBER, 2022

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Whether accused is entitled to be released on default bail if further investigation in respect of other accused is pending or for production of some documents?

In this regard, this Court recently held in case of CBI v. Kapil Wadhwan and Anr.2 that:

Once from the material produced along with the chargesheet, the court is satisfied about the commission of an offence and takes cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the Accused, it is immaterial whether the further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the other Accused or for production of some documents not available at the time of filing of chargesheet would neither vitiate the chargesheet, nor would it entitle the Accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground that the chargesheet was an incomplete chargesheet or that the chargesheet was not filed in terms of Section 173(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1511 of 2024 

Decided On: 12.03.2024

Dablu Kujur Vs. The State of Jharkhand

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bela M. Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Author: Bela M. Trivedi, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0194/2024.

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Important Supreme Court Judgments on bail(Part 3)

 

1) Supreme Court: Participation in protest and expression of strong views is not violation of bail conditions-bail is not liable to be cancelled on that ground

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1994 OF 2024

A.DURAIMURUGAN PANDIYAN SATTAI @ DURAIMURUGAN  VS. STATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE & ANR.

Dated: April 08, 2024.

https://www.lawweb.in/2024/06/supreme-court-participation-in-protest.html

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