Whether court can direct daughter in law to pay maintenance to mother in law in senior citizen Act?

We have reservations about such direction to Sheetal Shah to pay maintenance amount to Nalini Shah. As already observed, in Section 2(a), 'children' include son, daughter, grandson and grand-daughter and there is no reference to the daughter-in-law. Be that as it may, upon perusal of the original record, we do not find a single document showing the earnings of Sheetal Shah. In that view of the matter, the Impugned Order, to the extent that it directs Sheetal Shah to pay Rs. 25,000/- alongwith her husband Devang Shah to Nalini Shah and Mahendra Shah, cannot be legally sustained. However, so far direction given to Devang Shah to pay the said maintenance amount to Nalini Shah, the same is legally sustainable. {Para 32}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 3323 of 2019

Decided On: 06.05.2022

 Sheetal Devang Shah Vs.  Presiding Officer of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sambhaji Shiwaji Shinde and Revati Mohite Dere, JJ.

Citation: MANU/MH/1615/2022

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Whether the father can seek eviction of his son and daughter-in-law from his self acquired property under the Senior citizen Act to lead normal life?

The provisions of the Senior Citizens Act are required to be construed to take within its ambit the maintenance of the senior citizens which certainly would include all facets of maintenance as provided for in Section 4 of the Senior Citizens Act, which would aid the senior citizens to lead a normal life. This certainly includes the senior citizens asserting rights in respect of ‘property’, the meaning of which, is spelt out by section 2(f) of the Act to mean property of any kind, whether movable or immovable, ancestral or self acquired, tangible or intangible and which would include rights or interest in such property.

9. As provided in sub-section (2) of Section 4, the obligation of the children or relative, as the case may be, to maintain a senior citizen, extends to the needs of such citizen so that senior citizen may lead a normal life, which would certainly take within its ambit a protection from any harassment and torture meted out by a son or relative by keeping himself on the premises of the senior citizens. The intention of the legislature to provide such protection to live a normal life to the parents is also reflected in the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 4 which provides that the obligation of the children to maintain his or her parents extends to the need of such parents either father or mother

or both, as the case may be so that such parents ‘may live a normal life’. Maintenance is also defined in Section 2(b) to include provision for food, clothing, residence, medical attendance and treatment. Further Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the said Act notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than the said Act.

10. It is thus clear that the intention of the legislature in making such

provisions in the interest of senior citizens, covers a wide spectrum of the senior citizens rights, which are fundamental to the their very

survival and/or livelihood at their old age. Certainly the Court’s

approach cannot be narrow and pedantic in applying the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act to the grievances of the senior citizens falling within the ambit of the said Act. A protection from harassment, exploitation, neglect, psychological disturbances, psychological needs, and all possible facets to safeguard their physical and mental health are required to be recognized when sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) of Section 4 clearly provide that the obligation of the children or relatives would be to cater to the needs of the senior citizens so that they ‘live a normal life’. The words “normal life” as used in these provisions would

possess a far deeper and wider concept, deriving its meaning and

having a bearing on the fundamental rights of livelihood as guaranteed and enjoyed by senior citizens under Article 21 of the Constitution. Certainly, this would include a right to prevent themselves from being harassed by children and by relatives. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.2400 OF 2021

Ashish Vinod Dalal & Ors. Vs Vinod Ramanlal Dalal 

CORAM : G.S.KULKARNI, J.

DATE : 15 September, 2021.

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Supreme Court: Summary Eviction Procedure Under Senior Citizens Act Cannot Be Invoked To Defeat Right Of Residence Of Woman In A Shared Household As Per DV Act

This Court is cognizant that the Senior Citizens Act 2007 was promulgated with a view to provide a speedy and inexpensive remedy to senior citizens. Accordingly, Tribunals were constituted Under Section 7. These Tribunals have the power to conduct summary procedures for inquiry, with all powers of the Civil Courts, Under Section 8. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts has been explicitly barred Under Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007. However, the over-riding effect for remedies sought by the applicants under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 Under Section 3, cannot be interpreted to preclude all other competing remedies and protections that are sought to be conferred by the PWDV Act 2005. The PWDV Act 2005 is also in the nature of a special legislation, that is enacted with the purpose of correcting gender discrimination that pans out in the form of social and economic inequities in a largely patriarchal society. In deference to the dominant purpose of both the legislations, it would be appropriate for a Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to grant such remedies of maintenance, as envisaged Under Section 2(b) of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that do not result in obviating competing remedies under other special statutes, such as the PWDV Act 2005. Section 2625 of the PWDV Act empowers certain reliefs, including relief for a residence order, to be obtained from any civil court in any legal proceedings. Therefore, in the event that a composite dispute is alleged, such as in the present case where the suit premises are a site of contestation between two groups protected by the law, it would be appropriate for the Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to appropriately mould reliefs, after noticing the competing claims of the parties claiming under the PWDV Act 2005 and Senior Citizens Act 2007. Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be deployed to over-ride and nullify other protections in law, particularly that of a woman's right to a 'shared household' Under Section 17 of the PWDV Act 2005. In the event that the "aggrieved woman" obtains a relief from a Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007, she shall duty-bound to inform the Magistrate under the PWDV Act 2005, as per Sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the PWDV Act 2005. This course of action would ensure that the common intent of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 and the PWDV Act 2005- of ensuring speedy relief to its protected groups who are both vulnerable members of the society, is effectively realized. Rights in law can translate to rights in life, only if there is an equitable ease in obtaining their realization.

23. Adverting to the factual situation at hand, on construing the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act 2007, it is evident that it applies to a situation where a senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is transferred. On the other hand, the Appellant's simple plea is that the suit premises constitute her 'shared household' within the meaning of Section 2 of the PWDV Act 2005. We have also seen the series of transactions which took place in respect of the property: the spouse of the Appellant purchased it in his own name a few months before the marriage but subsequently sold it, after a few years, under a registered sale deed at the same price to his father (the father-in-law of the Appellant), who in turn gifted it to his spouse i.e. the mother-in-law of the Appellant after divorce proceedings were instituted by the Fourth Respondent. Parallel to this, the Appellant had instituted proceedings of dowry harassment against her mother-in-law and her estranged spouse; and her spouse had instituted divorce proceedings. The Appellant had also filed proceedings for maintenance against the Fourth Respondent and the divorce proceedings are pending. It is subsequent to these events, that the Second and Third Respondents instituted an application under the Senior Citizens Act 2007. The fact that specific proceedings under the PWDV Act 2005 had not been instituted when the application under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was filed, should not lead to a situation where the enforcement of an order of eviction deprives her from pursuing her claim of entitlement under the law. The inability of a woman to access judicial remedies may, as this case exemplifies, be a consequence of destitution, ignorance or lack of resources. Even otherwise, we are clearly of the view that recourse to the summary procedure contemplated by the Senior Citizen Act 2007 was not available for the purpose of facilitating strategies that are designed to defeat the claim of the Appellant in respect of a shared household. A shared household would have to be interpreted to include the residence where the Appellant had been jointly residing with her husband. Merely because the ownership of the property has been subsequently transferred to her in-laws (Second and Third Respondents) or that her estranged spouse (Fourth Respondent) is now residing separately, is no ground to deprive the Appellant of the protection that was envisaged under the PWDV Act 2005

F Summation

24. For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the claim of the Appellant that the premises constitute a shared household within the meaning of the PWDV Act 2005 would have to be determined by the appropriate forum. The claim cannot simply be obviated by evicting the Appellant in exercise of the summary powers entrusted by the Senior Citizens Act 2007. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3822 of 2020 

Decided On: 15.12.2020

 S. Vanitha  Vs.  The Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee, JJ.

Author: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0943/2020

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