Bar to Sue vs Suit Barred by Law: Supreme Court Clarifies Why Order II Rule 2 Cannot Be Used to Reject a Plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d)

S. Valliammai and Ors. Vs. S. Ramanathan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

 Citation: 2026 INSC 372, MANU/SC/0362/2026

Decided On: 16.04.2026

Factual background in brief

The litigation arises from a Chettiar family dispute where the aged parents alleged that their advocate son exerted pressure and coercion to grab properties and bank deposits. The father and mother first filed O.S. No. 4722/2012 (the “first suit”) at Chennai seeking permanent injunction to protect (i) the residential Harrington Road property and (ii) the Standard Chartered Bank account, alleging intimidation, assault and coercion leading to execution of a settlement deed dated 04.11.2011.

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Supreme Court: Precaution to be taken by court while deciding application for rejection of plaint

Under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, few lines or passage from the plaint should not be read in isolation and the pleadings ought to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. Even in that case, the trial Court and the High Court had failed to advert to the relevant averments, as stated in the plaint, which approach was disapproved by this Court. In the present case, as noticed earlier, the trial Court had failed to advert to and analyse the averments in the plaint, but selectively took notice of the assertion in the plaint in question that the Appellant became aware about the discrepancies in July, 2000, and then proceeded to reject the plaint being barred by law of limitation having been filed in February, 2005.

21. Taking overall view of the matter, therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the decisions of the trial Court, the first appellate Court and the High Court in the fact situation of the present case, rejecting the plaint in question Under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, cannot be sustained. As a result, the same are quashed and set aside.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2514 of 2020 

Decided On: 05.06.2020

 Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. Vs.  The Central Bank of India and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Khanwilkar, Indira Banerjee and Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ.

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Whether plaint can be rejected if suit is filed on possibility of infringement of right?

 In the aforesaid background, it is to be held that the plaint does not
disclose any cause of action for the relief prayed, that is, a direction to
the second respondent to execute and register a sale deed in favour of
the first respondent and to put the first respondent in possession. There
does not exist any legal right which the plaintiff or the first respondent is
entitled to invoke and enforce. For a right to exist, there must be a
corelative duty which can be enforced in a law suit. A right cannot exist
without an enforceable duty. Ownership means a bundle of rights which
would normally include the right to exclude and transfer the property in a
manner one wants, subject to contractual obligations as agreed or
statutory restrictions imposed on the owner. In the present case, the
pleadings fail to establish violation of a statutory right or breach of a
contractual obligation which creates an enforceable right in the court of
law. In the absence of any such right or even a claim, the plaint would
not disclose cause of action.
10. This Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational
Society Represented by its Chairman v. Ponniamman Educational

Trust Represented by its Chairman/ Managing Trustee1 has referred
to the earlier judgment of this Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and
Another v. A.P. Agencies, Salem2 to explain that the cause of action
means every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff
to prove in order to seek a decree and relief against the defendant.
Cause of action requires infringement of the right or breach of an
obligation and comprises of all material facts on which the right and
claim for breach is founded, that is, some act done by the defendant to
infringe and violate the right or breach an obligation. In T. Arivandanam
v. T.V. Satyapal and Another3 this Court has held that if the plaint is
manifestly vexatious, meritless and groundless, in the sense that it does
not disclose a clear right to sue, it would be right and proper to exercise
power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(‘Code’, for short). A mere contemplation or possibility that a right may
be infringed without any legitimate basis for that right, would not be
sufficient to hold that the plaint discloses a cause of action.
11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we would allow the present appeal
and set aside the impugned order. The application under Order VII Rule
11 of the Code filed by the appellant is allowed and the plaint preferred by the first respondent is rejected as it discloses no cause of action.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6760 OF 2019

COLONEL SHRAWAN KUMAR JAIPURIYAR
@ SARWAN KUMAR JAIPURIYAR Vs  KRISHNA NANDAN SINGH 

Dated: SEPTEMBER 02, 2019.

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Factors to be considered by court while allowing legal representative of plaintiff on record

From the perusal of the impugned order, it is apparent that the learned trial Judge has not even applied mind so as to whether the right to sue survives or not. Besides, from the perusal of the impugned order, it is not clear as to whether the learned trial Judge has accepted the position as to whether the respondent herein is indeed a legal representative of the deceased plaintiff. At least all this is not reflected from the reading of the impugned order which contains no reasons whatsoever. On the issue as to whether the right to sue survives or not, the petitioner, in the present case, ought to have been heard. Besides, although it is true that the learned trial Judge, at this stage is not expected to go into contentious issues relating to the title, at least prima facie verification as to whether the respondent is the legal representative or nor was required to be made by the learned trial Judge. Since, there is no application of mind on all these relevant aspects, the impugned order dated 3rd September, 2018 is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 925 of 2019

Decided On: 13.03.2019

 Swapnesh Bhupati Mudliyar Vs.  Subhashchandra Dhondu Narvekar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.S. Sonak, J.

Citation: 2019(4) MHLJ 892

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Whether right to sue will survive if plaintiff dies during pendency of appeal in defamation suit?

 Where a suit for defamation is dismissed and the plaintiff has filed an appeal, what the appellant-plaintiff is seeking to enforce in the appeal is his right to sue for damages for defamation and as this right does not survive his death, his legal representative has no right to be brought on the record of the appeal in his place and stead if the appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal. The position, however, is different where a suit for defamation has resulted in a decree in favour of the plaintiff because in such a case the cause of action has merged in the decree and the decretal debt forms part of his estate and the appeal from the decree by the defendant becomes a question of benefit or detriment to the estate of the plaintiff-respondent which his legal representatives is entitled to uphold and defend and is, therefore, entitled to be substituted in place of the deceased respondent-plaintiff.

10. Section 306 further speaks only of executors and administrators but on principle the same position must necessarily prevail in the case of other legal representatives, for such legal representatives cannot in law be in better or worse position than executors and administrators and what applies to executors and administrators will apply to other legal representatives also.

11. The position, therefore, is that had the Appellant died during the pendency of his suit, the suit would have abated. Had he died during the pendency of the appeal filed by him in the District Court, the appeal would have equally abated because his suit had been dismissed by the Trial Court, had he, however, died during the pendency of the second appeal filed by the respondent in the High Court, the appeal would not have abated because he had succeeded in the first appeal and his suit had been decreed. As, however, the High Court allowed the second appeal and dismissed the suit, the present Appeal by Special Leave must abate because what the Appellant was seeking in this Appeal was to enforce his right to sue for damages for defamation. This right did not survive his death and accordingly the Appeal abated automatically on his death and his legal representatives acquired no right in law to be brought on the record in his place and stead.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 91 of 1972

Decided On: 29.11.1985

Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan Vs. Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

D.P. Madon and G.L. Oza, JJ.

Citation: (1986) 1 SCC 118.

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Whether Injunction decree will survive to legal heirs of deceased plaintiff?

Therefore, the question in this second appeal is whether the injunction obtained by the plaintiff against the defendants would be rendered nugatory on the death of the plaintiff.

8. There is a distinction between the death of the plaintiff and the death of the defendant. The injunction is operative against the defendants. In fact, the model form of prayers in many suits for injunction would be "restraining the defendants or his men or servants or agents or anybody claiming under or through him". Therefore, on the death of the defendant, all these persons would vanish. Consequently, the question of binding the L.Rs of the defendant by such injunction would not arise. But this will not be the case, if the plaintiff who seeks injunction dies, A decree for injunction obtained by the plaintiff can be succeeded to by his L.Rs and such a right of injunction does not die with the plaintiff. I am fortified in my view by the dictum rendered by the High Court of Allahabad in Krishna Behari Goel v Raj Mangal Persad and Others, which is in the following passage:

"(5) The suit was not of a personal nature at all. Sukhu did not claim any personal right. The injunction sought was that the applicant should not interfere with his possession over the property in dispute. A suit claiming injunction of this nature did not abate on the death of the plaintiff. The cause of action survived to his legal representative who came in possession of the property in dispute".

This position stands further clarified by the leading case of Penn v Lord Baltimore, wherein Lord Chancellor Hardwicke stated in effect as follows:

"The strict primary decree in this Court, as a Court of Equity, is in personam, .....until the defendant do comply with the order of judgment of the Court, which is against himself the defendant personally to do or cause to be done or to abstain from doing some act".

The italicized portion indicates that it is a personal against the defendant against whom injunction is sought for. Therefore, the decree of injunction would become infructuous on the death of the defendant or the party against whom injunction is granted. The person who gets an injunction were to die, certainly his L.Rs will be entitled to the benefit of the decree.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

Regular Second Appeal No. 132 of 1993

Decided On: 12.01.1998

Venkubai  Vs The Assistant Commissioner, Sedam, Gulbarga District and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

T.N. Vallinayagam, J.

Citation: 1999(1) Civil Court Cases 119 Kant

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How to ascertain limitation for claiming compensation for extra work done?

Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for tiling of a suit for recovery of money for work done by the Plaintiff, within three years from the date when the work is done, in a situation where no time has been fixed for payment. Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on the other hand, provides for limitation of three years from the date of breach of a contract in a case of a suit for compensation for damages arising out of such breach. Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is the residuary provision which provides for a suit to be instituted within three years from the date when the right to sue accrues.

10. In the present case, de hors the correspondences that had been exchanged by and between the parties after the date of final payment i.e. 13th January, 1981, the aforesaid date of final payment would have been crucial for determination of the period of limitation for filing the instant suit. However, in the present case, from the correspondences that had been exchanged after the date of final payment it clearly appears that the Plaintiff after receipt of the payment on 13th January, 1981, reiterated its claim for additional payment on different counts including escalation and for extra works done. The Defendant instead of rejecting the said claim entertained the same and kept the matter pending. Finally on 6th November, 1981 (Exhibit P-2) the said claims were rejected. If the claims raised by the Plaintiff were entertained and rejected finally on 6th November, 1981, it would be reasonable to assume that the cause of action for the suit in respect of the said rejected claims arose on 6th November, 1981 and the suit could have been filed at any point of time prior to the expiry of three years from the said date i.e. 6th November, 1981 in view of Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit having been filed on 6th November, 1984, the same, therefore, will have to be considered to be within the period of limitation. The High Court, therefore, was not justified in holding the contrary.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 1034/2008

Decided On: 21.03.2017

 Aries & Aries Vs.  Tamil Nadu Electricity Board

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ranjan Gogoi and Navin Sinha, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 12 SCC 393

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How to ascertain limitation in case of multiple cause of action?

While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word 'first' has been used between the words `sue' and `accrued'. This would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently, successive violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7773 of 2011 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 22126 of 2009)

Decided On: 09.09.2011

Khatri Hotels Private Limited and Anr. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Singhvi and H.L. Dattu, JJ.

Citation: (2011) 9 SCC 126

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When cause of action for filing suit for declaration will accrue?

The suit filed by the original plaintiff is for declaration of ownership and about the Certificate of Sale dated 30.06.1973 in execution proceedings No. 24/1970, being null and void and for cancellation of the same. Thus, the suit would be governed by Article 58 of the Indian Limitation Act, which reads thus:-

16. It can thus be seen that the starting point of limitation for filing a suit for declaration under Article-58 of the Limitation Act is when the right to sue "first accrues". The expression right to sue has not been defined in the Act, but, the said expression has been considered in several cases by the Supreme Court.

17. In the case of State of Punjab Vs. Gurdev Singh, MANU/SC/0612/1991 : (1991) 4 SCC 1, the expression was explained thus:

"The words "right to sue" ordinarily mean the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. Generally, the right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises, that is, the right to prosecute to obtain relief by legal means. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

First Appeal No. 21 of 2006

Decided On: 05.07.2017

 Jahangir and Ors. Vs. Maureen de Sequeira

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.V. Bhadang, J.

Citation: 2017(6) MHLJ 270

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Whether it is necessary to file suit for declaration if there is repudiation of a person's title?

This Article was subject to judicial scrutiny both by the Judicial Committee as well as by the High Court of various States. The leading decision on the subject is that of the Judicial Committee in Bolo v. Koklan (1929) L.R. 57. Therein, Sir Benod Mitter, observed :

"There can be no 'right to sue' until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right, by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted."

32. The said principle was restated and followed by the Judicial Committee in Annamalai Chettiar v. A. M. K. C. T. Muthukaruppan Chettiar I.L.R. (1930) Rang. 645 and in Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh I.L.R. (1930) IndAp 125. The further question is, if there are successive invasions or denials of a right, when it can be held that a person's right has been clearly and unequivocally threatened so as to compel him to institute a suit to establish that right. In Pothukutchi Appa Rao v. Secretary of State A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 193, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court had to consider the said question. In that case, Venkatasubba Rao J., after considering the relevant decisions, expressed his view thus :

"There is nothing in law which says that the moment a person's right is denied, he is bound at his peril to bring a suit declaration. The Government beyond passing the order did nothing to disturb the plaintiff's possession. It would be most unreasonable to hold that a bare repudiation of a person's title, without even an overt act, would make it incumbent on him to bring the declaratory suit".

He adds at p. 199 :

"It is a more difficult question, what is the extent of the injury or infringement that gives rise to, what may be termed, a compulsory cause of action ?"

33. The legal position may be briefly stated thus :

The right to sue under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act accrues when the defendant has clearly and unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted by the plaintiff in the suit. Every threat by a party to such a right, however ineffective and innocuous it may be, cannot be considered to be a clear and unequivocal threat so as to compel him to file a suit. Whether a particular threat gives rise to a compulsory cause of action depends upon the question whether that treat effectively invades or jeopardizes the said right.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 173 of 1955

Decided On: 17.11.1959

Mst. Rukhmabai Vs. Lala Laxminarayan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.C. Shah, K. Subba Rao and P.B. Gajendragadkar, JJ.

Citation:AIR 1960 SCC 335

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How to ascertain period of limitation if suit is based on multiple cause of action?

 In Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v Union of India (2011

(9) SCC 126) the Apex Court held that, while enacting Article 58

of the Limitation Act, 1963, the legislature has designedly made a

departure from the language of Article 120 of the Limitation Act,

1908. The word 'first' has been used between the words 'sue' and

'accrue'. This would mean that, if the suit is based on multiple

cause of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the

date when the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently,

successive violation of right will not give rise to fresh cause and

the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of

limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first

accrued.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALAAT ERNAKULAM

                                               PRESENT:

                 MR.JUSTICE P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON
                                                      &
                     MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN

                4TH DAYOF NOVEMBER 2016

                                          RFA.No. 140 of 2010
                                          

                     K.K.GOVINDAN 
Vs

                     K.G.PREMSANKAR, I

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When right to sue will survive to legal heirs of deceased appellant who is granted probate?

The argument advanced by learned advocate Mr. Chitale on the question as to the nature of the proceeding namely Second Appeal No. 529 of 1999 is required to be accepted. The proceeding namely Second Appeal No. 529 of 1999 cannot be termed as a proceeding concerning grant of probate. The provisions of Section 222 and Section 226 of the said Act will be applicable to a proceeding where the Court is required to decide as to whether probate should be granted or not. The Second Appeal No. 529 of 1999 was filed so as to challenge that order passed by the learned District Judge by which the application for revocation of probate was granted. After the probate was granted in favour of Laxmanrao in respect of the Will executed by Mrs. Zende, Laxmanrao being the sole beneficiary, all the properties covered by the Will devolved on Laxmanrao and he secured interest in the properties as per the Will. Once it is observed that Laxmanrao secured right in respect of the properties covered by the Will dated 9th September, 1982 as a sole beneficiary, surely, heirs of Laxmanrao will have a right to prosecute the proceedings which were initiated by Laxmanrao to protect his interest in the properties. In my view, after the death of Laxmanrao, right to sue would survive and his heirs were rightly brought on record in Second Appeal No. 529 of 1999. The application filed by heirs of Laxmanrao was maintainable and grant of the same by the Registrar (Judicial-I) was legal and proper.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Application No. 2091 of 2012 in Second Appeal No. 529 of 1999

Decided On: 08.10.2013

 Smt. Radhabai Vithal Waikar
Vs.
 Late Shri Laxmanrao Shankarrao Shinde through his LRs.(Sunita Laxmanrao Shinde and Ors.)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:R.Y. Ganoo, J.

Citation:2013(6) MHLJ298

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Whether blanket authority can be given to particular director to institute suit or proceeding?

The essential requirement of this provision is that the Company which is a juristic person must itself decide to sue.

Once that is done, it would authorise one of its Directors who is the agent of the Company or its principal officers the Secretary of the Company or the Managing Director to file the Suit. The suing in each case is a separate act. The Company acts only through its meetings. Hence the Board of Directors in the day to day management of the company must decide and resolve to sue or not to sue. A blanket authority cannot be given to a particular Managing Director or Director to sign the papers and documents, including the power to sue. The power to sue requires application of mind upon the particular cause of action. It requires the Company to pay the requisite Court fee. It requires the Company to be represented by a legal officer being an Advocate of the Court. It is an act which, therefore, is not a part of the day to day management of the Company. A Company would decide in a given case upon legal advice or otherwise whether or not it would sue upon a given cause of action. Such exercise is imperatively required to be performed if the intention of the Company, which is only a juristic person, is to be deciphered. That act, of course, may be undertaken even after the filing of the Suit and ratified by the Board as all other acts of management. However, the seminal requirement is to see the act of the Company though its Board or members (dependent upon whether the resolution is passed in the Board meeting or a general meeting) or is given by the Company itself (under its Articles of Association).

Bombay High Court

M/S.Hari Shree Enterprises vs M/s vikas housing ltd on 19 March, 2009

Bench: R. S. Dalvi

Citation: 2009(4) ALLMR 247

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When suit seeking true and correct accounts from agent will be barred by limitation?

As far as prayer (e) is concerned, plaintiff seeks an order and decree

against defendant No.1 to render true and correct accounts of its acts and actions

in respect of suit property.   Even if defendant No.1 is considered as an agent of

the plaintiff, for such relief as claimed in prayer (e) for rendering true and

correct accounts by an agent Article 4 of the Limitation Act would be applicable

which provides for three years time to file a suit by  a principal against agent to

include his conduct or in any event Article 113 which provides for three years

period in respect of the claim to which no other article applies would apply and

time begins when right to sue first accrues.  Consent award was made on 15th

April 1986.  Decree was passed in 1991.  Right to sue if any for rendering true

and correct account by the first defendant arose in the year 1991.   Prayer (e)

thus on the face of it is barred by law of limitation.  

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

 ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION 

SUIT NO. 808 OF 2011

Naresh Lachmandas Aswani  

Vs

  Haridas alias Hardas Lachmandas

     

     CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.

    

    Dated : 18th OCTOBER, 2013

Citation: 2016(4) ALLMR 286

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Whether Daughter has right to sue for partition against other coparceners including her father?

Section 29A introduced by the Amending Act of 2005 further elaborates the said provision and provides that the daughter of a coparcener shall have the same rights in the coparcenary property as that of a son inclusive of the right to claim by survivorship and shall be subject to the same liabilities and disabilities. It is not in dispute that a son of a coparcener becomes a coparcener by birth and is entitled to sue for partition even against his own father. Now by the aforesaid amendment of the Hindu Succession Act same rights in the coparcenary property as that of a son has been given to a daughter of a coparcener and hence she has become a coparcener in her own right by birth which automatically entitles her to a so have a right to sue for partition against other coparceners including her father.

Patna High Court

Ram Belas Singh vs Uttamraj Singh And Ors. on 28 February, 2008

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Whether period of limitation can be extended after the claim gets barred by limitation?

No period of limitation can be extended after the claim gets barred by limitation. A specified period is allowed by law to parties to sue to afford inherent protection to parties to a contract who have not been sued within the period of limitation to deal with their 

properties and transaction with further parties thereafter. Limitless extension of time to sue after the period specified in law expires would cause tremendous prejudice and injustice to parties who seek to deal with their own properties after contracting with a party who has allowed these rights to lapse by limitation. The very expression "Limitation" implies limitation of time to sue. The right to sue cannot go on endlessly. If that were allowed a very strange, unjust consequence would arise. No party would be able to enter into a transaction even after the period of limitation in Law expired if the earlier transaction did not materialise. This would constitute a impediment on the Defendants' vested rights.

18. Consequently, the statements in the plaint must be read as a whole. Reading such statements the cause of action which initially accrued to the Plaintiffs must be seen. How the Plaintiffs sought to enforce their legal rights within the period of limitation from the date of the accrual of such cause of action has to be seen. Further statements in the plaint relating to whatever may have transpired between the Defendants and further contracting parties after their claim in favour of the Plaintiffs got barred by limitation cannot show the extension of the period of limitation

Bombay High Court

M/S. Anand Laxmi Enterprises vs Vasant Balu Mhatre & Ors on 30 September, 2008

Bench: R. S. Dalvi

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